This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

62 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 62
  1. added 2019-01-15
    Choosing Emotions: The Late Sartre and the Early Flaubert.Peter Caws - 1992 - Bulletin de la Société Américaine de Philosophie de Langue Française 4 (2-3):209-217.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2018-08-20
    Bernard Williams on Regarding One's Own Action Purely Externally.Jake Wojtowicz - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1):49-66.
    I explore what BernardWilliams means by regarding one’s action ‘purely externally, as one might regard anyone else’s action’, and how it links to regret and agent-regret. I suggest some ways that we might understand the external view: as a failure to recognize what one has done, in terms of Williams’s distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic luck, and as akin to Thomas Nagel’s distinction between an internal and external view. I argue that none of these captures what Williams was getting at (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2018-08-09
    Conflict and Resolution: The Ethics of Forgiveness, Revenge, and Punishment (Tentative Title).Krisanna Scheiter & Paula Satne (eds.) - forthcoming - Springer.
    In this volume top scholars from around the world contribute essays on the ethics of forgiveness, revenge, and punishment. The book covers both classical and contemporary views on these topics. Given the current climate of political division and global conflict it is not surprising that there has been an increasing interest in how we ought to respond to perceived wrongdoing, both personal and political. Many contemporary philosophers draw on views put forth by Aristotle, Seneca, Kant and other historical philosophers. For (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2018-08-02
    Responsibility and the Limits of Good and Evil.Robert H. Wallace - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    P.F. Strawson’s compatibilism has had considerable influence. However, as Gary Watson has argued in “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” (1987/2008), his view appears to have a disturbing consequence: extreme evil exempts an agent from moral responsibility. This is a reductio of the view. Moreover, in some cases our emotional reaction to an evildoer’s history clashes with our emotional expressions of blame. Anyone’s actions can be explained by his or her history, however, and thereby can conflict with our present blame. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2018-05-29
    Feeling in Character: Towards an Ethics of Emotion.John M. Monteleone - 2013 - Dissertation, Syracuse University
    This dissertation contends that emotions are subject to ethical assessment, not simply as motives or overt expressions, but in their own right. Emotions, I argue, are subject to assessment because they are aspects of a person's character. Specifically, emotions involve voluntary acts of attention, which are due to habituation. These acts show character by manifesting certain stable, deeply-held desires called 'concerns.' This view, dubbed 'Attentional Voluntarism,' is opposed to the prevalent view, dubbed 'Rationalism,' that emotions are subject to assessment because (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2018-04-11
    Moral Psychology of Compassion.Justin Caouette & Carolyn Price (eds.) - 2018 - London: Rowman and Littlefield.
    Compassion is widely regarded as an important moral emotion – a fitting response to various cases of suffering and misfortune. Yet contemporary theorists have rarely given it sustained attention. This volume aims to fill this gap by offering answers to a number of questions surrounding this emotion. These questions include: What is the nature of compassion? How does compassion differ from other emotions, such as empathy, pity, or gratitude? Is compassion a virtue? Can we have too much compassion? How does (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2018-03-30
    Moralische Vorwürfe.Leonhard Menges - 2017 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.
    Vorwürfe sind ein wichtiger Bestandteil unseres moralischen Alltags und spielen zentrale Rollen in grundlegenden philosophischen Diskussionen. In dieser Studie wird nach der Natur, der Angemessenheit und dem Wert moralischer Vorwürfe gefragt und es wird untersucht, wer in der richtigen Position ist, Vorwürfe zu machen. Abschließend wird das Verhältnis von Vorwürfen und Verantwortung in den Blick genommen.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2018-02-17
    Modification of the Reactive Attitudes.David Goldman - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):1-22.
    In ‘Freedom and Resentment’ P. F. Strawson argues that reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation cannot be eliminated altogether, because doing so would involve exiting interpersonal relationships altogether. I describe an alternative to resentment: a form of moral sadness about wrongdoing that, I argue, preserves our participation in interpersonal relationships. Substituting this moral sadness for resentment and indignation would amount to a deep and far‐reaching change in the way we relate to each other – while keeping in place the interpersonal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9. added 2018-01-10
    Responsibility Without Wrongdoing or Blame.Julie Tannenbaum - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7.
    In most discussions of moral responsibility, an agent’s moral responsibility for harming or failing to aid is equated with the agent’s being blameworthy for having done wrong. In this paper, I will argue that one can be morally responsible for one’s action even if the action was not wrong, not blameworthy, and not the result of blameworthy deliberation or bad motivation. This makes a difference to how we should relate to each other and ourselves in the aftermath. Some people have (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2017-12-09
    Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):89-115.
    It is often assumed that we are only blameworthy for that over which we have control. In recent years, however, several philosophers have argued that we can be blameworthy for occurrences that appear to be outside our control, such as attitudes, beliefs and omissions. This has prompted the question of why control should be a condition on blameworthiness. This paper aims at defending the control condition by developing a new conception of blameworthiness: To be blameworthy, I argue, is most fundamentally (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. added 2017-09-20
    Blame, Communication, and Morally Responsible Agency.Coleen Macnamara - 2015 - In Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna & Angela Smith (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 211-236.
    Many important theorists – e.g., Gary Watson and Stephen Darwall – characterize blame as a communicative entity and argue that this entails that morally responsible agency requires not just rational but moral competence. In this paper, I defend this argument from communication against three objections found in the literature. The first two reject the argument’s characterization of the reactive attitudes. The third urges that the argument is committed to a false claim.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2017-09-11
    Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness.Pamela Hieronymi - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):529-555.
    I first pose a challenge which, it seems to me, any philosophical account of forgiveness must meet: the account must be articulate and it must allow for forgiveness that is uncompromising. I then examine an account of forgiveness which appears to meet this challenge. Upon closer examination we discover that this account actually fails to meet the challenge—but it fails in very instructive ways. The account takes two missteps which seem to be taken by almost everyone discussing forgiveness. At the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  13. added 2017-09-04
    Agent-Regret and the Social Practice of Moral Luck.Jordan MacKenzie - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):95-117.
    Agent-regret seems to give rise to a philosophical puzzle. If we grant that we are not morally responsible for consequences outside our control, then agent-regret—which involves self-reproach and a desire to make amends for consequences outside one’s control—appears rationally indefensible. But despite its apparent indefensibility, agent-regret still seems like a reasonable response to bad moral luck. I argue here that the puzzle can be resolved if we appreciate the role that agent-regret plays in a larger social practice that helps us (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  14. added 2017-08-10
    Forgiveness and Reconciliation.Barrett Emerick - 2017 - In Kathryn J. Norlock (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Forgiveness. London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 117-134.
    Forgiveness and reconciliation are central to moral life; after all, everyone will be wronged by others and will then face the dual decisions of whether to forgive and whether to reconcile. It is therefore important that we have a clear analysis of each, as well as a thoroughly articulated understanding of how they relate to and differ from each other. -/- Forgiveness has received considerably more attention in the Western philosophical literature than has reconciliation. In this paper I aim to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. added 2017-08-08
    Objective and Subjective Blame After War.Shannon Fyfe & Amy McKiernan - 2017 - Essays in Philosophy 18 (2).
    When soldiers come home from war, some experience lingering emotional effects from the choices they were forced to make, and the outcomes of these choices. In this article, we consider the gap between objective assessments of blame and subjective assessments of self-blame, guilt, and shame after war, and we suggest a way of understanding how soldiers can understand their moral responsibility from both of these vantage points. We examine arguments from just war theory regarding the objective moral responsibility of combatants (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2017-06-01
    A Conditional Defense of Shame and Shame Punishment.Erick Jose Ramirez - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (1):77-95.
    This paper makes two essential claims about the nature of shame and shame punishment. I argue that, if we properly understand the nature of shame, that it is sometimes justifiable to shame others in the context of a pluralistic multicultural society. I begin by assessing the accounts of shame provided by Cheshire Calhoun (2004) and Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, & Fabrice Teroni (2012). I argue that both views have problems. I defend a theory of shame and embarrassment that connects both (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2017-02-14
    Properly Proleptic Blame.Benjamin Bagley - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):852-882.
    Crucially, blame can be addressed to its targets, as an implicit demand for recognition. But when we ask whether offenders would actually appreciate this demand, via a sound deliberative route from their existing motivations, we face a puzzle. If they would, their offense reflects a deliberative mistake, and blame’s hostility seems unnecessary. If they wouldn’t, addressing them is futile, and blame’s emotional engagement seems unwarranted. To resolve this puzzle, I develop an account of blame as a proleptic response to indeterminacy (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18. added 2016-12-05
    Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel Miller - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):118-139.
    Hypocrites are often thought to lack the standing to blame others for faults similar to their own. Although this claim is widely accepted, it is seldom argued for. We offer an argument for the claim that nonhypocrisy is a necessary condition on the standing to blame. We first offer a novel, dispositional account of hypocrisy. Our account captures the commonsense view that hypocrisy involves making an unjustified exception of oneself. This exception-making involves a rejection of the impartiality of morality and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  19. added 2016-11-22
    Accepting Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - forthcoming - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge.
    I argue that certain kinds of luck can partially determine an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. To make this view clearer, consider some examples. Two identical agents drive recklessly around a curb, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two identical corrupt judges would freely take a bribe if one were offered. Only one judge is offered a bribe, and so only one judge takes a bribe. Put in terms of these examples, I argue that the killer driver and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2016-10-11
    Sungnōmē in Aristotle.Carissa Phillips-Garrett - 2017 - Apeiron 50 (3):311-333.
    Aristotle claims that in some extenuating circumstances, the correct response to the wrongdoer is sungnōmē rather than blame. Sungnōmē has a wide spectrum of meanings that include aspects of sympathy, pity, fellow-feeling, pardon, and excuse, but the dominant interpretation among scholars takes Aristotle’s meaning to correspond most closely to forgiveness. Thus, it is commonly held that the virtuous Aristotelian agent ought to forgive wrongdoers in specific extenuating circumstances. Against the more popular forgiveness interpretation, I begin by defending a positive account (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2016-08-24
    Emotions, Value, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Emotions are crucial to human agency. But what are emotions? And how do they relate to agency? The aim of this book is to spell out an account of emotions, which is grounded on analogies between emotions and sensory experiences, and to explore the implications of this account for our understanding of human agency. The central claim is that emotions consist in perceptual experiences of values, such as the fearsome, the disgusting or the admirable. A virtue of this account is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. added 2016-07-26
    Neurosurgery for Psychopaths? The Problems of Empathy and Neurodiversity.Erick Ramirez - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 7 (3):166-168.
    I argue that deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a bad approach for incarcerated psychopaths for two reasons. First, given what we know about psychopathy, empathy, and DBS, it is unlikely to function as an effective treatment for the moral problems that characterize psychopathy. Second, considerations of neurodiversity speak against seeing psychopathy as a mental illness in the first place.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2016-04-22
    The Emotion Account of Blame.Leonhard Menges - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):257-273.
    For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2016-04-22
    Pettigrove, Glen. Forgiveness and Love. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 200. $60.00.Kathryn J. Norlock - 2013 - Ethics 123 (4):780-784.
    Glen Pettigrove's work enlarges my own thinking on forgiveness. In this review, I argue for even more attention to some philosophical connections that I suggest he neglects. But it is undeniably the case that Pettigrove advances a new view of forgiveness, taking the results of his analysis of the utterance, “I forgive you,” to inform a “broader definition that encompasses a wider range of experiences” than are accommodated by predominant conceptions of forgiveness as an emotional state (151). Philosophers interested in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2016-03-02
    Receptivity, Reactivity and the Successful Psychopath.Erick Ramirez - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):330-343.
    I argue that psychopathy undermines three common assumptions typically invoked in favor of moderate reasons responsive theories of moral responsibility. First, I propose a theory of psychopathic agency and claim that psychopathic agency suggests that the systems underlying receptivity to reason bifurcate into at least two sub-systems of receptivity. Next, I claim that the bifurcation of systems for receptivity suggests that reactivity is not “all of a piece” but that it too decomposes into at least two subsystems. Lastly, I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. added 2015-12-21
    Pride and Moral Responsibility.Jeremy Fischer - 2015 - Ratio 28 (4).
    Having the emotion of pride requires taking oneself to stand in some special relation to the object of pride. According to agency accounts of this pride relation, the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or excellence of the object of one's pride. I argue that agency accounts fail. This argument provides a strong prima facie defence of an alternate account of pride, according to which the self and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2015-10-27
    Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Moral Consequence of Consistency.Jason D'Cruz - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):467-484.
    Situationists such as John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt suppose that appeal to reliable behavioral dispositions can be dispensed with without radical revision to morality as we know it. This paper challenges this supposition, arguing that abandoning hope in reliable dispositions rules out genuine trust and forces us to suspend core reactive attitudes of gratitude and resentment, esteem and indignation. By examining situationism through the lens of trust we learn something about situationism (in particular, the radically revisionary moral implications (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. added 2015-09-27
    Private Revenge and its Relation to Punishment.Brian Rosebury - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (1):1-21.
    In contrast to the vast literature on retributive theories of punishment, discussions of private revenge are rare in moral philosophy. This paper reviews some examples, from both classical and recent writers, finding uncertainty and equivocation over the ethical significance of acts of revenge, and in particular over their possible resemblances, in motive, purpose or justification, to acts of lawful punishment. A key problem for the coherence of our ethical conception of revenge is the consideration that certain acts of revenge may (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. added 2015-09-27
    Respect for Just Revenge.Brian Rosebury - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):451-471.
    The paper considers acts of private (in the sense of individually motivated and extra-legal) revenge, and draws attention to a special kind of judgement we may make of such acts. While endorsing the general view that an act of private revenge must be morally wrong, it maintains that under certain special conditions (which include its being just) it is susceptible of a rational respect from others which is based on its standing outside morality, as a choice by the revenger not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2015-08-28
    Nancy Sherman's Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy Behind the Military Mind.L. Lengbeyer - 2006 - Journal of Military Ethics 5 (3):233.
  31. added 2015-03-31
    Le double sens de la communauté morale : la considérabilité morale et l’agentivité morale des autres animaux.Christiane Bailey - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (3):31-67.
    Christiane Bailey | : Distinguant deux sens de « communauté morale », cet article soutient que certains animaux appartiennent à la communauté morale dans les deux sens : ils sont des patients moraux dignes de considération morale directe et équivalente, mais également des agents moraux au sens où ils sont capables de reconnaître, d’assumer et d’adresser aux autres des exigences minimales de bonne conduite et de savoir-vivre. Au moyen de la notion d’« attitudes réactives » développée par Peter F. Strawson, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2014-12-18
    Valuing Blame.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - In D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press.
    Blaming (construed broadly to include both blaming-attitudes and blaming-actions) is a puzzling phenomenon. Even when we grant that someone is blameworthy, we can still sensibly wonder whether we ought to blame him. We sometimes choose to forgive and show mercy, even when it is not asked for. We are naturally led to wonder why we shouldn’t always do this. Wouldn’t it be a better to wholly reject the punitive practices of blame, especially in light of their often undesirable effects, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  33. added 2014-11-14
    Emotions: Philosophical Issues About.Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - WIREs Cognitive Science 1:193-207.
    We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. added 2014-05-26
    Intentions, Blame, and Contractualism: A Review of T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. [REVIEW]Jussi Suikkanen - 2011 - Jurisprudence 2 (2):561-573.
    This is a longer critical notice of T.M. Scanlon's book Moral Dimensions. The main crux of the article is to investigate how Scanlon's claims about the moral significance of intentions and reactive attitudes in this book fit with the earlier contractualist ethical theory which he presented in What We Owe to Each Other.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2014-04-21
    The Moral Dimensions of Empathy.Julinna Oxley - 2012 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. added 2014-03-27
    Morality and the Emotions.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    What is their relation to practical rationality? Are they roots of our identity or threats to our autonomy? This volume is born out of the conviction that philosophy provides a distinctive approach to these problems.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37. added 2014-03-26
    Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions.Claudia Eisen Murphy - 1999 - Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8 (2):163-205.
  38. added 2014-03-10
    The Logic of Excuses and the Rationality of Emotions.John Gardner - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (3):315-338.
    Sometimes emotions excuse. Fear and anger, for example, sometimes excuse under the headings of (respectively) duress and provocation. Although most legal systems draw the line at this point, the list of potentially excusatory emotions outside the law seems to be longer. One can readily imagine cases in which, for example, grief or despair could be cited as part of a case for relaxing or even eliminating our negative verdicts on those who performed admittedly unjustified wrongs. To be sure, the availability (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  39. added 2014-03-07
    Forgiveness, Commemoration, and Restorative Justice: The Role of Moral Emotions.Jeffrey Blustein - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (4):582-617.
    Abstract: Forgiveness of wrongdoing in response to public apology and amends making seems, on the face of it, to leave little room for the continued commemoration of wrongdoing. This rests on a misunderstanding of forgiveness, however, and we can explain why there need be no incompatibility between them. To do this, I emphasize the role of what I call nonangry negative moral emotions in constituting memories of wrongdoing. Memories so constituted can persist after forgiveness and have important moral functions, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. added 2014-03-07
    Punitive Emotions and Norm Violations.Benoît Dubreuil - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):35 – 50.
    The recent literature on social norms has stressed the centrality of emotions in explaining punishment and norm enforcement. This article discusses four negative emotions (righteous anger, indignation, contempt, and disgust) and examines their relationship to punitive behavior. I argue that righteous anger and indignation are both punitive emotions strictly speaking, but induce punishments of different intensity and have distinct elicitors. Contempt and disgust, for their part, cannot be straightforwardly considered punitive emotions, although they often blend with a colder form of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  41. added 2014-03-04
    Shame, Guilt and Morality.Fabrice Teroni & Otto Bruun - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):223-245.
    The connection between shame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-social Argument has it that guilt is, contrary to shame, morally good since it promotes pro-social behaviour. Three other arguments claim that only guilt has the requisite connection to central moral concepts: the Responsibility (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  42. added 2014-02-19
    What Emotional Responding is to Blame It Might Not Be to Responsibility.R. J. R. Blair - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 149-151.
  43. added 2014-02-18
    Die Melancholie, der Geist des Kapitalismus und die Depression.Marco Solinas - 2010 - Freie Assoziation 13 (4):79-99.
    The essay aims to analyse the gradual historical process of the partial overlap, replacement and expansion of the theoretical paradigm of depression with respect to that of melancholy. The first part is devoted to analysing some of the central features of the multivalent thematizations of melancholy drawn up during modernity, also with relation to the spirit of capitalism (in its Weberian acceptation). This is followed by an overview of the birth of the modern category of depression, and the process that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. added 2014-02-10
    Solomon on the Control of Emotions.Robert C. Roberts - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (March):395-404.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  45. added 2013-08-27
    Performing Dignity.Grace Hunt - 2010 - Women in Philosophy Annual Journal of Papers 6:47-61.
  46. added 2013-08-24
    In Defense of Happiness: Presidential Address to the Florida Philosophical Association.Shelley M. Park - 2005 - Florida Philosophical Review 5 (1):1-15.
    In this address, I defend happiness as a disposition conducive to, or at least compatible with, a view of the world that is both cognitively and politically valuable, that is, both conducive to truth and ethically appropriate.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. added 2013-08-20
    Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions.Zac Cogley - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177.
    In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions – appraisal, communication, and sanction – that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  48. added 2013-02-25
    Constraining Condemning.Roger Wertheimer - 1998 - Ethics 108 (3):489-501.
    Our culture is conflicted about morally judging and condemning. We can't avoid it altogether, yet many layfolk today are loathe to do it for reasons neither they nor philosophers well understand. Their resistance is often confused (by themselves and by theorists) with some species of antiobjectivism. But unlike a nonobjectivist, most people think that (a) for us to judge and condemn is generally (objectively) morally wrong , yet (b) for God to do so is (objectively) proper, and (c) so too (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  49. added 2012-10-11
    Bile & Bodhisattvas: Śāntideva on Justified Anger.Nicolas Bommarito - 2011 - Journal of Buddhist Ethics 18:357-81.
    In his famous text the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the 8th century Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva argues that anger towards people who harm us is never justified. The usual reading of this argument rests on drawing similarities between harms caused by persons and those caused by non-persons. After laying out my own interpretation of Śāntideva's reasoning, I offer some objections to Śāntideva's claim about the similarity between animate and inanimate causes of harm inspired by contemporary philosophical literature in the West. Following this, I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. added 2012-10-10
    Ascriptions of Responsibility.Marina A. L. Oshana - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):71 - 83.
1 — 50 / 62