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  1. Dissolving Reactive Attitudes: Forgiving and Understanding.L. Allais - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):197-201.
    In ‘Freedom and Resentment,' Strawson argues that we cannot separate holding people morally responsible for their actions from specific emotional responses, which he calls reactive attitudes, which we are disposed towards in response to people's actions. Strawson's view might pose problems for forgiveness, in which we choose to overcome reactive attitudes like resentment without altering the judgments that make them appropriate. I present a detailed analysis of reactive attitudes, which I use both to defend Strawson's account of the connection between (...)
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  2. Review: Implicit Bias and Philosophy (Vol. 1 & 2).Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2016 - Philosophy:1-8.
  3. When Ignorance is No Excuse.Maria Alvarez & Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press.
    Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they have in (...)
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  4. Revisiting Strawsonian Arguments From Inescapability.Andras Szigeti - 2012 - Philosophica 85 (2):91-121.
    Peter Strawson defends the thesis that determinism is irrelevant to the justifiability of responsibility-attributions. In this paper, I want to examine various arguments advanced by Strawson in support of this thesis. These arguments all draw on the thought that the practice of responsibility is inescapable. My main focus is not so much the metaphysical details of Strawsonian compatibilism, but rather the more fundamental idea that x being inescapable may be reason for us to regard x as justified. I divide Strawsonian (...)
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  5. Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame.Audrey L. Anton - 2015 - Lexington Books.
    Through critical examination of three main contemporary approaches to describing moral responsibility, this book illustrates why philosophers must take into account the relationship between retrospective moral responsibility and desert of praise or blame. The author advances the moral attitude account, whereby desert of praise and blame depends on the agent’s moral attitudes in response to moral reasons, and retrospective moral responsibility results from expressions of those attitudes in overt behavior.
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  6. Reactive Robotic Systems.Ronald C. Arkin - 1995 - In Michael A. Arbib (ed.), Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks. MIT Press. pp. 793--796.
  7. Properly Proleptic Blame.Benjamin Bagley - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):852-882.
    Crucially, blame can be addressed to its targets, as an implicit demand for recognition. But when we ask whether offenders would actually appreciate this demand, via a sound deliberative route from their existing motivations, we face a puzzle. If they would, their offense reflects a deliberative mistake, and blame’s hostility seems unnecessary. If they wouldn’t, addressing them is futile, and blame’s emotional engagement seems unwarranted. To resolve this puzzle, I develop an account of blame as a proleptic response to indeterminacy (...)
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  8. Saving Strawson: Evil and Strawsonian Accounts of Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW]Peter Brian Barry - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):5-21.
    Almost everyone allows that conditions can obtain that exempt agents from moral responsibility—that someone is not a morally responsible agent if certain conditions obtain. In his seminal Freedom and Resentment, Peter Strawson denies that the truth of determinism globally exempts agents from moral responsibility. As has been noted elsewhere, Strawson appears committed to the surprising thesis that being an evil person is an exempting condition. Less often noted is the fact that various Strawsonians—philosophers sympathetic with Strawson’s account of moral responsibility—at (...)
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  9. On Strawson's Foundation of Moral Reality.A. Barua - 2001 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1):41-48.
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  10. Moral Disapproval and Moral Indignation.Elizabeth Lane Beardsley - 1970 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (2):161-176.
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  11. Forgive Me: Medical Error and the Poetics of Forgiveness.Daniel Becker, Natalie May & Margaret Plews-Ogan - 2012 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 55 (3):339-349.
    Let us remember that in the end we go to poetry for one reason, so that we might more fully inhabit our lives and the world in which we live them, and that if we more fully inhabit these things we might be less apt to destroy both.ALEXANDER POPE, IN HIS Essay on Criticism (1711), proposes that "To err is human; to forgive divine." This essay considers the second half of that proposition. Why is forgiveness so difficult?Doctors are trained to (...)
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  12. Accountability.Jonathan Bennett - unknown
    I shall present a problem about accountability, and its solution by Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Some readers of this don’t see it as a profound contribution to moral philosophy, and I want to help them. It may be helpful to follow up Strawson’s gracefully written discussion with a more staccato presentation. My treatment will also be angled somewhat differently from his, so that its lights and shadows will fall with a certain difference, which may make it serviceable even to the (...)
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  13. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments by R.Jay Wallace. [REVIEW]Paul Benson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):574-578.
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  14. Agency and Resentment: Reinterpreting Strawson's Compatibilism.Bobby Bingle - unknown
    In his influential work, “Freedom and Resentment,” P.F. Strawson argues that the truth of determinism would be irrelevant to our moral responsibility practices, since our commitment to these practices is somehow connected to both our reactive attitudes—e.g. resentment, gratitude, and love—and participation in interpersonal relationships. However, some of the moves made by Strawson in his work remain unclear. In this paper, I address three prominent attempts to explain these moves, and contend that none of them captures his view because they (...)
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  15. Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism About Culpability.Gunnar Björnsson - forthcoming - In Shoemaker David (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    Recently, a number of authors have suggested that the epistemic condition on moral responsibility makes blameworthiness much less common than we ordinarily suppose, and much harder to identify. This paper argues that such epistemically based responsibility skepticism is mistaken. Section 2 sketches a general account of moral responsibility, building on the Strawsonian idea that blame and credit relates to the agent’s quality of will. Section 3 explains how this account deals with central cases that motivate epistemic skepticism and how it (...)
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  16. Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.
    Recently, a number of people have argued that certain entities embodied by groups of agents themselves qualify as agents, with their own beliefs, desires, and intentions; even, some claim, as moral agents. However, others have independently argued that fully-fledged moral agency involves a capacity for reactive attitudes such as guilt and indignation, and these capacities might seem beyond the ken of “collective” or “ corporate ” agents. Individuals embodying such agents can of course be ashamed, proud, or indignant about what (...)
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  17. A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.
    Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they are mistaken—theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept has proved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitions; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibility judgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are influenced by a number of (...)
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  18. Accountability and Answerability.Charles V. Blatz - 1972 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 2 (2):101–120.
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  19. Bile & Bodhisattvas: Śāntideva on Justified Anger.Nicolas Bommarito - 2011 - Journal of Buddhist Ethics 18:357-81.
    In his famous text the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the 8th century Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva argues that anger towards people who harm us is never justified. The usual reading of this argument rests on drawing similarities between harms caused by persons and those caused by non-persons. After laying out my own interpretation of Śāntideva's reasoning, I offer some objections to Śāntideva's claim about the similarity between animate and inanimate causes of harm inspired by contemporary philosophical literature in the West. Following this, I argue (...)
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  20. Knowledge and Attributability.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    A prominent objection to the so-called ‘knowledge norm of belief’ is that it is too demanding or too strong. The objection is commonly framed in terms of the idea that there is a tight connection between norm violation and the appropriateness of criticism or blame. In this paper I do two things. First, I argue that this way of motivating the objection leads to an impasse in the epistemic norms debate. It leads to an impasse when knowledge normers invoke excuses (...)
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  21. Responsibility and Planning.Michael E. Bratman - 1997 - Journal of Ethics 1 (1):27-43.
    We are planning agents and we are, or so we suppose, responsible agents. How are these two distinctive aspects of our agency related? In his "Freedom and Resentment" Peter Strawson understands responsible agency in terms of "reactive attitudes" like resentment and gratitude, attitudes which are normally embedded in "ordinary inter-personal relationships." I draw on Strawson''s account to sketch an answer to my question about responsibility and planning. First, the fact that an action is plan-embedded can influence the agent''s degree of (...)
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  22. Strawson and Prasad on Determinism and Resentment.Brian Bruya - 2001 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 18 (3):198-216.
    P. F. Strawson's influential article "Freedom and Resentment" has been much commented on, and one of the most trenchant commentaries is Rajendra Prasad's, "Reactive Attitudes, Rationality, and Determinism." In his article, Prasad contests the significance of the reactive attitude over a precise theory of determinism, concluding that Strawson's argument is ultimately unconvincing. In this article, I evaluate Prasad's challenges to Strawson by summarizing and categorizing all of the relevant arguments in both Strawson's and Prasad's pieces. -/- Strawson offers four types (...)
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  23. P. F. Strawson’s Free Will Naturalism.Joe Campbell - forthcoming - Brill.
    _ Source: _Page Count 27 This is an explication and defense of P. F. Strawson’s naturalist theory of free will and moral responsibility. I respond to a set of criticisms of the view by free will skeptics, compatibilists, and libertarians who adopt the _core assumption_: Strawson thinks that our reactive attitudes provide the basis for a rational justification of our blaming and praising practices. My primary aim is to explain and defend Strawson’s naturalism in light of criticisms based on the (...)
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  24. P. F. Strawson’s Free Will Naturalism.Joe Campbell - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):26-52.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 1, pp 26 - 52 This is an explication and defense of P. F. Strawson’s naturalist theory of free will and moral responsibility. I respond to a set of criticisms of the view by free will skeptics, compatibilists, and libertarians who adopt the _core assumption_: Strawson thinks that our reactive attitudes provide the basis for a rational justification of our blaming and praising practices. My primary aim is to explain and defend Strawson’s naturalism in light (...)
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  25. Gut-Wrenching Choices and Blameworthiness.Justin Capes - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (4):577-585.
    While there is no shortage of disagreement about what is required for blameworthiness, it has traditionally been assumed that freely doing what you know to be wrong all things considered, despite being aware that it is within your power to do the right thing instead, suffices. Let us refer to this traditional assumption as the sufficiency thesis. The sufficiency thesis is plausible, but it is not beyond dispute. Reflection on certain situations in which a person can do the right thing (...)
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  26. Blameworthiness Without Wrongdoing.Justin A. Capes - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):417-437.
    In this article I argue that it is possible to be blameworthy for doing something that was not objectively morally wrong. If I am right, this would have implications for several debates at the intersection of metaphysics and moral philosophy. I also float a view about which actions can serve as legitimate bases for blame that allows for the possibility of blameworthiness without objective wrongdoing and also suggests an explanation for the appeal of the commonly held view that blameworthiness requires (...)
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  27. Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2017 - Journal of Ethics 21 (1):89-115.
    It is often assumed that we are only blameworthy for that over which we have control. In recent years, however, several philosophers have argued that we can be blameworthy for occurrences that appear to be outside our control, such as attitudes, beliefs and omissions. This has prompted the question of why control should be a condition on blameworthiness. This paper aims at defending the control condition by developing a new conception of blameworthiness: To be blameworthy, I argue, is most fundamentally (...)
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  28. Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An Argument for Optimism.Gregg Caruso - forthcoming - In Elizabeth Shaw (ed.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society.
  29. Moral Responsibility and the Strike Back Emotion: Comments on Bruce Waller’s The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso - forthcoming - Syndicate Philosophy 1 (1).
    In The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility (2015), Bruce Waller sets out to explain why the belief in individual moral responsibility is so strong. He begins by pointing out that there is a strange disconnect between the strength of philosophical arguments in support of moral responsibility and the strength of philosophical belief in moral responsibility. While the many arguments in favor of moral responsibility are inventive, subtle, and fascinating, Waller points out that even the most ardent supporters of moral responsibility (...)
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  30. Précis of Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Gregg Caruso - 2014 - Science, Religion and Culture 1 (3):178-201.
    Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life provides the most lively and comprehensive defense of free will skepticism in the literature. It contains a reworked and expanded version of the view he first developed in Living without Free Will. Important objections to the early book are answered, some slight modifications are introduced, and the overall account is significantly embellished—for example, Pereboom proposes a new account of rational deliberation consistent with the belief that one’s actions are causally determined and (...)
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  31. (Un)Just Deserts: The Dark Side of Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso - 2014 - Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (1):27-38.
    What would be the consequence of embracing skepticism about free will and/or desert-based moral responsibility? What if we came to disbelieve in moral responsibility? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some maintain? Or perhaps increase anti-social behavior as some recent studies have suggested (Vohs and Schooler 2008; Baumeister, Masicampo, and DeWall 2009)? Or would it rather (...)
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  32. Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior: A Public Health-Quarantine Model.Gregg D. Caruso - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1):25-48.
    One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical view per (...)
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  33. R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility And The Moral Sentiments. [REVIEW]Thomas Cavanaugh - 1995 - Philosophy in Review 15:296-298.
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  34. R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments Reviewed By.Thomas A. Cavanaugh - 1995 - Philosophy in Review 15 (4):296-298.
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  35. Apologia Pro Vita-Fabula Sua: Defending Narrativity and How We Make Sense of Our Lives.Melvin Chen - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):251-268.
    This paper attempts to provide a defence for a narrative theory of the self in the face of criticisms from the anti-narrative camp. It begins by addressing certain uncontroversial premises that both pro- and the anti-narrative camps might be thought to agree on: the status of humans as homo significans or meaning-makers, the natural form-finding tendency and certain desiderata for significance and value that we possess, and the raw material of life and its constituents that we proceed from. Whereas the (...)
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  36. Strawson Contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi‐Compatibilism.Melvin Chen - 2014 - Philosophical Forum 45 (1):1-15.
    This paper addresses the Basic Argument in favour of incompatibilism, both in its Strawsonian form and in its weakened form (the CDA). After examining the worries raised by this argument, I will defend a version of semi-compatibilism that is motivated by a narrative theory of the self, arguing that moral responsibility is possible even if the thesis of determinism is taken to be incompatible with the thesis of freedom of will. The semi-compatibilist argument that I provide lowers the standard of (...)
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  37. Luck, Blame, and Desert.Michael Cholbi - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):313-332.
    T.M. Scanlon has recently proposed what I term a ‘double attitude’ account of blame, wherein blame is the revision of one’s attitudes in light of another person’s conduct, conduct that we believe reveals that the individual lacks the normative attitudes we judge essential to our relationship with her. Scanlon proposes that this account justifies differences in blame that in turn reflect differences in outcome luck. Here I argue that although the double attitude account can justify blame’s being sensitive to outcome (...)
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  38. Moral Responsibility: Justifying Strawson and the Excuse of Peculiarly Unfortunate Formative Circumstances. [REVIEW]Michelle Ciurria - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):545-557.
    P.F. Strawson’s theory of moral responsibility remains eminently influential. However, moral philosophers such as G. Watson and T.M. Scanlon have called into question it explanatory basis, which grounds moral responsibility in human nature and interpersonal relationships. They demand a deeper normative explanation for when it is appropriate to modify or mollify the reactive attitudes. In this paper, following A. Sneddon, I argue that the best interpretation of Strawson is an externalistic one which construes moral responsibility as an interpersonal social competence, (...)
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  39. Some Theses on Desert.Randolph Clarke - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):153-64.
    Consider the idea that suffering of some specific kind is deserved by those who are guilty of moral wrongdoing. Feeling guilty is a prime example. It might be said that it is noninstrumentally good that one who is guilty feel guilty (at the right time and to the right degree), or that feeling guilty (at the right time and to the right degree) is apt or fitting for one who is guilty. Each of these claims constitutes an interesting thesis about (...)
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  40. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.Randolph Clarke - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):230-232.
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  41. The Nature of Moral Responsibility.Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna & Angela M. Smith - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or another of these kinds. -/- Debate on this point turns partly on disagreement about the kinds of responses made appropriate when one is blameworthy or praiseworthy. It is generally agreed that these include "reactive attitudes" such (...)
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  42. Blame.D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2014 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In this entry we provide a critical review of recent work on the nature and ethics of blame, including issues of moral standing.
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  43. The Nature and Ethics of Blame.D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.
    Blame is usually discussed in the context of the free will problem, but recently moral philosophers have begun to examine it on its own terms. If, as many suppose, free will is to be understood as the control relevant to moral responsibility, and moral responsibility is to be understood in terms of whether blame is appropriate, then an independent inquiry into the nature and ethics of blame will be essential to solving (and, perhaps, even fully understanding) the free will problem. (...)
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  44. Manuel Vargas, Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.Zac Cogley - 2016 - Social Theory and Practice 42 (1):205-211.
    I develop and explore the main themes of Vargas's recent book. The first section of my review lays out Vargas's case for revisionism about moral responsibility: the idea that our thinking about moral responsibility is internally inconsistent, so we need to purge core problematic elements. In the section section, I develop Vargas's own revisionist position. Vargas argues that the practice of blaming people aims at agency cultivation: trying to train people to be more sensitive to moral considerations. I explore similarities (...)
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  45. Michael McKenna, Conversation and Responsibility. Reviewed by Zac Cogley.Zac Cogley - 2013 - Philosophy in Review 33 (6):480-482.
    In this review I present the main claims of McKenna's book Conversation and Responsibility. There McKenna develops a theory of moral responsibility inspired by an analogy with the relationship people bear to each other as part of a conversational exchange. The first half of the book develops the conversational account and considers objections to it. In the second half of the book, McKenna turns to an examination of the kind of normative claim being made when we say that being morally (...)
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  46. The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions.Zac Cogley - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 205-224.
    In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions—appraisal, communication, and sanction—that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.
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  47. Tamler Sommers: Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility. Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Zac Cogley - 2012 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 7.
  48. Blameworthiness and Time.Jules Coleman & Alexander Sarch - 2012 - Legal Theory 18 (2):101-137.
    Reactive emotion accounts hold that blameworthiness should be analyzed in terms of the familiar reactive emotions. However, despite the attractions of such views, we are not persuaded that blameworthiness is ultimately a matter of correctly felt reactive emotion. In this paper, we draw attention to a range of little-discussed considerations involving the moral significance of the passage of time that drive a wedge between blameworthiness and the reactive emotions: the appropriateness of the reactive emotions is sensitive to the passage of (...)
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  49. Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Moral Consequence of Consistency.Jason D'Cruz - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):467-484.
    Situationists such as John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt suppose that appeal to reliable behavioral dispositions can be dispensed with without radical revision to morality as we know it. This paper challenges this supposition, arguing that abandoning hope in reliable dispositions rules out genuine trust and forces us to suspend core reactive attitudes of gratitude and resentment, esteem and indignation. By examining situationism through the lens of trust we learn something about situationism (in particular, the radically revisionary moral implications (...)
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  50. Comment on “Standing Conditions and Blame” by Amy McKiernan.E. M. Dadlez - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2):49-52.
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