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  1. Liability for Robots: Sidestepping the Gaps.Bartek Chomanski - forthcoming - Philosophy and Technology:1-20.
    In this paper, I outline a proposal for assigning liability for autonomous machines modeled on the doctrine of respondeat superior. I argue that the machines’ users’ or designers’ liability should be determined by the manner in which the machines are created, which, in turn, should be responsive to considerations of the machines’ welfare interests. This approach has the twin virtues of promoting socially beneficial design of machines, and of taking their potential moral patiency seriously. I then argue for abandoning the (...)
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  2. Why Criminal Responsibility for Negligence Cannot Be Indirect.Alexander Greenberg - forthcoming - Cambridge Law Journal.
    A popular way to try to justify holding defendants criminally responsible for inadvertent negligence is via an indirect or ‘tracing’ approach, i.e. an approach which traces the inadvertence back to prior culpable action. I argue that this indirect approach to criminal negligence fails because it can’t account for a key feature of how criminal negligence should be (and sometimes is) assessed. Specifically, it can’t account for why, when considering whether a defendant is negligent, what counts as a risk should be (...)
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  3. Holding Responsible and Taking Responsibility.Stephen Bero - 2020 - Law and Philosophy 39 (3):263-296.
    In matters of responsibility, there are often two sides to the transaction: one party who holds another responsible, and the other who takes responsibility for her conduct. The first side has been closely scrutinized in discussions of the nature of responsibility, due to the influential Strawsonian conjecture that an agent is responsible if and only if it is appropriate to hold her responsible. This preoccupation with holding responsible – with its focus on the second-personal perspective and on responses like blame (...)
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  4. Morally Permissible Risk Imposition and Liability to Defensive Harm.Susanne Burri - 2020 - Law and Philosophy 39 (4):381-408.
    This paper examines whether an agent becomes liable to defensive harm by engaging in a morally permissible but foreseeably risk-imposing activity that subsequently threatens objectively unjustified harm. It first clarifies the notion of a foreseeably risk-imposing activity by proposing that an activity should count as foreseeably risk-imposing if an agent may morally permissibly perform it only if she abides by certain duties of care. Those who argue that engaging in such an activity can render an agent liable to defensive harm (...)
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  5. Special Issue on Recklessness and Negligence.Christopher Cowley & Beatrice Krebs - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):5-8.
    This paper introduces the Special Issue on Recklessness and Negligence. It highlights the main issues and controversies that surround these concepts and then briefly introduces each of the papers that comprise the Special Issue.
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  6. Yaffe, Gideon. The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility. [REVIEW]Craig K. Agule - 2019 - Ethics 130 (2):271-276.
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  7. Children of a Lesser God? The Vividown Case and Privacy on the Internet.Gianluca Andresani & Natalina Stamile - 2019 - Revista da Faculdade de Direito UFPR 64 (2):141-169.
    In the wake of high profile and recent events of blatant privacy violations, which also raise issues of democratic accountability as well as, at least potentially, undermining the legitimacy of current local and international governance arrangements, a rethinking of the justification of the right to privacy is proposed. In this paper, the case of the violation of the privacy of a bullied autistic youngster and the consequent prosecution of 3 Google executives will be discussed first. We will then analyse the (...)
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  8. Responsibility, Paternalism and Alcohol Interlocks.Kalle Grill & Jessica Fahlquist - 2012 - Public Health Ethics 5 (2):116-127.
    Drink driving causes great suffering and material destruction. The alcohol interlock promises to eradicate this problem by technological design. Traditional counter-measures to drink driving such as policing and punishment and information campaigns have proven insufficient. Extensive policing is expensive and intrusive. Severe punishment is disproportionate to the risks created in most single cases. If the interlock becomes inexpensive and convenient enough, and if there are no convincing moral objections to the device, it may prove the only feasible as well as (...)
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  9. Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and Moral Luck.Benjamin C. Zipursky - 2008 - Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9 (1):97-137.
    Parallel moral luck problems exist in three different normative domains: criminal law, tort law, and conventional moral thinking. In all three, the normative status of an actor’s conduct seems to depend on matters beyond the actor’s control. Criminal law has historically imposed greater punishment on the murderer who kills his intended victim than on the identically behaved would-be murderer whose shot fortuitously misses. Tort law imposes liability on the negligent driver who injures someone, but no liability if, through good fortune, (...)
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