Resurrection

ABSTRACT: The cluster theory of names is generally thought to have been to have been utterly discredited by the objections raised against it by Kripke in Naming and Necessity. In this paper, I develop a new version of the cluster theory in which the role played by clusters of associated descriptions is occupied by teams of cognitive relations. And I argue that these teams of relations find a home in an account of the meanings of expressions in epistemic sentence frames, (...) and in a more general theory of the reference of proper names. RÉSUMÉ: La théorie des faisceaux de noms est généralement considérée sans fondement depuis les objections soulevées par Kripke dans Naming and Necessity. Nous proposons une nouvelle version de la théorie des faisceaux dans laquelle le rôle joué par les faisceaux de descriptions associées est pris en charge par des équipes de relations cognitives. Ces équipes de relations trouvent leur place au sein de l’explication de la signification des expressions dans le cadre de phrases épistémologiques et, plus généralement, dans celui d’une théorie de la référence des noms propres. (shrink)

Most studies of 1 Corinthians 15 have concentrated on the identity of the so-called opponents and the beliefs regarding the after-life that led them to challenge the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. In contrast, by concentrating on the themes of polarity and change in 1 Corinthians 15:35--57, this study argues that Paul uses a didactic argument of accommodation and correction in an attempt to convince the Corinthians that there is a resurrection of the dead. Rather than confronting them (...) as opponents, Paul treats them as uninformed students who are in need of further instruction. Drawing on dialectical techniques and pedagogical models, Paul accommodates the dissenters' views regarding polarity and corrects their false conclusion with the idea of change. ;Given the nature and scope of Paul's argument, it is quite likely that certain members of the Corinthian community had challenged the doctrine of the resurrection because they believed it violated the strictures of their cosmological thinking, a view that was probably philosophical in origin and reflected their pre-Christian worldview. In accommodating their worldview, Paul demonstrates in verses 39--49 that the resurrection can be comprehensible within a cosmological system where the celestial and terrestrial realms are understood as opposites. In verses 39--44a, he demonstrates that the resurrection is compatible with the spatial aspects of this cosmology. In verses 44b--49, he shows that this polar cosmology also allows for the temporal succession of opposites and ultimately an eschatological resurrection. ;Again drawing on didactic models, Paul corrects the false conclusion of the Corinthians dissenters in verses 50--53 with the idea of change. In verse 50, he calls attention to the metaphysical and physical incompatibility between the celestial and terrestrial realms. In verses 51--52, he shows that the resurrection complies with the metaphysical strictures of this polar cosmology because the body that is raised will be changed into a form appropriate for a celestial habitation. Paul then demonstrates in verse 53 that this transformation in the resurrection is necessitated by the metaphysical strictures involved in being raised from one cosmic realm of existence to the other. (shrink)

In his 1998 postscript to ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’ Peter van Inwagen argues that the scenario he describes by which God might resurrect a human organism, even though probably not true, is still conceivable and, consequently, ‘serves to establish a possibility’, namely, the metaphysical possibility of the resurrection of material beings. Van Inwagen, however, has also argued in favour of ‘modal scepticism’ [van Inwagen in, God, knowledge and mystery: essays in philosophical theology, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1995b, pp. 11–12; van (...) Inwagen in, Philos Stud 92:67–84, 1998a]. That is, he thinks that we should limit all our claims about what is possible to ‘ordinary propositions about everyday matters’, 1998a). In this paper I argue that van Inwagen’s modal argument as found in ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’ is inconsistent with his modal scepticism as found in ‘Modal Epistemology’. In consequence, I argue that, given his modal scepticism, the task van Inwagen set himself in ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’ has not been achieved. (shrink)

In his paper ‘Mind, Mortality and Material Being’ Paul Anders attempts to show that Peter van Inwagen’s materialist metaphysics of the human person, combined with the belief that human persons survive death, faces a dilemma. Either, on the one hand, van Inwagen has to accept an account of the survival of human persons across death that cannot escape the duplication objection, or, on the other hand, van Inwagen has to accept an account of the survival of human persons across death (...) that entails the possibility of that which is logically impossible and, in consequence, renders his metaphysics necessarily false. This paper is concerned with the second horn of the dilemma. In this paper, I will attempt to do two things. First, I will attempt to show that Anders’ description of van Inwagen’s ‘naked kernel’ account of the survival of human persons across death is, at times, unclear, before, second, attempting to demonstrate that there is a response that van Inwagen could give to Anders’ argument regardless of these unclarities. Consequently, I think that, at least until Anders’ description is made clearer, and until Anders tells us why van Inwagen can’t opt for the solution I propose, we should consider van Inwagen’s inclination that God can preserve a kernel that is sufficient for the survival of human persons across death to be unharmed by Anders’ argument. (shrink)

The world of our experience consists at all times of two parts, an objective and a subjective part . . . The objective part is the sum total of whatsoever at any given time we may be thinking of, the subjective part is the inner 'state' in which the thinking comes to pass.

Many Christians who argue against Christian materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails only that I cannot exist without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to Type-I materialism in an age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II materialism can accommodate Christian doctrines like the (...) Resurrection of the Body, the Incarnation, and the intermediate state (if there is one). (shrink)

Theories of the human person differ greatly in their ability to underwrite a metaphysics of resurrection. This paper compares and contrasts a number of such views in light of the Christian doctrine of resurrection. In a Christian framework, resurrection requires that the same person who exists on earth also exists in an afterlife, that a postmortem person be embodied, and that the existence of a postmortem person is brought about by a miracle. According to my view of persons (the Constitution (...) View), a human person is constituted by—but not identical to—a human organism. A person has a first-person perspective essentially, and an organism has interrelated biological functions essentially. I shall argue for the superiority the Constitution View as a metaphysical basis for resurrection. (shrink)

Many Christians assume that there are only two possibilities for what a human person is: either Animalism (the view that we are fundamentally animals) or Immaterialism (the view that we are fundamentally immaterial souls). I set out a third possibility: the Constitution View (the view that we are material beings, constituted by bodies but not identical to the bodies that now constitute us.) After setting out and briefly defending the Constitution View, I apply it to the doctrine of resurrection. I (...) conclude by giving reasons for Christians to prefer the Constitution View of human persons to both Animalism and Immaterialism. (shrink)

The historicist approach is rarely challenged by art historians, who draw a clear distinction between art history and the present-centred pursuit of art criticism. The notion of the 'period eye' offers a relevant methodology. Bearing this in mind, I examine the nineteenth-century phase in the development of history painting, when artists started to take trouble over the accuracy of historical detail, instead of repeating conventions for portraying classical and biblical subjects. This created an unprecedented situation at the Paris Salon, where (...) such representations of history could be experienced as a collective 'dream-work', in Freud's sense. In France, this new pictorial language dates back to the aftermath of the Revolution, and the activities of the 'Lyon School'. Two artists, Richard and Révoil, were its leading proponents. However their initial closeness has obscured the differences in their approach to the past. Substituting for Freud's 'condensation' and 'displacement' the concepts of 'Resurrection' and 'Restoration', I analyse the pictorial language of the two painters, taking two works as examples. The conclusion is that Révoil, also a collector, was a precursor of the historical museum, which convinces through accumulating objects. Richard, however, employs technical and rhetorical devices to evoke empathetic reactions, and anticipates the illusionism of cinema. (shrink)

“Discussions of the Resurrection have never been biblical enough.”.

Suppose one judges as a historian that after Jesus' death there was an occurrence during the careers of various individuals in which: they took it that Jesus was appearing, raised by God to Life; and a concept worked in their minds, ‘Already, Jesus has been raised to Life’.Assume also that before one are fuller statements proposed now as to what happened. Some themselves cite just inner‐worldly, non‐transcendent factors – delusion and so on. The ‘Encountered’ statement however runs: ‘A transcendent reality, (...) Jesus raised by God to Life, was encountered by the individuals.’At first glance it might seem that in principle one could say: ‘Whereas I have not been convinced by the statements citing inner‐worldly factors alone, I do by contrast find the Encountered statement convincing and elucidatory.’ But on closer scrutiny, would it indeed be possible for one maturely to say that? Some commentators voice a quick ‘Yes’– an apologetic argument thus. On the other hand some press challenges that a priori one may never fittingly say that.We should be content neither with a swift ‘Yes’ nor with swift dismissiveness. How you think directly about ‘resurrection appearances’ depends much on your analysis apropos of a wide range of epistemological and other matters.Some challenges are that the Encountered statement is as such flawed. But these claims rest on premises which arguably we should judge misguided.Some challenges concern how one is placed when the Encountered statement lies adjacent to ‘inner‐worldly’ statements. Now we should maintain a standpoint on which a person can reach, apart from regard to Jesus, a theistic outlook: yet not by ‘natural theology’. Where that person is oneself, no a priori obstacles prevent one's maturely saying, ‘The Encountered statement for me elucidates, in contrast to the others’. These points can be put without talk of ‘probability estimates’ or ‘explanation’. (shrink)

Survival is the theory that some significant part of man continues after the death of his physical body. This dissertation studies philosophical argumentation of Christians and Buddhists, and analyzes the latest available empirical data, to determine which if any forms of survival are most probable. ;Part I finds insuperable difficulties in the purely materialistic resurrection theory, and in survival of disembodied minds as pure process. To make sense, resurrection must postulate either invisible bodies as conscious carriers of personal identity, or (...) a next world of Berkeleyan or Leibnizian idealism entered at death. ;Part II studies Buddhist views of survival. Early Buddhism proposes the alternatives of perpetual rebirth and transcendent nirvana. Pure Land Buddhism propounds objective idealist heavens accessible both in meditation and at death. Tibetan Buddhism further defends the mind-dependent nature of the intermediate state between rebirths. Thus Buddhism also requires either invisible bodies or an idealist next world. ;Part III examines empirical evidence indicative of survival: claimed memories of former lives; apparitions and out-of-body experiences ; and visions of dead people or other worlds at death . Questionable materials are discarded and evidence is presented with sample cases and experimental results. Alternative hypotheses are adduced to interpret the data. The evidence that NDE's are independent of culture and personality, and that some subjects have experiences while "brain dead," shows the falsity of the mind-brain identity theory, and is strongly indicative of survival. ;Part IV considers survival research as a case history of resistance to counter-paradigmatic scientific theories. Change and conservatism in science prove more dependent on sociological and psychological variables than on objective or logical grounds. The study concludes that at least some consciousnesses survive in ethereal or idealistic states, but broader generalization is dangerous without further empirical studies. (shrink)

In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies. We argue that these problems render (...) the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified. (shrink)

A collection of seventeen philosophical essays that systematically investigate heaven, or paradise, as conceived within theistic religious traditions.

Wittgenstein probably did not believe in Christ's Resurrection (as an historical event), but he may well have believed that if he had achieved a higher level of devoutness he would believe it. His view seems to have been that devout Christians are right in holding onto this belief tenaciously even though, in fact, it's false. It's historical falsity, is compatible with its religious validity, so to speak. So far as I can see, he did not think that devout Christians should (...) believe that it doesn't really matter whether or not that alleged historical event occurred. (shrink)

This collection brings together cutting-edge research on the metaphysics of human nature and soul-body dualism.Kevin Corcoran's collection, Soul, Body, and ...

This essay explores how the doctrine of the Resurrection informs theological reflection on reconciliation in post-Apartheid South Africa. It begins by establishing the fragile and liminal state of reconciliation, despite the efforts of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It then argues that the Resurrection offers an ecstatic and relational understanding of the human, which in turn provides a basis for advancing claims regarding human dignity and well-being. In conversation with the work of Oliver O'Donovan and James Alison on the Resurrection, (...) this view is further contextualized by incorporating insights from ubuntu and from the work of Judith Butler on grieving. The essay closes with proposals for how the church in post-Apartheid South Africa can give witness to the Resurrection in its immediate life and work through advocacy and carrying on the politics of grieving. (shrink)

I have argued that the central Christian doctrine of general resurrection (with particular reference to the Pauline corpus) can and should be understood in a scientifically and philosophically informed context, and have proposed a personalist-phenomenological model of general resurrection as a personally continuous transformative re-embodiment by the grace of God within an interpretative framework that respects the methods and findings of science while rejecting scientism and associated physicalist metaphysical claims. I have considered and rejected the re-assembly model of resurrection on (...) theological, philosophical and scientific grounds. (shrink)

The present paper is a rejoinder to Michael Martin’s “Reply to Davis” (Philo vol. 2, no. 1), which was a response to my “Is Belief in theResurrection Rational? A Response to Michael Martin” (ibid.), which was itself a response to Martin’s “Why the Resurrection is Initially Improbable” (Philo vol. 1, no. 1), which in turn was a critique of various of my own writings on resurrection, especially Risen Indeed: Making Sense of the Resurrection.

This essay is a response to Michael Martin’s “Why the Resurrection Is Initially Improbable,” Philo, Vol. 1, No.1. I argue that Martin has not succeeded in achieving his aim of showing that the Resurrection is initially improbable and thus, by Bayes’s Theorem, implausible. I respond to five of Martin’s arguments: (1) the “particular time and place argument”; (2) the claim that there is no plausible Christian theory of why Jesus should have been incarnated and resurrected; (3) the claim that the (...) Resurrection accounts in the New Testament are unreliable; (4) Martin’s assumptions about how one establishes the initial probability of Resurrection; and (5) the use Martin makes of Bayes’s Theorem to discredit belief in the Resurrection. (shrink)