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  1. added 2020-06-30
    Alfreda Tarskiego schemat T jako równość definicyjna.Robert Kublikowski - 2005 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 53 (1):143-154.
    The goal of this paper is to present a way of reading Alfred Tarski\'s T-scheme as a definitional - and not material - equivalence. Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap in their book The Revision Theory of Truth (MIT 1993), develop a theory of truth and a theory of definition, which are called Revision Theories - of Truth (RTT) and of Definition (RTD). They accept Tarski\'s T-sentences (such as: \"snow is white\" is true iff snow is white) and their central role (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-16
    Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap. The Revision Theory of Truth. Bradford Books. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1993, Xii + 299 Pp. [REVIEW]Michael Sheard - 1995 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 60 (4):1314-1316.
  3. added 2020-06-16
    Robert L. Martin and Peter W. Woodruff. On Representing ‘True-in-L' in L. Philosophia , Vol. 5 No. 3 , Pp. 213–217. - Saul Kripke. Outline of a Theory of Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72 , Pp. 690–716. - Anil Gupta. Truth and Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 11 , Pp. 1–60. - Hans G. Herzberger. Notes on Naive Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 11 , Pp. 61–102. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Hellman - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (4):1068-1071.
  4. added 2020-02-05
    Comparing Inductive and Circular Definitions: Parameters, Complexity and Games.Philip Welch, Kai–Uwe Kühnberger, Benedikt Löwe & Michael Möllerfeld - 2005 - Studia Logica 81 (1):79-98.
    Gupta-Belnap-style circular definitions use all real numbers as possible starting points of revision sequences. In that sense they are boldface definitions. We discuss lightface versions of circular definitions and boldface versions of inductive definitions.
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  5. added 2019-12-28
    Herzberger’s Limit Rule with Labelled Sequent Calculus.Andreas Fjellstad - forthcoming - Studia Logica:1-41.
    Inspired by recent work on proof theory for modal logic, this paper develops a cut-free labelled sequent calculus obtained by imitating Herzberger’s limit rule for revision sequences as a clause in a possible world semantics. With the help of two completeness theorems, one between the labelled sequent calculus and the corresponding possible world semantics, and one between the axiomatic theory of truth PosFS and a neighbourhood semantics, together with the proof of the equivalence between the two semantics, we show that (...)
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  6. added 2019-12-21
    Herzberger’s Limit Rule with Labelled Sequent Calculus.Andreas Fjellstad - forthcoming - Studia Logica:1-41.
    Inspired by recent work on proof theory for modal logic, this paper develops a cut-free labelled sequent calculus obtained by imitating Herzberger’s limit rule for revision sequences as a clause in a possible world semantics. With the help of two completeness theorems, one between the labelled sequent calculus and the corresponding possible world semantics, and one between the axiomatic theory of truth PosFS and a neighbourhood semantics, together with the proof of the equivalence between the two semantics, we show that (...)
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  7. added 2019-11-14
    Paradoxical Hypodoxes.Alexandre Billon - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5205-5229.
    Most paradoxes of self-reference have a dual or ‘hypodox’. The Liar paradox (Lr = ‘Lr is false’) has the Truth-Teller (Tt = ‘Tt is true’). Russell’s paradox, which involves the set of sets that are not self-membered, has a dual involving the set of sets which are self-membered, etc. It is widely believed that these duals are not paradoxical or at least not as paradoxical as the paradoxes of which they are duals. In this paper, I argue that some paradox’s (...)
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  8. added 2019-10-28
    Addressing Circular Definitions Via Systems of Proofs.Riccardo Bruni - 2019 - In Peter Schuster, Deniz Sarikaya, Sara Negri & Stefania Centrone (eds.), Mathesis Universalis, Computability and Proof. Springer Verlag.
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  9. added 2019-10-26
    Herzberger’s Limit Rule with Labelled Sequent Calculus.Andreas Fjellstad - forthcoming - Studia Logica:1-41.
    Inspired by recent work on proof theory for modal logic, this paper develops a cut-free labelled sequent calculus obtained by imitating Herzberger’s limit rule for revision sequences as a clause in a possible world semantics. With the help of two completeness theorems, one between the labelled sequent calculus and the corresponding possible world semantics, and one between the axiomatic theory of truth PosFS and a neighbourhood semantics, together with the proof of the equivalence between the two semantics, we show that (...)
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  10. added 2019-05-08
    Benedikt Löwe and Philip Welch. Set-Theoretic Absoluteness and the Revision Theory. Studia Logica, Vol. 68 , Pp. 21–41. - Benedikt Löwe. Revision Sequences and Computers with an Infinite Amount of Time. Journal of Logic and Computation, Vol. 11 , Pp. 25–40. [REVIEW]Volker Halbach - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):235-237.
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  11. added 2018-11-28
    Some Open Questions About Degrees of Paradoxes.Ming Hsiung - manuscript
    We can classify the (truth-theoretic) paradoxes according to their degrees of paradoxicality. Roughly speaking, two paradoxes have the same degrees of paradoxicality, if they lead to a contradiction under the same conditions, and one paradox has a (non-strictly) lower degree of paradoxicality than another, if whenever the former leads to a contradiction under a condition, the latter does so under the very condition. This paper aims at setting forth the theoretical framework of the theory of paradoxicality degree, and putting forward (...)
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  12. added 2018-10-23
    In Praise of a Logic of Definitions That Tolerates Ω‐Inconsistency.Anil Gupta - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):176-195.
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  13. added 2018-09-18
    Truth, Predication and a Family of Contingent Paradoxes.Francesco Orilia & Gregory Landini - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):113-136.
    In truth theory one aims at general formal laws governing the attribution of truth to statements. Gupta’s and Belnap’s revision-theoretic approach provides various well-motivated theories of truth, in particular T* and T#, which tame the Liar and related paradoxes without a Tarskian hierarchy of languages. In property theory, one similarly aims at general formal laws governing the predication of properties. To avoid Russell’s paradox in this area a recourse to type theory is still popular, as testified by recent work in (...)
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  14. added 2018-09-16
    Probability for the Revision Theory of Truth.Catrin Campbell-Moore, Leon Horsten & Hannes Leitgeb - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):87-112.
    We investigate how to assign probabilities to sentences that contain a type-free truth predicate. These probability values track how often a sentence is satisfied in transfinite revision sequences, following Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth. This answers an open problem by Leitgeb which asks how one might describe transfinite stages of the revision sequence using such probability functions. We offer a general construction, and explore additional constraints that lead to desirable properties of the resulting probability function. One such property (...)
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  15. added 2018-09-16
    Rethinking Revision.P. Welch - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):137-154.
    We sketch a broadening of the Gupta-Belnap notion of a circular or revision theoretic definition into that of a more generalized form incorporating ideas of Kleene’s generalized or higher type recursion. This thereby connects the philosophically motivated, and derived, notion of a circular definition with an older form of definition by recursion using functionals, that is functions of functions, as oracles. We note that Gupta and Belnap’s notion of ‘categorical in L’ can be formulated in at least one of these (...)
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  16. added 2018-08-26
    Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):57-85.
    The classical theory of definitions bans so-called circular definitions, namely, definitions of a unary predicate P, based on stipulations of the form $$Px =_{\mathsf {Df}} \phi,$$where ϕ is a formula of a fixed first-order language and the definiendumP occurs into the definiensϕ. In their seminal book The Revision Theory of Truth, Gupta and Belnap claim that “General theories of definitions are possible within which circular definitions [...] make logical and semantic sense” [p. IX]. In order to sustain their claim, they (...)
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  17. added 2018-08-26
    Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
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  18. added 2018-08-07
    Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.
    The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named Revision-theoretic supervaluation, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth into the formal framework of Kripkean fixed-point semantics. In Kripke-style theories the final set of grounded true sentences can be reached from below along a strictly increasing sequence of sets of grounded true sentences: in this sense, each stage of the construction can be viewed as an improvement on the previous ones. I want to (...)
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  19. added 2018-08-06
    Some Observations on Truth Hierarchies.P. D. Welch - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):1-30.
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  20. added 2018-08-06
    Revision.Vann McGee - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:387-406.
  21. added 2018-08-06
    Revision and its Rivals.Donald A. Martin - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:407-418.
  22. added 2018-02-17
    Limits in the Revision Theory: More Than Just Definite Verdicts.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):11-35.
    We present a new proposal for what to do at limits in the revision theory. The usual criterion for a limit stage is that it should agree with any definite verdicts that have been brought about before that stage. We suggest that one should not only consider definite verdicts that have been brought about but also more general properties; in fact any closed property can be considered. This more general framework is required if we move to considering revision theories for (...)
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  23. added 2018-02-17
    How Truth Behaves When There’s No Vicious Reference.Philip Kremer - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):345-367.
    In The Revision Theory of Truth (MIT Press), Gupta and Belnap (1993) claim as an advantage of their approach to truth "its consequence that truth behaves like an ordinary classical concept under certain conditions—conditions that can roughly be characterized as those in which there is no vicious reference in the language." To clarify this remark, they define Thomason models, nonpathological models in which truth behaves like a classical concept, and investigate conditions under which a model is Thomason: they argue that (...)
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  24. added 2018-02-17
    Jump Liars and Jourdain’s Card Via the Relativized T-Scheme.Ming Hsiung - 2009 - Studia Logica 91 (2):239-271.
    A relativized version of Tarski's T-scheme is introduced as a new principle of the truth predicate. Under the relativized T-scheme, the paradoxical objects, such as the Liar sentence and Jourdain's card sequence, are found to have certain relative contradictoriness. That is, they are contradictory only in some frames in the sense that any valuation admissible for them in these frames will lead to a contradiction. It is proved that for any positive integer n, the n-jump liar sentence is contradictory in (...)
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  25. added 2017-07-20
    Trivial Languages.Arvid Båve - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):1-17.
    I here present and defend what I call the Triviality Theory of Truth, to be understood in analogy with Matti Eklund’s Inconsistency Theory of Truth. A specific formulation of is defended and compared with alternatives found in the literature. A number of objections against the proposed notion of meaning-constitutivity are discussed and held inconclusive. The main focus, however, is on the problem, discussed at length by Gupta and Belnap, that speakers do not accept epistemically neutral conclusions of Curry derivations. I (...)
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  26. added 2017-06-12
    Proof Theory for Functional Modal Logic.Shawn Standefer - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (1):49-84.
    We present some proof-theoretic results for the normal modal logic whose characteristic axiom is \. We present a sequent system for this logic and a hypersequent system for its first-order form and show that these are equivalent to Hilbert-style axiomatizations. We show that the question of validity for these logics reduces to that of classical tautologyhood and first-order logical truth, respectively. We close by proving equivalences with a Fitch-style proof system for revision theory.
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  27. added 2017-05-22
    How to Find an Attractive Solution to the Liar Paradox.Mark Pinder - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1661-1680.
    The general thesis of this paper is that metasemantic theories can play a central role in determining the correct solution to the liar paradox. I argue for the thesis by providing a specific example. I show how Lewis’s reference-magnetic metasemantic theory may decide between two of the most influential solutions to the liar paradox: Kripke’s minimal fixed point theory of truth and Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth. In particular, I suggest that Lewis’s metasemantic theory favours Kripke’s solution to (...)
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  28. added 2017-04-11
    Non-Classical Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1).
    Circular denitions have primarily been studied in revision theory in the classical scheme. I present systems of circular denitions in the Strong Kleene and supervaluation schemes and provide complete proof systems for them. One class of denitions, the intrinsic denitions, naturally arises in both schemes. I survey some of the features of this class of denitions.
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  29. added 2017-03-14
    Boolean Paradoxes and Revision Periods.Ming Hsiung - 2017 - Studia Logica 105 (5):881-914.
    According to the revision theory of truth, the paradoxical sentences have certain revision periods in their valuations with respect to the stages of revision sequences. We find that the revision periods play a key role in characterizing the degrees of paradoxicality for Boolean paradoxes. We prove that a Boolean paradox is paradoxical in a digraph, iff this digraph contains a closed walk whose height is not any revision period of this paradox. And for any finitely many numbers greater than 1, (...)
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  30. added 2017-03-03
    A Rational Way of Playing: Revision Theory for Strategic Interaction.Riccardo Bruni & Giacomo Sillari - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):419-448.
    Gupta has proposed a definition of strategic rationality cast in the framework of his revision theory of truth. His analysis, relative to a class of normal form games in which all players have a strict best reply to all other players’ strategy profiles, shows that game-theoretic concepts have revision-theoretic counterparts. We extend Gupta’s approach to deal with normal form games in which players’ may have weak best replies. We do so by adapting intuitions relative to Nash equilibrium refinements to the (...)
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  31. added 2017-02-24
    The Revision Theory of Truth.Vann McGee - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):727-730.
  32. added 2017-02-23
    Truth by Ascent.Nuel Belnap - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (3-4):291-306.
    This paper offers a lighthearted presentation of some of the chief ideas about truth that are shared by theories similar to those of Kripke, Herzberger, and Gupta. The problem is to explain the concept of truth for a language that contains its own truth predicate. The proposal of these theories is that one can unwind the tangles that threaten by invoking a transfinite series of stages of semantic reflection as one ascends the ordinals. The presentation emphasizes how each stage begins, (...)
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  33. added 2017-02-22
    Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap.J. Michael Dunn & Anil Gupta - 1993 - Studia Logica 52 (3):483-484.
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  34. added 2017-02-21
    On Representing `True-in-L' in L.Geoffrey Hellman - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (4):1068-1071.
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  35. added 2017-02-20
    Maximal Three-Valued Clones with the Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point Property.José Martínez Fernández - 2007 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 48 (4):449-472.
    This paper gives a propositional reformulation of the fixed-point problem posed by Gupta and Belnap, using the stipulation logic of Visser. After presenting a solution for clones of three-valued operators that include the constant functions, I determine the maximal three-valued clones with constants that have the fixed-point property, giving different characterizations of them.
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  36. added 2017-02-17
    Intersubstitutivity Principles and the Generalization Function of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1065-1075.
    We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the (...)
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  37. added 2017-02-17
    Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox.Nuel Belnap - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705-712.
    Tim Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox, a book that is richly endowed with interesting analyses and original theses, chooses to ignore both the prosentential theory of truth from Grover, Camp and Belnap 1975 and the revision theory in its book form, Gupta and Belnap 1993. There is no discussion of either theory, nor even any mention of them in the list of references. I offer a pair of quotes chosen from among a number of T&P generalizations that Maudlin would doubtless have (...)
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  38. added 2017-02-17
    A Note on Analysis and Circular Definitions.Francesco Orilia & Achille C. Varzi - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 54:107-113.
    Analyses, in the simplest form assertions that aim to capture an intimate link between two concepts, are viewed since Russell's theory of definite descriptions as analyzing descriptions. Analysis therefore has to obey the laws governing definitions including some form of a Substitutivity Principle. Once is accepted the road to the paradox of analysis is open. Popular reactions to the paradox involve the fundamental assumption that sentences differing only in containing an analysandum resp. an analysans express the same proposition, because analysandum (...)
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  39. added 2017-02-17
    A Note on Extension, Intension, and Truth.Anil Gupta & Nuel Belnap - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):168-174.
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  40. added 2017-01-14
    Some Remarks on the Finite Theory of Revision.Riccardo Bruni - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag. pp. 169-187.
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  41. added 2016-12-12
    Two Types of Deflationism.Aladdin M. Yaqub - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):77-106.
    It is a fundamental intuition about truth that the conditions under which a sentence is true are given by what the sentence asserts. My aim in this paper is to show that this intuition captures the concept of truth completely and correctly. This is conceptual deflationism, for it does not go beyond what is asserted by a sentence in order to define the truth status of that sentence. This paper, hence, is a defense of deflationism as a conceptual account of (...)
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  42. added 2016-12-08
    Circularity, Definition and Truth.Michael Glanzberg - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):465-470.
    This is a collection of eighteen solicited papers on the topics of the title: circularity, definition, and truth. The papers are loosely connected in subject matter, but present a great variety of issues, theories, and approaches. Amongst the many subjects discussed are: the revision theory of truth and applications of revision rules, partiality and fixed point constructions, substitutional quantification, fuzzy logic, negation, belief revision, context dependence, hierarchies, Tarski on truth, deflationism, correspondence theories of truth, and normative aspects of truth. The (...)
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  43. added 2016-07-18
    Self-Referential Probability.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2016 - Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
    This thesis focuses on expressively rich languages that can formalise talk about probability. These languages have sentences that say something about probabilities of probabilities, but also sentences that say something about the probability of themselves. For example: (π): “The probability of the sentence labelled π is not greater than 1/2.” Such sentences lead to philosophical and technical challenges; but can be useful. For example they bear a close connection to situations where ones confidence in something can affect whether it is (...)
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  44. added 2016-07-02
    Discussions: For Anil Gupta.W. D. Hart - 1990 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90 (1):161-166.
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  45. added 2016-07-02
    XV—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth.Anil Gupta - 1989 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1):227-246.
  46. added 2016-04-19
    Contraction and Revision.Shawn Standefer - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77.
    An important question for proponents of non-contractive approaches to paradox is why contraction fails. Zardini offers an answer, namely that paradoxical sentences exhibit a kind of instability. I elaborate this idea using revision theory, and I argue that while instability does motivate failures of contraction, it equally motivates failure of many principles that non-contractive theorists want to maintain.
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  47. added 2016-03-09
    On the Probabilistic Convention T.Hannes Leitgeb - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):218-224.
    We introduce an epistemic theory of truth according to which the same rational degree of belief is assigned to Tr(. It is shown that if epistemic probability measures are only demanded to be finitely additive (but not necessarily σ-additive), then such a theory is consistent even for object languages that contain their own truth predicate. As the proof of this result indicates, the theory can also be interpreted as deriving from a quantitative version of the Revision Theory of Truth.
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  48. added 2016-03-08
    Circularity, Definition, and Truth.André Chapuis & Anil Gupta (eds.) - 2000 - Sole Distributor, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers.
  49. added 2016-03-08
    Definition and Revision: A Response to McGee and Martin.Anil Gupta - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:419-443.
  50. added 2016-03-08
    The Meaning of Truth.Anil Gupta - 1987 - In Ernest Lepore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics. Academic Press. pp. 453--480.
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