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  1. Some Open Questions About Degrees of Paradoxes.Ming Hsiung - manuscript
    We can classify the (truth-theoretic) paradoxes according to their degrees of paradoxicality. Roughly speaking, two paradoxes have the same degrees of paradoxicality, if they lead to a contradiction under the same conditions, and one paradox has a (non-strictly) lower degree of paradoxicality than another, if whenever the former leads to a contradiction under a condition, the latter does so under the very condition. This paper aims at setting forth the theoretical framework of the theory of paradoxicality degree, and putting forward (...)
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  2. Comparing More Revision and Fixed-Point Theories of Truth.Qiqing Lin & Hu Liu - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-57.
    Kremer presented three approaches of comparing fixed-point and revision theories of truth in Kremer, 363–403, 2009). Using these approaches, he established the relationships among ten fixed-point theories suggested by Kripke in, 690–716, 1975) and three revision theories presented by Gupta and Belnap in. This paper continues Kremer’s work. We add five other revision theories to the comparisons, including the theory proposed by Gupta in, 1–60, 1982), the theory proposed by Herzberger in, 61–102, 1982), the theory based on fully-varied revision sequences (...)
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  3. Herzberger’s Limit Rule with Labelled Sequent Calculus.Andreas Fjellstad - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (4):815-855.
    Inspired by recent work on proof theory for modal logic, this paper develops a cut-free labelled sequent calculus obtained by imitating Herzberger’s limit rule for revision sequences as a clause in a possible world semantics. With the help of two completeness theorems, one between the labelled sequent calculus and the corresponding possible world semantics, and one between the axiomatic theory of truth PosFS and a neighbourhood semantics, together with the proof of the equivalence between the two semantics, we show that (...)
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  4. Paradoxical Hypodoxes.Alexandre Billon - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5205-5229.
    Most paradoxes of self-reference have a dual or ‘hypodox’. The Liar paradox (Lr = ‘Lr is false’) has the Truth-Teller (Tt = ‘Tt is true’). Russell’s paradox, which involves the set of sets that are not self-membered, has a dual involving the set of sets which are self-membered, etc. It is widely believed that these duals are not paradoxical or at least not as paradoxical as the paradoxes of which they are duals. In this paper, I argue that some paradox’s (...)
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  5. Addressing Circular Definitions Via Systems of Proofs.Riccardo Bruni - 2019 - In Peter Schuster, Deniz Sarikaya, Sara Negri & Stefania Centrone (eds.), Mathesis Universalis, Computability and Proof. Springer Verlag.
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  6. Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
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  7. Limits in the Revision Theory: More Than Just Definite Verdicts.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):11-35.
    We present a new proposal for what to do at limits in the revision theory. The usual criterion for a limit stage is that it should agree with any definite verdicts that have been brought about before that stage. We suggest that one should not only consider definite verdicts that have been brought about but also more general properties; in fact any closed property can be considered. This more general framework is required if we move to considering revision theories for (...)
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  8. Probability for the Revision Theory of Truth.Catrin Campbell-Moore, Leon Horsten & Hannes Leitgeb - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):87-112.
    We investigate how to assign probabilities to sentences that contain a type-free truth predicate. These probability values track how often a sentence is satisfied in transfinite revision sequences, following Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth. This answers an open problem by Leitgeb which asks how one might describe transfinite stages of the revision sequence using such probability functions. We offer a general construction, and explore additional constraints that lead to desirable properties of the resulting probability function. One such property (...)
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  9. Truth, Predication and a Family of Contingent Paradoxes.Francesco Orilia & Gregory Landini - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):113-136.
    In truth theory one aims at general formal laws governing the attribution of truth to statements. Gupta’s and Belnap’s revision-theoretic approach provides various well-motivated theories of truth, in particular T* and T#, which tame the Liar and related paradoxes without a Tarskian hierarchy of languages. In property theory, one similarly aims at general formal laws governing the predication of properties. To avoid Russell’s paradox in this area a recourse to type theory is still popular, as testified by recent work in (...)
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  10. Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):57-85.
    The classical theory of definitions bans so-called circular definitions, namely, definitions of a unary predicate P, based on stipulations of the form $$Px =_{\mathsf {Df}} \phi,$$where ϕ is a formula of a fixed first-order language and the definiendumP occurs into the definiensϕ. In their seminal book The Revision Theory of Truth, Gupta and Belnap claim that “General theories of definitions are possible within which circular definitions [...] make logical and semantic sense” [p. IX]. In order to sustain their claim, they (...)
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  11. Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.
    The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named Revision-theoretic supervaluation, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth into the formal framework of Kripkean fixed-point semantics. In Kripke-style theories the final set of grounded true sentences can be reached from below along a strictly increasing sequence of sets of grounded true sentences: in this sense, each stage of the construction can be viewed as an improvement on the previous ones. I want to (...)
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  12. Rethinking Revision.P. Welch - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):137-154.
    We sketch a broadening of the Gupta-Belnap notion of a circular or revision theoretic definition into that of a more generalized form incorporating ideas of Kleene’s generalized or higher type recursion. This thereby connects the philosophically motivated, and derived, notion of a circular definition with an older form of definition by recursion using functionals, that is functions of functions, as oracles. We note that Gupta and Belnap’s notion of ‘categorical in L’ can be formulated in at least one of these (...)
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  13. Trivial Languages.Arvid Båve - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):1-17.
    I here present and defend what I call the Triviality Theory of Truth, to be understood in analogy with Matti Eklund’s Inconsistency Theory of Truth. A specific formulation of is defended and compared with alternatives found in the literature. A number of objections against the proposed notion of meaning-constitutivity are discussed and held inconclusive. The main focus, however, is on the problem, discussed at length by Gupta and Belnap, that speakers do not accept epistemically neutral conclusions of Curry derivations. I (...)
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  14. A Rational Way of Playing: Revision Theory for Strategic Interaction.Riccardo Bruni & Giacomo Sillari - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):419-448.
    Gupta has proposed a definition of strategic rationality cast in the framework of his revision theory of truth. His analysis, relative to a class of normal form games in which all players have a strict best reply to all other players’ strategy profiles, shows that game-theoretic concepts have revision-theoretic counterparts. We extend Gupta’s approach to deal with normal form games in which players’ may have weak best replies. We do so by adapting intuitions relative to Nash equilibrium refinements to the (...)
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  15. In Praise of a Logic of Definitions That Tolerates Ω‐Inconsistency.Anil Gupta - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):176-195.
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  16. Intersubstitutivity Principles and the Generalization Function of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1065-1075.
    We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the (...)
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  17. How to Find an Attractive Solution to the Liar Paradox.Mark Pinder - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1661-1680.
    The general thesis of this paper is that metasemantic theories can play a central role in determining the correct solution to the liar paradox. I argue for the thesis by providing a specific example. I show how Lewis’s reference-magnetic metasemantic theory may decide between two of the most influential solutions to the liar paradox: Kripke’s minimal fixed point theory of truth and Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth. In particular, I suggest that Lewis’s metasemantic theory favours Kripke’s solution to (...)
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  18. Proof Theory for Functional Modal Logic.Shawn Standefer - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (1):49-84.
    We present some proof-theoretic results for the normal modal logic whose characteristic axiom is \. We present a sequent system for this logic and a hypersequent system for its first-order form and show that these are equivalent to Hilbert-style axiomatizations. We show that the question of validity for these logics reduces to that of classical tautologyhood and first-order logical truth, respectively. We close by proving equivalences with a Fitch-style proof system for revision theory.
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  19. Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
    We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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  20. Boolean Paradoxes and Revision Periods.Ming Hsiung - 2017 - Studia Logica 105 (5):881-914.
    According to the revision theory of truth, the paradoxical sentences have certain revision periods in their valuations with respect to the stages of revision sequences. We find that the revision periods play a key role in characterizing the degrees of paradoxicality for Boolean paradoxes. We prove that a Boolean paradox is paradoxical in a digraph, iff this digraph contains a closed walk whose height is not any revision period of this paradox. And for any finitely many numbers greater than 1, (...)
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  21. Non-Classical Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1).
    Circular denitions have primarily been studied in revision theory in the classical scheme. I present systems of circular denitions in the Strong Kleene and supervaluation schemes and provide complete proof systems for them. One class of denitions, the intrinsic denitions, naturally arises in both schemes. I survey some of the features of this class of denitions.
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  22. Self-Referential Probability.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2016 - Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
    This thesis focuses on expressively rich languages that can formalise talk about probability. These languages have sentences that say something about probabilities of probabilities, but also sentences that say something about the probability of themselves. For example: (π): “The probability of the sentence labelled π is not greater than 1/2.” Such sentences lead to philosophical and technical challenges; but can be useful. For example they bear a close connection to situations where ones confidence in something can affect whether it is (...)
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  23. Contraction and Revision.Shawn Standefer - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77.
    An important question for proponents of non-contractive approaches to paradox is why contraction fails. Zardini offers an answer, namely that paradoxical sentences exhibit a kind of instability. I elaborate this idea using revision theory, and I argue that while instability does motivate failures of contraction, it equally motivates failure of many principles that non-contractive theorists want to maintain.
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  24. Some Remarks on the Finite Theory of Revision.Riccardo Bruni - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag. pp. 169-187.
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  25. Cofinally Invariant Sequences and Revision.Edoardo Rivello - 2015 - Studia Logica 103 (3):599-622.
    Revision sequences are a kind of transfinite sequences which were introduced by Herzberger and Gupta in 1982 as the main mathematical tool for developing their respective revision theories of truth. We generalise revision sequences to the notion of cofinally invariant sequences, showing that several known facts about Herzberger’s and Gupta’s theories also hold for this more abstract kind of sequences and providing new and more informative proofs of the old results.
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  26. Periodicity and Reflexivity in Revision Sequences.Edoardo Rivello - 2015 - Studia Logica 103 (6):1279-1302.
    Revision sequences were introduced in 1982 by Herzberger and Gupta as a mathematical tool in formalising their respective theories of truth. Since then, revision has developed in a method of analysis of theoretical concepts with several applications in other areas of logic and philosophy. Revision sequences are usually formalised as ordinal-length sequences of objects of some sort. A common idea of revision process is shared by all revision theories but specific proposals can differ in the so-called limit rule, namely the (...)
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  27. On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158.
    In Saving Truth from Paradox, Hartry Field presents and defends a theory of truth with a new conditional. In this paper, I present two criticisms of this theory, one concerning its assessments of validity and one concerning its treatment of truth-preservation claims. One way of adjusting the theory adequately responds to the truth-preservation criticism, at the cost of making the validity criticism worse. I show that in a restricted setting, Field has a way to respond to the validity criticism. I (...)
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  28. Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
    We present an extension of the basic revision theory of circular definitions with a unary operator, □. We present a Fitch-style proof system that is sound and complete with respect to the extended semantics. The logic of the box gives rise to a simple modal logic, and we relate provability in the extended proof system to this modal logic via a completeness theorem, using interpretations over circular definitions, analogous to Solovay’s completeness theorem forGLusing arithmetical interpretations. We adapt our proof to (...)
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  29. Remarks on the Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point Property for K-Valued Clones.José Martínez-Fernández - 2014 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (1-2):118-131.
    Here, I first prove that certain families of k-valued clones have the Gupta-Belnap fixed-point property. This essentially means that all propositional languages that are interpreted with operators belonging to those clones are such that any net of self-referential sentences in the language can be consistently evaluated. I then focus on two four-valued generalisations of the Kleene propositional operators that generalise the strong and weak Kleene operators: Belnap?s clone and Fitting?s clone, respectively. I apply the theorems from the initial part of (...)
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  30. Some Observations on Truth Hierarchies.P. D. Welch - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):1-30.
    We show how in the hierarchies${F_\alpha }$of Fieldian truth sets, and Herzberger’s${H_\alpha }$revision sequence starting from any hypothesis for${F_0}$ that essentially each${H_\alpha }$ carries within it a history of the whole prior revision process.As applications we provide a precise representation for, and a calculation of the length of, possiblepath independent determinateness hierarchiesof Field’s construction with a binary conditional operator. We demonstrate the existence of generalized liar sentences, that can be considered as diagonalizing past the determinateness hierarchies definable in Field’s recent (...)
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  31. Vagueness and Revision Sequences.C. M. Asmus - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):953-974.
    Theories of truth and vagueness are closely connected; in this article, I draw another connection between these areas of research. Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth is converted into an approach to vagueness. I show how revision sequences from a general theory of definitions can be used to understand the nature of vague predicates. The revision sequences show how the meaning of vague predicates are interconnected with each other. The approach is contrasted with the similar supervaluationist approach.
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  32. Notes on Ω-Inconsistent Theories of Truth in Second-Order Languages.Eduardo Barrio & Lavinia Picollo - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):733-741.
    It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but -consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting -inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T # and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with (...)
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  33. Analytic Calculi for Circular Concepts by Finite Revision.Riccardo Bruni - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (5):915-932.
    The paper introduces Hilbert– and Gentzen-style calculi which correspond to systems ${\mathsf{C}_{n}}$ from Gupta and Belnap [3]. Systems ${\mathsf{C}_{n}}$ were shown to be sound and complete with respect to the semantics of finite revision. Here, it is shown that Gentzen-style systems ${\mathsf{GC}_{n}}$ admit a syntactic proof of cut elimination. As a consequence, it follows that they are consistent.
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  34. Truth, Meaning, Experience.Anil Gupta - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    This volume reprints eight of Anil Gupta's essays, some with additional material. The essays bring a refreshing new perspective to central issues in philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and epistemology.
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  35. Revision Revisited.Leon Horsten, Graham E. Leigh, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):642-664.
    This article explores ways in which the Revision Theory of Truth can be expressed in the object language. In particular, we investigate the extent to which semantic deficiency, stable truth, and nearly stable truth can be so expressed, and we study different axiomatic systems for the Revision Theory of Truth.
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  36. Gupta’s Gambit.Selim Berker - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39.
    After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
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  37. Theories of Abstract Objects Without Ad Hoc Restriction.Wen-Fang Wang - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (1):1-15.
    The ideas of fixed points (Kripke in Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox. Clarendon Press, London, pp 53–81, 1975; Martin and Woodruff in Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox. Clarendon Press, London, pp 47–51, 1984) and revision sequences (Gupta and Belnap in The revision theory of truth. MIT, London, 1993; Gupta in The Blackwell guide to philosophical logic. Blackwell, London, pp 90–114, 2001) have been exploited to provide solutions to the semantic paradox and have achieved admirable (...)
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  38. How Truth Behaves When There’s No Vicious Reference.Philip Kremer - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):345-367.
    In The Revision Theory of Truth (MIT Press), Gupta and Belnap (1993) claim as an advantage of their approach to truth "its consequence that truth behaves like an ordinary classical concept under certain conditions—conditions that can roughly be characterized as those in which there is no vicious reference in the language." To clarify this remark, they define Thomason models, nonpathological models in which truth behaves like a classical concept, and investigate conditions under which a model is Thomason: they argue that (...)
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  39. A Note on Theories for Quasi-Inductive Definitions.Riccardo Bruni - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):684-699.
    This paper introduces theories for arithmetical quasi-inductive definitions (Burgess, 1986) as it has been done for first-order monotone and nonmonotone inductive ones. After displaying the basic axiomatic framework, we provide some initial result in the proof theoretic bounds line of research (the upper one being given in terms of a theory of sets extending Kripke–Platek set theory).
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  40. Jump Liars and Jourdain’s Card Via the Relativized T-Scheme.Ming Hsiung - 2009 - Studia Logica 91 (2):239-271.
    A relativized version of Tarski's T-scheme is introduced as a new principle of the truth predicate. Under the relativized T-scheme, the paradoxical objects, such as the Liar sentence and Jourdain's card sequence, are found to have certain relative contradictoriness. That is, they are contradictory only in some frames in the sense that any valuation admissible for them in these frames will lead to a contradiction. It is proved that for any positive integer n, the n-jump liar sentence is contradictory in (...)
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  41. Comparing Fixed-Point and Revision Theories of Truth.Philip Kremer - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):363-403.
    In response to the liar’s paradox, Kripke developed the fixed-point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. Kripke’s work suggests a number of related fixed-point theories of truth for such languages. Gupta and Belnap develop their revision theory of truth in contrast to the fixed-point theories. The current paper considers three natural ways to compare the various resulting theories of truth, and establishes the resulting relationships among these theories. The point is to get a sense of the lay of (...)
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  42. Games for Truth.P. D. Welch - 2009 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 15 (4):410-427.
    We represent truth sets for a variety of the well known semantic theories of truth as those sets consisting of all sentences for which a player has a winning strategy in an infinite two person game. The classifications of the games considered here are simple, those over the natural model of arithmetic being all within the arithmetical class of $\Sum_{3}^{0}$.
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  43. The Revision Theory of Truth.Philip Kremer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  44. On the Probabilistic Convention T.Hannes Leitgeb - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):218-224.
    We introduce an epistemic theory of truth according to which the same rational degree of belief is assigned to Tr(. It is shown that if epistemic probability measures are only demanded to be finitely additive (but not necessarily σ-additive), then such a theory is consistent even for object languages that contain their own truth predicate. As the proof of this result indicates, the theory can also be interpreted as deriving from a quantitative version of the Revision Theory of Truth.
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  45. Ultimate Truth Vis- À- Vis Stable Truth.P. D. Welch - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):126-142.
    We show that the set of ultimately true sentences in Hartry Field's Revenge-immune solution model to the semantic paradoxes is recursively isomorphic to the set of stably true sentences obtained in Hans Herzberger's revision sequence starting from the null hypothesis. We further remark that this shows that a substantial subsystem of second-order number theory is needed to establish the semantic values of sentences in Field's relative consistency proof of his theory over the ground model of the standard natural numbers: -CA0 (...)
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  46. Two Types of Deflationism.Aladdin M. Yaqub - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):77-106.
    It is a fundamental intuition about truth that the conditions under which a sentence is true are given by what the sentence asserts. My aim in this paper is to show that this intuition captures the concept of truth completely and correctly. This is conceptual deflationism, for it does not go beyond what is asserted by a sentence in order to define the truth status of that sentence. This paper, hence, is a defense of deflationism as a conceptual account of (...)
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  47. On Some Recently Debated Issues in the Theory of Formal Truth.Riccardo Bruni - 2007 - Annali Del Dipartimento di Filosofia 13:117-146.
    As the title suggests, this paper aims at surveying some recent advances in the theory of formal truth. It contains an account of the debate concerning the deflationist approach to truth, according to which truth is a ‘thin’ notion in that it should involve no assumption of whatsoever nature. We review here the main issues that were comprised by the discussion accompanying the attempts of translating this idea into logical terms. In the second half of the paper, we focus on (...)
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  48. Maximal Three-Valued Clones with the Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point Property.José Martínez Fernández - 2007 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 48 (4):449-472.
    This paper gives a propositional reformulation of the fixed-point problem posed by Gupta and Belnap, using the stipulation logic of Visser. After presenting a solution for clones of three-valued operators that include the constant functions, I determine the maximal three-valued clones with constants that have the fixed-point property, giving different characterizations of them.
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  49. Presentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox. [REVIEW]Nuel Belnap - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705–712.
    Tim Maudiin’s Truth and Paradox (Maudlin 2004, cited here as T&P), a book that is richly endowed with interesting analyses and original theses, chooses to ignore both the prosentential theory of truth from Grover, Camp and Belnap 1975 and the revision theory in its book form, Gupta and Belnap 1993 (The Revision Theory of Truth, henceforth RTT).1 There is no discussion of either theory, nor even any mention of them in the list of references. I offer a pair of quotes (...)
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  50. Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox.Nuel Belnap - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705-712.
    Tim Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox, a book that is richly endowed with interesting analyses and original theses, chooses to ignore both the prosentential theory of truth from Grover, Camp and Belnap 1975 and the revision theory in its book form, Gupta and Belnap 1993. There is no discussion of either theory, nor even any mention of them in the list of references. I offer a pair of quotes chosen from among a number of T&P generalizations that Maudlin would doubtless have (...)
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