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  1. The Complexity of Revision, Revised.G. Aldo Antonelli - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2):75-78.
    The purpose of this note is to acknowledge a gap in a previous paper, "The complexity of revision," and to provide a corrected version of the argument.
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  2. A Revision-Theoretic Analysis of the Arithmetical Hierarchy.G. Aldo Antonelli - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (2):204-218.
    In this paper we apply the idea of Revision Rules, originally developed within the framework of the theory of truth and later extended to a general mode of definition, to the analysis of the arithmetical hierarchy. This is also intended as an example of how ideas and tools from philosophical logic can provide a different perspective on mathematically more “respectable” entities. Revision Rules were first introduced by A. Gupta and N. Belnap as tools in the theory of truth, and they (...)
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  3. Revision Rules: An Investigation Into Non-Monotonic Inductive Definitions.G. Aldo Antonelli - 1992 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Many different modes of definition have been proposed over time, but none of them allows for circular definitions, since, according to the prevalent view, the term defined would then be lacking a precise signification. I argue that although circular definitions may at times fail uniquely to pick out a concept or an object, sense still can be made of them by using a rule of revision in the style adopted by Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap in the theory of truth.
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  4. What's in a Function?Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1996 - Synthese 107 (2):167 - 204.
    In this paper we argue that Revision Rules, introduced by Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap as a tool for the analysis of the concept of truth, also provide a useful tool for defining computable functions. This also makes good on Gupta's and Belnap's claim that Revision Rules provide a general theory of definition, a claim for which they supply only the example of truth. In particular we show how Revision Rules arise naturally from relaxing and generalizing a classical construction due (...)
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  5. The Complexity of Revision.Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (1):67-72.
    In this paper we show that the Gupta-Belnap systems S# and S* are П12. Since Kremer has independently established that they are П12-hard, this completely settles the problem of their complexity. The above-mentioned upper bound is established through a reduction to countable revision sequences that is inspired by, and makes use of a construction of McGee.
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  6. Vagueness and Revision Sequences.C. M. Asmus - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):953-974.
    Theories of truth and vagueness are closely connected; in this article, I draw another connection between these areas of research. Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth is converted into an approach to vagueness. I show how revision sequences from a general theory of definitions can be used to understand the nature of vague predicates. The revision sequences show how the meaning of vague predicates are interconnected with each other. The approach is contrasted with the similar supervaluationist approach.
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  7. Trees for Truth.Juan Barba - 2001 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (1):71-99.
    This papers aims to analyse sentences of a self-referential language containing a truth-predicate by means of a Smullyan-style tableau system. Our analysis covers three variants of Kripke's partial-model semantics (strong and weak Kleene's and supervaluational) and three variants of the revision theory of truth (Belnap's, Gupta's and Herzberger's).
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  8. Verdad y Circularidad.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio - 2002 - Theoria 17 (1):63-79.
    Belnap and Gupta have recently maintained that truth is a circular concept: its extension cannot be established without being previously hypothesized. This has led Yaqub to claim that the circular character in question cannot be made compatible with the thesis that semantic properties tlre supervenient ones. Belnap and Gupta have explicitly denied sitch a claim any plausibility. In this paper, I offir some new arguments in support of Yaqub 's position. Such arguments are based on an analysis of some aspects (...)
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  9. Verdad y Circularidad.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio - 2002 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 17 (1):63-79.
    Belnap and Gupta have recently maintained that truth is a circular concept: its extension cannot be established without being previously hypothesized. This has led Yaqub to claim that the circular character in question cannot be made compatible with the thesis that semantic properties tlre supervenient ones. Belnap and Gupta have explicitly denied sitch a claim any plausibility. In this paper, I offir some new arguments in support of Yaqub 's position. Such arguments are based on an analysis of some aspects (...)
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  10. Notes on Ω-Inconsistent Theories of Truth in Second-Order Languages.Eduardo Barrio & Lavinia Picollo - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):733-741.
    It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but -consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting -inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T # and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with (...)
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  11. Trivial Languages.Arvid Båve - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-17.
    I here present and defend what I call the Triviality Theory of Truth, to be understood in analogy with Matti Eklund’s Inconsistency Theory of Truth. A specific formulation of is defended and compared with alternatives found in the literature. A number of objections against the proposed notion of meaning-constitutivity are discussed and held inconclusive. The main focus, however, is on the problem, discussed at length by Gupta and Belnap, that speakers do not accept epistemically neutral conclusions of Curry derivations. I (...)
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  12. Truth by Ascent.Belnap Nuel - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (3-4):291-306.
    This paper offers a lighthearted presentation of some of the chief ideas about truth that are shared by theories similar to those of Kripke, Herzberger, and Gupta. The problem is to explain the concept of truth for a language that contains its own truth predicate. The proposal of these theories is that one can unwind the tangles that threaten by invoking a transfinite series of stages of semantic reflection as one ascends the ordinals. The presentation emphasizes how each stage begins, (...)
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  13. Presentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox. [REVIEW]Nuel Belnap - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705–712.
    Tim Maudiin’s Truth and Paradox (Maudlin 2004, cited here as T&P), a book that is richly endowed with interesting analyses and original theses, chooses to ignore both the prosentential theory of truth from Grover, Camp and Belnap 1975 and the revision theory in its book form, Gupta and Belnap 1993 (The Revision Theory of Truth, henceforth RTT).1 There is no discussion of either theory, nor even any mention of them in the list of references. I offer a pair of quotes (...)
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  14. Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox.Nuel Belnap - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705-712.
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  15. Truth by Ascent.Nuel Belnap - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (3-4):291–306.
    This paper offers a lighthearted presentation of some of the chief ideas about truth that are shared by theories similar to those of Kripke, Herzberger, and Gupta. The problem is to explain the concept of truth for a language that contains its own truth predicate. The proposal of these theories is that one can unwind the tangles that threaten by invoking a transfinite series of stages of semantic reflection as one ascends the ordinals. The presentation emphasizes how each stage begins, (...)
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  16. On Rigorous Definitions.Nuel Belnap - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (2-3):115 - 146.
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  17. Gupta's Rule of Revision Theory of Truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.
    Gupta’s Rule of Revision theory of truth builds on insights to be found in Martin and Woodruff and Kripke in order to permanently deepen our understanding of truth, of paradox, and of how we work our language while our language is working us. His concept of a predicate deriving its meaning by way of a Rule of Revision ought to impact significantly on the philosophy of language. Still, fortunately, he has left me something to.
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  18. Gupta's Gambit.Selim Berker - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39.
    After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
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  19. Some Remarks on the Finite Theory of Revision.Riccardo Bruni - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag. pp. 169-187.
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  20. Analytic Calculi for Circular Concepts by Finite Revision.Riccardo Bruni - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (5):915-932.
    The paper introduces Hilbert– and Gentzen-style calculi which correspond to systems ${\mathsf{C}_{n}}$ from Gupta and Belnap [3]. Systems ${\mathsf{C}_{n}}$ were shown to be sound and complete with respect to the semantics of finite revision. Here, it is shown that Gentzen-style systems ${\mathsf{GC}_{n}}$ admit a syntactic proof of cut elimination. As a consequence, it follows that they are consistent.
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  21. A Note on Theories for Quasi-Inductive Definitions.Riccardo Bruni - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (4):684-699.
    This paper introduces theories for arithmetical quasi-inductive definitions (Burgess, 1986) as it has been done for first-order monotone and nonmonotone inductive ones. After displaying the basic axiomatic framework, we provide some initial result in the proof theoretic bounds line of research (the upper one being given in terms of a theory of sets extending Kripke–Platek set theory).
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  22. A Rational Way of Playing: Revision Theory for Strategic Interaction.Riccardo Bruni & Giacomo Sillari - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-30.
    Gupta has proposed a definition of strategic rationality cast in the framework of his revision theory of truth. His analysis, relative to a class of normal form games in which all players have a strict best reply to all other players’ strategy profiles, shows that game-theoretic concepts have revision-theoretic counterparts. We extend Gupta’s approach to deal with normal form games in which players’ may have weak best replies. We do so by adapting intuitions relative to Nash equilibrium refinements to the (...)
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  23. The Truth is Never Simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.
    The complexity of the set of truths of arithmetic is determined for various theories of truth deriving from Kripke and from Gupta and Herzberger.
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  24. Self-Referential Probability.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2016 - Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
    This thesis focuses on expressively rich languages that can formalise talk about probability. These languages have sentences that say something about probabilities of probabilities, but also sentences that say something about the probability of themselves. For example: (π): “The probability of the sentence labelled π is not greater than 1/2.” Such sentences lead to philosophical and technical challenges; but can be useful. For example they bear a close connection to situations where ones confidence in something can affect whether it is (...)
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  25. The Revision Theory of Truth.James Cargile - 1995 - Philosophical Books 36 (3):165-173.
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  26. An Application of Circular Definitions: Rational Decision.André Chapuis - 2003 - In Benedikt Löwe, Thoralf Räsch & Wolfgang Malzkorn (eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences Ii. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 47--54.
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  27. Alternative Revision Theories of Truth.André Chapuis - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):399-423.
    The Revision Theory of Truth has been challenged in A. M. Yaqūb's recent book The Liar Speaks the Truth. Yaqūb suggests some non-trivial changes in the original theory - changing the limit rule - to avoid certain artifacts. In this paper it is shown that the proposed changes are not sufficient, i.e., Yaqūb's system also produces artifacts. An alternative solution is proposed and the relation between it and Yaqūb's solution is explored.
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  28. Circularity, Truth, and the Liar Paradox.Andre Chapuis - 1993 - Dissertation, Indiana University
    This dissertation is a study of some recent theories of truth. The theories fall into three groups: The Revision Theories, the context-sensitive theories, and the "Chrysippian theories". ;The "Chrysippian theories" are based on the intuition that pathologicalities arising from the concept of truth can be recognized and acknowledged with the concept of truth itself. Thus, from the pathologicality of the Liar, for example, we can conclude that the Liar is not true. This leads to immediate difficulties since the Liar claims (...)
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  29. Circularity, Definition, and Truth.André Chapuis & Anil Gupta (eds.) - 2000 - Sole Distributor, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers.
  30. Counterintuitive Consequences of the Revision Theory of Truth.R. T. Cook - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):16-22.
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  31. Counterintuitive Consequences of the Revision Theory of Truth.Roy Cook - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):16–22.
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  32. Still Counterintuitive: A Reply to Kremer.Roy T. Cook - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):257–261.
    In (2002) I argued that Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth (1993) has counterintuitive consequences. In particular, the pair of sentences: (S1) At least one of S1 and S2 is false. (S2) Both of S1 and S2 are false.1 is pathological on the Revision account. There is one, and only one, assignment of truth values to {(S1), (S2)} that make the corresponding Tarski..
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  33. Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap.J. Michael Dunn & Anil Gupta - 1993 - Studia Logica 52 (3):483-484.
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  34. Circularity, Definition and Truth.M. Glanzberg - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):465-470.
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  35. The Revision Theory of Truth.Gupta Anil & Belnap Nuel - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):727-730.
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  36. Review: Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles. [REVIEW]A. Gupta - 2006 - Mind 115 (457):163-165.
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  37. The Revision Theory of Truth.A. Gupta & N. Belnap - 1993 - MIT Press.
    In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological..
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  38. Truth, Meaning, Experience.Anil Gupta - 2011 - Oup Usa.
    This volume reprints eight of Anil Gupta's essays, some with additional material. The essays bring a refreshing new perspective to central issues in philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and epistemology.
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  39. Empiricism and Experience.Anil Gupta - 2006 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This book offers a novel account of the relationship of experience to knowledge. The account builds on the intuitive idea that our ordinary perceptual judgments are not autonomous, that an interdependence obtains between our view of the world and our perceptual judgments. Anil Gupta shows in this important study that this interdependence is the key to a satisfactory account of experience. He uses tools from logic and the philosophy of language to argue that his account of experience makes available an (...)
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  40. Finite Circular Definitions.Anil Gupta - 2006 - In Thomas Bolander, Vincent F. Hendricks & Stig Andur Andersen (eds.), Self-Reference. CSLI Publications. pp. 79-93.
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  41. Definition and Revision: A Response to McGee and Martin.Anil Gupta - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:419-443.
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  42. Two Theorems Concerning Stability.Anil Gupta - 1990 - In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 49--60.
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  43. XV—Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth.Anil Gupta - 1989 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1):227-246.
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  44. Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth.Anil Gupta - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89:227 - 246.
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  45. The Meaning of Truth.Anil Gupta - 1987 - In Ernest Lepore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics. Academic Press. pp. 453--480.
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  46. Truth and Paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
  47. Reply to Robert Koons.Anil Gupta & Nuel Belnap - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (4):632-636.
    We are grateful to Professor Robert Koons for his excellent, and generous, review (henceforth KR) of our book The Revision Theory of Truth (henceforth RTT). Koons provides in KR a welcome guide to our RTT, and he puts forward objections that deserve serious consideration. In this note we shall respond only to his principal objection.' This objection, which is developed on pp. 625 — 628 of KR, calls into question our main thesis. As we argue below, however, the objection is (...)
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  48. A Note on Extension, Intension, and Truth.Anil Gupta & Nuel Belnap - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):168-174.
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  49. Intersubstitutivity Principles and the Generalization Function of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - forthcoming - Synthese:1-11.
    We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the (...)
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  50. Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
    We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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