Robot Ethics

In his 1923 play R.U.R.: Rossum s Universal Robots, Karel Capek coined In 1993, we began a humanoid robotics project aimed at constructing a robot for use in exploring theories of human intelligence. In this article, we describe three aspects of our research methodology that distinguish our work from other humanoid projects. First, our humanoid robots are designed to act autonomously and safely in natural workspaces with people. Second, our robots are designed to interact socially with people by exploiting natural (...) human social cues. Third, we believe that robotics offers a unique tool for testing models of human intelligence drawn from developmental psychology and cognitive science. (shrink)

Arming uninhabited vehicles (UVs) is an increasing trend. Widespread deployment can bring dangers for arms-control agreements and international humanitarian law (IHL). Armed UVs can destabilise the situation between potential opponents. Smaller systems can be used for terrorism. Using a systematic definition existing international regulation of armed UVs in the fields of arms control, export control and transparency measures is reviewed; these partly include armed UVs, but leave large gaps. For preventive arms control a general prohibition of armed UVs would be (...) best. If that is unattainable, several measures should be taken. An explicit prohibition of autonomous attack, that is without a human decision, should be added to IHL. Concerning armed UVs remotely controlled by a human soldier, recommendations differ according to type or mission. New kinds of uninhabited nuclear-weapon carriers should be banned. Space weapons should be prohibited in general. UVs smaller than 0.2–0.5 m should be banned. Bigger remotely controlled armed UVs not equipped with weapons of mass destruction should be subject to numerical limitations in various categories. For these the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is an important precedent. (shrink)

Using Asimov’s “Bicentennial Man” as a springboard, a number of metaethical issues concerning the emerging field of machine ethics are discussed. Although the ultimate goal of machine ethics is to create autonomous ethical machines, this presents a number of challenges. A good way to begin the task of making ethics computable is to create a program that enables a machine to act an ethical advisor to human beings. This project, unlike creating an autonomous ethical machine, will not require that we (...) make a judgment about the ethical status of the machine itself, a judgment that will be particularly difficult to make. Finally, it is argued that Asimov’s “three laws of robotics” are an unsatisfactory basis for machine ethics, regardless of the status of the machine. (shrink)

This position paper addresses the issue of responsibility in the use of autonomous robotic systems. We are nowhere near autonomy in the philosophical sense, i.e., where there exists free agency and moral culpability for a non-human artificial agent. Sentient robots and the singularity are not concerns in the near to mid-term. While agents such as corporations can be held legally responsible for their actions, these exist of organizations under the direct control of humans. Intelligent robots, by virtue of their autonomous (...) decision-making, are not of the same ilk. (shrink)

The underlying thesis of the research in ethical autonomy for lethal autonomous unmanned systems is that they will potentially be capable of performing more ethically on the battlefield than are human soldiers. In this article this hypothesis is supported by ongoing and foreseen technological advances and perhaps equally important by an assessment of the fundamental ability of human warfighters in today's battlespace. If this goal of better-than-human performance is achieved, even if still imperfect, it can result in a reduction in (...) noncombatant casualties and property damage consistent with adherence to the Laws of War as prescribed in international treaties and conventions, and is thus worth pursuing vigorously. (shrink)

This article argues that existing approaches to programming ethical AI fail to resolve a serious moral-semantic trilemma, generating interpretations of ethical requirements that are either too semantically strict, too semantically flexible, or overly unpredictable. This paper then illustrates the trilemma utilizing a recently proposed ‘general ethical dilemma analyzer,’ _GenEth_. Finally, it uses empirical evidence to argue that human beings resolve the semantic trilemma using general cognitive and motivational processes involving ‘mental time-travel,’ whereby we simulate different possible pasts and futures. I (...) demonstrate how mental time-travel psychology leads us to resolve the semantic trilemma through a six-step process of interpersonal negotiation and renegotiation, and then conclude by showing how comparative advantages in processing power would plausibly cause AI to use similar processes to solve the semantic trilemma more reliably than we do, leading AI to make better moral-semantic choices than humans do by our very own lights. (shrink)

There are at least three things we might mean by "ethics in robotics": the ethical systems built into robots, the ethics of people who design and use robots, and the ethics of how people treat robots. This paper argues that the best approach to robot ethics is one which addresses all three of these, and to do this it ought to consider robots as socio-technical systems. By so doing, it is possible to think of a continuum of agency that lies (...) between amoral and fully autonomous moral agents. Thus, robots might move gradually along this continuum as they acquire greater capabilities and ethical sophistication. It also argues that many of the issues regarding the distribution of responsibility in complex socio-technical systems might best be addressed by looking to legal theory, rather than moral theory. This is because our overarching interest in robot ethics ought to be the practical one of preventing robots from doing harm, as well as preventing humans from unjustly avoiding responsibility for their actions. (shrink)

The enduring progression of artificial intelligence and cybernetics offers an ever-closer possibility of rational and sentient robots. The ethics and morals deriving from this technological prospect have been considered in the philosophy of artificial intelligence, the design of automatons with roboethics and the contemplation of machine ethics through the concept of artificial moral agents. Across these categories, the robotics laws first proposed by Isaac Asimov in the twentieth century remain well-recognised and esteemed due to their specification of preventing human harm, (...) stipulating obedience to humans and incorporating robotic self-protection. However the overwhelming predominance in the study of this field has focussed on human–robot interactions without fully considering the ethical inevitability of future artificial intelligences communicating together and has not addressed the moral nature of robot–robot interactions. A new robotic law is proposed and termed AIonAI or artificial intelligence-on-artificial intelligence. This law tackles the overlooked area where future artificial intelligences will likely interact amongst themselves, potentially leading to exploitation. As such, they would benefit from adopting a universal law of rights to recognise inherent dignity and the inalienable rights of artificial intelligences. Such a consideration can help prevent exploitation and abuse of rational and sentient beings, but would also importantly reflect on our moral code of ethics and the humanity of our civilisation. (shrink)

The enduring innovations in artificial intelligence and robotics offer the promised capacity of computer consciousness, sentience and rationality. The development of these advanced technologies have been considered to merit rights, however these can only be ascribed in the context of commensurate responsibilities and duties. This represents the discernable next-step for evolution in this field. Addressing these needs requires attention to the philosophical perspectives of moral responsibility for artificial intelligence and robotics. A contrast to the moral status of animals may be (...) considered. At a practical level, the attainment of responsibilities by artificial intelligence and robots can benefit from the established responsibilities and duties of human society, as their subsistence exists within this domain. These responsibilities can be further interpreted and crystalized through legal principles, many of which have been conserved from ancient Roman law. The ultimate and unified goal of stipulating these responsibilities resides through the advancement of mankind and the enduring preservation of the core tenets of humanity. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine a variety of agents that appear in Kantian ethics in order to determine which would be necessary to make a robot a genuine moral agent. However, building such an agent would require that we structure into a robot’s behavioral repertoire the possibility for immoral behavior, for only then can the moral law, according to Kant, manifest itself as an ought, a prerequisite for being able to hold an agent morally accountable for its actions. Since building (...) a moral robot requires the possibility of immoral behavior, I go on to argue that we cannot morally want robots to be genuine moral agents, but only beings that simulate moral behavior. But then, if that is what we want for robots, why should we want something different for human beings? Robot ethics, it seems, presents something of a reductio of Kant’s ethics that points to hidden assumptions that hide in the very fabric of the Kantian moral enterprise, not the least of which is that Kant presumes humans to be fallen creatures. Religious doctrine, in other words, infects Kant’s attempt to derive morality from reason. This paper will demonstrate that this is so. (shrink)

In his famous 1950 paper where he presents what became the benchmark for success in artificial intelligence, Turing notes that "at the end of the century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted" (Turing 1950, 442). Kurzweil (1990) suggests that Turing's prediction was correct, even if no machine has yet to pass the Turing Test. In the wake of the (...) computer revolution, research in artificial intelligence and cognitive science has pushed in the direction of interpreting "thinking" as some sort of computational process. On this understanding, thinking is something computers (in principle) and humans (in practice) can both do. It is difficult to say precisely when in history the meaning of the term "thinking" headed in this direction. Signs are already present in the mechanistic and mathematical tendencies of the early Modern period, and maybe even glimmers are apparent in the ancient Greeks themselves. But over the long haul, we somehow now consider "thinking" as separate from the categories of "thoughtfulness" (in the general sense of wondering about things), "insight" and "wisdom." Intelligent machines are all around us, and the world is populated with smart cars, smart phones and even smart (robotic) appliances. But, though my cell phone might be smart, I do not take that to mean that it is thoughtful, insightful or wise. So, what has become of these latter categories? They seem to be bygones left behind by scientific and computational conceptions of thinking and knowledge that no longer have much use for them. In 2000, Allen, Varner and Zinser addressed the possibility of a Moral Turing Test (MTT) to judge the success of an automated moral agent (AMA), a theme that is repeated in Wallach and Allen (2009).. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine a variety of agents that appear in Kantian ethics in order to determine which would be necessary to make a robot a genuine moral agent. However, building such an agent would require that we structure into a robot’s behavioral repertoire the possibility for immoral behavior, for only then can the moral law, according to Kant, manifest itself as an ought, a prerequisite for being able to hold an agent morally accountable for its actions. Since building (...) a moral robot requires the possibility of immoral behavior, I go on to argue that we cannot morally want robots to be genuine moral agents, but only beings that simulate moral behavior. Finally, I raise but do not answer the question that if morality requires us to want robots that are not genuine moral agents, why should we want something different in the case of human beings. (shrink)

The author reflects on the premature speculations of many commentators on robot caregivers. He argues on the commentator's ethical issues that it creates false beliefs in children, in which he says that the creation of false beliefs by their caretakers is part and parcel of childhood. He argues that societies are already delegated the childcare onto others such as school and since technology is often substituting for direct physical social contact, its time to embrace the robotic care.

Histoire et utilisation du robot Bien que la robotique soit un marché économique relativement jeune et en pleine croissance, la genèse des robots remonte à l’Antiquité. Le premier robot à être déployé sur des lignes d’assemblage est Unimate, utilisé dès 1961 par General Motors. La robotique, en se di usant dans tous les pans de notre économie, va impacter les business modèles de nombreuses industries comme l’automobile et l’aéronautique mais aussi la construction ou l’agriculture. Aujourd’hui les robots industriels et de (...) service servent à de multiples tâches allant de la logistique à l’usinage en passant par la fonderie. La robotique constitue aussi et surtout un enjeu sociétal contribuant à relever les dé s de la mobilité, de la santé, de l’autonomie, du vieillissement et de l’éducation. Absence de dé nition et de régime juridique spéci que au robot En France, la notion de robot ne fait pas l’objet d’une dé nition juridique qui lui est propre. Les dé nitions relatives à l’environnement robotique peuvent tout de même se retrouver dans la norme ISO 8373:2012. Bien que les robots intéressent les juristes à plusieurs titres, le législateur n’a, à ce jour, pas adopté de régime juridique spéci quement applicable aux robots. Il convient donc de rechercher dans le droit positif le corpus de textes applicables aux robots. Ce corpus pourra alors recevoir l’appellation de « droit de la robotique ». Garanties Le vendeur d’un robot industriel et de service doit se conformer aux garanties légales que sont la garantie des vices cachés et la garantie d’éviction. Il doit également respecter les éventuelles garanties qui ont pu être convenues contractuellement Clauses contractuelles Le fournisseur d’un robot industriel et de service doit être particulièrement attentif aux clauses contractuelles rela- tives à la garantie, à la propriété intellectuelle, à la con dentialité, à la responsabilité et à la conformité aux directives techniques. Les spéci cités liées au robot, telles que les éléments relatifs à l’intelligence arti cielle, pourront être intégrées dans des annexes spéci ques. Intelligence arti cielle L’algorithme d’intelligence arti cielle dont est équipé un robot industriel et de service peut, dans certaines condi- tions, béné cier d’une protection grâce au droit d’auteur, à la protection du savoir-faire et au brevet. Aucun régime spécial n’existe à ce jour protégeant les œuvres conçues par le robot intelligent. Mobilité Les véhicules et drones autonomes utilisés au sein même de l’usine sont considérés comme des machines. Etant don- né les risques existants, il convient de xer de règles internes d’utilisation. Les véhicules autonomes ne peuvent à ce jour quitter l’espace privé. En revanche, les drones peuvent circuler dans l’espace aérien en respectant strictement le cadre réglementaire. Douanes Le taux de perception des droits de douanes d’un robot industriel et de service est conditionné par la connaissance de l’origine, préférentielle ou non préférentielle, du robot qui est déterminée par la position tarifaire de ce dernier. Le robot industriel et de service entre dans le chapitre 84, qui concerne notamment les machines, de la nomenclature du système harmonisé établi par l’Organisation mondiale de douanes. Sécurité En application de la « directive machines », le robot peut recevoir la quali cation de machine ou de quasi-machine. En vertu de cette directive, mais également au titre du Code du travail, de nombreuses obligations en matière de santé et de sécurité doivent être respectées pour la commercialisation et l’utilisation des robots. Conformité Le Code du travail, en transposant la « directive machines », a prévu de nombreuses obligations et procédures, appli- cables aux robots industriels et de service, permettant ainsi de s’assurer que ces derniers respectent les exigences de conformité nécessaires en matière de santé et de sécurité. Maintenance Dans le cadre de la maintenance, le fournisseur d’un robot industriel et de service est soumis à plusieurs obligations législatives aux titres de la disponibilité des pièces détachées et de la location. Les dispositions contractuelles de- vront prendre en considération les spéci cités propres au robot et ne pas ignorer la maintenance prédictive. Quali cation juridique Dans le cadre de la conception, de la fabrication et de l’utilisation du robot, il convient de porter une attention par- ticulière à quatre textes spéciaux qui peuvent être applicables aux robots industriels et de service : le règlement 428/2009 sur les biens à double usage, la directive 2014/35/UE applicable au matériel électrique basse tension, la directive 2014/53/UE applicable aux équipements radioélectriques et la directive 2014/30/UE sur la compatibilité électromagnétique. Responsabilité Bien que les régimes de responsabilité, civile et pénale, ne sont pas adaptés aux robots autonomes, la responsabilité civile de droit commun, la responsabilité du fait des choses, la responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux et la responsabilité des commettants du fait de leurs préposés peuvent s’appliquer en cas de fait dommageable causé par le robot tout comme la responsabilité pénale en cas d’infraction commise dans le cadre de l’utilisation du robot. Assurance La police d’assurance relative aux robots doit permettre de protéger le robot contre les risques auxquels ils sont confrontés mais également d’assurer la responsabilité pour les dommages qu’ils pourraient causer, on peut alors parler de « dommages robotiques ». Données et bases de données Les bases de données contenues dans un robot industriel et de service doivent respecter les droits dont dispose l’auteur sur la structure de la base de données et/ou les droits du producteur des bases de données dans lesquelles gurent les données utilisées. La réglementation Informatique et libertés est également applicable au robot lorsque celui-ci collecte et/ou traite des données personnelles. Droit de la robotique dans le monde Aucun Etat ne s’est à ce jour doté d’un régime juridique détaillé et spéci que à la robotique. Des dispositions juri- diques relatives aux robots peuvent tout de même se retrouver de façon éparse dans certains droits étrangers concer- nant notamment les drones et les véhicules terrestres autonomes. (shrink)

Due to tremendous progress in digital electronics now intelligent and autonomous agents are gradually being adopted into the fields and domains of the military, defense and warfare. This paper tries to explore some of the inherent ethical issues, threats and some remedial issues about the impact of such systems on human civilization and existence in general. This paper discusses human ethics in contrast to machine ethics and the problems caused by non-sentient agents. A systematic study is made on paradoxes regarding (...) the long-term advantages of such agents in military combat. This paper proposes an international standard which could be adopted by all nations to bypass the adverse effects and solve ethical issues of such intelligent agents. (shrink)

The intense and polemical debate over the legality and morality of weapons systems to which human cognitive functions are delegated (up to and including the capacity to select targets and release weapons without further human intervention) addresses a phenomena which does not yet exist but which is widely claimed to be emergent. This groundbreaking collection combines contributions from roboticists, legal scholars, philosophers and sociologists of science in order to recast the debate in a manner that clarifies key areas and articulates (...) questions for future research. The contributors develop insights with direct policy relevance, including who bears responsibility for autonomous weapons systems, whether they would violate fundamental ethical and legal norms, and how to regulate their development. It is essential reading for those concerned about this emerging phenomenon and its consequences for the future of humanity. (shrink)

We commonly identify something seriously defective in a human life that is lived in ignorance of important but unpalatable truths. At the same time, some degree of misapprehension of reality may be necessary for individual health and success. Morally speaking, it is unclear just how insistent we should be about seeking the truth. Robert Sparrow has considered such issues in discussing the manufacture and marketing of robot ‘pets’, such as Sony’s doglike ‘AIBO’ toy and whatever more advanced devices may supersede (...) it. Though it is not his only concern, Sparrow particularly criticizes such robot pets for their illusory appearance of being living things. He fears that some individuals will subconsciously buy into the illusion, and come to sentimentalize interactions that fail to constitute genuine relationships. In replying to Sparrow, I emphasize that this would be continuous with much of the minor sentimentality that we already indulge in from day to day. Although a disposition to seek the truth is morally virtuous, the virtue concerned must allow for at least some categories of exceptions. Despite Sparrow’s concerns about robot pets (and robotics more generally), we should be lenient about familiar, relatively benign, kinds of self-indulgence in forming beliefs about reality. Sentimentality about robot pets seems to fall within these categories. Such limited self-indulgence can co-exist with ordinary honesty and commitment to truth. (shrink)

Robots are becoming an increasingly pervasive feature of our personal lives. As a result, there is growing importance placed on examining what constitutes appropriate behavior when they interact with human beings. In this paper, we discuss whether companion robots should be permitted to “nudge” their human users in the direction of being “more ethical”. More specifically, we use Rawlsian principles of justice to illustrate how robots might nurture “socially just” tendencies in their human counterparts. Designing technological artifacts in such a (...) way to influence human behavior is already well-established but merely because the practice is commonplace does not necessarily resolve the ethical issues associated with its implementation. (shrink)

Bill Joy’s deep pessimism is now famous. Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us, his defense of that pessimism, has been read by, it seems, everyone—and many of these readers, apparently, have been converted to the dark side, or rather more accurately, to the future-is-dark side. Fortunately (for us; unfortunately for Joy), the defense, at least the part of it that pertains to AI and robotics, fails. Ours may be a dark future, but we cannot know that on the basis of (...) Joy’s reasoning. On the other hand, we ought to fear a good deal more than fear itself: we ought to fear not robots, but what some of us may do with robots. (shrink)

-/- This article was first published in Technology and Contemporary Life, Philosophy and Technoloy vol. IV, ed. Paul T. Durbin, Dordrecht/Boston: D. Reidel, 1988, pp. 63-85.

A description of how microelectronics and robotics are tending to increase unemployment, followed by comparisons between the social policies of Western European countries and the United States with reard to this problem. A conclusion points out the need for a social philosophy of technology that acknowledges workers' rights.

The play begins in a factory that makes artificial people, called roboti (robots), from synthetic organic matter. They seem happy to work for humans at first, but that changes, and a hostile robot rebellion leads to the extinction of the human race.

Introduction -/- I. Recent Research in Roboethics II. Intercultural Robethics III. Roboethics and Digital Ontology IV. "Robotopia Nipponica" V. Ethics of Robot Cars VI. Open Roboethics Initiative VII. Cyber warfare VIII. Healthcare Robots IX. Robot Law X. Social Robotics -/- Conclusion -/- References -/- Annex 1: Conferences and Workshops Annex 2: Korean Robot Ethics Charter Annex 3: Selected Recent Publications.

P. M. Asaro: What should We Want from a Robot Ethic? G. Tamburrini: Robot Ethics: A View from the Philosophy of Science B. Becker: Social Robots - Emotional Agents: Some Remarks on Naturalizing Man-machine Interaction E. Datteri, G. Tamburrini: Ethical Reflections on Health Care Robotics P. Lin, G. Bekey, K. Abney: Robots in War: Issues of Risk and Ethics J. Altmann: Preventive Arms Control for Uninhabited Military Vehicles J. Weber: Robotic warfare, Human Rights & The Rhetorics of Ethical Machines T. (...) Nishida: Towards Robots with Good Will R. Capurro: Ethics and Robotics. (shrink)

Sparrow argues that military robots capable of making their own decisions would be independent enough to allow us denial for their actions, yet too unlike us to be the targets of meaningful blame or praise—thereby fostering what Matthias has dubbed “the responsibility gap.” We agree with Sparrow that someone must be held responsible for all actions taken in a military conflict. That said, we think Sparrow overlooks the possibility of what we term “blank check” responsibility: A person of sufficiently high (...) standing could accept responsibility for the actions of autonomous robotic devices—even if that person could not be causally linked to those actions besides this prior agreement. The basic intuition behind our proposal is that humans can impute relations even when no other form of contact can be established. The missed alternative we want to highlight, then, would consist in an exchange: Social prestige in the occupation of a given office would come at the price of signing away part of one's freedoms to a contingent and unpredictable future guided by another agency. (shrink)

La robotique, comme plus largement le numérique, débouche sur de multiples usages aux déploiements parfois aussi massifs qu’inattendus, tel l’essor actuel des drones civils. Dans ce contexte évolutif, il serait vain d’énoncer de nouvelles normes éthiques qui pourraient vite s’avérer inadéquates. Mieux vaut équiper le monde scienti que pour que la dimension éthique devienne indissociable de l’activité de recherche, dans les communautés et les esprits. Le présent avis émet à cet effet quelques préconisations à l’attention des établissements et un ensemble (...) de préconisations ancrées dans la recherche à l’attention des scientifiques. (shrink)

What would it take for an artificial agent to be treated as having moral value? As a first step toward answering this question, we ask what it would take for an artificial agent to be capable of the sort of autonomous, adaptive social behavior that is characteristic of the animals that humans interact with. We propose that this sort of capacity is best measured by what we call the Embodied Turing Test. The Embodied Turing test is a test in which (...) intelligence is operationally defined in terms of autonomous, adaptive interaction with the environment and with other animals. Three versions of the Embodied Turing test were performed with a SONY AIBO robot. Human participants were asked to differentiate between AIBO in a human-controlled mode and AIBO in a software-controlled mode. Our results indicate that the human participants were guessing at how AIBO was controlled. Our data reveals that people do not have enough experience with robots to accurately evaluate its behavior. This indicates that today’s humans do not have enough experience with artificial agents to treat them as morally valuable. (shrink)