Roderick Chisholm

The article provides a critical overview of the main theses contained in the book The First Person by Roderick Chisholm. Chisholm's main thesis is that of the priority of the reference de se over reference de re. Chisholm develops firstly a theory of properties according to which these must be able to remain unexemplified. This excludes from the outset that we can reinterpret the indexical term “I” (the first person) in the sense of a property, since an indexical term always (...) refers to an existing particular object, so that the property in question would necessarily be exemplified. The sentences relating to the first person (de se) are not propositions but attributions, from which one can derive both the sentences de re as well as sentences de dicto (intentional attitudes). These sentences can have as subjects persons other than the “I”. (shrink)

This paper explores a particularist element in the theory of method of Imre Lakatos, who appealed to the value-judgements of élite scientists in the appraisal of competing theories of method. The role played by such value-judgements is strongly reminiscent of the epistemological particularism of Roderick Chisholm. Despite the existence of a clear parallel between the particularist approaches of both authors, it is argued that Lakatos’s approach is subject to a weakness that does not affect the approach of Chisholm.

In this paper I focus on the conditions that have to be met for Chisholm’s Paradox (CP) to occur. My claim is that identity and structure are notions closely related to each other. I propose a discussion in which the minimal framework for CP is set, then analyze the paradox in terms of S5, and suggest that in order to capture the core of the paradox one should use a dynamic valuation function for the model. Identity appears, at this point, (...) to be dependent upon a structuralist point of view. (shrink)

In this dissertation we examine Roderick Chisholm's philosophy as it relates to problems of the self. His views regarding the observability of the self, personal identity and freedom and his arguments for these views are discussed, examined and evaluated. ;Although Chisholm's positions on these three issues are merely contingently related, they exhibit a common feature which characterizes Chisholm's entire philosophy as it relates to the self--the attempt to refute positions which traditionally have been associated with empiricism by employing an epistemology (...) modified by the incorporation of a metaphilosophy of common sense, i.e, the view that the basic premises with which we begin our philosophical inquiries should be those propositions which we "presuppose in our ordinary activity" and that such propositions "should be regarded as innocent, epistemically, until we have positive reason for thinking them guilty" . ;Contained within the list of propositions which Chisholm believes to be presupposed in our ordinary activity are those which support the three central tenets of Chisholm's philosophy of the self: the self is directly observable in the sense that there are self-presenting states which the person has and through which the person can know himself to have certain properties; the person remains strictly identical over time; and the person is an agent capable of freely initiating at least some of his actions. ;These tenets are opposed to those positions which historically have been associated with empiricism: the non-observability of the self or subject of experience; the analyzability of the self into a series of temporary "person-stages"; and the non-existence of any type of causation other than event causation . ;As will soon become evident, while Chisholm's arguments frequently do not establish their intended conclusions, these conclusions sometimes can be supported by revising his arguments or by constructing new arguments with materials either taken from or logically compatible with Chisholm's philosophical corpus. (shrink)

I discuss the treatment by Chisholm of the problem posed by the fact that one can produce some neuro-physiological changes by moving a limb, namely the ones which cause the motions. I concentrate largely on the treatment Chisholm gave to this question before Person and Object, and I compare it with von Wright's discussion of it, I conclude that there are correct elements about both but that both are unsatisfactory, Chisholm's because it entails that we must know something which we (...) manifestly need not know when we move. (shrink)

SummaryIn considering the main weaknesses of epistemologies like Chisholm's, this paper introduces a concept which is foreign to such systems, Cardinal Newman's notion of illative judgment. The method of concrete inference involves the cumulation of probabilities, and principles of epistemic logic can never accommodate all relevant circumstances. Epistemic principles like Chisholm's, perhaps best rephrased as principles of inductive logic, will not, when applied, elicit assent by themselves. Systems like Chisholm's do not ring true phenomenologically because they overemphasize inference at the (...) expense of judgment.RésuméPour remédier aux faiblesses majeures des épistémologies telles que celle de Chisholm, cet article introduit un conceptétranger à de tels systémes: la notion de‘ jugment illatif’ du Cardinal Newman. La méthode ?on;inférence concréte suppose la cumulation de probabilityés et les principes ?on;une logique épistémique ne peuvent jamais tenir compte de toutes les circonstances qui inter‐viennent. Des principes épistémiques tels que ceux de Chisholm, qu'on pourrait peut‐être qualifier de principes de logique inductive, ne vont pas, lorsqu'ils sont appliqués, entraîner par eux‐mêmes ľassentiment. De tels systémes ne sonnent pas phénoménologiquement juste parce qu'ils surestiment ľinférence aux dépens du jugement.ZusammenfassungIndem er die Hauptschwächen von Erkenntnistheorien wie die von Chisholm hervorhebt, fuhrt der Verfasser einen Begriff ein, der solchen Systemen fremd ist, nämlich der Begriff des illativen Urteils von Kardinal Newman. Die Methode des konkreten Folgerns involviert die Kumulation von Warscheinlichkeiten, und die Prinzipien der epistemischen Logik können nie alle relevanten Umstände erfassen. Epistemische Prinzipien wie diejenigen von Chisholm, die man vielleicht am besten als Prinzipien der induktiven Logik reformuliert, werden, wenn sie angewen‐det werden, nicht von selbst Zustimmung erwecken. Systeme wie das von Chisholm scheinen phänomenologisch inadäquat, weil sie Folgerungen auf Kosten von Ürteilen uberbewerten. (shrink)

In the article Chisholm's conception of truth is considered. In author's opinion Chisholm defends the possibility of certain knowledge by modifying the concept of „certainty”. Contrary to the philosophical tradition, in Chisholm's view the certainty of knowledge does not imply its truth.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RODERICK M. CHISHOLM 1941 (a) 'Sextus Empiricus and Modern Empiricism', Philosophy of Science VIII, 371-384. 1942 (a) 'The Problem of the Speckled Hen', Mind u, 368-373. 1943 (a) Review of 'Lewin's Topological and Vector ...

Chisholm holds that each person's empirical knowledge is a structure resting on a foundation of self-presenting propositions. He also holds that a person's knowledge of the past and the external world cannot be inferred from his self-presenting propositions by the rules of deduction and induction; special rules of evidence are needed. I argue that Chisholm has not made a compelling case for either view and that there is good reason to doubt that either view is correct.

Russell maintained that a person can have knowledge about a particular only if he is acquainted with some particular. In a similar vein, Chisholm has argued that a person cannot identify a particular unless he identifies some particular per se. According to Chisholm, a person identifies a particular per se just in casehe has knowledge of its haecceity or individml essence. Chisholni urges us to accept the following controversial claim concerning haecceities: none of us has knowledge of the haecceity of (...) a particular physical object or person, x, when he perceives x by means of his senses, and picks x out as that thing. However, Chisholm does not offer a compelling argument to support this claim. In this paper I aim to show that Chisholm's claim is fundamentally correct. (shrink)