Roman Ingarden

Phenomenologists have no taste for desert landscapes. The early phenomenologists—Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Roman Ingarden—adopt stratified views of reality on which spiritual objects like artifacts and persons are distinct from their underlying matter. Call this view “pluralism.” After describing Scheler, Ingarden, and Husserl's pluralism about goods, literary artworks, and images, respectively, I reconstruct a phenomenological case for pluralism from Husserl's work and defend it against an objection. The phenomenological method reveals a special subset of objects' essential properties: modes of (...) givenness. On Husserl's view, there are necessary correlations between types of objects and the types of intentional acts through which they are given. Spiritual objects, unlike their matter, can only be given in acts belonging to the “personalistic attitude,” which has a motivational and expressive structure. My broader claim is that Husserl's phenomenology is a sophisticated metametaphysical view about the methodology of first‐order metaphysical inquiry. (shrink)

Roman Ingarden, der große polnische Phänomenologe, glaubte den metaphysischen Idealismus in vielen Entscheidungen Husserls zu sehen. Er ist u.a. in der These des transzendentalen Idealismus Husserls enthalten. Diese These hat Ingarden folgendermaßen formuliert: » das Sein der uns in der Erfahrung gegebenen Welt ist auf das Sein und den Verlauf des reinen konstituierenden Bewußtseins angewiesen, ohne das die Welt überhaupt nicht existieren würde, und zweitens ist es absolut sinnlos, schon deshalb nach der Existenz der Welt zu fragen«. Demzufolge » ist (...) es nicht erlaubt, zwischen dem im Prozeß der Konstituierung entstandenen ›Sinn‹ des Gegenstands und dem bestehenden Gegenstand, zwischen dem ›Phänomen‹ eines gewissen Seins und diesem Sein selbst, zwischen dem Sinn seiner Existenz und der Existenz selbst zu unterscheiden.«. (shrink)

The Controversy over the Existence of the World (henceforth Controversy) is the magnum opus of Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden. Despite the renewed interest for Ingarden’s pioneering ontological work whithin analytic philosophy, little attention has been dedicated to Controversy's main goal, clearly indicated by the very title of the book: finding a solution to the centuries-old philosophical controversy about the ontological status of the external world. -/- There are at least three reasons for this relative indifference. First, even at the time (...) when the book was published, the Controversy was no longer seen as a serious polemical topic, whether it was disqualified as an archaic metaphysical pseudo-problem, or taken to be the last remnant of an antiscientific approach to philosophy culminating in idealism and relativism. Second, Ingarden’s reasoning on the matter is highly complex, at times misleading, and even occasionally faulty. Finally, his analysis is not only incomplete – Controversy being unachieved – but also arguably aporetic. -/- One may wonder, then, why it is still worth excavating this mammoth treatise to study an issue apparently no longer relevant to contemporary philosophy. Aside from historical and exegetical purposes, which are of course very interesting in their own right, Ingarden’s treatment of the Controversy remains one of the most detailed and ambitious ontological undertakings of the twentieth century. Not only does it lay out an incredibly detailed map of possible solutions to the Controversy, but it also tries to show why the latter is a genuine and fundamental problem that owes its hasty disqualification to various oversimplifications over the course of the history of philosophy. -/- In this chapter, I first give an overview of Ingarden’s method, which relies mainly on a combinatorial analysis. Then, I summarize his examination of possible solutions to the Controversy, and determine which ones can be ruled out on ontological grounds. Finally, I explain why this ambitious project ultimately leads to a theoretical impasse, leaving Ingarden unable to come up with a definitive solution to the Controversy – regardless of the fact that the book is unachieved. I argue that his analysis of the problem yields a more modest but nonetheless valuable result. (shrink)

A short rebuttal to Antonín Mokrejš's hostile reply to my critical review of his translation of Roman Ingarden's 'The Literary Work of Art'.

The philosophical press, in the United States as well as abroad, has not given the thought of the Polish philosopher, Roman Ingarden, the recognition that it rightly deserves. It is because of this state of affairs that Volume IV of Analecta Husserliana comes to us as a scholarly contribution in a time of need. The singular merit of this volume is that it not only makes available some noteworthy critical and constructive analyses by Ingarden but also offers a series of (...) systematic studies of various facets of Ingarden’s philosophy by his chief interpreters and critics. The first selection in Volume IV is part of the Oslo Lectures, given by Ingarden in 1967, and here made public for the first time in its original German transcription. In these very important lectures Ingarden distills the results of his many years of critical reflection on the possibilities and limits of Husserl’s program of phenomenological research. The general topic of these lectures is: "The Problem of Husserlian Reduction". However, as the discussion proceeds it is not only problems attendant to the celebrated reduction that come under critical review but indeed the whole gamut of Husserlian motifs from intentionality to inter-subjectivity. (shrink)

Roman Ingarden published his two major works in aesthetics in the 1930’s. The Literary Work of Art was published first in a German edition in 1931 and The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art was published first in a Polish edition in 1937. A revised and enlarged edition of the second book was published in Germany in 1968 and it is the German edition translated into English in 1973 which is the subject of this review. Ingarden’s two works, founded (...) on the antipsychologism of Edmund Husserl are intended as companion volumes, the first responding to the question, "How is the object of cognition, the literary work of art, structured?" and the second answering the question, "What is the procedure which will lead to knowledge of the literary work?" In The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, Ingarden is concerned with the mode of cognition which corresponds to the necessary structures of the literary work of art which he has analyzed in his earlier study. He sets out to show that such a cognition is composed of heterogenous but closely connected processes and that it is accomplished in a temporal process. (shrink)

The article is a critical elaboration of two phenomenological theories of imagination formulated by Ingarden and Blaustein in their discussion with Twardowski. Ingarden, as well as Blaustein were students of both Twardowski and Husserl, however, they defined imagination in two different contexts: whereas for Ingarden a proper way of analysis of imagination is ontology, for Blaustein imagination is the object of descriptive psychology, connected mainly with an aesthetic experience. As a result, the question of creativity of imagination is described in (...) two different, but intertwined ways. For Ingarden, creative imagination is understood as a noematical structure which generates the imagined object as a purely intentional object. Ingarden’s description expresses the ontological status of the imagined object as ontologically dependent on the act of imagining, and on the content of the imagined object. In his review of Ingarden’s Das literarische Kunstwerk, Blaustein was clear that one has to revise Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional object by adopting it to imaginative intentionality and aesthetic experience. To elaborate Ingarden’s theory of imagination, Blaustein discusses it also with reference to Twardowski. Blaustein claims that Twardowski’s Cartesian differentiation between perceptive, reproductive, and creative imagination is based on a vague criterion, and moreover it does not refer to two key notions of descriptive psychology, i.e., the notion of the representative content, and the intentional object. As a result of his critique, Blaustein limits the concept of creative imagination to ‘fantasy’, understood as secondary imagination. (shrink)

Roman Ingarden fut un auteur prolifique. Ancien élève de Husserl, il publia de nombreux ouvrages et articles en près de cinquante ans de carrière et suscita un nombre impressionnant de commentaires tout en demeurant peu connu des francophones. Victor Kocay tente de réparer cette injustice en nous montrant l’intérêt de l’approche ingardenienne pour l’analyse littéraire et la théorisation de la réception esthétique de l’œuvre littéraire. Deux ouvrages constituent le cœur de l’exposition: Das literarische Kunstwerks et Vom Erkennen des literarischen Kunstwerks. (...) Dans ces textes, Ingarden développe deux concepts centraux qui seront mis en application par Kocay dans la dernière partie de son ouvrage avec l’analyse du Journal d’un curé de campagne de Bernanos et du Journal du voleur de Genet: la concrétisation et la stratification. La concrétisation constitue «la notion de base de l’esthétique d’Ingarden» et ce terme renvoie au processus d’interprétation-compréhension du lecteur face au texte, processus qui résulte en la formation d’un objet esthétique. La concrétisation consiste au moins à remplir ce qu’Ingarden appelle les «lacunes d’ordre conceptuel», c’est-à-dire certains non-dits du texte. À aucun moment Conan Doyle ne dit que Sherlock Holmes est un être humain ou qu’il a trente-deux dents, et pourtant c’est ce que nous inférons de notre lecture, en utilisant nos croyances sur le monde, les traditions littéraires dans lesquelles s’inscrit l’auteur, etc. Il ne s’agit pas de combler tous les blancs, ce qui serait impossible, mais de constituer un objet en vue de son appréciation esthétique. Chaque lecteur peut concrétiser différemment un même texte, mais Ingarden refuse de sombrer pour autant dans le relativisme: l’objet esthétique constitué ne l’est pas pour la seule jouissance personnelle de son lecteur, mais il doit reposer sur les propriétés du texte lui-même et pouvoir être soumis au jugement d’autrui. Si plusieurs concrétisations d’un même texte sont possibles, toutes ne sont pas acceptables. De même, les qualités qui servent de base à l’appréciation esthétique doivent avoir leur source dans les qualités du texte lui-même, selon Ingarden. Lorsque Albert Cohen réussit à nous faire pénétrer dans l’esprit oisif d’Ariane d’Auble, dans Belle du Seigneur, à nous faire ressentir son désœuvrement en nous faisant participer aux mouvements incohérents de son imagination, c’est par un style particulier, un rythme de phrase qui épouse parfaitement les mouvements erratiques de l’esprit d’Ariane. La valeur que nous attribuons à ces pages repose sur des propriétés du texte lui-même, propriétés que nous valorisons parce qu’elles provoquent l’effet esthétique attendu. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper explores the structure and elements of the intentional experiences of imagining fictional objects. The author critically examines the argument that whereas Husserl’s theory of imagination cannot do justice to fictional objects, Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional objects provides a basis for the theory of intentionality that explains the status of fictional objects. The paper discusses this argument to show that it is justified only in regard to Husserl’s early account of imagination, and on the condition of understanding contents (...) as the phantasmas. Moreover, the author sketches Ingarden’s theory of imagination, and compares it to Husserl’s later account of imagination in terms of noetic-noematic structures. Finally, the author questions the sharp distinction between Husserl and Ingarden with respect to their theories of imagination and fictional objects by showing that it is hard to classify clearly their theories as content or object theories respectively. (shrink)

This volume is a translation from the third German edition of Roman Ingarden’s classic work in phenomenological aesthetics originally written in 1931. The book is not only one of the best exemplifications of the phenomenological method; it also ranks with the major products of Russian formalism, the Prague school of linguistics, and American new criticism as a fundamental contribution to literary theory. It is surely the most systematic and exhaustive study yet devoted by a Western philosopher to determining "the ontic (...) position of a literary work." If the early Husserl regarded physicalism and especially psychologism as the Scylla and Charybdis for logical theory, Ingarden likewise considers them the greatest obstacle to a proper understanding of das literarische Kunstwerk. When these two fallacious and influential theories are rejected the traditional dichotomy of real and ideal as assigned to the literary work is seen to be untenable. Ingarden’s most significant ontological conclusion states that the literary work of art is neither a physical, a psychic, nor a psychophysical entity, but rather "a purely intentional object," an ontically heteronomous system of significations essentially describable as "a polyphonic harmony of aesthetic value qualities.". (shrink)

Roman Ingarden, der große polnische Phänomenologe, glaubte den metaphysischen Idealismus in vielen Entscheidungen Husserls zu sehen. Er ist u.a. in der These des transzendentalen Idealismus Husserls enthalten. Diese These hat Ingarden folgendermaßen formuliert: » das Sein der uns in der Erfahrung gegebenen Welt ist auf das Sein und den Verlauf des reinen konstituierenden Bewußtseins angewiesen, ohne das die Welt überhaupt nicht existieren würde, und zweitens ist es absolut sinnlos, schon deshalb nach der Existenz der Welt zu fragen«. Demzufolge » ist (...) es nicht erlaubt, zwischen dem im Prozeß der Konstituierung entstandenen ›Sinn‹ des Gegenstands und dem bestehenden Gegenstand, zwischen dem ›Phänomen‹ eines gewissen Seins und diesem Sein selbst, zwischen dem Sinn seiner Existenz und der Existenz selbst zu unterscheiden.«. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the subject of the intersubjective constitution of intentional objects in Ingarden, particularly in the literary work. Subsequently, I cover certain topics of Husserl’s phenomenology adopted and developed further by Ingarden, which were certainly taken up in Reception Aesthetics, but were insufficiently recognized as Husserl’s legacy. In doing so, I attempt to show that Ingarden’s literature aesthetics, as regards its origin in Husserl’s essential-eidetic phenomenology, provides important clues to suggest that Ingarden may not necessarily be regarded (...) as the founder of reader-oriented hermeneutics. (shrink)

Roman Ingarden, one of Husserl’s most gifted students, devoted several thousand pages to the development of an ontological, epistemological, aesthetical and even anthropological framework that would allow him to firmly reject the so-called “idealistic turn” of his master Husserl. This paper aims at reconstructing an often overlooked side of his philosophy: his theory of consciousness and his analysis of the constitutive process involved in sense perception. After emphasizing the distinctive character of Ingarden’s ontological frame and its impact on understanding concepts (...) as fundamental as consciousness or intentionality, this paper tries to sketch Ingarden’s answers to several genetic questions raised by Husserl: the relation between time and consciousness, the nature of the ultimate sense data and the question of motivation. (shrink)

The paper develops the argument presented in my earlier article, Intentional Reference and Its Object in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism. It contains further considerations on the proper understanding of Husserl’s notion of noema. My aim is not only to present an interpretation of Husserl’s text, but primarily to understand what constitutes an intentional reference of an act of consciousness. I agree with some of Husserl’s claims in Ideas, Book I, that noema, sense and intentional object are basically the same. This standpoint (...) implies, however, a drastic reinterpretation of the notion of an object. I refer to Ingarden’s conception of a purely intentional object to show the difficulties connected with regarding noema as an object separate from consciousness but still existentially dependent on it. Analyzing Husserlian notion of a noematic core I emphasize the relevance of universals for Husserl’s theory of consciousness. (shrink)

Autobiographical survey of interactions between the author and Barry Smith, especially as concerns the background and influence of the Seminar for Austro-German Philosophy and work on the relevance of Adolf Reinach, Roman Ingarden and other Central-European thinkers to contemporary analytic philosophy.

Here the concept of the human being as a “relatively isolated system” developed in Ingarden’s later phenomenology is adapted into an “aesthetics of isolation” that complements conventional environmental aesthetics. Such an aesthetics of isolation is especially relevant, given the growing “aesthetic overload” brought about by ubiquitous computing and new forms of art and aesthetic experience such as those involving virtual reality, interactive online performance art, and artificial creativity.

An account of Roman Ingarden's ontology of literature.

As conceived by analytic philosophers ontology consists in the application of the methods of mathematical logic to the analysis of ontological discourse. As conceived by realist philosophers such as Meinong and the early Husserl, Reinach and Ingarden, it consists in the investigation of the forms of entities of various types. The suggestion is that formal methods be employed by phenomenological ontologists, and that phenomenological insights may contribute to the construction of adequate formal-ontological languages. The paper sketches an account of what (...) might be involved in this new discipline, an account which is illustrated in application to the formal-ontological problems raised by negative states of affairs. (shrink)

It is accepted that certain mereological concepts and phenomenological conceptualisations presented in Carl Stumpf’s Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung and Tonpsychologie played an important role in the development of the Husserlian formal ontology. In the third Logical Investigation, which displays the formal relations between part and whole and among parts that make out a whole, one of the main concepts of contemporary formal ontology and metaphysics is settled: ontological dependence or foundation. My main objective is to display Stumpf’s concepts (...) of partial content, independent content, spatial wholes, sound wholes, and the different kinds of connection among parts, in particular, fusion. Second, I will show how Husserl improved this background, in particular with regards to the exact nature of the theory of manifolds, in discussion with Georg Cantor, the father of set theory. Third, I will focus on Ingarden’s use of formal ontology and on the different modes of being that can be justified by appealing to the concept of ontological dependence in its Ingardenian variations. If my interpretation is adequate, it should be inferred that formal ontology is the operative theory of phenomenological philosophy, and this must be acknowledged in its full significance with respect to the supposed independence of the phenomenological method since 1913. A further consequence, not developed in this essay, is that formal ontology can be mathematised. (shrink)