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  1. Russellian Propositions and Properties.Jan Almäng - 2012 - Metaphysica 13 (1):7-25.
    This paper discusses a problem for Russellian propositions. According to Russellianism, each word in a sentence contributes its referent to the proposition expressed by the sentence. Russellian propositions have normally been conceived of as problematic for two reasons, viz. they cannot account for the unity of the proposition and they have problems with non-referring singular names. In this paper, I argue that Russellianism also faces a problem with respect to properties. It is inconsistent with both traditional realism and trope-theories. The (...)
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  2. Direct Reference and Significant Cognition: Any Paradoxes?Joseph Almog - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47 (1):2-14.
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  3. Some Difficulties Concerning Russellian Intensional Logic.C. Anthony Anderson - 1986 - Noûs 20 (1):35-43.
  4. Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes.M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne (eds.) - 1997 - CSLI Press.
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  5. How to Become an Enlightened Millian Heir.Philip Atkins - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):927-934.
    Tiddy Smith, Philosophia, 42, 173–179 has recently argued that there is an enlightenment problem for Millianism. In this paper I show that Smith’s argument rests on a misunderstanding, and that the enlightenment problem can be solved according to standard versions of Millianism. In fact, the problem can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s version of Millianism, which is one of Smith’s main targets.
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  6. A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag's Puzzle.Philip Atkins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.
    Gary Ostertag has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not identified with sentences.
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  7. Comparing Frege and Russell.Kent Bach - manuscript
    Frege's and Russell's views are obviously different, but because of certain superficial similarities in how they handle certain famous puzzles about proper names, they are often assimilated. Where proper names are concerned, both Frege and Russell are often described together as "descriptivists." But their views are fundamentally different. To see that, let's look at the puzzle of names without bearers, as it arises in the context of Mill's purely referential theory of proper names, aka the 'Fido'-Fido theory.
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  8. Thought and Reference.Kent Bach - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
    Presenting a novel account of singular thought, a systematic application of recent work in the theory of speech acts, and a partial revival of Russell's analysis of singular terms, this book takes an original approach to the perennial problems of reference and singular terms by separating the underlying issues into different levels of analysis.
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  9. Is There a Fact of the Matter Between Direct Reference Theory and (Neo-)Fregeanism?Mark Balaguer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):53-78.
    It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. And (...)
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  10. Meaning, Reference and Necessity.Victor H. Balowitz - 1976 - International Studies in Philosophy 8:216-217.
  11. The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and its Origins.Jc Beall - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):308 – 309.
    Book Information The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and Its Origins. Edited by Paul Humphreys and James Fetzer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Boston. Pp. xiii + 290. Hardback, US$105.
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  12. Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question, and Semantic Externalism.Helen Beebee - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.
  13. How 'Russellian' Was Frege?David Bell - 1990 - Mind 99 (394):267-277.
  14. Meta-Incommensurability Between Theories of Meaning: Chemical Evidence.Nicholas W. Best - 2015 - Perspectives on Science 23 (3):361-378.
    Attempting to compare scientific theories requires a philosophical model of meaning. Yet different scientific theories have at times—particularly in early chemistry—pre-supposed disparate theories of meaning. When two theories of meaning are incommensurable, we must say that the scientific theories that rely upon them are meta-incommensurable. Meta- incommensurability is a more profound sceptical threat to science since, unlike first-order incommensurability, it implies complete incomparability.
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  15. Scott Soames. 2002. Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity. [REVIEW]David Braun - 2003 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (3):367-379.
  16. Russellianism and Explanation.David Braun - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):253-289.
    Many philosophers think that the Substitution Objection decisively refutes Russellianism. This objection claims that sentences (1) and (2) can differ in truth value. Therefore, it says, the sentences express different propositions, and so Russellianism is false.
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  17. Russellianism and Prediction.David Braun - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (1):59 - 105.
    Russellianism (also called `neo-Russellianism, `Millianism, and `thenaive theory') entails that substitution of co-referring names inattitude ascriptions preserves truth value and proposition expressed.Thus, on this view, if Lucy wants Twain to autograph her book, thenshe also wants Clemens to autograph her book, even if she says ``I donot want Clemens to autograph my book''. Some philosophers (includingMichael Devitt and Mark Richard) claim that attitude ascriptions canbe used to predict behavior, but argue that if Russellianism weretrue, then this would not be so. (...)
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  18. Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations.David M. Braun - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.
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  19. Review of Nicholas Griffin, Dale Jacquette (Eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting"[REVIEW]Berit Brogaard - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).
  20. Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham.Susan Brower-Toland - 2007 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (4):317-336.
    In this paper I challenge recent externalist interpretations of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition. I begin by distinguishing two distinct theses that defenders of the externalist interpretation typically attribute to Ockham: a ‘direct reference thesis’, according to which intuitive cognitions are states that lack all internal, descriptive content; and a ‘causal thesis’, according to which intuitive states are wholly determined by causal connections they bear to singular objects. I then argue that neither can be plausibly credited to Ockham. In particular, (...)
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  21. Millian Descriptivism.Ben Caplan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):181-198.
    In this paper, I argue against Millian Descriptivism: that is, the view that, although sentences that contain names express singular propositions, when they use those sentences speakers communicate descriptive propositions. More precisely, I argue that Millian Descriptivism fares no better (or worse) than Fregean Descriptivism: that is, the view that sentences express descriptive propositions. This is bad news for Millian Descriptivists who think that Fregean Descriptivism is dead.
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  22. On Sense and Direct Reference.Ben Caplan - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):171-185.
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  23. Russellian Thoughts.Peter Carruthers - 1987 - Mind 96 (381):18-35.
  24. Perspectival Direct Reference for Proper Names.Ralph Clark - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):251-265.
    I defend what I believe to be a new variation on Kripkean themes, for the purpose of providing an improved way to understand the referring functions of proper names. I begin by discussing roles played by perceptual perspectives in the use of proper names, and then broaden the discussion to include what I call cognitive perspectives. Although both types of perspectives underwrite the existence of intentional intermediaries between proper names and their referents, the existence of these intentional intermediaries does not (...)
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  25. Denoting Concepts, Reference, and the Logic of Names, Classes as Many, Groups, and Plurals.Nino Cocchiarella - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (2):135 - 179.
    Bertrand Russell introduced several novel ideas in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics that he later gave up and never went back to in his subsequent work. Two of these are the related notions of denoting concepts and classes as many. In this paper we reconstruct each of these notions in the framework of conceptual realism and connect them through a logic of names that encompasses both proper and common names, and among the latter, complex as well as simple common names. (...)
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  26. Pure Russellianism.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202.
    Abstract According to Russellianism, the content of a Russellian thought, in which a person ascribes a monadic property to an object, can be represented as an ordered couple of the object and the property. A consequence of this is that it is not possible for a person to believe that a is F and not to believe b is F, when a=b. Many critics of Russellianism suppose that this is possible and thus that Russellianism is false. Several arguments for this (...)
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  27. Kripkenstein and Non-Reductionism About Meaning-Facts.Florian Demont - unknown
    In 1982 Saul A. Kripke proposed a reconstruction of the central insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following. The reconstruction prominently featured a sceptical challenge which soon was recognised as a new and very radical form of scepticism. According to the challenge there is no fact of the matter which constitutes meaning. As there is no such fact, the first-person authority people intuitively seem to have concerning what they mean is also baseless. In response to the sceptic, many solutions have (...)
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  28. On Direct Reference.Harry Deutsch - 1989 - In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-195.
  29. The One and Only Argument for Radical Millianism.Max Deutsch - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):427-445.
    Radical Millianism agrees with less radical varieties in claiming that ordinary proper names lack “descriptive senses” and that the semantic content of such a name is just its referent but differs from less radical varieties of Millianism in claiming that any pair of sentences differing only in the exchange of coreferential names cannot differ in truth-value. This is what makes Radical Millianism radical. The view is surprisingly popular these days, and it is popular despite the fact that, until very recently, (...)
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  30. Against Direct Reference.Michael Devitt - 1989 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):206-240.
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  31. Referring When Push-Comes-to-Shove.Kevan Edwards - 2009 - In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    The anchoring focus of this paper is a cluster of complaints that have been raised against reference-based approaches to semantics, in particular against the view defended by Scott Soames (2002). I am going to lump the complaints that I have in mind under the heading of the Threat of Collapse (or the Threat, for short). At the heart of the Threat of Collapse is the accusation that various moves referentialists make in dealing with well-known problems end up undercutting the motivations (...)
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  32. Kripkean Externalism Versus Conceptual Analysis.Crawford L. Elder - 2003 - Facta Philosophica 5 (1):75-86.
  33. Russellianism and Referential Uses of Descriptions.Neil Feit - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (2):99 - 122.
    A number of philosophers continue to argue, inthe spirit of Keith Donnellans classic paperReference and Definite Descriptions, thatthere is more to the semantics of definitedescriptions than Russells theory predicts. If their arguments are correct, then a completesemantic theory for sentences that containdefinite descriptions will have to provide morethan one set of truth conditions. A unitaryRussellian analysis of sentences of the form`the F is G would not suffice. In this paper,I examine a recent line of argument for thisanti-Russellian conclusion.Unlike earlier Donnellan-style (...)
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  34. Direct Reference, Empty Names and Implicature.Mitchell S. Green - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):419-447.
    Angle Grinder Man removes wheel locks from cars in London.1 He is something of a folk hero, saving drivers from enormous parking and towing fi nes, and has succeeded thus far in eluding the authorities. In spite of his cape and lamé tights, he is no fi ction; he’s a real person. By contrast, Pegasus, Zeus and the like are fi ctions. None of them is real. In fact, not only is each of them different from the others, all differ (...)
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  35. Scientific Realism and Ordinary Usage.Oswald Hanfling - 1984 - Philosophical Investigations 7 (3):187-205.
  36. Direct Reference, Direct Perception, and the Cognitive Theory of Demonstratives.Robert Hanna - 1993 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):96-117.
  37. Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia.John Hawthorne - 2007 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
  38. Dancing Qualia and Direct Reference.John Hawthorne - 2006 - In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
  39. Language and Mind.John Hawthorne (ed.) - 2003 - Blackwell.
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  40. The Open Future Square of Opposition: A Defense.Elijah Hess - forthcoming - Sophia:1-15.
    This essay explores the validity of Gregory Boyd’s open theistic account of the nature of the future. In particular, it is an investigation into whether Boyd’s logical square of opposition for future contingents provides a model of reality for free will theists that can preserve both bivalence and a classical conception of omniscience. In what follows, I argue that it can.
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  41. Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence.T. Hofweber & A. Everett (eds.) - 2000 - CSLI Publications.
    Philosophers and theorists have long been puzzled by humans' ability to talk about things that do not exist, or to talk about things that they think exist but, in fact, do not. _Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence_ is a collection of 13 new works concerning the semantic and metaphysical issues arising from empty names, non-existence, and the nature of fiction. The contributors include some of the most important researchers working in these fields. Some of the papers develop (...)
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  42. New Essays on the Nature of Propositions.David Hunter & Gurpreet Rattan (eds.) - 2015 - Routledge.
    These are exciting times for philosophical theorizing about propositions, with the last 15 years seeing the development of new approaches and the emergence of new theorists. Propositions have been invoked to explain thought and cognition, the nature and attribution of mental states, language and communication, and in philosophical treatments of truth, necessity and possibility. According to Frege and Russell, and their followers, propositions are structured mind- and language-independent abstract objects which have essential and intrinsic truth-conditions. Some recent theorizing doubts whether (...)
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  43. Beyond Millianism.Leo Iacono - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):423 - 436.
    In Beyond Rigidity, Soames attempts to defend Millianism by articulating a novel account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing names. Soames uses this account both to respond to the objection that Millianism unintuitively allows the unrestricted substitution of coreferential names in propositional attitude contexts, and to generate a positive argument for Millianism. I argue that the positive argument fails, and that Soames’s account of the semantics and pragmatics of sentences containing names is inconsistent with Millianism.
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  44. An Idea of Donnellan.David Kaplan - 2011 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), Having In Mind: The Philosophy of Keith Donnellan. Oxford, but (c) David Kaplan. pp. 122-175.
    This is a story about three of my favorite philosophers—Donnellan, Russell, and Frege—about how Donnellan’s concept of having in mind relates to ideas of the others, and especially about an aspect of Donnellan’s concept that has been insufficiently discussed: how this epistemic state can be transmitted from one person to another.
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  45. How to Russell a Frege-Church.David Kaplan - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):716-729.
  46. The End of Millianism.Jerrold J. Katz - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):137 - 166.
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  47. Complex Demonstratives, QI Uses, and Direct Reference.Jeffrey C. King - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (1):99-117.
    result from combining the determiners `this' or `that' with syntactically simple or complex common noun phrases such as `woman' or `woman who is taking her skis off'. Thus, `this woman', and `that woman who is taking her skis off' are complex demonstratives. There are also plural complex demonstratives such as `these skis' and `those snowboarders smoking by the gondola'. My book Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account argues against what I call the direct reference account of complex demonstratives (henceforth DRCD) and (...)
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  48. Are Complex 'That' Phrases Devices of Direct Reference?Jeffrey C. King - 1999 - Noûs 33 (2):155-182.
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  49. A Puzzle About Belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.
  50. Intensionality, Modality, Rationality: Some Presemantic Considerations.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2010 - Journal of Pragmatics 42 (8):2314-2346.
    On the basis of arguments put forth by (Kripke, 1977a) and (Kripke, 1980), it is widely held that one can sometimes rationally accept propositions of the form "P and not-P" and also that there are necessary a posteriori truths. We will find that Kripke's arguments for these views appear probative only so long as one fails to distinguish between semantics and presemantics—between the literal meanings of sentences, on the one hand, and the information on the basis of which one identifies (...)
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