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  1. Simple and Sophisticated "Naive" Semantics.Peter Alward - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (1):101-122.
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  2. A Pragmatic Defense of Millianism.Arvid Båve - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):271 - 289.
    A new kind of defense of the Millian theory of names is given, which explains intuitive counter-examples as depending on pragmatic effects of the relevant sentences, by direct application of Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory and uncontroversial assumptions. I begin by arguing that synonyms are always intersubstitutable, despite Mates’ considerations, and then apply the method to names. Then, a fairly large sample of cases concerning names are dealt with in related ways. It is argued that the method, as (...)
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  3. Indexical Sinn: Fregeanism Versus Millianism.João Branquinho - 2014 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 26 (39):465-486.
    This paper discusses two notational variance views with respect to indexical singular reference and content: the view that certain forms of Millianism are at bottom notational variants of a Fregean theory of reference, the Fregean Notational Variance Claim; and the view that certain forms of Fregeanism are at bottom notational variants of a direct reference theory, the Millian Notational Variance Claim. While the former claim rests on the supposition that a direct reference theory could be easily turned into a particular (...)
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  4. On the Persistence of Indexical Belief.João Branquinho - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:21-30.
    This paper is devoted to an examination of the topic of cognitive dynamics as introduced by David Kaplan in his essay ‘Demonstratives’. I discuss two approaches to cognitive dynamics: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in Kaplan’s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans’s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan’s account and Evans’s account are on the whole defective (...)
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  5. Illogical, but Rational.David Braun - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):376–379.
    Stephen Schiffer says that Nathan Salmon and I are committed to the special-case consequence. He also says that it is possible for - to be true.
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  6. Cognitive Significance, Attitude Ascriptions, and Ways of Believing Propositions.David M. Braun - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):65-81.
    We use names to talk about objects. We use predicates to talk about properties and relations. We use sentences to attribute properties and relations to objects. We say things when we utter sentences, often things we believe.
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  7. Schiffer's Puzzle: A Kind of Fregean Response.Ray Buchanan - forthcoming - In Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things. Oxford University Press.
    In ‘What Reference Has to Tell Us about Meaning’, Stephen Schiffer argues that many of the objects of our beliefs, and the contents of our assertoric speech acts, have what he calls the relativity feature. A proposition has the relativity feature just in case it is an object-dependent proposition ‘the entertainment of which requires different people, or the same person at different times or places, to think of [the relevant object] in different ways’ (129). But as no Fregean or Russellian (...)
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  8. Pure Russellianism.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202.
    Abstract According to Russellianism, the content of a Russellian thought, in which a person ascribes a monadic property to an object, can be represented as an ordered couple of the object and the property. A consequence of this is that it is not possible for a person to believe that a is F and not to believe b is F, when a=b. Many critics of Russellianism suppose that this is possible and thus that Russellianism is false. Several arguments for this (...)
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  9. A Solution for Russellians to a Puzzle About Belief.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):223-29.
  10. A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription.B. Frances - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):116-125.
    These days the two most popular approaches to belief ascription are Millianism and Contextualism. The former approach is inconsistent with the existence of ordinary Frege cases, such as Lois believing that Superman flies while failing to believe that Clark Kent flies. The Millian holds that the only truth-conditionally relevant aspect of a proper name is its referent or extension. Contextualism, as I will define it for the purposes of this essay, includes all theories according to which ascriptions of the form (...)
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  11. The Four Puzzles of Reference.Bryan Frances - manuscript
  12. The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism.Bryan Frances - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):1007-1022.
    For years philosophers argued for the existence of distinct yet materially coincident things by appealing to modal and temporal properties. For instance, the statue was made on Monday and could not survive being flattened; the lump of clay was made months before and can survive flattening. Such arguments have been thoroughly examined. Kit Fine has proposed a new set of arguments using the same template. I offer a critical evaluation of what I take to be his central lines of reasoning.
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  13. Disquotation and Substitutivity.Bryan Frances - 2000 - Mind 109 (435):519-25.
    Millianism is reasonable; that is, it is reasonable to think that all there is to the semantic value of a proper name is its referent. But Millianism appears to be undermined by the falsehood of Substitutivity, the principle that interchanging coreferential proper names in an intentional context cannot change the truth value of the resulting belief report. Mary might be perfectly rational in assenting to ‘Twain was a great writer’ as well as ‘Clemens was not a great writer’. Her confusion (...)
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  14. Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):203–226.
    Kripke’s puzzle has puts pressure on the intuitive idea that one can believe that Superman can fly without believing that Clark Kent can fly. If this idea is wrong then many theories of belief and belief ascription are built from faulty data. I argue that part of the proper analysis of Kripke’s puzzle refutes the closure principles that show up in many important arguments in epistemology, e.g., if S is rational and knows that P and that P entails Q, then (...)
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  15. Defending the Defense.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Mind 108 (431):563-566.
    My hunch has always been that in the end, Fregeanism will defeat Millianism. So I suspect that my (1998) arguments on behalf of Millianism are flawed. Peter Graham (1999) is confident he has found the flaws, but he has not. I hope that some clarification will encourage others to reveal the errors.
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  16. Arguing for Frege's Fundamental Principle.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):341–346.
    Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief demonstrates the lack of soundness of the traditional argument for the Fregean fundamental principle that the sentences 'S believes that a is F' and 'S believes that b is F' can differ in truth value even if a = b. This principle is a crucial premise in the traditional Fregean argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, individuative elements of beliefs that are sensitive to our varying conceptions of what the beliefs are about. Joseph (...)
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  17. Defending Millian Theories.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):703-728.
    In this article I offer a three-pronged defense of Millian theories, all of which share the rough idea that all there is to a proper name is its referent, so it has no additional sense. I first give what I believe to be the first correct analysis of Kripke’s puzzle and its anti-Fregean lessons. The main lesson is that the Fregean’s arguments against Millianism and for the existence of semantically relevant senses (that is, individuative elements of propositions or belief contents (...)
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  18. Philosophy of Language and Webs of Information.Heimir Geirsson - 2012 - Routledge.
    Introduction and overview -- Reference -- Propositions: structure and objects -- Reporting attitudes -- Singular propositions and acquaintance -- Beliefs and belief reports -- Empty names -- Attitude contexts: beliefs and justification.
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  19. Direct Reference and Implicature.Mitchell S. Green - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (1):61-90.
    On some formulations of Direct Reference the semantic value, relative to a context of utterance, of a rigid singular term is just its referent. In response to the apparent possibility of a difference in truth value of two sentences just alike save for containing distinct but coreferential rigid singular terms, some proponents of Direct Reference have held that any two such sentences differ only pragmatically. Some have also held, more specifically, that two such sentences differ by conveying distinct conversational implicata, (...)
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  20. De Re Belief.David Kaplan - 2013 - In Richard Hull (ed.), Presidential Addresses of The American Philosophical Association 1981–1990. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 25-37.
  21. Opacity.David Kaplan - 1986 - In Lewis Edwin Hahn & Paul Arthur Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. Open Court. pp. 229-289.
  22. Russellianism Unencumbered.Mark McCullagh - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    Richard Heck, Jr has recently argued against Russellianism about proper names not in the usual way—by appeal to “intuitions” about the truth conditions of “that”-clause belief ascriptions—but by appeal to our need to specify beliefs in a way that reflects their individuation. Since beliefs are individuated by their psychological roles and not their Russellian contents, he argues, Russellianism is precluded in principle from accounting for our ability to specify beliefs in ordinary language. I argue that Heck thus makes things easier (...)
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  23. A Russellian Account of Belief Sentences.Michael McDermott - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):141-157.
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  24. On Proper Names in Belief Ascriptions.Thomas McKay - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 39 (3):287-303.
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  25. On Non-Pragmatic Millianism.Andrea Onofri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):305-327.
    Speakers often judge the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Superman flies” to be true and the sentence “Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies” to be false. If Millianism is true, however, these sentences express the very same proposition and must therefore have same truth value. “Pragmatic” Millians like Salmon and Soames have tried to explain speakers’ “anti-substitution intuitions” by claiming that the two sentences are routinely used to pragmatically convey different propositions which do have different truth values. “Non-Pragmatic” Millians (...)
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  26. Semantics for Propositional Attitude Ascriptions.Graham Oppy - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (1):1 - 18.
    This paper provides a semantics for propositional attitude ascriptions. (In this respect, the title of the paper is quite well chosen.).
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  27. A Problem for Russellian Theories of Belief.Gary Ostertag - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):249 - 267.
    Russellianism is characterized as the view that ‘that’-clauses refer to Russellian propositions, familiar set-theoretic pairings of objects and properties. Two belief-reporting sentences, S and S*, possessing the same Russellian content, but differing in their intuitive truthvalue, are provided. It is argued that no Russellian explanation of the difference in apparent truthvalue is available, with the upshot that the Russellian fails to explain how a speaker who asserts S but rejects S* can be innocent of inconsistency, either in what she says (...)
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  28. A Puzzle About Disbelief.Gary Ostertag - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (11):573 - 593.
    According to the naive theory of belief reports, our intuition that “Lois believes that Kent flies” is false results from our mistakenly identifying what this sentence implicates, which is false, with what it says, which is true. Whatever the merits of this proposal, it is here argued that the naive theory’s analysis of negative belief reports—sentences such as “Lois doesn't believe that Kent flies”—gives rise to equally problematic clashes with intuition, but that in this case no “pragmatic” explanation is available. (...)
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  29. Attitude Ascriptions and Acceptable Translations.Mark Pinder - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):530-540.
    Critical notice of Mark Richard's 'Context and the Attitudes: Meaning in Context, Volume 1'.
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  30. The Price of Innocent Millianism.Stefano Predelli - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):335-356.
    According to the view I call `innocent Millianism', that-clauses differing only for occurrences of co-referential names provide the same contribution to the intensional profile of a belief report. It is widely believed by friends and foes of innocent Millianism alike that this approach entails either the denial of what I label a `naïve' account ofbelief reports, or a dismissive attitude towards our semantic intuitions. In this essay, I counter that the conjunction of innocent Millianism and the naïve view of belief (...)
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  31. Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions.Ian Proops - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (2):151-205.
    The paper argues that philosophers commonly misidentify the substitutivity principle involved in Russell’s puzzle about substitutivity in “On Denoting”. This matters because when that principle is properly identified the puzzle becomes considerably sharper and more interesting than it is often taken to be. This article describes both the puzzle itself and Russell's solution to it, which involves resources beyond the theory of descriptions. It then explores the epistemological and metaphysical consequences of that solution. One such consequence, it argues, is that (...)
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  32. Attitudes in Context.Mark Richard - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (2):123 - 148.
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  33. Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them.Mark Richard - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defence of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is 'psychologically real'. The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important issues (...)
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  34. Direct Reference and Ascriptions of Belief.Mark Richard - 1983 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (4):425--52.
  35. Frege’s Puzzle and Frege Cases: Defending a Quasi-Syntactic Solution.Robert D. Rupert - 2008 - Cognitive Systems Research 9:76-91.
    There is no doubt that social interaction plays an important role in language-learning, as well as in concept acquisition. In surprising contrast, social interaction makes only passing appearance in our most promising naturalistic theories of content. This is particularly true in the case of mental content (e.g., Cummins, 1996; Dretske, 1981, 1988; Fodor, 1987, 1990a; Millikan, 1984); and insofar as linguistic content derives from mental content (Grice, 1957), social interaction seems missing from our best naturalistic theories of both.1 In this (...)
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  36. The Resilience of Illogical Belief.Nathan Salmon - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):369–375.
    Although Professor Schiffer and I have many times disagreed, I share his deep and abiding commitment to argument as a primary philosophical tool. Regretting any communication failure that has occurred, I endeavor here to make clearer my earlier reply in “Illogical Belief” to Schiffer’s alleged problem for my version of Millianism.1 I shall be skeletal, however; the interested reader is encouraged to turn to “Illogical Belief” for detail and elaboration. I have argued that to bear a propositional attitude de re (...)
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  37. Naming, Necessity, and Beyond. [REVIEW]Nathan Salmon - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):475-492.
  38. Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt.Nathan Salmon - 1995 - Noûs 29 (1):1-20.
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  39. Illogical Belief.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:243-285.
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  40. Substitution, Simple Sentences, and Sex Scandals.Jennifer M. Saul - 1999 - Analysis 59 (262):106–112.
  41. The Pragmatics of Attitude Ascription.Jennifer M. Saul - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (3):363-389.
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  42. Reply to Forbes.Jennifer M. Saul - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):114–118.
  43. The 'Fido'-Fido Theory of Belief.Stephen Schiffer - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 1:455-480.
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  44. A Problem for a Direct-Reference Theory of Belief Reports.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):361-368.
    (1) The propositions we believe and say are _Russellian_ _propositions_: structured propositions whose basic components are the objects and properties our thoughts and speech acts are about. (2) Many singular terms.
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  45. Three Problems for Richard's Theory of Belief Ascription.Theodore Sider - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):487 - 513.
    Some contemporary Russellians, defenders of the view that the semantic content of a proper name, demonstrative or indexical is simply its referent, are prepared to accept that view’s most infamous apparent consequence: that coreferential names, demonstratives, indexicals, etc. are intersubstitutable salva veritate, even in intentional contexts. Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames argue that our recalcitrant intuitions with respect to the famous apparent counterexamples are not semantic intuitions, but rather pragmatic intuitions. Strictly and literally speaking, Lois Lane believes, and even knows (...)
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  46. Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content.Scott Soames - 2009 - In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 33-71.
  47. Beyond Singular Propositions?Scott Soames - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):515 - 549.
  48. The Import of the Puzzle About Belief.David Sosa - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (3):373 - 402.
    Relocating Kripke's puzzle about belief, this paper investigates i) in what the puzzle consists, exactly; ii) the method used in its construction; and iii) relations between meaning and rationality. Essential to Kripke's puzzle is a normative notion of contradictory belief. Different positions about the meaning of names yield different views of what constitutes the attribution of contradictory belief; and Kripke's puzzle unwittingly _imports a Millian assumption. Accordingly, the puzzle about belief is not independent of positions about the meaning of names.
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  49. Frege's Puzzle and Descriptive Enrichment.Jeff Speaks - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):267-282.
    Millians sometimes claim that we can explain the fact that sentences like "If Hesperus exists, then Hesperus is Phosphorus" seem a posteriori to speakers in terms of the fact that utterances of sentences of this sort would typically pragmatically convey propositions which really are a posteriori. I argue that this kind of pragmatic explanation of the seeming a posterioricity of sentences of this sort fails. The main reason is that for every sentence like the above which (by Millian lights) is (...)
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  50. Do Conversational Implicatures Explain Substitutivity Failures?Cara Spencer - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):126–139.
    The Russellian approach to the semantics of attitude ascriptions faces a problem in explaining the robust speaker intuitions that it does not predict. A familiar response to the problem is to claim that utterances of attitude ascriptions may differ in their Gricean conversational implicatures. I argue that the appeal to Grice is ad hoc. First, we find that speakers do not typically judge an utterance false merely because it implicates something false. The apparent cancellability of the putative implicatures is irrelevant, (...)
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