Science and Values

Edited by Matthew J. Brown (University of Texas at Dallas, University of Texas at Dallas)
Assistant editor: Daniel Hicks
About this topic
Summary Science and values is a multifaceted discussion in the philosophy of science, as there are a variety of ways the conjunction of the two can be understood. Two major theses in this area are (1) that scientific inquiry, rather than being a simple matter of evidence and logic or rule-governed inference, requires a variety of value judgments, and (2) that social (ethical, prudential, political, etc.) values play some role in scientific inquiry. Arguments for the first thesis have generally proceeded from some sort of uncertainty or indeterminacy in the relationship of evidence and theory, such as the underdetermination of theory by evidence. Defenders of this thesis have posited a special set of values, termed "epistemic" or "cognitive", which play a privileged role in scientific inquiry, e.g., simplicity, scope or universality, fruitfulness, accuracy. Proponents of the second thesis have argued either that epistemic values have no special status vis-a-vis other sorts of values, that epistemic values are insufficient to determine theory appraisal, or that decisions about epistemic values depend on contextual social values. Feminist philosophers of science and social studies of science have been particularly important in forwarding the second sort of argument. Those who argue that science is laden with social values have also relied on the argument from inductive risk (the trade-off between false negative and false positive errors).  In addition to these two main issues, the category of social values includes a variety of other important issues, such as the responsible conduct of research, the relation between science and religion, the role of science in policy and politics, the politics of science, the democratization of science, and the extent to which science can generate social and ethical norms (if at all). 
Key works On the role of epistemic values in science, Kuhn 1977, McMullin 1982,and Laudan 1984 are the key works. Rooney 1992 and Longino 1996 examine the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic (or cognitive and non-cognitive) values. On the role of social values in science, two of the most historically important works are Rudner 1953 and Hempel 1965. Feminist philosophers of science have played a central role in this debate, e.g., Longino 1987, Longino 1990, Nelson 1990, Harding 1991, Fox & Longino Helen 1996, Intemann 2001, Harding 2004, and Kourany 2010. Lacey 1999, Anderson 2004, and Intemann 2005 challenge some of the key assumptions of the arguments for values in science debate. Much of the recent debate over social values in science stems from Douglas 2000, Douglas 2009, Kitcher 2001, and Kitcher 2011.    
Introductions Allchin ms; Longino 2008; Wylie et al 2010; Machamer & Wolters 2004; Carrier et al 2008; Kincaid et al 2007
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1630 found
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  1. added 2019-01-17
    Rescuing Objectivity: A Contextualist Proposal.Jack Wright - 2018 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (4):385-406.
    Ascriptions of objectivity carry significant weight. But they can also cause confusion because wildly different ideas of what it means to be objective are common. Faced with this, some philosophers have argued that objectivity should be eliminated. I will argue, against one such position, that objectivity can be useful even though it is plural. I will then propose a contextualist approach for dealing with objectivity as a way of rescuing what is useful about objectivity while acknowledging its plurality.
  2. added 2019-01-15
    Values, Regulation, and Species Delimitation.Stijn Conix - 2018 - Zootaxa 4415 (2):390-392.
    Garnett and Christidis (2017) [hereafter GC] recently proposed that the International Union of the Biological Sciences should centrally regulate the taxonomy of complex organisms. Their proposal was met with much criticism (e.g. Hołyński 2017; Thomson et al., 2018), and perhaps most extensively from Raposo et al. (2017) in this journal. The main target of this criticism was GC’s call to, first, “restrict the freedom of taxonomic action”, and, second, to let social, political and conservation values weigh in on species classification. (...)
  3. added 2019-01-11
    Weaving Value Judgment Into the Tapestry of Science.Matthew J. Brown - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (10).
    I critically analyze Kevin Elliott’s A Tapestry of Values in order to tease out his views on the nature and status of values or value judgments in the text. I show there is a tension in Elliott’s view that is closely connected to a major lacuna in the philosophical literature on values in science: the need for a better theory of values.
  4. added 2019-01-05
    Karl Popper, Science and Enlightenment (Nicholas Maxwell) (Review). [REVIEW]William Peden - 2018 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 22 (44).
    Nicholas Maxwell is not afraid of big ideas. As the title suggests, this book covers several sweeping topics: aside from those in the title, Maxwell discusses the methodology of social science, interdisciplinarity, quantum mechanics, and more besides. Given the 325-page word-length, this scope inevitably means that the ideas and arguments are frequently underdeveloped. However, despite this proportion of pages to topics, Maxwell's book is clear, accessible, and (most importantly) thought-provoking.
  5. added 2018-12-20
    Kevin C. Elliott and Ted Richards , Exploring Inductive Risk. Case Studies of Values in Science.Federica Russo - forthcoming - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science.
  6. added 2018-12-20
    Value-Free Science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge. Robert N. Proctor.Jerome R. Ravetz - 1992 - Isis 83 (4):635-636.
  7. added 2018-12-14
    Reports of the Death of Value-Free Science Are Greatly Exaggerated.Josef Mattes - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-11.
    The present paper discusses the claim that value-free science is impossible. After applauding the observation of Colombo et al. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7: 743–763, that this is at least to a considerable extent a psychological question, and should therefore be studied using the methods of psychological science, the studies performed by these authors were examined and unfortunately found seriously wanting in various respects. Beyond the merits or demerits of that particular piece of work, the discussion lead to a (...)
  8. added 2018-11-26
    Exploration and Exploitation in Scientific Inquiry: Towards a Society of Explorers.Roope Oskari Kaaronen - unknown
    This essay argues that scientific systems have two main functions typical to self-organising adaptive and complex systems: Exploration for and exploitation of information. The self-organising nature, or spontaneous order, of scientific systems was prominently conceived by polymath Michael Polanyi. Revisiting Polanyi’s philosophy of science reveals why scientific freedom is still today as important a value as ever, even though the notion of “freedom” itself must be revised. Namely, freedom of inquiry should serve to maintain a diverse and adaptive balance between (...)
  9. added 2018-11-09
    Hugh Lacey: Is Science Value Free?: Values & Scientific Understanding. [REVIEW]Heather Douglas - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):386-389.
  10. added 2018-11-02
    Elliott, Kevin C. , A Tapestry of Values: An Introduction to Values in Science, New York: Oxford University Press, 224pp, ISBN 9780190260804. [REVIEW]Francesco Orsi - 2017 - Acta Baltica Historiae Et Philosophiae Scientiarum 5 (2):116-121.
  11. added 2018-10-21
    Précis of A Tapestry of Values: An Introduction to Values in Science.Kevin C. Elliott - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10.
  12. added 2018-10-19
    A Tapestry of Values: Response to My Critics.Kevin C. Elliott - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (11).
    This response addresses the excellent responses to my book provided by Heather Douglas, Janet Kourany, and Matt Brown. First, I provide some comments and clarifications concerning a few of the highlights from their essays. Second, in response to the worries of my critics, I provide more detail than I was able to provide in my book regarding my three conditions for incorporating values in science. Third, I identify some of the most promising avenues for further research that flow out of (...)
  13. added 2018-10-19
    Adding to the Tapestry. [REVIEW]Janet A. Kourany - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (9).
    Kevin Elliott’s A Tapestry of Values is a terrific book, chock full of valuable case studies and incisive analyses. It aims to be useful not only to students of philosophy of science and the other areas of science studies but also to practicing scientists, policymakers, and the public at large—a tall order. And it succeeds admirably for many of these folks. In my comments I suggest what it would need for the rest.
  14. added 2018-10-18
    From Tapestry to Loom: Broadening the Perspective on Values in Science.Heather Douglas - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (8).
    After raising some minor philosophical points about Kevin Elliott’s A Tapestry of Values (2017), I argue that we should expand on the themes raised in the book and that philosophers of science need to pay as much attention to the loom of science (i.e., the institutional structures which guide the pursuit of science) as the tapestry of science. The loom of science includes such institutional aspects as patents, funding sources, and evaluation regimes that shape how science gets pursued, and that (...)
  15. added 2018-10-15
    Speech Act Theory and the Multiple Aims of Science.Paul L. Franco - manuscript
    I draw upon speech act theory to understand the speech acts appropriate to the multiple aims of scientific practice and the role of nonepistemic values in evaluating speech acts made relative to those aims. First, I look at work that distinguishes explaining from describing within scientific practices. I then argue speech act theory provides a framework to make sense of how explaining, describing, and other acts have different felicity conditions. Finally, I argue that if explaining aims to convey understanding to (...)
  16. added 2018-09-24
    Theory and Practice of Feminist Postcolonial Science Studies: Sandra Harding’s Is Science Multicultural? [REVIEW]David J. Stump - 2001 - Radical Philosophy Review 4 (1/2):263-265.
  17. added 2018-09-07
    Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective?Anna Alexandrova - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):421-445.
    Well–being, health and freedom are some of the many phenomena of interest to science whose definitions rely on a normative standard. Empirical generalizations about them thus present a special case of value-ladenness. I propose the notion of a ‘mixed claim’ to denote such generalizations. Against the prevailing wisdom, I argue that we should not seek to eliminate them from science. Rather, we need to develop principles for their legitimate use. Philosophers of science have already reconciled values with objectivity in several (...)
  18. added 2018-09-06
    Paradox and Tragedy in Human Morality.Pouwel Slurink - 1994 - International Political Science Review 15 (347):378.
    An evolutionary approach to ethics supports, to some extent, the sceptical meta-ethics found by some of the Greek sophists and Nietzsche. On the other hand, a modern naturalistic account on the origin and nature of morality, leads to somewhat different conclusions. This is demonstrated with an answer to three philosophical questions: does real freedom exist?, does the good, or real virtue, exist?, does life have a meaning?
  19. added 2018-09-01
    Pragmatic Encroachment on Scientific Knowledge?Mikkel Gerken - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    Pragmatic encroachment theories of knowledge may be characterized as views according to which practical factors may partly determine the truth-value of ascriptions that S knows that p – even though these factors do not partly determine S’s belief that p or p itself. The pros and cons of variations of pragmatic encroachment are widely discussed in epistemology. But despite a long pragmatist tradition in the philosophy of science, few efforts have been devoted to relate this particular view to issues in (...)
  20. added 2018-08-31
    The Flight Against Doubt.Inmaculada de Melo-Martin & Kristen Intemann - 2018 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    The lack of public support for climate change policies and refusals to vaccinate children are just two alarming illustrations of the impacts of dissent about scientific claims. Dissent can lead to confusion, false beliefs, and widespread public doubt about highly justified scientific evidence. Even more dangerously, it has begun to corrode the very authority of scientific consensus and knowledge. Deployed aggressively and to political ends, some dissent can intimidate scientists, stymie research, and lead both the public and policymakers to oppose (...)
  21. added 2018-08-24
    A Critical Context For Longino’s Critical Contextual Empiricism.Miriam Solomon & Alan Richardson - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (1):211-222.
  22. added 2018-08-13
    What is Inductive Risk? [REVIEW]S. Andrew Schroeder - forthcoming - Metascience:1-4.
  23. added 2018-07-18
    Christianisme et théorie de l'information. Science et théologie dans l'œuvre de Claude Tresmontant.Philippe Gagnon - 1998 - Paris: F.-X. de Guibert.
    Taking as a starting point for his quest the teaching received from the Hebrew prophets and transmitted by the people of Israel, Claude Tresmontant identifies in it the specific moment where an entirely new and creative thought is introduced in the history of mankind. Trained in philosophy of science and conscious of the discipline involved in a rigorous experimental method as a key to valid and true knowledge, Claude Tresmontant boldly recreated bridges, long destroyed, between science and philosophy of nature, (...)
  24. added 2018-07-14
    Making Uncertainties Explicit: The Jeffreyan Value-Free Ideal and its Limits.David M. Frank - 2017 - In Kevin C. Elliott & Ted Richards (eds.), Exploring Inductive Risk. New York, NY, USA:
    According to Richard Jeffrey’s value-free ideal, scientists should avoid making value judgments about inductive risks by offering explicit representations of scientific uncertainty to decision-makers, who can use these to make decisions according to their own values. Some philosophers have responded by arguing that higher-order inductive risks arise in the process of producing representations of uncertainty. This chapter explores this line of argument and its limits, arguing that the Jeffreyan value-free ideal is achievable in contexts where methodological decisions introduce minimal higher-order (...)
  25. added 2018-07-14
    'Biodiversity’ and Biological Diversities: Consequences of Pluralism Between Biology and Policy.David M. Frank - 2017 - In Justin Garson, Sahotra Sarkar & Anya Plutynski (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Biodiversity. New York, NY, USA: pp. 96-109.
  26. added 2018-07-06
    Which Values Should Be Built Into Economic Measures?S. Andrew Schroeder - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy.
    Many economic measures are structured to reflect ethical values. I describe three attitudes towards this: maximalism, according to which we should aim to build all relevant values into measures; minimalism, according to which we should aim to keep values out of measures; and an intermediate view. I argue the intermediate view is likely correct, but existing versions are inadequate. In particular, economists have strong reason to structure measures to reflect fixed, as opposed to user-assessable, values. I conclude by arguing that, (...)
  27. added 2018-06-20
    Bridging a Fault Line: On Underdetermination and the Ampliative Adequacy of Competing Theories.Guy Axtell - 2014 - In Editor Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Synthese Library. pp. 227-245.
    This paper pursues Ernan McMullin‘s claim ("Virtues of a Good Theory" and related papers on theory-choice) that talk of theory virtues exposes a fault-line in philosophy of science separating "very different visions" of scientific theorizing. It argues that connections between theory virtues and virtue epistemology are substantive rather than ornamental, since both address underdetermination problems in science, helping us to understand the objectivity of theory choice and more specifically what I term the ampliative adequacy of scientific theories. The paper argues (...)
  28. added 2018-06-20
    Just Methods: An Interdisciplinary Reader.Alison M. Jaggar (ed.) - 2013 - Paradigm.
    The supplemented edition of this important reader includes a substantive new introduction by the author on the changing nature of feminist methodology. It takes into account the implications of a major new study included for this first time in this book on poverty and gender (in)equality, and it includes an article discussing the ways in which this study was conducted using the research methods put forward by the first edition. This article begins by explaining why a new and better poverty (...)
  29. added 2018-06-08
    Well-Ordered Science: The Case of GM Crops.Matthew J. Lister - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (Supplement):127-139.
    The debate over the use of genetically-modified crops is one where the heat to light ratio is often quite low. Both proponents and opponents of GM crops often resort more to rhetoric than argument. This paper attempts to use Philip Kitcher’s idea of a “well-ordered science” to bring coherence to the debate. While I cannot, of course, here decide when and where, if at all, GM crops should be used I do show how Kitcher’s approach provides a useful framework in (...)
  30. added 2018-06-07
    The Aesthetics of Theory Selection and the Logics of Art.Ian O'Loughlin & Katie McCallum - 2018 - Philosophy of Science.
    Philosophers of science discuss whether theory selection depends on aesthetic judgments or criteria, and whether these putatively aesthetic features are genuinely extra-epistemic. As examples, judgments involving criteria such as simplicity and symmetry are often cited. However, other theory selection criteria, such as fecundity, coherence, internal consistency, and fertility, more closely match those criteria used in art contexts and by scholars working in aesthetics. Paying closer attention to the way these criteria are used in art contexts allows us to understand some (...)
  31. added 2018-06-06
    What’s Wrong With Science? Towards a People’s Rational Science of Delight and Compassion, Second Edition.Nicholas Maxwell - 2009 - London: Pentire Press.
    What ought to be the aims of science? How can science best serve humanity? What would an ideal science be like, a science that is sensitively and humanely responsive to the needs, problems and aspirations of people? How ought the institutional enterprise of science to be related to the rest of society? What ought to be the relationship between science and art, thought and feeling, reason and desire, mind and heart? Should the social sciences model themselves on the natural sciences: (...)
  32. added 2018-06-05
    Scientists as Experts: A Distinct Role?Torbjørn Gundersen - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 69:52-59.
    The role of scientists as experts is crucial to public policymaking. However, the expert role is contested and unsettled in both public and scholarly discourse. In this paper, I provide a systematic account of the role of scientists as experts in policymaking by examining whether there are any normatively relevant differences between this role and the role of scientists as researchers. Two different interpretations can be given of how the two roles relate to each other. The separability view states that (...)
  33. added 2018-06-05
    The Dangers of Pragmatic Virtue.Daniel Nolan - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):623-644.
    Many people want to hold that some theoretical virtues—simplicity, elegance, familiarity or others—are only pragmatic virtues. That is, these features do not give us any more reason to think a theory is true, or close to true, but they justify choosing one theoretical option over another because they are desirable for some other, practical purpose. Using pragmatic virtues in theory choice apparently brings with it a dilemma: if we are deciding what to accept on the basis of considerations that are (...)
  34. added 2018-06-02
    Run the Experiment, Publish the Study, Close the Sale: Commercialized Biomedical Research.Aleta Quinn - 2016 - De Ethica 2 (3):5-21.
    Business models for biomedical research prescribe decentralization due to market selection pressures. I argue that decentralized biomedical research does not match four normative philosophical models of the role of values in science. Non-epistemic values affect the internal stages of for-profit biomedical science. Publication planning, effected by Contract Research Organizations, inhibits mechanisms for transformative criticism. The structure of contracted research precludes attribution of responsibility for foreseeable harm resulting from methodological choices. The effectiveness of business strategies leads to overrepresentation of profit values (...)
  35. added 2018-05-15
    Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, Xii + 229 Pp., US$88.50. [REVIEW]István S. N. Berkeley - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (4):837-.
  36. added 2018-05-15
    Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science Larry Laudan Chicago: University of Chicago, Press, 1990. Xii + 180 P., $16.85. [REVIEW]James Robert Brown - 1992 - Dialogue 31 (2):333-.
  37. added 2018-04-18
    The Significance of Self-Fulfilling Science.Charles Lowe - 2018 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (4):343-363.
    Once lively debates concerning the philosophical significance of self-fulfilling science, or the causal contribution of science to bringing about the states of affairs it depicts, lapsed in the 1970s. Recent claims concerning the influence of economic theory on the behavior it predicts or explains seem poised to revitalize discussion, yet lack of clarity abounds concerning the key features of such cases and the philosophical issues to which they might be relevant. In this paper, I examine a paradigmatic case of self-fulfilling (...)
  38. added 2018-04-17
    Rational Endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
    It is valuable for inquiry to have researchers who are committed advocates of their own theories. However, in light of pervasive disagreement, such a commitment is not well explained by the idea that researchers believe their theories. Instead, this commitment, the rational attitude to take toward one’s favored theory during the course of inquiry, is what I call endorsement. Endorsement is a doxastic attitude, but one which is governed by a different type of epistemic rationality. This inclusive epistemic rationality is (...)
  39. added 2018-04-07
    Reviewed Work: Theory of Experimental Inference by C. West Churchman. [REVIEW] Anonymous - 1948 - Synthese 7 (4):365-366.
  40. added 2018-03-15
    Everyday Practice of Science: Where Intuition and Passion Meeting Objectivity and Logic.Fred Grinnell - 2009 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
  41. added 2018-03-05
    Inductive Risk and Regulatory Toxicology: A Comment on de Melo-Martín and Intemann.Daniel Hicks - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (1):164-174.
    Inmaculada de Melo-Martín and Kristen Intemann consider whether, from the perspective of the argument from inductive risk, ethical and political values might be logically, epistemically, pragmatically, or ethically necessary in the “core” of scientific reasoning. In each case, they argue that there are significant conceptual problems. In this comment, employing regulatory uses of high-throughput toxicology at the US Environmental Protection Agency as a case study, I respond to some of their claims about the notion of “pragmatic necessity.” I conclude that, (...)
  42. added 2018-03-05
    Is Consistency Overrated?S. Andrew Schroeder - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (3):199-200.
    In their insightful article, ‘The Disvalue of Death in the Global Burden of Disease’, Solberg et al argue that there is a potential incoherence in the way disability-adjusted life years are calculated. Morbidity is measured in years lived with disability in a way quite unlike the way mortality is measured in years of life lost. This potentially renders them incommensurable, like apples and oranges, and makes their aggregate—DALYs—conceptually unsound. The authors say that it is ‘vital’ to address this problem, that (...)
  43. added 2018-02-18
    Trust, Expertise, and the Philosophy of Science.Kyle Powys Whyte & Robert Crease - 2010 - Synthese 177 (3):411-425.
    Trust is a central concept in the philosophy of science. We highlight how trust is important in the wide variety of interactions between science and society. We claim that examining and clarifying the nature and role of trust (and distrust) in relations between science and society is one principal way in which the philosophy of science is socially relevant. We argue that philosophers of science should extend their efforts to develop normative conceptions of trust that can serve to facilitate trust (...)
  44. added 2018-02-18
    Biomedical Research, Neglected Diseases, and Well-Ordered Science.Philip Kitcher - 2009 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 24 (3):263-282.
    In this paper we make a proposal for reforming biomedical research that is aimed to align research more closely with the so-called fair-share principle according to which the proportions of global resources assigned to different diseases should agree with the ratios of human suffering associated with those diseases.
  45. added 2018-02-18
    Environmental Pollution and Professional Responsibility: Ibsen's A Public Enemy as a Seminar on Science Communication and Ethics.Hub Zwart - 2004 - Environmental Values 13 (3):349-372.
    Dr Stockmann, the principal character in Henrik Ibsen's A Public Enemy, is a classic example of a whistle-blower who, upon detecting and disclosing a serious case of environmental pollution, quickly finds himself transformed from a public benefactor into a political outcast by those in power. If we submit the play to a 'second reading', however, it becomes clear that the ethical intricacies of whistle-blowing are interwoven with epistemological issues. Basically, the play is about the complex task of communicating scientific data (...)
  46. added 2018-02-17
    The Undiscovered Dewey: Religion, Morality, and the Ethos of Democracy.Melvin L. Rogers - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    _The Undiscovered Dewey_ explores the profound influence of evolution and its corresponding ideas of contingency and uncertainty on John Dewey's philosophy of action, particularly its argument that inquiry proceeds from the uncertainty of human activity. Dewey separated the meaningfulness of inquiry from a larger metaphysical story concerning the certainty of human progress. He then connected this thread to the way in which our reflective capacities aid us in improving our lives. Dewey therefore launched a new understanding of the modern self (...)
  47. added 2018-02-17
    Pierre Duhem’s Virtue Epistemology.David J. Stump - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):149-159.
    Duhem’s concept of “good sense” is central to his philosophy of science, given that it is what allows scientist to decide between competing theories. Scientists must use good sense and have intellectual and moral virtues in order to be neutral arbiters of scientific theories, especially when choosing between empirically adequate theories. I discuss the parallels in Duhem’s views to those of virtue epistemologists, who understand justified belief as that arrived at by a cognitive agent with intellectual and moral virtues, showing (...)
  48. added 2018-02-17
    Technological Democracy or Democratic Technology?Jeff Kochan - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (2):401-412.
  49. added 2018-02-17
    Interests and Values in National Nutrition Policy in the United States.H. O. Kunkel & Paul B. Thompson - 1988 - Journal of Agricultural Ethics 1 (4):241-256.
    When scientists consider the interaction of science and value judgments, debates often occur. When public policy grows out of science, disagreements between scientists can become even more spirited. This paper examines the case of nutrition policy in the United States, which has been both at the interface between agriculture and medicine and the object of serious discord concerned with the strength and validity of the scientific evidence and the responsibility for action. The development of indirect intervention policies, designed to educate (...)
  50. added 2018-02-17
    Keller's Gender/Science System: Is the Philosophy of Science to Science as Science is to Nature?Kelly Oliver - 1988 - Hypatia 3 (3):137-148.
    I argue that although in "The Gender/Science System," Keller intends to formulate a middle ground position in order to open science to feminist criticisms without forcing it into relativism, she steps back into objectivism. While she endorses the dynamic-object model for science, she endorses the static-object model for philosophy of science. I suggest that by modeling her methodology for philosophy on her methodology for science her philosophy would better serve her feminist goals.
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