Science, Logic, and Mathematics

In this article, a comparative analysis of Karl Popper’s falsifiability theory and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning in the context of the historical-philosophical approach to the problem of new knowledge formation and justification is undertaken. An assumption is made that the constellation of fact is connected with the possibility of the emergence of an epistemological field. Researchers have repeatedly addressed this issue; however, one important detail received no due attention: Popper’s counter-arguments regarding Wittgenstein’s view on semantic paradoxes show the fundamental (...) difference of these philosophers’ views on the sign and the signified, which contributes to the analysis of new knowledge formation. Arguments that concern both early and late periods of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are used in this study. The uncertainty of the demarcation criterion allowed analyzing Wittgenstein’s position as to how and why different rules of inference form different epistemological fields. (shrink)

In their article, ‘That is not dead which can eternal lie: the aestivation hypothesis for resolving Fermi’s paradox’, Sandberg et al. try to explain the Fermi paradox by claiming that Landauer’s principle implies that a civilization can in principle perform far more times more) irreversible logical operations if it conserves its resources until the distant future when the cosmic background temperature is very low. So perhaps aliens are out there, but quietly waiting. Sandberg et al. implicitly assume, however, that computer-generated (...) entropy can only be disposed of by transferring it to the cosmological background. In fact, while this assumption may apply in the distant future, our universe today contains vast reservoirs and other physical systems in non-maximal entropy states, and computer-generated entropy can be transferred to them at the adiabatic conversion rate of one bit of negentropy to erase one bit of error. This can be done at any time, and is not improved by waiting for a low cosmic background temperature. Thus aliens need not wait to be active. As Sandberg et al. do not provide a concrete model of the effect they assert, we construct one and show where their informal argument goes wrong. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPaul Thompson's book The Spirit of the Soil first appeared in 1995, and has been re-issued in a new edition in 2017. This comment on the new edition addresses Thompson's argument concerning...

I apply homotopy type theory to the hole argument as formulated by Earman and Norton. I argue that HoTT gives a precise sense in which diffeomorphism-related Lorentzian manifolds represent the same spacetime, undermining Earman and Norton’s verificationist dilemma and common formulations of the hole argument. However, adopting this account does not alleviate worries about determinism: general relativity formulated on Lorentzian manifolds is indeterministic using this standard of sameness and the natural formalization of determinism in HoTT. Fixing this indeterminism results in (...) a more faithful mathematical representation of general relativity as used by physicists. It also gives a substantive notion of general covariance. (shrink)

Scientific discovery is an important moment in scientific pursuit, but only a few philosophers of science appreciate this moment as a logical issue. Starting from his understanding that all thought contains components of which we are subsidiarily aware in focal content of thinking, Michael Polanyi puts out his thesis that scientific discovery cannot be justified by a series of strictly explicit operations but by merely invoking deeper forms of commitment in sighting the problem and the vision of reality. This article (...) will delve into Polanyi’s notion of scientific discovery in three sections: the first section is dealing with Polanyi’s concept of heuristic philosophy which tones that discovery of problem is the primary requisite of a good scientist to vision reality, the second discusses the role of intellectual passions in scientific justification, and the third focuses on the ontological implication of scientific discovery that it guides us to comprehension of something real both tangible and intangible. The article concludes that since scientific discovery involves the creative and imaginative appeal to reality, its rationality must be counted on by its logical structure and personal experiences in scientific community. (shrink)

The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the increase in knowledge and understanding, respectively. Dellsén (2018) criticizes the epistemic account (Park, 2017a) and defends the noetic account (Dellsén, 2016). I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against the epistemic account fail, and that his notion of understanding, which he claims requires neither belief nor justification, cannot explain scientific progress, although it can explain fictional progress in science-fiction.

The production of scientific instruments in America was neither a postwar phenomenon nor dramatically different from that of several other developed countries. It did, however, undergo a step-change in direction, size and style during and after the war. The American scientific instrument industry after 1945 was intimately dependent on, and shaped by, prior American and European experience. This was true of the specific genres of instrument produced commercially; to links between industry and science; and, just as importantly, to manufacturing practices (...) and cultures. I will argue that, despite the new types of instrument commercialized after the war, this historical continuity of links with science and scientists guided and constrained the design and manufacture of these products. Nevertheless, new designers, manufacturers and customers gradually transformed the culture of scientific instruments in the second half of the century. -/- This chapter deals with a subset of the American instrument industry, namely the measuring and monitoring instruments manufactured for scientific use. Even with the specification of ‘scientific’ instruments, however, these borders are rather artificial and unclear: instrument making from the seventeenth through the twentieth century has generally involved the fabrication of both standard products and custom-made devices for scientific use.2 In this context of sales quantities, ‘scientific’ instruments have often been defined as low-volume, special-order or custom devices. In a similar vein, ‘scientific’ instruments were commonly distinguished from ‘production’ instruments by context of usage, namely their very absence from – and indeed irrelevance to – production environments. This demarcation according to customer and environment was mirrored in at least one furth er respect: the training of their users. The classification into ‘scientific’ and ‘engineering’ applications was as fluid as the relationship between American universities and technical industries themselves.Despite these complementary definitions, the notion of the ‘scientific instrument’ was beginning to prove inadequate even at the turn of the twentieth century, and dramatically so when discussing the post-Second World War period. Definitions altered qualitatively after the Second World War in at least three further ways: (a) new genres of device altered the scope of the scientific instrument; (b) the contribution of State and military sponsorship of new forms of instrument became significant; and, (c) the postwar demand for specialist instruments increased rapidly, owing to wartime innovation, new applications and new customers. I will explore the evolution of instrument manufacturing in this changing context of new technology, funding, development and markets. (shrink)

Is there room enough in all creation for an 'Empty Universe Theory'? How should we view the realm in which we exist? Are the natures of matter and energy, their compositions and relationships with each other the fundamental key to the understanding of everything or is it something else? A thought on the true nature of the realm we really inhabit with some basic mathematical description of the relationship between the finite and the absolute as we are capable of understanding (...) it. (shrink)

In How We Understand Others: Philosophy and Social Cognition, Shannon Spaulding develops a novel account of social cognition with pessimistic implications for mindreading accuracy: according to Spaulding, mistakes in mentalizing are much more common than traditional theories of mindreading commonly assume. In this commentary, I push against Spaulding’s pessimism from two directions. First, I argue that a number of the heuristic mindreading strategies that Spaulding views as especially error prone might be quite reliable in practice. Second, I argue that current (...) methods for measuring mindreading performance are not well-suited for the task of determining whether our mental-state attributions are generally accurate. I conclude that any claims about the accuracy or inaccuracy of mindreading are currently unjustified. (shrink)

We are teacher educators trying to recalibrate to the world of Trump. As we search to find our new bearings, we recognize that the markers of meaning that we relied on (such as civility and...

ABSTRACTA few decades ago, there was a lively debate on the problem of overpopulation. Various proposals to limit population growth and to control fertility were made and debated both in academia a...

In 2012 the Geological Time Scale, which sets the temporal framework for studying the timing and tempo of all major geological, biological, and climatic events in Earth's history, had one-quarter of all its boundaries moved in a prima facie puzzling, widespread revision of radiometric dates. In this paper I show how recent work in the philosophy of metrology can help us understand this episode, and in turn how a careful consideration of this case elucidates the distinct, but related, notions of (...) calibration, coherence, and consilience. In particular, I argue that coherence testing should be recognized as a distinct activity that precedes both calibration and consilience arguments, and I highlight the tradeoffs scientists often face between intercalibrating two measurement methods or keeping them independent for arguments of consilience. Finally, I show how the iterative nature of calibration leads to the problem of legacy data, which has been inadequately appreciated. (shrink)

Anthropogenic changes in the biosphere, driven mainly by human cultural habits and technological advances, are altering the direction of evolution on Earth, with ongoing and permanent changes modifying uncountable interactions between organisms, the environment, and humankind itself. While numerous species may go extinct, others will be favored due to strong human influences. The Bio-Evolutionary Anthropocene hypothesizes that directly or indirectly human-driven organisms, including alien species, hybrids, and genetically modified organisms, will have major roles in the evolution of life on Earth, (...) shifting the evolutionary pathways of all organisms through novel biological interactions in all habitats. We anticipate that, in future scenarios, novel organisms will be continuously created, and contemporary native organisms with no obvious economic use will decline—while anthropogenic-favored and novel organisms will spread. The Bio-Evolutionary Anthropocene hypothesis therefore predicts that humankind and novel organisms will interact within a strong evolutionary bias that will lead to unexpected, and probably irreversible, outcomes for the evolution of life on our planet. (shrink)

A compact microcontroller based photoacoustic spectrometer (PAS) has been designed and fabricated. The photoacoustic (PA) cell designed for the present study is of Helmholtz resonator type with a provision to measure the sample behavior as a function of temperature. In this system, an electret microphone is employed to achieve high signal to noise ratio. The microphone compartment is isolated from the sample compartment to avoid the heating effect to the electric microphone which detects the photoacoustic signal. A high-gain low-noise two (...) stage preamplifier, second order bandpass and tunable narrow band-pass filters have been designed with a low noise op-amp LM308 to improve signal quality. C8051F060 microcontroller-based phase sensitive detector has been implemented to measure the amplitude and phase of the signal from the photoacoustic cell. The applications of PAS for phase transition studies on some samples are presented. The designed system is low-cost, very compact and easy to carry the experiments for studying the thermal properties of samples. (shrink)

Cantor’s proof that the reals are uncountable forms a central pillar in the edifices of higher order recursion theory and set theory. It also has important applications in model theory, and in the foundations of topology and analysis. Due partly to these factors, and to the simplicity and elegance of the proof, it has come to be accepted as part of the ABC’s of mathematics. But even if as an Archimedean point it supports tomes of mathematical theory, there is a (...) question that demands clarification: What, exactly, does Cantor’s proof show? One of few places where this question is addressed is Appendix II of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. This essay is devoted to clarifying Wittgenstein’s remarks in that section. (shrink)

Les singularités de la relativité générale résultant de la résolution des équations d'Einstein ont été et font encore l'objet de nombreux débats scientifiques : existe-t-il des singularités dans l'espace-temps ou pas ? Big Bang a été une singularité initiale ? Si les singularités existent, quelle est leur ontologie ? La théorie générale de la relativité est-elle une théorie qui a montré ses limites dans ce cas ? Dans cet essai, je soutiens qu'il existe des singularités et que la théorie de (...) la relativité générale, comme toute autre théorie scientifique à l'heure actuelle, n'est pas valable pour les singularités. Toutefois, comme le pensent certains scientifiques, cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu’il doit être considéré comme obsolète. Après une brève présentation des aspects spécifiques de la théorie classique newtonienne et de la théorie de la relativité spéciale et une brève présentation de la théorie de la relativité générale, le chapitre Ontologie de la relativité générale présente les aspects ontologiques de la relativité générale. Le chapitre suivant, Singularités, est consacré à la présentation des singularités aboutissant à la relativité générale, aux aspects spécifiques des trous noirs et de l’horizon des événements, y compris le débat Big Bang en tant que singularité d’origine et aux arguments en faveur de l’existence de ces singularités. Dans l'Ontologie des singularités, je parle des possibilités d'encadrement ontologique des singularités en général et des trous noirs en particulier, de l'argument du trou mis en évidence par Einstein, et des arguments présentés par les scientifiques selon lesquels il n'y a pas de singularités et donc que la théorie générale de la relativité est dans l'impasse. Dans Conclusions, je décris et résume brièvement les arguments qui soutiennent mes vues ci-dessus. -/- TABLE: -/- Abstract Introduction - La théorie classique et la relativité restreinte - La relativité générale 1. Ontologie de la relativité générale 2. Singularités - 2.1 Trous noirs - - 2.1.1 Horizon des événements - 2.2 Big Bang - 2.3 Y a-t-il des singularités ? 3. L'ontologie des singularités - Ontologie des trous noirs - L'argument du trou - Il n'y a pas des singularités Conclusions Notes Bibliographie -/- Mots-clés : relativité générale, théorie de la relativité générale, Albert Einstein, singularités, trou noir, horizon des événements, Big Bang, cosmologie, gravité -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28102.01606 . (shrink)

A poor understanding of probability may lead people to misinterpret every day coincidences and form anomalistic beliefs. We investigated the relationship between anomalis...

ABSTRACTThe Spirit of the Soil was updated for its 2nd edition in 2017. Three comments on the update are addressed here. First, productionism was not intended as a explanation of farm management de...

In this short note I reply to criticisms of an argument in my paper that appear in comment. Baumann et al. raise one “main criticism” then go on to claim that the argument of Healey contains a series of problems. But their “main criticism” is not an objection to the argument and the problems are of their own making.

No evidence of “new physics” was found so far by LHC experiments, and this situation has led some voices in the physics community to call for the abandonment of the “naturalness” criterion, while other scientists have felt the need to break a lance in its defense by claiming that, at least in some sense, it has already led to successes and therefore should not be dismissed too quickly, but rather only reflected or reshaped to fit new needs. In our paper (...) we will argue that present pro-or-contra naturalness debates miss the fundamental point that naturalness, despite contrary claims, is essentially a very hazily defined, in a sense even mythical notion which, in the course of more than four decades, has been steadily, and often not coherently, shaped by its interplay with different branches of model-building in high-energy physics and cosmology on the one side, and new incoming experimental results on the other. In our paper we will endeavor to clear up some of the physical and philosophical haze by taking a closer look back at origin of naturalness in the 1970s and 1980s, with particular attention to the early work of Kenneth Wilson. In doing this, we aim to bring to light how naturalness belongs to a long tradition of present and past physical and philosophical criteria for effectively guiding theoretical reflection and experimental practice in fundamental research. (shrink)

According to the thesis of transparency, subjects can attend only to the representational content of perceptual experience, never to the intrinsic properties of experience that carry this representational content, i.e., to “mental paint.” So far, arguments for and against transparency were conducted from the armchair, relying mainly on introspective observations. In this paper, we argue in favor of transparency, relying on the cognitive neuroscience of attention. We present a trilemma to those who hold that attention can be directed to mental (...) paint. Such attention is either first-order sensory, higher-order cognitive, or higher-order sensory attention. We argue that the notion of first-order sensory attention to mental paint is incompatible with the neuroscience of sensory attention; that higher-order cognitive attention to mental paint is irrelevant to transparency; and that the notion of higher-order sensory attention to mental paint has an apparently incoherent prediction. Via elimination, these considerations support the thesis of transparency. (shrink)

Memorably in Nature, Jerry Coyne likened recalcitrant debates between species experts to barnacles on a whale, saying they “retard slightly the progress of the field”. However, experts have been happy to agree on at least this: species are evolving lineages. The importance of that putative fact, and of agreement about it, have been emphasized for over twenty years. Recent review works reaffirm both. But this lends some urgency to the unhappy fact that the exact nature of the implicated evolving lineages (...) remains unclear. Great, species are evolving lineages—but what are those, exactly? (shrink)

The paper presents a plan for negation, proposing a paradigm shift from the Australian plan for negation, leading to a family of contra-classical logics. The two main ideas are the following: Instead of shifting points of evaluation, shift the evaluated formula. Introduce an incompatibility set for every atomic formula, extended to any compound formula, and impose the condition on valuations that a formula evaluates to true iff all the formulas in its incompatibility set evaluate to false. Thus, atomic sentences are (...) not independent in their truth-values. The resulting negation, in addition to excluding the negated formula, provides a positive alternative to the negated formula. I also present a sound and complete natural deduction proof systems for those logics. In addition, the kind of negation considered in this paper is shown to provide an innovative notion of grounding negation. (shrink)

How do you effectively teach moral philosophy to classes of twenty to thirty-five students who come from diverse national, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and educational backgrounds, and most of whom have little or no interest in philosophy? In seeking ways to create a course that is relevant, practical, and engaging, I hit upon the idea of adapting literature circles to the study of moral philosophies. In this paper, I contextualize the need for an approach that promotes individual student responsibility within a (...) teamwork context, introduce the appropriateness and adaptability of the literature circles concept in a philosophy classroom, and uncover the theoretical structure underneath the strategy in order to make it more adaptable to other classrooms and courses. (shrink)

Student relativism is a widespread phenomenon in introductory philosophy courses. It is a pressing issue for teachers because it seems to undermine the very purpose of philosophy. Since the 1980s there is a debate about how to understand and how to deal with student relativism. However, there is as yet no comprehensive presentation of the debate. The first aim of the article is to offer a classification of the strategies for dealing with student relativism and a presentation and short assessment (...) of the main strategies from the debate. The second aim is to present a new strategy based on the theory of conceptual change and drawing on the results from empirical research in developmental psychology on epistemic cognition. I call it the epistemic conceptual change strategy. (shrink)

Twenty-two years after Charles Darwin began to think of character divergence from a common ancestor in his Notebook B, the now famous and iconic branching diagram appeared in the fourth chapter of On the Origin of Species.

When I was a graduate student, the entomologist Phil Ward posed the following question in a seminar on species and phylogenetics: “Are the branches of phylogenetic trees too thin?” This question struck me then, and it has continued to resonate as I think about contemporary phylogenetics. Ward was pressing us to think about what, if anything, was lost in the way we idealize phylogenetic relationships and ignore the internal structure of those lineages. Though the term ‘genealogical discordance’ had not quite (...) yet become common parlance, this was precisely what the examples Ward was using to prompt discussion were displaying. As a philosopher of science in a graduate biology seminar, I was well primed to pick up on this interrogation of the intersection of theory, method, concept, and practice. (shrink)

Sterner and Lidgard urge that philosophers of phylogenetics move beyond the “systematics wars”, referring to the 1960s–80s debates between numerical taxonomists, evolutionary taxonomists, and phylogenetic systematists. Indeed, philosophers would do well to move beyond those wars, and to focus even more recently than the parsimony versus likelihood debates of the 1980s–90s. In this paper I use integrated historical-philosophical analysis of those debates to clarify a contemporary dispute between proponents of coalescence-based methods and proponents of concatenation. My intent is to illuminate (...) the present state of the field of phylogenetics by tracing the use of one particular philosophical argument, “total evidence”, through several distinct scientific debates. (shrink)