Science of Consciousness, Miscellaneous

Ordinary consciousness absorbed in natural life is unable on its own to go beyond its immediate existence. Only if it is somehow forced out of its complacency by something other than itself can it be raised beyond itself, such that this being torn from itself is its death — its negation. However, because consciousness is for itself its own Concept, it is immediately both Concept and object for itself. Thus its original immediacy (taken as object) is overcome or negated by (...) its own self. In this way it goes beyond or transcends its own immediate limited being. Therefore, by positing the singular individual, consciousness also posits an other-worldly beyond, which it may intuit from a spatial perspective as if they were existing alongside each other. Of course consciousness is not spatial and therefore such a perspective fails to grasp its true notion. It is only when consciousness turns upon itself — suffers violence at its own hands, that the Concept of consciousness can grasp its own self and thereby establish its truth. The path by which this self-critique of consciousness is accomplished is the science of consciousness. Because it is accomplished by rational introspection and direct experience it is also called the phenomenology of consciousness. (shrink)

Niels Bohr gave us the model of the atom as having a central nucleus around which electrons were circulating in stable orbits. He also gave us the complementarity principle that states that the mutually exclusive wave and corpuscular nature of light were not merely contradictory but complementary descriptions. Field theory considers light as a continuous wave phenomenon with a wavelength and frequency, while quantum theory considers its corpuscular nature as a discrete packet of energy called a photon. Thus we actually (...) have an opposition of a continuous-discontinuous description concerning the fundamental nature of light. In line with what we have been discussing about the nature of reality as having an intrinsic polar nature, we have yet another confirmation at even the atomic level of investigation. This harks back to Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” where in his second antinomy he tried to show that the continuous and discontinuous descriptions of the cosmos were both possible although they were mutually exclusive of each other. Kant tried to demonstrate that this was a limitation of the way we think about the world, i.e. a defect of reason since the world is obviously content to go on as a single reality regardless of how we understand it. But we are showing here that our understanding of the world does not have to be antagonistic to it if we understand it properly. For Kant, opposites merely exclude one another. We are claiming that not only do they exclude each other but also they depend upon each other for either to exist at all. (shrink)

Representing oneself as an existing entity and having intense fear of the unknown are human specificities. Self-consciousness and anxiety states are characteristics of our human minds. We propose that these two characteristics share a common evolutionary history during which they acted in synergy for the build-up of our human minds. We present that perspective by using an evolutionary scenario for self-consciousness in which anxiety management plays a key role. Such evolutionary background can introduce new relations between philosophy of mind and (...) psychology. The proposed evolutionary scenario starts at the Pan-Homo split time (about 6my ago) when our pre-human ancestors were able to manage representations while also being able to partly identify with their conspecifics. These identifications allowed our ancestors to merge the representations they had of parts of themselves with the corresponding representations they had of their conspecifics. The scenario proposes that such merger has led our ancestors to progressively build up a representation of their own entity as existing in the environment, like conspecifics were represented as existing. This evolutionary process is considered in the scenario as the source of an ancestral form of self-consciousness. The same process has also produced identifications with suffering or endangered conspecifics which have created in the minds of our ancestors some new anxieties coming in addition to the animal ones. The resulting psychological sufferings had to be limited for evolution to continue. The tools developed to that end by our ancestors (caring, collaboration, communication, ToM, ...) have also procured significant evolutionary benefits with positive feedbacks on identifications. Overall, the evolutionary scenario proposes that the combination of the anxiety management processes with the evolution toward self-consciousness has created an evolutionary engine that has accelerated the coming up of our human self-consciousness. As a result, our today human minds contain important anxieties interwoven with an evolutionary nature of self-consciousness. Such perspective brings to consider that many of our mental states may be unconsciously guided by these evolutionary sourced anxieties (which are still to be clearly understood). Corresponding anxiety management processes are then key contributors to our human feelings and motivations, and to our interpersonal relationship. For instance, the role of Pascalian type diversions can be understood as keeping consciousness away from psychological sufferings produced by too anxious mental states. Also, part of our human sexuality developed during human evolution can be considered as a multidimensional escape and refuge from anxiety. This also brings to look at our psychological well-being and to our mental health as much more related to anxiety management than assumed so far. Dis-functioning of anxiety management processes can then be source of mental disorders and illnesses. On that subject the evolutionary scenario proposes that avoidances of too anxious mental states can lead to evil behaviors. These subjects need more developments. Possible continuations are introduced. (shrink)

The paper defends a version of the perceptual account of bodily feelings, according to which having a feeling is feeling something about one’s body. But it rejects the idea, familiar in the work of William James, that what one feels when one has a feeling is something biological about one’s body. Instead it argues that to have a bodily feeling is to feel an apparent bodily indication of something – a bodily appearance. Being aware of what one’s body is apparently (...) indicating to one is being aware of something about one’s body, but the focus of attention is on what is apparently being indicated, which is not something about one’s body. This is one way of making sense of the idea in contemporary phenomenology that the body is conspicuous in feelings that do not take the body as an object of awareness. Bodily inclinations are apparent indications of what one is going to do, and it is argued that feeling one’s bodily inclinations constitutes an important class of bodily feelings – e.g. feeling like crying or feeling like being sick. Such inclinations are often felt through a process of resisting them. Bodily inclinations also have some intentionality, albeit quite limited, and this goes some way towards explaining Peter Goldie’s concept of feelings towards. (shrink)

In this article, we develop a new approach to integrating philosophical phenomenology with qualitative research. The approach uses phenomenology’s concepts, namely existentials, rather than methods such as the epoché or reductions. We here introduce the approach to both philosophers and qualitative researchers, as we believe that these studies are best conducted through interdisciplinary collaboration. In section 1, we review the debate over phenomenology’s role in qualitative research and argue that qualitative theorists have not taken full advantage of what philosophical phenomenology (...) has to offer, thus motivating the need for new approaches. In section 2, we introduce our alternative approach, which we call Phenomenologically Grounded Qualitative Research (PGQR). Drawing parallels with phenomenology’s applications in the cognitive sciences, we explain how phenomenological grounding can be used to conceptually front-load a qualitative study, establishing an explicit focus on one or more structures of human existence, or of our being in the world. In section 3, we illustrate this approach with an example of a qualitative study carried out by one of the authors: a study of the existential impact of early parental bereavement. In section 4, we clarify the kind of knowledge that phenomenologically grounded studies generate and how it may be integrated with existing approaches. (shrink)

Jung's interpretative "matrix" seems to offer us the possibility to frame the social phenomenology concerning the loss of sense, with the consequent load of experience of widespread awkwardness, in a context of epoch-making, progressive, "one-dimensional" reduction of the symbolic. -/- This seems to us the fundamental matrix of the disastrous, schizoid conflict of the present day society: on one side a literalism in keeping with the logics of power and control, disheartening any possibility of individual and collective development and wellbeing; (...) on the other side the absolute impossibility to keep together the fragments of this vision of the world, anachronistic as it appears by now, in an epoch-making realizing of what could be defined as the violence of the "monotheism" of the reason. -/- The pervasive social influence we are subjected to and we suffer even in the ephemeral shelter of our privacy speaks the language of literalism, rejects the oxygenating receptiveness to the metaphor, prefers the poor inclusive significance of the meaning to the deeper (and potentially enlivening source of psychic welfare) but embarrassing liberty of the sense. (shrink)

This paper is aiming to investigate the physical substrate of conscious process. It will attempt to find out: How does conscious process establish relations between their external stimuli and internal stimuli in order to create reality? How does consciousness devoid of new sensory input result to its new quantum effects? And how does conscious process gain mass in brain? This paper will also try to locate the origins of consciousness at the level of neurons along with the quantum effects of (...) conscious process. (shrink)

The scientific study of consciousness emerged as an organized field of research only a few decades ago. As empirical results have begun to enhance our understanding of consciousness, it is important to find out whether other factors, such as funding for consciousness research and status of consciousness scientists, provide a suitable environment for the field to grow and develop sustainably. We conducted an online survey on people’s views regarding various aspects of the scientific study of consciousness as a field of (...) research. 249 participants completed the survey, among which 80% were in academia, and around 40% were experts in consciousness research. Topics covered include the progress made by the field, funding for consciousness research, job opportunities for consciousness researchers, and the scientific rigor of the work done by researchers in the field. The majority of respondents (78%) indicated that scientific research on consciousness has been making progress. However, most participants perceived obtaining funding and getting a job in the field of consciousness research as more difficult than in other subfields of neuroscience. Overall, work done in consciousness research was perceived to be less rigorous than other neuroscience subfields, but this perceived lack of rigor was not related to the perceived difficulty in finding jobs and obtaining funding. Lastly, we found that, overall, the global workspace theory was perceived to be the most promising (around 28%), while most non-expert researchers (around 22% of non-experts) found the integrated information theory (IIT) most promising. We believe the survey results provide an interesting picture of current opinions from scientists and researchers about the progresses made and the challenges faced by consciousness research as an independent field. They will inspire collective reflection on the future directions regarding funding and job opportunities for the field. (shrink)

We exist inside a Game of Thinking. We call it the universe, life, reality. But it is the Game of Thinking, a game not played by us, but by thought. Thinking is a fact; everything else is theory. Thought wants us to think. If that was not true, we would be able to stop thinking. But we are not. Our thinking process runs our lives, yet we do not control it, create it, or guide it. Nor can we switch it (...) off. For it to be real, freedom has to not be a thought. By acquiring more thought, thought acquires you. By acquiring less thought, you acquire you. There is no need to understand black holes or string theory. Those things don’t matter, and they may not even exist. There is, likewise, no need to understand ourselves. The benefits of understanding a fool are minimal, and we are all fools. But there is a need to understand understanding itself, which is the Game of Thinking. This book is the first of its kind that questions what is never questioned, namely thinking itself. The purpose of this book is to acquire less thought, not more. (shrink)

The immune self is our reified way to describe the processes through which the immune system maintains the differentiated identity of the organism and itself. This is an interpretative process, and to study it in a scientifically constructive way we should merge a long hermeneutical tradition asking questions about the nature of interpretation, together with modern understanding of the immune system, emerging sensing technologies and advanced computational tools for analyzing the sensors' data.

This paper explores the critical conditions of such semiotic realism that is commonly presumed in the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of biosemiotics. The central task is to make basic biosemiotic concepts as clear as possible by applying C.S. Peirce’s pragmaticist methodology to his own concepts, especially to those that have had a strong influence on the Copenhagian biosemiotics. It appears essential to study what kinds of observation the basic semiotic concepts are derived from. Peirce had two different derivations to the concept (...) of sign, both having a strong logical character. Therefore, it is discussed at length what Peirce’s conception of logic consists of and how logical concepts relate to the concepts of other sciences. It is shown that Peirce had two different perspectives toward sign, the ‘transcendental’ one and the objective one, and only the latter one is executable in biosemiotic applications. Although Peirce’ theory of signs seems to appear as twofold (if not even manifold), it is concluded that the ore conception has been stable. The apparent differences are presumably due to the different perspectives of consideration. Severe limitations for the application of Peirce’s semiotic concepts follow from this analysis that should be taken into account in biosemiotics relying on its Copenhagen interpretation. The first one concerns the ‘interpreter’ of a suggested biosemiotic sign — whether it is ‘we’ (as a ‘meta-agent’) or some genuine biosemiotic ‘object-agent’. Only if the latter one is determinable, some real biosemiotic sign-action may occur. The second one concerns the application of the concept of the object of sign — its use is limited so that a sign has an object if and only if it seeks a true conception about it. This conclusion has drastic further consequences. Most of the genuinely biosemiotic sign-processes do not tend toward truth about anything but toward various practical ends. Therefore, the logical concept of sign, e.g. the one of Peirce’s semeiotic, is an insufficient concept for biosemiotics. In order to establish a sufficient one, Peircean theoretical ethics and esthetics are introduced. It is concluded that they involve simpler and more general but still normative concept of sign — the concept of anticipative or constructive representation that does not represent any object at all. Instead, it is a completely future-oriented representation that guides action. Objective ethics provides the suitable concept of representation, but it appeals to objective esthetics that provides a theory of (local) natural self-normativity. The concepts of objective logic form the special species of objective ethics. The conclusion is that biosemiotics should be based on applied objective ethics and esthetics rather than on (Peircean semeiotic) logic and its metaphysical application. Finally, the physiosemiotic over-generalization of the concept of sign is shortly discussed. It is suggested that it would be more appropriate to rename such controversial generalizations than to adhere to semiotic terminology. Here, again, Peirce appears as a healthy role model with his ‘ethics of terminology’. (shrink)

Conference Report: ASSC-5 conference at Duke, June 27-30, 2001.

Combining philosophical reflections with deep self-exploration to delve into the ancient mystery of death and rebirth, this book emphasizes collective rather than individual transformation. Drawing upon twenty years of experience working with nonordinary states, the author argues that when the deep psyche is hyper-simulated using Stanislaw Grof's powerful therapeutic methods, the healing that results sometimes extends beyond the individual to the collective unconscious of humanity itself.

Although evidential reports of paranormal phenomena have been accumulating over the last 50 years, scepticism within the scientific community at large against the very existence of psi has not retreated in proportion. Strong criticism has been voiced and it is worth taking it under serious consideration while attempting to understand psi. This article reviews the micro- psychokinesis phenomenon, aiming to reconcile evidence that favours it with other evidence that seems to refute it. To achieve this challenging task, some seemingly irrelevant (...) observations will be invoked -- such as the often observed decline and differential effects, the ten-year-old statistical balancing effect, the longstanding reports for the experimental evidence of PK, the recent large-scale failure to replicate the conventional PK hypothesis -- alongside the austere arguments against PK. This paper argues that the evidence can withstand this serious criticism. (shrink)

Do some people have a paranormal power to ‘see’ into the future? There are innumerable anecdotes of events foretold, of course. But is there any scientific evidence of the ability? Fiona Steinkamp, a leading investigator of the paranormal, believes there is.

Recently, in cognitive science, the enactivist account of cognition has been gaining ground, due in part to studies of movement in conjunction with thought. The idea, as Noë , has put it, that “cognition is not something happening inside us or to us, but it’s something we do, something we achieve,” is increasingly supported by research on joint attention, movement coordination, and gesture. Not surprisingly, therefore, enactivists have also begun to look at “movement specialists”—dancers—for both scientific and phenomenological accounts of (...) thinking with and through movement. In this paper, I argue that a serious exploration of dance and movement does not merely bolster the enactivist view, but rather, it suggests a radical enactivism, as envisaged by, e.g., Hutto . To support this claim, I examine an account of “Thinking in Movement” provided by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone in order to highlight the ways in which intentional agency and meaning-making occur in improvisational dance. These processes, I further argue, closely mirror some of the key components of participatory sense making, as described by De Jaegher and Di Paolo :485–507, 2007). This is beneficial to my case, because it permits a discussion of “thought-full action” that does not depend upon standard cognitivist frameworks for explanation. By carefully focusing on how agency can help to separate mere “thrashing about” from meaningful movement, this paper aim to strengthen the position of radical enactivism from the unique perspective and dance and sense-making. (shrink)

The psychology of belief in the paranormal has often been used to stigmatize believers but it has also been used with a more open-minded approach. This paper describes some research of this kind in which believers were found to report more mystical experience, have more creative personalities, report more manic and depressive experience, and more magical ideation, unwittingly suggesting a link with bipolar disorder and schizotypal personality. In addition, however, these six variables were all found to correlate positively and significantly (...) with each other. The positive manifold suggested a single underlying factor, which indeed emerged from principal components analysis. It was speculated that the underlying factor was “transliminality”—a gating mechanism modulating the flow of information and affect from subliminal levels into supraliminal. Later studies have not as clearly confirmed the existence of the positive manifold but nevertheless the concept of transliminality may be a useful one for understanding paranormal experience and hence paranormal belief. (shrink)

Stemming from Uexkull’s fundamental concepts of Umwelt and Innenwelt as developed in the biosemiotic approach of Ferreira 2010, 2011, the present work models mathematically the semiosis of cognition and proposes an artificial cognitive architecture to be deployed in a robotic structure.

The widespread use of brain imaging techniques encourages conceiving of neuroscience as the forthcoming “mindscience.” Perhaps surprisingly for many, this conclusion is still largely unwarranted. The present paper surveys various shortcomings of neuroscience as a putative “mindscience.” The analysis shows that the scope of mind (both cognitive and phenomenal) falls outside that of neuroscience. Of course, such a conclusion does not endorse any metaphysical or antiscientific stance as to the nature of the mind. Rather, it challenges a series of assumptions (...) that the undeniable success of neuroscience has fostered. In fact, physicalism is here taken as the only viable ontological framework – an assumption that does not imply that the central nervous system exhausts the physical domain. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Notes on Contributors -- Introduction; Z.Radman -- The Mystery of the Background qua Background; H.L.Dreyfus -- PART I: ECHOING SEARLE'S AND DREYFUS' VIEWS ON THE BACKGROUND -- Ground-Level Intelligence:Action-Oriented Representation and the Dynamics of the Background; M.Cappuccio& M.Wheeler -- Exposing the Background: Deep and Local; D.D.Hutto -- The Background as Intentional, Conscious, and Nonconceptual; M.Schmitz -- Social Cognition, the Chinese Room, and the Robot Replies; S.Gallagher -- Contesting John's Searle' Social Ontology: (...) Institutions and Background; J.Margolis -- Music and the Background; D.Schmicking -- PART II: EXTENDED VIEWS ON THE BACKGROUND -- Implicit Precision; E.T.Gendlin -- Enkinaesthesia: The Essential Sensuous Background for Co-Agency; S.A.J.Stuart -- Steps Entailed in Foregrounding the Background: Taking the Challenge of Languaging Experience Seriously; M.Sheets-Johnstone -- The Body as Background: Pragmatism and Somasthetics; R.Shusterman -- The Background: A Tool of Potentiality; Z.Radman -- Embodied Technology as Implicit Knowledge of Modern Civilization; K.Mainzer -- Index. (shrink)

This is the third of a three-volume set on The Innate Mind providing a comprehensive assessment of nativist thought and definitive reference point for future inquiry. Together these volumes point the way toward a synthesis that provides a powerful picture of our minds and their place in the natural order.

Three experiments investigated level of processing effects on a variety of direct and indirect memory tasks, in the context of a processing theory of dissociations. Subjects studied words in five encoding conditions and received one of ten memory tests. In Experiment 1, four tests previously classified as conceptual showed a robust LOP effect, as did a direct perceptual test of graphemic cued recall. An indirect perceptual word fragment completion test was unaffected by LOP. Experiment 2 showed that a new indirect (...) version of a graphemic cued test was not affected by LOP. In Experiment 3, guided by a generation/recognition model, we constructed three new direct tests in which subjects identified words that were graphemically, phonologically, or semantically similar to studied words. The three tests differed in their sensitivity to study conditions, but LOP had no effect in any case, despite the involvement of deliberate conscious recollection. Contemporary explanatory frameworks couched as dichotomies do not provide an adequate account of the results. It seems necessary instead to specify the types of information activated by each encoding condition, the types of information required by each test, and how encoding and retrieval processes are modified by task instructions. (shrink)

In the present paper, we first argue that it is critical for humans to forget; that is, to have some means of preventing out-of-date information from interfering with the recall of current information. We then argue that the primary means of accomplishing such adaptive updating of human memory is retrieval inhibition: Information that is rendered out of date by new learning becomes less retrievable, but remains at essentially full strength in memory as indexed by other measures, such as recognition and (...) word-fragment completion. We conclude with a speculation that certain unconscious influences of prior events may, in fact, be stronger if those events were to be forgotten rather than to be remembered. (shrink)

Evidence coming from several studies into memory and awareness during general anesthesia suggests that in surgical patients who seem to be adequately anesthetized , some form of cognitive functioning is preserved. This finding has important implications both for clinical practice and for memory research. In order to give the methodological background of the present situation in this field of research, this article deals, on the basis of recent experiments, with important methodological aspects of studies into perception and memory during general (...) anesthesia. (shrink)

Three experiments examined repetition priming for meaningful environmental sounds in a sound stem identification paradigm using brief sound cues. Prior encoding of target sounds together with their associated names facilitated subsequent identification of sound stems relative to nonstudied controls. In contrast, prior exposure to names alone in the absence of the environmental sounds did not prime subsequent sound stem identification performance at all . Explicit and implicit memory were dissociated such that sound stem cued recall was higher following semantic than (...) nonsemantic encoding, whereas sound priming was insensitive to manipulations of depth encoding . These results extend the findings of long-term repetition priming into the auditory nonverbal domain and suggest that priming for environmental sounds is mediated primarily by perceptual processes. (shrink)

We addressed the questions whether stimuli presented below the threshold of verbal awareness are nevertheless perceived and whether there are perceptual differences between the two cerebral hemispheres. Pictures of line drawn objects and animals were subliminally presented to each visual half-field for subsequent identification in a form as fragmented as possible. The performance of 40 healthy subjects was compared to that of 63 controls. Whereas identification performance after blank presentation in the experimental group did not differ from that of controls, (...) identification in a significantly more fragmented form was achieved after the presentation of the complete picture. This effect, however, occurred only after subliminal stimulation in the left visual field, i.e., of the right hemisphere. Our results show that pictures presented below the threshold of verbal awareness can be perceived, and that only the right hemisphere can perceive them and make use of the perception. It remains an open question whether this kind of hemispheric specialization represents a right hemisphere dominance for subliminal perception or reflects an inability of the left hemisphere to access and behaviorally use unaware percepts via fragmented picture identification, for which a right hemisphere advantage is known. (shrink)

This paper evaluates Mangan’s (1993) analysis of the way feelings at the fringes of consciousness provide global evaluations of what is happening at the focus of attention in ways that allow the human mind to direct its activities in an effective, adaptive way—elaborating on a distinction between fringe consciousness and focal-attentive consciousness originally developed by William James. The paper argues that, while Mangan’s analysis is a plausible account of mental operations, viewed from a first-person perspective, it is inconsistent with a (...) detailed account of human information processing viewed from a third-person perspective, which largely operates in an unconscious fashion. It also ignores classical problems relating to consciousness-brain causal interaction in philosophy of mind, and the subtlety different ways in which information processing can be said to be “conscious”. The paper then offers an alternative interpretation of the evidence (following Velmans, 1991) in which first- and third-person accounts of mental processing are complementary and mutually irreducible. (shrink)

I make three points about Searle’s philosophical work on consciousness and intentionality. First, I comment on Searle’s presentation and paper “The Problems of Consciousness.” I show that one of Searle’s philosophical claims about the relation between consciousness and intentionality appears to conflict with a demand he makes on acceptable empirical theories of the brain. Second, I argue that closer attention to the difference between conceptual connections and empirical connections corrects and improves Searle’s response to the so-called “Logical Connections” argument, the (...) argument that claims that mental states cannot be causes, since they are conceptually connected with actions. Third, I give a formulation of his Chinese Room argument that avoids some tempting responses. (shrink)