Science of Consciousness

This article comprehensively examines how information processing relates to attention and consciousness. We argue that no current theoretical framework investigating consciousness has a satisfactory and holistic account of their informational relationship. Our key theoretical contribution is showing how the dissociation between consciousness and attention must be understood in informational terms in order to make the debate scientifically sound. No current theories clarify the difference between attention and consciousness in terms of information. We conclude with two proposals to advance the debate. (...) First, neurobiological homeostatic processes need to be more explicitly associated with conscious information processing, since information processed through attention is algorithmic, rather than being homeostatic. Second, to understand subjectivity in informational terms, we must define information uniqueness in consciousness (e.g., irreproducible information, biologically encrypted information). These approaches could help cognitive scientists better understand conflicting accounts of the neural correlates of consciousness and work toward a more unified theoretical framework. (shrink)

Recent activities in virtually all fields engaged in consciousness studies indicate early signs of a structural turn, where verbal descriptions or simple formalisations of conscious experiences are replaced by structural tools, most notably mathematical spaces. My goal here is to offer three comments that, in my opinion, are essential to avoid misunderstandings in these developments early on. These comments concern metaphysical premises of structuralist approaches, overlooked assumptions in regard to isomorphisms, and the question of what structure to consider on the (...) side of consciousness in the first place. I will also explain what, in my opinion, are the great promises of structural methodologies and how they might impact consciousness science at large. (shrink)

Commensurate with our work on dark consciousness, we present a small extension of our previous formalism to model the mixed-frequency states as time crystals. We then posit shared intelligence as an Everettian phone, which is a looking-glass p-adic periodicity in time.

This essay sketches out a biocultural theory of religion which is based on an expanded view of cognition that is anchored in brain and body (embrained and embodied), deeply dependent on culture (enculturated) and extended and distributed beyond the borders of individual brains. Such an approach uniquely accommodates contemporary cultural and neurobiological sciences. Since the challenge that the study of religion faces, in my opinion, is at the interstices of these sciences, I have tried to develop a theory of religion (...) which acknowledges the fact. My hope is that the theory can be of use to scholars of religion and be submitted to further hypotheses and tests by cognitive scientists. (shrink)

This book offers a new theoretical framework within which to understand “the mind-body problem”. The crux of this problem is phenomenal experience, which Thomas Nagel famously described as “what it is like” to be a certain living creature. David Chalmers refers to the problem of “what-it-is-like” as “the hard problem” of consciousness and claims that this problem is so “hard” that investigators have either just ignored the issue completely, investigated a similar (but distinct) problem, or claimed that there is literally (...) nothing to investigate – that phenomenal experience is illusory. This book contends that phenomenal experience is both very real and very important. Two specific “biological naturalist” views are considered in depth. One of these two views, in particular, seems to be free from problems; adopting something along the lines of this view might finally allow us to make sense of the mind-body problem. -/- An essential read for anyone who believes that no satisfactory solution to “the mind-body problem” has yet been discovered. (shrink)

The expanding integration of artificial intelligence (AI) in various aspects of society makes the infosphere around us increasingly complex. Humanity already faces many obstacles trying to have a better understanding of our own minds, but now we have to continue finding ways to make sense of the minds of AI. The issue of AI’s capability to have independent thinking is of special attention. When dealing with such an unfamiliar concept, people may rely on existing human properties, such as survival desire, (...) to make assessments. Employing information-processing-based Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) analytics on a dataset of 266 residents in the United States, we found that the more people believe that an AI agent seeks continued functioning, the more they believe in that AI agent’s capability of having a mind of its own. Moreover, we also found that the above association becomes stronger if a person is more familiar with personally interacting with AI. This suggests a directional pattern of value reinforcement in perceptions of AI. As the information processing of AI becomes even more sophisticated in the future, it will be much harder to set clear boundaries about what it means to have an autonomous mind. (shrink)

Contemplative scholarship has reoriented attention towards the neuroscientific study of the soteriological ambition of Buddhist practice, awakening. This article evaluates the project of seeking neural correlates for awakening. We identify key definitional and operational issues demonstrating that: the nature of awakening is highly contested both within and across Buddhist traditions; the meaning of awakening is both context- and concept-dependent; and awakening may be non-conceptual and ineffable. We demonstrate that operationalised secular conceptions of awakening, divorced from soteriological and cultural factors, have (...) little relationship to traditional Buddhist construct(s) of awakening. We identify methodological issues for secular conceptions of awakening concerning introspection and neuroimaging, yet identify the value of recent advancements in empirical first-person phenomenology for attenuating introspective bias. Overall, we identify the problems with decontextualising awakening and placing it within a scientific naturalistic framework. Careful attention to the definitional, operational and methodological neuroscientific obstacles identified herein, is required in the responsible approach to the investigation of awakening states. (shrink)

Nicht durch das Denken erschaffen wir Welten. Indem wir die Welt verstehen, lernen wir zu denken. Kosmovision ist ein Begriff, der eine Reihe von Grundlagen bedeuten sollte, aus denen ein systemisches Verständnis des Universums, seiner Bestandteile als Leben, der Welt, in der wir leben, der Natur, des menschlichen Phänomens und ihrer Beziehungen hervorgehen sollte. Es handelt sich also um ein von den Wissenschaften gespeistes Feld der analytischen Philosophie, deren Ziel dieses aggregierte und erkenntnistheoretisch nachhaltige Wissen über alles ist, was wir (...) sind und beinhalten, was uns umgibt und was uns in einer Weise betrifft. Sie ist so alt wie das menschliche Denken und umfasst neben der Verwendung von Elementen der wissenschaftlichen Kosmologie alles in Philosophie und Wissenschaft, was sich auf das Universum und das Leben bezieht. Eine Kosmovision ist keine Sammlung von Ideen, Hypothesen und Annahmen, sondern ein System, das auf Beobachtung, Analyse, Beweisen und Demonstrationen basiert. Keine Kosmovision will definieren, etablieren oder vorschlagen, sondern nur verstehen, analysieren und interpretieren. Jeder von uns baut und transportiert sein ganzes Leben lang seine Kosmovision, ohne Formen zu etablieren, als Hintergrund für unser Denken und Handeln. In dieser Arbeit versuchen wir, eine Kosmovision zu skizzieren, die auf den Realitäten basiert, die die Wissenschaft heute bietet. Wir schlagen zu keinem Zeitpunkt vor, Wissenschaft zu betreiben; oder Philosophie zu theoretisieren, aber wir werden immer versuchen, von ihnen unterstützt oder zumindest vor den kognitiven Verzerrungen geschützt zu werden, die wir normalerweise mit uns herumtragen. (shrink)

A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, such as the ability to feel pain and pleasure or reflect on one’s own experience, vary in different states and animal species. Considering the tight link between consciousness and moral status, answers to these questions have implications for law and ethics. Here we point out that given this link, the scientific community studying consciousness may face implicit pressure to carry out certain research programs or interpret results (...) in ways that justify current norms rather than challenge them. We show that because consciousness largely determines moral status, the use of nonhuman animals in the scientific study of consciousness introduces a direct conflict between scientific relevance and ethics—the more scientifically valuable an animal model is for studying consciousness, the more difficult it becomes to ethically justify compromises to its well-being for consciousness research. Finally, in light of these considerations, we call for a discussion of the immediate ethical corollaries of the body of knowledge that has accumulated and for a more explicit consideration of the role of ideology and ethics in the scientific study of consciousness. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) (...) relevant ignorance has constrained the decision-maker’s menu of options. If this is right, then a person’s moral judgments in some set of circumstances should vary with their knowledge and ignorance of these circumstances. In this study, we test the hypothesis of the logical priority of the epistemic. We describe two experiments in which subjects’ knowledge and ignorance of relevant consequences were manipulated. In the second experiment, we also compared the effect of ignorance on moral judgments with that of personal force, a factor previously shown to influence moral judgments. We found broad empirical support for the armchair arguments that epistemic considerations are logically prior to normative considerations. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) (...) relevant ignorance has constrained the decision-maker’s menu of options. If this is right, then a person’s moral judgments in some set of circumstances should vary with their knowledge and ignorance of these circumstances. In this study, we test the hypothesis of the logical priority of the epistemic. We describe two experiments in which subjects’ knowledge and ignorance of relevant consequences were manipulated. In the second experiment, we also compared the effect of ignorance on moral judgments with that of personal force, a factor previously shown to influence moral judgments. We found broad empirical support for the armchair arguments that epistemic considerations are logically prior to normative considerations. (shrink)

The goal of this programmatic paper is to highlight a close connection between the core problem in the philosophy of medicine, i.e. the concept of health, and the core problem of the philosophy of mind, i.e. the concept of consciousness. I show when we look at these phenomena together, taking the evolutionary perspective of modern state-based behavioural and life-history theory used as the teleonomic tool to Darwinize the agent- and subject-side of organisms, we will be in a better position to (...) make sense of them both as natural phenomena. (shrink)

In this letter we focus on the cognitive science of consciousness. The general message is that, while this interdisciplinary area has made much progress in recent years, there is a tendency of downplaying conceptual issues, and therefore underestimating the difficulties of various problems. We briefly focus on a few prominent examples only, due to the space limit, but the general message should be clear: this recent tendency can be problematic for the progress of the consciousness branch of cognitive sciences.

What occurs in the mind of an expert who is performing at their very best? In this paper, I survey the history of debate concerning this question. I suggest that expertise is neither solely a mastery of the automatic nor solely a mastery of intelligence in skilled action control. Experts are also capable of performing automatic actions intelligently. Following this, I argue that unconscious-thought theory (UTT) is a powerful tool in coming to understand the role of executive, intelligent action control (...) in the fluidly automatic performance of expertise. Relying on a body of empirical evidence concerning the cognitive structures and perceptual strategies employed by experts, I show that the realm of skilled action is an ideal environment within which the powers of unconscious cognitive processing can have positive effects on action. I conclude that experts rely upon unconscious thinking in the production of intelligently automatic skilled actions. (shrink)

In Being You, Anil Seth takes us on a comprehensive tour through the science of consciousness, drawing on the most up-to-date data, lessons and theories in the field. This is a compelling book that will leave readers pondering whether new technologies and smart experimental designs will further deepen our understanding of the mind, writes Manh Tung Ho.

How Galileo created the problem of consciousness -- Is there a ghost in the machine? -- Can physical science explain consciousness? -- How to solve the problem of consciousness -- Consciousness and the meaning of life.

What is consciousness? Where is it? What happens to our consciousness when we die? We associate consciousness with our material brain yet no one has found it there, or anywhere else. Within a framework of established science, however, the author outlines a compelling new way to think about consciousness and its workings. This first revised edition of Between Space describes our material world construed of tiny bits of space and time ("quantized space"). Each of these bits exist, as only they (...) can, within a field of non-space; an abstract reality outside of space and time... but not outside of Nature. Non-space is a reality of awareness, meanings, concepts, and ideas of every sort, while space-time is a reality of distinct objects such as your brain. The author describes in detail how self-awareness and your mind are the result of interaction between the two realms by means of Simultaneity and quantum Observation. While this little book contains scientific descriptions and speculations, it's written in common language so that it can be enjoyed by most of us who have little or no background in science or math; about a hundred pages plus many appendices and illustrations. (shrink)

Os debates sobre a existência da consciência em animais não humanos vêm ganhando cada vez mais destaque nos círculos científicos e filosóficos ao redor do mundo. Um importante empecilho que a área atualmente enfrenta diz respeito à construção de um método confiável capaz de identificar se um determinado animal não humano possui estados mentais conscientes. A literatura nomeia essa questão de “o problema da mensuração da consciência animal”. A presente dissertação possui como objetivo analisar e responder esse problema através da (...) combinação entre o uso de evidências empíricas e de ferramentas filosóficas. Dito isso, existem inúmeras formas de respondê-lo. Ao longo do texto, analisarei algumas das que são consideradas mais relevantes na discussão atual. Uma delas é a concepção cética de que não há questão de fato sobre os animais não humanos serem ou não conscientes. Em contraste, as abordagens neutras e newtonianas buscam se esquivar de compromissos metafísicos e teóricos para atribuir consciência aos animais. Ao final da dissertação defenderei a chamada “abordagem teórica leve”, posição originalmente proposta pelo filósofo Jonathan Birch. Buscarei mostrar que ela é atualmente a hipótese empiricamente mais adequada e filosoficamente plausível dentre as disponíveis na literatura. (shrink)

Which animals have conscious experiences? Many different, diverse and unrelated behaviors and cognitive capacities have been proposed as tests of the presence of consciousness in an animal. It is unclear which of these tests, if any, are valid. To remedy this problem, I develop a list consisting of eight desiderata which can be used to assess putative tests of animal consciousness. These desiderata are based either on detailed analogies between consciousness-linked human behavior and non-human behavior, on theories of consciousness or (...) on methods from human consciousness science. If a test or set of tests satisfies more of these desiderata, passing it provides stronger evidence of consciousness. Moreover, one can design future tests of animal consciousness with the intention of satisfying these desiderata to ensure their evidential strength. (shrink)

A sense of agency over wilful actions is thought to be dependent on the level of choice and the nature of the outcome. In a preregistered study, we manipulated choice and valence of outcome to assess the relationship between SoA across the depression and psychosis continuum. Participants completed a Libet Clock task, in which they had either a free or forced choice to press one of two buttons and received either a rewarding or punishing outcome. Participants also completed questionnaires on (...) depressive and psychosis-like traits. Rewarding outcomes increased intentional binding. The evidence favoured no effect of choice on average, but this was influenced by inter-individual differences. Individuals reporting more depressive traits had less of a difference in intentional binding between free and forced choice conditions. We show that implicit SoA is sensitive to outcome valence and the effect of choice differs across the depression continuum. (shrink)

As humans, we use the power of thinking to make scientific discoveries, develop technologies, manage social interactions, and transmit knowledge to the next generations. With the ability to think, we can trace back and discover the origin of the universe, the natural world, and ourselves. The content of this book, Mindsponge Theory, is part of that discovery process. -/- Product Details -/- Publisher ‏ : ‎ Walter de Gruyter (December 6, 2022) Publication date ‏ : ‎ December 6, 2022 Language (...) ‏ : ‎ English Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 214 pages ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 8367405145 ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-8367405140 Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 6.3 x 0.71 x 9.29 inches -/- . (shrink)

The most widely endorsed philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness assume that it contributes a single functional capacity to an organism’s information processing toolkit. However, conscious processes are a heterogeneous class of psychological phenomena supported by a variety of neurobiological mechanisms. This suggests a plurality of functional contributions of consciousness (FCCs), in the sense that conscious experience facilitates different functional capacities in different psychological domains. In this paper, I first develop a general methodological framework for isolating the psychological functions that (...) are associated with conscious experience. I then use this to show that the leading accounts—Global Workspace Theories, Higher Order Thought Theory and Information Integration Theory—all fail to acknowledge this functional pluralism, which limits their applicability as theories of consciousness. (shrink)

Sensorimotor enactivism is the view that the content and the sensory modality of perceptual experience are determined by implicit knowledge of lawful regularities between bodily movements and patterns of sensory stimulation. A proponent of the explanatory argument for sensorimotor enactivism holds that this view is able to provide an intelligible explanation for why certain material realizers give rise to certain perceptual experiences, while rival accounts cannot close this “explanatory gap”. However, I argue that the notion of the “material realizer” of (...) perceptual experience is ambiguous. On a narrow construal, the explanatory gap cannot be bridged, not even by enactivism. On a wide construal, enactivism gets a grip on the explanatory gap, but to the same extent do established theories of consciousness. Thus, on both horns of the dilemma, the explanatory power of enactivism is not superior to more traditional theories of conscious experience. (shrink)

It is argued that in terms of Thomas Kuhn's analysis of how different fields of science develop and progress, consciousness research is still in the pre-paradigm or pre-science phase that precedes the advent of any universally accepted paradigm. A means by which this long-standing situation may be escaped is here suggested. This is to treat each of the three distinct theoretical positions that presently drive experimental research on the nature of consciousness as mini-paradigms and then apply the same logic that (...) Kuhn sees as underpinning paradigm shifts in mature sciences to decide which of these three mini-paradigms becomes the first universally accepted paradigm of a mature science of consciousness. At present, the three mini-paradigms that drive experimental research on the nature of consciousness are: the cognitive-science process theory mini-paradigm, the neurophysiologists' preferred psychoneural identity theory mini-paradigm and the EMF field theory mini-paradigm. In established science, paradigms shift when enough 'anomalies' – falsified predictions or largely unrecognised but once-recognised-unacceptable consequences – build up to make the existing paradigm uncomfortable for those who operate within it. At this point, a sudden paradigm shift occurs, ushering in another long period of 'normal science' during which the new paradigm drives experimentation. With regard to the three existing mini-paradigms on the nature of consciousness, it is argued that recognition that _processes_ are abstract entities –and that this renders the "consciousness is a process, not a thing" mini-paradigm dualist – makes this mini-paradigm unacceptable to practitioners who regard dualism as unscientific and who prefer to see themselves as staunchly scientific, and therefore as monists.. The strong prediction of the "consciousness is brain activity" mini-paradigm – that conscious experiences should invariably correlate with the firing of either particular single neurons or groups of single neurons in the brain – has now been falsified often enough to make this mini-paradigm unacceptable to its practitioners. And this leaves intact only the "consciousness is a 3-D electromagnetic field" mini-paradigm – the idea that conscious experiences_ are_ particular 3-dimensional patterns in the electromagnetic field generated by brain activity. And as a result, it is suggested that this third mini-paradigm might usefully become the first universally accepted full paradigm, which would finally allow announcement of the birth of a Kuhnian science of consciousness. ER -. (shrink)

A striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one’s original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of (...) experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be. (shrink)

The monograph offers an original account of Spinoza’s philosophy and ethics concentrated on its concordance with selected modern neuroscientific theories. The book proceeds through the whole of Spinoza’s philosophy and by increasingly complex analytical account acquaints with its essential frameworks, terminology, and concepts, and is thus accessible also to readers who are not yet familiar with the thought of this peculiar thinker. The fundamental motives of this interpretation are the nature of the mind and the questions of human freedom and (...) human bondage, mainly in connection with the investigation of affects (passions and drives) that the mind tends to be bound with. In his philosophy, Spinoza not only offers brilliant analyses of human experience but in anticipation of modern psychotherapeutic techniques suggests practical methods for the realization of sufficiently functional affective-cognitive self-therapy aimed at the regulation and control of one’s passivity. The understanding of and working with one’s weaknesses is, according to Spinoza, the necessary condition for realizing one’s freedom, or – for being able to shift from pathetics to ethics. (shrink)

Being You is a beautifully written book about consciousness. It pulls off the seemingly impossible trick of being a deeply personal account of the author’s own life and conscious experiences while...