Science of Consciousness

Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. A common view is that all mental qualities can be modeled as points in multidimensional spaces, where distances between points inversely correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. I argue that this standard framework cannot capture precision structure: for example, consider the phenomenal contrast between seeing an object as crimson in foveal vision versus seeing an object merely as red in peripheral vision. (...) Then I develop a new formal framework that models mental qualities using regions, rather than points. I explain how this new framework not only provides a natural way of modeling precision, but also yields a variety of further theoretical fruits: it enables us to formulate novel hypotheses about the space and structures of mental qualities, formally differentiate two dimensions of phenomenal similarity, generate a quantitative model of the phenomenal sorites, and deploy a new theoretical tool for the empirical investigation of conscious experiences. A noteworthy philosophical consequence is that the structure of the mental qualities of conscious experiences is fundamentally different from the structure of the perceptible qualities of external objects. (shrink)

The possibility of algorithmic consciousness depends on the assumption that conscious states can be copied or repeated by sufficiently duplicating their underlying physical states, leading to a variety of paradoxes, including the problems of duplication, teleportation, simulation, self-location, the Boltzmann brain, and Wigner’s Friend. In an effort to further elucidate the physical nature of consciousness, I challenge these assumptions by analyzing the implications of special relativity on evolutions of identical copies of a mental state, particularly the divergence of these evolutions (...) due to quantum fluctuations. By assuming the supervenience of a conscious state on some sufficient underlying physical state, I show that the existence of two or more instances, whether spacelike or timelike, of the same conscious state leads to a logical contradiction, ultimately refuting the assumption that a conscious state can be physically reset to an earlier state or duplicated by any physical means. Several explanatory hypotheses and implications are addressed, particularly the relationships between consciousness, locality, physical irreversibility, and quantum no-cloning. (shrink)

The startle reflex provides a revealing model for examining the ways in which evolved neurophysiology shapes personal experience and patterns of recurrent social interaction. In the most diverse cultural contexts, in societies widely separated by time and space, the inescapable physiology of the reflex both shapes the experience of startle and biases the social usages to which the reflex is put. This book describes ways in which the startle reflex is experienced, culturally elaborated, and socially used in a wide variety (...) of times and places. It offers explanations both for the patterned commonalities found across cultural settings and for the differences engendered by diverse social environments. Boo! will intrigue readers in fields such as psychological anthropology, medical anthropology, general cultural anthropology, social psychology, cross-cultural psychiatry, evolutionary psychology, and human ethology. (shrink)

A collection of previously unpublished essays--philosophical, literary and critical--presenting the influential views of T. E. Hulme and throwing new light upon the complex personality of their originator. The book also includes Hulme's war diary, his controversy with Russell on war, some poems and fragments, and a complete bibliography of his writings.--A. R.

Taylor believes that if we "penetrate the illusions that encompass us," then we can see the picture of man as one with "God the creator." This picture is created by Taylor through his critical and sometimes whimsical approach to man’s relations with himself, others, the world and God. What man must realize is the openness of creation. He must avoid the problem of intellectualizing or showing no feeling "for the sticks, stones and grass at [his] feet." Taylor feels that man (...) is more concerned about his deeds rather than his being. Man has to rid himself of the "separateness of illusion, of failing to see what is in fact before us." The purpose of life is "not to do but simply to be." Within God’s world there is death and deterioration yet there is an ever renewing generation of life in all its forms. This book offers a vision of creation that all can share.—G. D. (shrink)

A verbatim record of the first of five conferences on consciousness, held 1950-55, by the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation. The participants in the conference chiefly represent two groups: research workers in medicine and physiology, and psychologists. The approach is thus primarily scientific, although some philosophic questions are discussed.--R. H.

Upshot: I present reflections on the particularities of second-order science in response to the commentaries on my paper, as well as comments on the limitations of verbal analytical attempts to grasp the implicit circularity of observer-inclusion.

Reading this book is, I imagine, very much like having a conversation with—by which I mean listening to—Gerald Edelman on topics of great interest: evolution; the brain; consciousness; and the nature and limits of human knowledge. Normally, this would be a great recommendation for a work, as one would assume the informality of style and intimacy of tone would make more accessible the ideas being conveyed. In this case, however, there are a couple of problems. The first is that, at (...) any point in this particular conversation, at most one person understands what is being said; the other problem is that it isn’t always Edelman. (shrink)