Scientific Change

Edited by Howard Sankey (University of Melbourne, University of Melbourne)
About this topic
Summary The topics dealt with under this category relate to the general nature of change in the sciences.  Most work in this area has addressed the topic of theory change, which was brought to the forefront of philosophical attention by the "historical turn", associated with such writers as Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Imre Lakatos and Larry Laudan.  A variety of philosophical problems arise in this area, including the question of whether science progresses toward truth, the rationality of choice between theories, the structure of theories, and the possibility of comparing alternative theories.
Key works Current thinking about scientific change may be traced back to  Kuhn 1962, or later editions, e.g. Kuhn 1962.  A valuable collection of essays on the topic is Lakatos & Musgrave 1970.  See, in particular, Imre 1970, for Lakatos's proposal of a methodology of scientific research programs.  Feyerabend 1974 is an influential discussion of the topic, including its implications for methodology.  Laudan 1977 is an important critical discussion of the works of Kuhn and Lakatos, which introduces Laudan's own positive account.  Kitcher 1993 continues the discussion, while introducing important proposals with respect to a realist account of scientific change.
Introductions Chalmers 1982 is an excellent introductory textbook which provides good general coverage of the issues relating to scientific change. See Nickles 2010 for an overview of topics relating to scientific revolutions.  Devitt 1979 is an incisive discussion of the claim that alternative theories are incommensurable.  See Bird 2007 for one proposal about the nature of scientific progress, and Sankey 1995 for some aspects of the problem of the rationality of the choice between theories.
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1719 found
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Material to categorize
  1. Explicações Científicas, Introdução a Filosofía da Ciência. [REVIEW]M. A. - 1971 - Review of Metaphysics 24 (4):747-748.
  2. Computational Scientific Discovery and Cognitive Science Theories.M. Addis, Peter D. Sozou, F. Gobet & Philip R. Lane - unknown
    This study is concerned with processes for discovering new theories in science. It considers a computational approach to scientific discovery, as applied to the discovery of theories in cognitive science. The approach combines two ideas. First, a process-based scientific theory can be represented as a computer program. Second, an evolutionary computational method, genetic programming, allows computer programs to be improved through a process of computational trialand-error. Putting these two ideas together leads to a system that can automatically generate and improve (...)
  3. Rationality in Science and Politics.Gunnar Andersson - 1984
  4. Repertoires: A Post-Kuhnian Perspective on Scientific Change and Collaborative Research.Rachel A. Ankeny & Sabina Leonelli - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 60:18-28.
  5. From Myth to the Modern Mind.Roger Ariew - 1987 - Review of Metaphysics 40 (4):792-793.
  6. Scientific Research Between Orthodoxy and Anomaly.Harald Atmanspacher - unknown
    Scientific research takes place in the field of tension between accepted coherent knowledge and not understood, not integrated fragments: between orthodoxy and anomaly. Orthodox knowledge is characterized by laws and norms which can be conceived formally (deterministic or statistical laws), methodologically (criteria for scientific work), or conceptually (frameworks of thinking, regulative principles). I propose to classify anomalies according to their feasibility of being systematically connected with accepted knowledge. In this way, one can distinguish anomalies at the frontier of our knowledge, (...)
  7. The Structure of Science. [REVIEW]J. H. B. - 1961 - Review of Metaphysics 15 (1):194-194.
  8. A Ciência E o Projeto Crítico Kantiano.Eduardo Salles de Oliveira Barra - 2013 - Scientiae Studia 11 (4):937-962.
  9. The Logical Structure of Science.Abraham Cornelius Benjamin - 1936 - K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co..
  10. Reviews-Thomas Kuhn.Alexander Bird & James Robert Brown - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (1):143-150.
  11. Discussion Notes: IS planck'S ‘PRINCIPLE’ TRUE?John T. Blackmore - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (4):347-349.
  12. Is Planck's 'Principle' True?John T. Blackmore - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (4):347-349.
  13. Paradigmawechsel in Analytischer Wissenschaftstheorie?Dietrich Böhler - 1972 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 3 (2):219-242.
    Summary It is argued that the „pragmatic turn represented by Kuhn's work constitutes a modification but not a change of the paradigm of „analytic philosophy of science. To show this, that paradigm (P) is reconstructed in terms of five programmatic schemata of knowledge production.
  14. Representaciones En la Ciencia: De la Invariancia Estructural a la Significatividad Pragmática.Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla - 1999 - Theoria 14 (2):380-382.
  15. The Advancement of Science, and its Burdens.Harold I. Brown - 1990 - International Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):114-115.
  16. Probabilistic Thinking, Thermodynamics, and the Interaction of the History and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1978 Pisa Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science, Volume IIJaakko Hintikka David Gruender Evandro Agazzi.Stephen G. Brush - 1982 - Isis 73 (2):286-287.
  17. A Reminiscence of Thomas Kuhn.Jed Z. Buchwald - 2010 - Perspectives on Science 18 (3):279-283.
    In the fall of 1967 I entered Princeton as a Freshman intending to major in physics but interested as well in history. The catalog listed a course on the history of science, taught by a Professor Thomas Kuhn with the assistance of Michael Mahoney that seemed nicely to fit both interests. The course proved to be peculiarly intense for something about what was, after all, obsolete science as, each week, hundreds of pages of arcana from the distant past had to (...)
  18. Thomas S. Kuhn, 1922-1996.Jed Z. Buchwald & George E. Smith - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (2):361-376.
  19. The Structure-Nominative Reconstruction of Scientific Knowledge.M. Burgin & V. Kuznetsov - 1988 - Epistemologia 11 (2):235-254.
  20. Philosophy of Science as a Model for All Philosophy.A. V. Bushkovitch - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (2):307-311.
  21. Über Einen Methodisch Geordneten Aufbau der Speziellen Relativitätstheorie.Manfred Buth - 1998 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (1):21-36.
    About a methodically ordered reconstruction of the theory of special relativity. One of the main results of the theory of special relativity is that our basic concepts concerning space and time must be revised, because there is new experimental evidence. But on the other hand it was meant to move in a circular procedure, if the usual methods of measuring distances and temporal durations are refused on the ground of experimental results that are based on even these measuring methods. Thus (...)
  22. Toward a Rational History of Medical Science.K. Codell Carter - 1995 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):493-502.
  23. Phenomenotechnique in Historical Perspective: Its Origins and Implications for Philosophy of Science.Teresa Castelao-Lawless - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (1):44-59.
    This article provides an overview of the historical and philosophical context from which originated G. Bachelard's concept of "phenomenotechnique". It analyzes why phenomenotechnique is crucial for science studies. By incorporating the concept of phenomenotechnique into Hacking's and Galison's models of science, I argue that we can avoid the radicalism of both while also preventing the analysis of scientific practices from collapsing into the interpretive frames mandated by social constructivists.
  24. Descriptions of Scientific Revolutions:Rorty’s Failure at Redescribing Scientific Progress.Kyle Cavagnini - 2012 - Stance 5:31-43.
    The twentieth century saw extended development in the philosophy of science to incorporate contemporary expansions of scientific theory and investigation. Richard Rorty was a prominent and rather controversial thinker who maintained that all progress, from social change to scientific inquiry, was achieved through the redescription of existing vocabularies. However, this theory fails to describe revolutionary scientific progress. Thomas Kuhn’s theories of paradigm change, as first described in his seminal work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, better portray this process. I attempt (...)
  25. Xiang Chen, Instrumental Traditions and Theories of Light: The Uses of Instruments in the Optical Revolution.H. Chang - 2002 - Annals of Science 59:436-439.
  26. Scientific Literacy: What It is, Why It is Important, and Why Scientists Think We Don't Have It.Bjorn Claeson, Emily Martin, Wendy Richardson, Monica Schoch-Spana & Karen-Sue Taussig - 1996 - In Laura Nader (ed.), Naked Science: Anthropological Inquiry Into Boundaries, Power, and Knowledge. Routledge.
  27. A New Programme of Research?Harry Collins - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (4):615-620.
  28. Introduction: A New Programme of Research?Harry Collins - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.
  29. Are Dinosaurs Extinct?Richard Creath - 1995 - Foundations of Science 1 (2):285-297.
    It is widely believed that empiricism, though once dominant, is now extinct. This turns out to be mistaken because of incorrect assumption about the initial dominance of logical empiricism and about the content and variety of logical empiricist views. In fact, prominent contemporary philosophers (Quine and Kuhn) who are thought to have demolished logical empiricism are shown to exhibit central views of the logical empiricists rather than having overthrown them.
  30. Book Review:Change and Progress in Modern Science Joseph C. Pitt. [REVIEW]James T. Cushing - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (1):173-.
  31. Carnap, Kuhn, and the History of Science: A Reply to Thomas Uebel.J. C. Pinto de Oliveira - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):215-223.
    The purpose of this article is to respond to Thomas Uebel’s criticisms of my comments regarding the current revisionism of Carnap’s work and its relations to Kuhn. I begin by pointing out some misunderstandings in the interpretation of my article. I then discuss some aspects related to Carnap’s view of the history of science. First, I emphasize that it was not due to a supposed affinity between Kuhn’s conceptions and those of logical positivists that Kuhn was invited to write the (...)
  32. On Science and Philosophy.Arjuna De Zoysa - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 8:83-91.
    I have argued here for a change in a scientific world-view, from that of the study of forms to that of process. In doing so we need to understand as to how process creates form. In showing this I have at first drawn from the history of Buddhist philosophy; with its concepts of ‘Sunyata’ (Emptiness) and radical interdependency (Huayen). Then showed its parallel with modern Fractal geometries, which thru’ rather simple mathematics, shows as to how process could derive form. I (...)
  33. Chapter 5. The Techno-Scientific Ideology.Craig Dilworth - 2003 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 81:63-72.
  34. The Several Categories Suggestedfor the" New Historiography of Science": An Interpretative Analysis From a Foundational Viewpoint.Antonino Drago - 2001 - Epistemologia 24 (1):43-82.
    Having characterized the foundations of science by means of two basic options - one on the kind of the infinity, the other on the kind of the organization - I characterize the categoeris of all historians of science and classify them. In particular Koyré's and Kuhn's categories are explained through their choices on the two options. Mach result to be the main historian of the dominant attitudes of the historians of science.
  35. The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions.John Dupre & Philip Kitcher - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):147.
  36. Stegmüller Über „Wissenschaftliche Revolutionen“.Klaus Jürgen Düsberg - 1977 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 8 (2):331-341.
    Anknüpfend an Untersuchungen von J. D. Sneed, hat W. Stegmüller eine Explikation von "'revolutionärem' wissenschaftlichem Fortschritt" vorgeschlagen, die auf einer bestimmten Definition der intertheoretischen Relation der Reduktion beruht. Zumindest in seiner bisherigen Fassung erweist sich das von Stegmüller vorgebrachte Kriterium für "revolutionären" wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt jedoch nicht nur als zu weit, sondern auch, wie das Beispiel klassische vs. relativistische Kinematik zeigt, als zu eng.
  37. Ciencia, Tecnología Y Sociedad: Una Introducción.Javier Echeverría - 1997 - Theoria 12 (2):389-391.
  38. Conceptos Y Teorías de la Ciencia.Javier Echeverría - 1985 - Theoria 1 (1):328-329.
  39. Creation as Reconfiguration: Art in the Advancement of Science.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2002 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (1):13 – 25.
    Cognitive advancement is not always a matter of acquiring new information. It often consists in reconfiguration--in reorganizing a domain so that hitherto overlooked or underemphasized features, patterns, opportunities, and resources come to light. Several modes of reconfiguration prominent in the arts--metaphor, fiction, exemplification, and perspective--play important roles in science as well. They do not perform the same roles as literal, descriptive, perspectiveless scientific truths. But to understand how science advances understanding, we need to appreciate the ineliminable cognitive contributions of non-literal, (...)
  40. The Interdependence of the Core, the Heuristic and the Novelty of Facts in Lakanto's MSRP.Elie G. Zahar - 2001 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 16 (42):415-435.
    In this paper I try to explain why Lakatos’s conventionalist view must be replaced by a phenomenological conception of the empirical basis; for only in this way can one make sense of the theses that the hard core of an RP can be shielded against refutations; that this metaphysical hard core can be turned into a set of guidelines or, alternatively, into a set of heuristic metaprinciples governing the development of an RP; and that a distinction can legitimately be made (...)
  41. Philosophy, Science, and (Anti-) Communism: The Two Lives of Imre Lakatos.Roberto Festa - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 57:247-253.
  42. Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science. Larry Laudan.Paul Feyerabend - 1992 - Isis 83 (2):367-368.
  43. Imre Lakatos.Paul Feyerabend - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (1):1-18.
  44. Zahar on Einstein.Paul K. Feyerabend - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):25-28.
  45. The Structure of Science. [REVIEW]Paul K. Feyerabend - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (3):237-249.
  46. ESP: A Scientific Evaluation.Antony Flew, C. E. M. Hansel & E. C. Boring - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 18 (71):183.
  47. Book Review:From Mineralogy to Geology: The Foundations of a Science, 1650-1830 Rachel Laudan. [REVIEW]Henry Frankel - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (2):340-.
  48. Book Review:The Essential Tension Thomas S. Kuhn. [REVIEW]Henry Frankel - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (4):649-.
  49. Towards a Social History of Newtonian Mechanics. Boris Hessen and Henryk Grossmann Revisited in Scientific Knowledge Socialized.Gideon Freudenthal - 1988 - Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 108:193-212.
  50. A Post-Kuhnian Approach to the History and Philosophy of Science.Michael Friedman - 2010 - The Monist 93 (4):497-517.
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