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  1. Kreativität.Günter Abel (ed.) - 2005 - Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin.
  2. Sober as a Judge.Gordon Belot - 2016 - Metascience 25 (3):387-392.
    In Ockham's Razors: A User's Guide, Elliott Sober argues that parsimony considerations are epistemically relevant on the grounds that certain methods of model selection, such as the Akaike Information Criterion, exhibit good asymptotic behaviour and take the number of adjustable parameters in a model into account. I raise some worries about this form of argument.
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  3. The Axiomatic Method, the Order of Concepts and the Hierarchy of Sciences: An Introduction.Arianna Betti, Willem R. de Jong & Marije Martijn - 2011 - Synthese 183 (1):1-5.
  4. Anarchism as Metaphilosophy.Lajos L. Brons - 2015 - The Science of Mind 53:139-158.
    Philosophy once started as the critical reflection on relatively ordinary human concerns. Increasing specialization has moved the discipline farther and farther away from these concerns, however, undermining its relevance outside the academy, but has also resulting in an ever increasing fragmentation. This fragmentation has further divided the field into a large number of esoteric communities that hardly understand each other. "Further divided", because philosophy was already divided into schools and traditions that seem to speak mutually unintelligible languages. In addition to (...)
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  5. How Empirical is Contemporary Logical Empiricism?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):299-317.
    There is a certain dominant tradition, school, ambiance or intellectual community in contemporary philosophy of science which can conveniently be labelled logical empiricism. Now a curious and (I believe) hitherto unremarked change occurred in the accepted methodology of logical empiricism shortly after the end of World War II. Before then accepted forms of argument for philosophical theses about the logic, analysis, or rational reconstruction of science fell into two main categories. Some arguments appealed to familiar or historically attestable facts about (...)
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  6. The Classical Model of Science: A Millennia-Old Model of Scientific Rationality.Willem R. de Jong & Arianna Betti - 2010 - Synthese 174 (2):185-203.
    Throughout more than two millennia philosophers adhered massively to ideal standards of scientific rationality going back ultimately to Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora . These standards got progressively shaped by and adapted to new scientific needs and tendencies. Nevertheless, a core of conditions capturing the fundamentals of what a proper science should look like remained remarkably constant all along. Call this cluster of conditions the Classical Model of Science . In this paper we will do two things. First of all, we will (...)
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  7. Kreativität Im Denken. Eine Kritik des Reliabilitätsarguments von John D. Norton Gegen Rationalistische Epistemologien Zur Methode des Gedankenexperiments.Yiftach J. H. Fehige - 2005 - In Günter Abel (ed.), Kreativität. Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin.
    In this paper I argue that Norton's case against Brown's rationalism about thought experiments suffers from serious shortcomings, which relate to the nature of induction.
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  8. Strong and Weak Methods.Vojtech Filkorn - 1989 - In Jens Erik Fenstad, Ivan Timofeevich Frolov & Risto Hilpinen (eds.), Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Viii: Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Moscow, 1987. Sole Distributors for the U.S.A. And Canada, Elsevier Science.
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  9. Lakatos, Reason, and Rationality.Gabor Forrai - 2002 - In G. Kampis L. Kvasz & M. Stöltzner (eds.), Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology, and the Man. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 73-83.
    Lakatos's methodology, if analysed as belonging to the demarcationist-rationalist program launched by Popper gives some interesting conclusions concerning the feasibility of the project: (1) Rationalism cannot provide arguments against relativism. (2) A theory of scientific rationality cannot be defended without relying on scientific authorities. (3) A historical justification of scientific rationality does not show that the procedures that are rational according to the theory are truth-conducive.
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  10. Attualità delle indicazioni metodologiche galileiane.Ludovico Geymonat - 1967 - Atti Del Simposio Internazionale Su Andquot;Galileo Galilei Nella Storia E Nella Filosofia Della Scienza" (1964) - a Cura Del Gruppo Italiano di Storia Della Scienza, Firenze:205-215.
  11. Per Galileo.Ludovico Geymonat & Mario Quaranta (eds.) - 1981 - Bertani.
  12. Descartes and His Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections, and Replies. [REVIEW]Gary Hatfield - 1997 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (4):624-626.
    Review of Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene, editors, _Descartes and His Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections, and Replies_. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. Pp. vii + 261. Cloth, $45.00. Paper, $17.95.
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  13. Science, Certainty, and Descartes.Gary Hatfield - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:249 - 262.
    During the 1630s Descartes recognized that he could not expect all legitimate claims in natural science to meet the standard of absolute certainty. The realization resulted from a change in his physics, which itself arose not through methodological reflections, but through developments in his substantive metaphysical doctrines. Descartes discovered the metaphysical foundations of his physics in 1629-30; as a consequence, the style of explanation employed in his physical writings changed. His early methodological conceptions, as preserved in the Rules and sketched (...)
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  14. A New Interpretation of the Representational Theory of Measurement.Conrad Heilmann - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (5):787-797.
    On the received view, the Representational Theory of Measurement reduces measurement to the numerical representation of empirical relations. This account of measurement has been widely criticized. In this article, I provide a new interpretation of the Representational Theory of Measurement that sidesteps these debates. I propose to view the Representational Theory of Measurement as a library of theorems that investigate the numerical representability of qualitative relations. Such theorems are useful tools for concept formation that, in turn, is one crucial aspect (...)
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  15. Heuristics and Meta-Heuristics in Scientific Judgement.Spencer Phillips Hey - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2):471-495.
    Despite the increasing recognition that heuristics may be involved in myriad scientific activities, much about how to use them prudently remains obscure. As typically defined, heuristics are efficient rules or procedures for converting complex problems into simpler ones. But this increased efficiency and problem-solving power comes at the cost of a systematic bias. As Wimsatt showed, biased modelling heuristics can conceal errors, leading to poor decisions or inaccurate models. This liability to produce errors presents a fundamental challenge to the philosophical (...)
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  16. Robust and Discordant Evidence: Methodological Lessons From Clinical Research.Spencer Phillips Hey - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (1):55-75.
    The concordance of results that are “robust” across multiple scientific modalities is widely considered to play a critical role in the epistemology of science. But what should we make of those cases where such multimodal evidence is discordant? Jacob Stegenga has recently argued that robustness is “worse than useless” in these cases, suggesting that “different kinds of evidence cannot be combined in a coherent way.” In this article I respond to this critique and illustrate the critical methodological role that robustness (...)
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  17. Common Method Variance & Bias dalam Penelitian Psikologis. Juneman - 2013 - Jurnal Pengukuran Psikologi Dan Pendidikan Indonesia 2 (5):364-381.
    The issue of common method variance and bias in Indonesia still has not gained much attention; even the terminology is less popular, except among psychometric enthusiasts and experts. In fact, the potential for common method variance and bias infiltrating in research results is very high, especially in studies that use a single method, a single source, and concurrent design, which are highly favored by psychological lecturers and researchers in Indonesia. This paper is a critical review, exposing the debate and serious (...)
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  18. Moderately Pluralistic Methodology.Pawel Kawalec - 2012 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 60 (4):233-247.
    The paper outlines and discusses the major tenets of moderately pluralistic methodology. The latter is juxtaposed to J. Życiński’s principle of natural interdisciplinarity. It instantiates scientific pluralism as a domain-specific agenda for research. The symbolic and causal understanding are integrated in this methodological conception by means of a specific kind of counterfactual reasoning, which is coined the delimiting counterfactual. It makes the moderately pluralistic methodology applicable to non-experimental research. -/- Streszczenie Tytuł: “Umiarkowanie pluralistyczna metodologia” -/- Artykuł prezentuje i omawia zasadnicze (...)
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  19. Peirce and Royce and the Betrayal of Science: Scientific Fraud and Misconduct.Jacquelyn Anne K. Kegley - 2010 - The Pluralist 5 (2):87-104.
    I believe that the long-neglected ideas on science and scientific method of Charles Sanders Peirce and Josiah Royce can illuminate some of the current attacks on science that have surfaced: misconduct and fraud in science and anti-scientism or the "new cynicism." In addition, Royce and Peirce offer insights relevant to the ferment in contemporary philosophy of science around the various forms of pluralism advocated by a number of philosophers (see Kellert, Longino, and Waters). "Pluralism" is the view that "plurality in (...)
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  20. Paradigmatische Fälle. Konstruktion, Narration und Verallgemeinerung von Fall-Wissen in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften.Katherina Kinzel & Ruben Hackler (eds.) - 2016 - Basel: Schwabe.
    Fallgeschichten werden seit dem 18. Jahrhundert zunehmend genutzt, um juristisches, psychologisches und medizinisches Wissen einer grösseren Öffentlichkeit zu vermitteln. In den letzten zehn Jahren haben sie auch in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften mehr Aufmerksamkeit erfahren. Die Diskussion über paradigmatische Fälle in diesem Band zielt darauf ab, Fallgeschichten in ihrer Funktion als besonders anschauliche oder lehrreiche Beispiele in verschiedenen historischen Kontexten zu untersuchen und zu vergleichen. Die in diesem Heft versammelten Texte gehen der Frage nach, wie Fälle dazu beitragen, Debatten zu (...)
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  21. Distributed Cognition: A Methodological Note.David Kirsh - 2006 - Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 14 (2):249-262.
    Humans are closely coupled with their environments. They rely on being `embedded' to help coordinate the use of their internal cognitive resources with external tools and resources. Consequently, everyday cognition, even cognition in the absence of others, may be viewed as partially distributed. As cognitive scientists our job is to discover and explain the principles governing this distribution: principles of coordination, externalization, and interaction. As designers our job is to use these principles, especially if they can be converted to metrics, (...)
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  22. Feminism As Method.Elisabeth A. Lloyd - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (2):189-220.
  23. Disagreement in Scientific Ontologies.David Ludwig - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie (1):1-13.
    The aim of this article is to discuss the nature of disagreement in scientific ontologies in the light of case studies from biology and cognitive science. I argue that disagreements in scientific ontologies are usually not about purely factual issues but involve both verbal and normative aspects. Furthermore, I try to show that this partly non-factual character of disagreement in scientific ontologies does not lead to a radical deflationism but is compatible with a “normative ontological realism.” Finally, I argue that (...)
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  24. Armchair Philosophy Naturalized.Sebastian Lutz - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Carnap suggests that philosophy can be construed as being engaged solely in conceptual engineering. I argue that since many results of the sciences can be construed as stemming from conceptual engineering as well, Carnap’s account of philosophy can be methodologically naturalistic. This is also how he conceived of his account. That the sciences can be construed as relying heavily on conceptual engineering is supported by empirical investigations into scientific methodology, but also by a number of conceptual considerations. I present a (...)
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  25. Metóda, problém a úloha (Method, Problem and Task).František Gahér Marko & Vladimír - 2017 - Bratislava: Univerzita Komenského.
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  26. The Objectivity of a Methodology.Michael Martin - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (3):447-450.
    In this paper I consider critically Richard Rudner's account of the objectivity of a methodology. I show that Rudner's analysis provides neither a sufficient condition nor a necessary condition for one method being more objective than another.
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  27. Experts in Science: A View From the Trenches.Carlo Martini - 2014 - Synthese 191 (1):3-15.
    In this paper I analyze four so-called “principles of expertise”; that is, good epistemic practices that are normatively motivated by the epistemological literature on expert judgment. I highlight some of the problems that the four principles of expertise run into, when we try to implement them in concrete contexts of application (e.g. in science committees). I suggest some possible alternatives and adjustments to the principles, arguing in general that the epistemology of expertise should be informed both by case studies and (...)
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  28. Problem-Centering Vs. Means-Centering in Science.A. H. Maslow - 1946 - Philosophy of Science 13 (4):326-331.
  29. Misunderstanding Understanding Scientific Progress.Nicholas Maxwell - manuscript
    In my book Understanding Scientific Progress, I argue that fundamental philosophical problems about scientific progress, above all the problem of induction, cannot be solved granted standard empiricism (SE), a doctrine which most scientists and philosophers of science take for granted. A key tenet of SE is that no permanent thesis about the world can be accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independent of evidence. For a number of reasons, we need to adopt a rather different conception of science which (...)
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  30. What’s Wrong With Aim-Oriented Empiricism?Nicholas Maxwell - 2015 - Acta Baltica Historiae Et Philosophiae Scientiarum 3 (2):5-31.
    For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, conception of rationality, and how we go about attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. Despite these far-reaching repercussions, aim-oriented empiricism has so far received scant attention from philosophers of science. Here, sixteen objections to the validity of the argument for (...)
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  31. Our Global Problems And What We Need To Do About Them.Nicholas Maxwell - 2012 - In Charles Tandy & Jack Lee (eds.), Death and Anti-Death Anthology, vol. 10: Ten Years After John Rawls (1921-2002). Ria University Press.
    How can what is of value associated with our human world exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the physical universe? Or, as we may put it, how can the God-of-Cosmic-Value exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the God-of-Cosmic-Power? This, I argue, is our fundamental problem – fundamental in both intellectual and practical terms. Here, I tackle the practical aspect of the problem. I consider briefly five global problems – climate change, war, population growth, world (...)
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  32. The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution: The Rational Pursuit of Wisdom.Nicholas Maxwell - 2010 - In Charles Tandy (ed.), Death And Anti-Death, Volume 7: Nine Hundred Years After St. Anselm (1033-1109. Ria University Press.
    We are in a state of impending crisis. And the fault lies in part with academia. For two centuries or so, academia has been devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how. This has enormously increased our power to act which has, in turn, brought us both all the great benefits of the modern world and the crises we now face. Modern science and technology have made possible modern industry and agriculture, the explosive growth of the world’s population, global (...)
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  33. What’s Wrong With Science? Towards a People’s Rational Science of Delight and Compassion, Second Edition.Nicholas Maxwell - 2009 - Pentire Press.
    What ought to be the aims of science? How can science best serve humanity? What would an ideal science be like, a science that is sensitively and humanely responsive to the needs, problems and aspirations of people? How ought the institutional enterprise of science to be related to the rest of society? What ought to be the relationship between science and art, thought and feeling, reason and desire, mind and heart? Should the social sciences model themselves on the natural sciences: (...)
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  34. The Problem of Induction and Metaphysical Assumptions Concerning the Comprehensibility and Knowability of the Universe.Nicholas Maxwell - 2007 - PhilSci Archive.
    Even though evidence underdetermines theory, often in science one theory only is regarded as acceptable in the light of the evidence. This suggests there are additional unacknowledged assumptions which constrain what theories are to be accepted. In the case of physics, these additional assumptions are metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe. Rigour demands that these implicit assumptions be made explicit within science, so that they can be critically assessed and, we may hope improved. This leads to (...)
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  35. Aim-Oriented Empiricism: David Miller's Critique.Nicholas Maxwell - 2006 - PhilSci Archive.
    For three decades I have expounded and defended aim-oriented empiricism, a view of science which, l claim, solves a number of problems in the philosophy of science and has important implications for science itself and, when generalized, for the whole of academic inquiry, and for our capacity to solve our current global problems. Despite these claims, the view has received scant attention from philosophers of science. Recently, however, David Miller has criticized the view. Miller’s criticisms are, however, not valid.
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  36. A Mug's Game? Solving the Problem of Induction with Metaphysical Presuppositions.Nicholas Maxwell - 2005 - In John Earman & John Norton (eds.), PhilSci Archive.
    A Mug's Game? Solving the Problem of Induction with Metaphysical Presuppositions Nicholas Maxwell Emeritus Reader in Philosophy of Science at University College London Email: nicholas.maxwell@ucl.ac.uk Website: www.ucl.ac.uk/from-knowledge-to-wisdom . Abstract This paper argues that a view of science, expounded and defended elsewhere, solves the problem of induction. The view holds that we need to see science as accepting a hierarchy of metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these theses asserting less and less as we go up the (...)
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  37. In Defense of Seeking Wisdom.Nicholas Maxwell - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 35 (5):733-743.
    Steven Yates has criticized my claim that we need to bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of academic inquiry, so that the aim becomes to promote wisdom rather than just acquire knowledge. Yates's main criticism is that the proposed revolution does not have a clear strategy for its implementation, and is, in any case, Utopian, unrealizable and undesirable. It is argued, here, that Yates has misconstrued what the proposed revolution amounts to; in fact it is realizable, urgently (...)
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  38. Science, Knowledge, Wisdom and the Public Good.Nicholas Maxwell - 2003 - Scientists for Global Responsibility Newsletter (26 February 2003):7-9.
    What kind of science – or, more generally, what kind of academic inquiry – can best contribute to the public good? Two answers are considered: knowledge-inquiry and wisdom-inquiry. The former is what we have at present. It is, however, damagingly irrational. The latter is more rigorous and, potentially, of greater value in human and intellectual terms. It arises as a result of putting the Enlightenment Programme properly into practice. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in academia, so that (...)
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  39. Two Great Problems of Learning.Nicholas Maxwell - 2003 - Teaching in Higher Education, 8 (January):129-134.
    Two great problems of learning confront humanity: learning about the universe, and learning how to live wisely. The first problem was solved with the creation of modern science, but the second problem has not been solved. This combination puts humanity into a situation of unprecedented danger. In order to solve the second problem we need to learn from our solution to the first problem. This requires that we bring about a revolution in the overall aims and methods of academic inquiry, (...)
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  40. Is Science Neurotic?Nicholas Maxwell - 2002 - Metaphilosophy 33 (3):259-299.
    Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer from. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B, represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C, and as a result fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic". Natural science is neurotic in this sense in so far as a basic (...)
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  41. A New Conception of Science.Nicholas Maxwell - 2000 - Physics World 13 (8):17-18.
    When scientists choose one theory over another, they reject out of hand all those that are not simple, unified or explanatory. Yet the orthodox view of science is that evidence alone should determine what can be accepted. Nicholas Maxwell thinks he has a way out of the dilemma.
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  42. Has Science Established That the Universe is Comprehensible?Nicholas Maxwell - 1999 - Cogito 13 (2):139-145.
    Many scientists, if pushed, may be inclined to hazard the guess that the universe is comprehensible, even physically comprehensible. Almost all, however, would vehemently deny that science has already established that the universe is comprehensible. It is, nevertheless, just this that I claim to be the case. Once one gets the nature of science properly into perspective, it becomes clear that the comprehensibility of the universe is as secure an item of current scientific knowledge as anything theoretical in science can (...)
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  43. Can Academic Inquiry Help Humanity Become Civilized?,.Nicholas Maxwell - 1993 - Philosophy Today (13 May 1993):1-3.
    Humanity is confronted by immense global problems. In order to learn how to tackle them we need a new kind of academic inquiry, rationally organized and devoted to helping us resolve our problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways.
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  44. Wanted: A New Way of Thinking.Nicholas Maxwell - 1987 - New Scientist (14 May 1987):63.
    Our world is beset with appalling problems. To solve these urgent, intractable global problems it is not new scientific knowledge and technology that we need so much as new actions: new policies, new international relations, new institutions and social arrangements, new ways of living. The mere provision of scientific know-ledge and technological know-how cannot help much: indeed, all too often it actually makes matters worse. The dreadful truth is that science has played a crucial role, often unwittingly, in the creation (...)
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  45. Scientific Method in Brief, by Hugh G. Gauch, Jr. [REVIEW]Kevin McCain - 2013 - Teaching Philosophy 36 (3):310-313.
  46. Scientific Empiricism.Charles W. Morris - 1938 - In Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath & Charles W. Morris (eds.), Encyclopedia and Unified Science. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press. pp. 63-75.
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  47. Cartwright’s Approach to Invariance Under Intervention.Paweł Kawalec - 2013 - Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa 49 (198):321-333.
    N. Cartwright’s results on invariance under intervention and causality (2003) are reconsidered. Procedural approach to causality elicited in this paper and contrasted with Cartwright’s apparently philosophical one unravels certain ramifications of her results. The procedural approach seems to license only a constrained notion of intervention and in consequence the “correctness to invariance” part of Cartwright’s first theorem fails for a class of cases. The converse “invariance to correctness” part of the theorem relies heavily on modeling assumptions which prove to be (...)
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  48. Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning.Niki Pfeifer & Igor Douven - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2):1-23.
    This position paper advocates combining formal epistemology and the new paradigm psychology of reasoning in the studies of conditionals and reasoning with uncertainty. The new paradigm psychology of reasoning is characterized by the use of probability theory as a rationality framework instead of classical logic, used by more traditional approaches to the psychology of reasoning. This paper presents a new interdisciplinary research program which involves both formal and experimental work. To illustrate the program, the paper discusses recent work on the (...)
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  49. American Science and its Anti-Evolutionist Critics: It's the Evidence Stupid.Reed Richter - manuscript
    This is an unpublished talk written for a meeting of French philosophers. The paper describes the evolution versus creationism/intelligent design controversy in the U.S. A number of philosophers and scientists try to resolve this issue by sharply distinguishing the realm of science versus any talk of the supernatural. These pro-evolutionists often appeal to science's essential commitment to "methodological naturalism," the view that scientific methodology is essentially committed to naturalism and cannot meaningfully entertain hypotheses concerning the supernatural. I criticize methodological naturalism, (...)
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  50. Kuhn, Normativity and History and Philosophy of Science.Howard Sankey - 2012 - Epistemologia:103-111.
    This paper addresses the relationship between the history and philosophy of science by way of the issue of epistemic normativity. After brief discussion of the relationship between history and philosophy of science in Kuhn’s own thinking, the paper focuses on the implications of the history of science for epistemic normativity. There may be historical evidence for change of scientific methodology, which may seem to support a position of epistemic relativism. However, the fact that the methods of science undergo variation does (...)
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