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  1. R. A. (1956). Speculative Instruments. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 9 (3):523-523.
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  2. Peter Achinstein (1986). Theoretical Derivations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 17 (4):375-414.
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  3. Peter Achinstein (1969). Studies in the Philosophy of Science Essays by Peter Achinstein [and Others]. --. Blackwell.
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  4. Peter Achinstein (1965). "Defeasible" Problems. Journal of Philosophy 62 (21):629-633.
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  5. Robert John Ackermann (1960). Simplicity and the Acceptability of Scientific Theories. Dissertation, Michigan State University
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  6. Avshalom M. Adam (2000). Farewell to Certitude: Einstein's Novelty on Induction and Deduction, Fallibilism. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1):19-37.
    In the late 19th century great changes in theories of light and electricity were in direct conflict with certitude, the view that scientific knowledge is infallible. What is, then, the epistemic status of scientific theory? To resolve this issue Duhem and Poincaré proposed images of fallible knowledge, Instrumentalism and Conventionalism, respectively. Only in 1919–1922, after Einstein's relativity was published, he offered arguments to support Fallibilism, the view that certainty cannot be achieved in science. Though Einstein did not consider Duhem's Instrumentalism, (...)
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  7. Ernest W. Adams (1993). Probability and the Art of Judgement by Richard Jeffrey. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):154-157.
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  8. T. R. Addis & D. C. Gooding (2008). Simulation Methods for an Abductive System in Science. Foundations of Science 13 (1):37-52.
    We argue that abduction does not work in isolation from other inference mechanisms and illustrate this through an inference scheme designed to evaluate multiple hypotheses. We use game theory to relate the abductive system to actions that produce new information. To enable evaluation of the implications of this approach we have implemented the procedures used to calculate the impact of new information in a computer model. Experiments with this model display a number of features of collective belief-revision leading to consensus-formation, (...)
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  9. Jonathan E. Adler (1982). Jennifer Trusted, "The Logic of Scientific Inference". [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 32 (28):291.
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  10. Joseph Agassi (1973). Testing as a Bootstrap Operation in Physics. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 4 (1):1-24.
    Science uses its firmest conclusions to arrive at new ones which may well completely destroy these, previously firmest, conclusions. The perceptive may notice that when the previously firmest conclusions are demolished we may remain in the dark with no conclusion worth replacing it with. But only when we replace it with a firmer conclusion can we speak of a bootstrap operation rather than of a refutations. Often, to conclude, the ad hoc nature of a fact-like statement is rooted in the (...)
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  11. E. Agazzi & S. Walker (1978). Is Scientific Objectivity Possible Without Measurements? Diogenes 26 (104):93-111.
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  12. F. Michael Akeroyd (1986). A Challenge to the Followers of Lakatos. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (3):359-362.
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  13. Atocha Aliseda (2007). Abductive Reasoning: Challenges Ahead. Theoria 22 (3):261-270.
    The motivation behind the collection of papers presented in this THEORIA forum on Abductive reasoning is my book Abductive Reasoning: Logical Investigations into the Processes of Discovery and Explanation. These contributions raise fundamental questions. One of them concerns the conjectural character of abduction. The choice of a logical framework for abduction is also discussed in detail, both its inferential aspect and search strategies. Abduction is also analyzed as inference to the best explanation, as well as a process of epistemic change, (...)
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  14. Kristin Andrews & Brian Huss (2014). Anthropomorphism, Anthropectomy, and the Null Hypothesis. Biology and Philosophy 29 (5):711-729.
    We examine the claim that the methodology of psychology leads to a bias in animal cognition research against attributing “anthropomorphic” properties to animals . This charge is examined in light of a debate on the role of folk psychology between primatologists who emphasize similarities between humans and other apes, and those who emphasize differences. We argue that while in practice there is sometimes bias, either in the formulation of the null hypothesis or in the preference of Type-II errors over Type-I (...)
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  15. Rani Lill Anjum (2016). Evidence Based or Person Centered? An Ontological Debate. European Journal for Person Centered Healthcare 4 (2):421-429.
    Evidence based medicine (EBM) is under critical debate, and person centered healthcare (PCH) has been proposed as an improvement. But is PCH offered as a supplement or as a replacement of EBM? Prima facie PCH only concerns the practice of medicine, while the contended features of EBM also include methods and medical model. I here argue that there are good philosophical reasons to see PCH as a radical alternative to the existing medical paradigm of EBM, since the two seem committed (...)
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  16. Rani Lill Anjum, Roger Kerry & Stephen D. Mumford (forthcoming). Evidence Based on What? Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice:n/a-n/a.
  17. Lennart Åqvist (2007). An Interpretation of Probability in the Law of Evidence Based on Pro-Et-Contra Argumentation. Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):391-410.
    The purpose of this paper is to improve on the logical and measure-theoretic foundations for the notion of probability in the law of evidence, which were given in my contributions Åqvist [ (1990) Logical analysis of epistemic modality: an explication of the Bolding–Ekelöf degrees of evidential strength. In: Klami HT (ed) Rätt och Sanning (Law and Truth. A symposium on legal proof-theory in Uppsala May 1989). Iustus Förlag, Uppsala, pp 43–54; (1992) Towards a logical theory of legal evidence: semantic analysis (...)
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  18. Chris Argyris (1987). Seeking Truth and Actionable Knowledge: How the Scientific Method Inhibits Both. Philosophica 40.
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  19. Roger Ariew (2008). Pierre Duhem. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  20. Jerrold L. Aronson (1991). Scientific Reasoning. International Studies in Philosophy 23 (3):120-121.
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  21. A. M. Arruda & M. Finger (2014). Completeness for Cut-Based Abduction. Logic Journal of the IGPL 22 (2):286-296.
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  22. Bruce Aune (1971). Two Theories of Scientific Knowledge. Critica 5 (13):3 - 20.
  23. Bengt Autzen (2016). Significance Testing, P-Values and the Principle of Total Evidence. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):281-295.
    The paper examines the claim that significance testing violates the Principle of Total Evidence. I argue that p-values violate PTE for two-sided tests but satisfy PTE for one-sided tests invoking a sufficient test statistic independent of the preferred theory of evidence. While the focus of the paper is to evaluate a particular claim about the relationship of significance testing and PTE, I clarify the reading of this methodological principle along the way.
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  24. Francisco J. Ayala (1994). On the Scientific Method, Its Practice and Pitfalls. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 16 (2):205 - 240.
    This paper sets forth a familiar theme, that science essentially consists of two interdependent episodes, one imaginative, the other critical. Hypotheses and other imaginative conjectures are the initial stage of scientific inquiry because they provide the incentive to seek the truth and a clue as to where to find it. But scientific conjectures must be subject to critical examination and empirical testing. There is a dialogue between the two episodes; observations made to test a hypothesis are the inspiration for new (...)
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  25. A. J. Ayer (2004). The Problem of Knowledge , and, Probability and Evidence.
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  26. A. J. Ayer & Graham MacDonald (2005). Probability and Evidence. Cambridge University Press.
    A. J. Ayer was one of the foremost analytical philosophers of the twentieth century, and was known as a brilliant and engaging speaker. In essays based on his influential Dewey Lectures, Ayer addresses some of the most critical and controversial questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science, examining the nature of inductive reasoning and grappling with the issues that most concerned him as a philosopher. This edition contains revised and expanded versions of the lectures and two additional essays. Ayer (...)
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  27. M. B. (1973). Scientific Method. Review of Metaphysics 26 (3):534-534.
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  28. Gaston Bachelard (1984). The New Scientific Spirit.
  29. Francis Bacon (2009). The Inductive Method. In Timothy J. McGrew, Marc Alspector-Kelly & Fritz Allhoff (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 190.
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  30. V. Bakoš (2007). Philosophical Production of the Association for Scientific Synthesis: Towards the 70th Anniversary of Its Foundation. Filozofia 62:853-869.
    The Association for Scientific Synthesis gathered a group of Slovak intellectuals, who tried to introduce modern scientific attitudes and structural methods into Slovak culture. In their systematic effort for a coordinated and convergent scientific research, for an exact scientific language and methods they were inspired by logical empiricism of Wiener Kreis, Czech Structuralism and Russian „formal“ school. Much of their attention was paid to such problems as the philosophy and methodology of science, concept of empirical knowledge, questions of logical syntax (...)
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  31. Arunasalam Balasubramaniam (1983). Epistemic Complementarity and Scientific Rationality. Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
    Classical empiricism raised epistemological issues within a framework of dichotomies that were rarely questioned. It was assumed that statements were either normative or descriptive ; terms were either observational or theoretical; meaning is either given atomically or holistically; truth was either radically independent of language or radically dependent upon it ; and the entities postulated by scientific theories are constructed or are theory-independent . Modern philosophers have questioned the tenability of these distinctions and attempts have been made to relinquish many (...)
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  32. Aristides Baltas (2004). On the Grammatical Aspects of Radical Scientific Discovery. Philosophia Scientae 8:169-201.
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  33. Anita Bandrowski, Ryan Brinkman, Mathias Brochhausen, Matthew H. Brush, Bill Bug, Marcus C. Chibucos, Kevin Clancy, Mélanie Courtot, Dirk Derom, Michel Dumontier, Liju Fan, Jennifer Fostel, Gilberto Fragoso, Frank Gibson, Alejandra Gonzalez-Beltran, Melissa A. Haendel, Yongqun He, Mervi Heiskanen, Tina Hernandez-Boussard, Mark Jensen, Yu Lin, Allyson L. Lister, Phillip Lord, James Malone, Elisabetta Manduchi, Monnie McGee, Norman Morrison, James A. Overton, Helen Parkinson, Bjoern Peters, Philippe Rocca-Serra, Alan Ruttenberg, Susanna-Assunta Sansone, Richard H. Scheuermann, Daniel Schober, Barry Smith, Larisa N. Soldatova, Christian J. Stoeckert, Chris F. Taylor, Carlo Torniai, Jessica A. Turner, Randi Vita, Patricia L. Whetzel & Jie Zheng (2016). The Ontology for Biomedical Investigations. PLoS ONE 11 (4):e0154556.
    The Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OBI) is an ontology that provides terms with precisely defined meanings to describe all aspects of how investigations in the biological and medical domains are conducted. OBI re-uses ontologies that provide a representation of biomedical knowledge from the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) project and adds the ability to describe how this knowledge was derived. We here describe the state of OBI and several applications that are using it, such as adding semantic expressivity to (...)
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  34. Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon G. Brittan (2006). Acceptibility, Evidence, and Severity. Synthese 148 (2):259-293.
    The notion of a severe test has played an important methodological role in the history of science. But it has not until recently been analyzed in any detail. We develop a generally Bayesian analysis of the notion, compare it with Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical approach by way of sample diagnostic tests in the medical sciences, and consider various objections to both. At the core of our analysis is a distinction between evidence and confirmation or belief. These notions must be kept separate (...)
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  35. Sorin Bangu (2013). Popper: Yet Again. [REVIEW] Metascience 22 (1):165-168.
    Popper: yet again Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-012-9669-y Authors Sorin Bangu, Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  36. Maya Bar-Hillel (1982). Ideal Evidence, Relevance and Second-Order Probabilities. Erkenntnis 17 (3):273 - 290.
    The concepts of supportive evidence and of relevant evidence seem very closely related to each other. Supportive evidence is clearly always relevant as well. But must relevant evidence be defined as evidence which is either supportive or weakeking? In an explicit or implicit manner, this is indeed the position of many philosophers. The paradox of ideal evidence, however, shows us that this is to restrictive. Besides increasing or decreasing the probability attached to some hypothesis, evidence can alter or interact with (...)
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  37. Gillian Abernathy Barker (1997). Abstraction, Analogy and Induction: Toward a General Account of Ampliative Inference. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    My central concern is with the epistemological status of ampliative inference. Three sorts of ampliative inference are initially distinguished: enumerative induction, analogical reasoning, and abstraction. Philosophers of science have generally treated these separately, and in particular have often divorced the familiar problem of induction from equally fundamental questions concerning the use of analogy and abstraction: What kinds of similarity can support inference? How can we pick out those features of a system that are essential for the purposes of understanding, and (...)
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  38. Barry Barnes (1996). Explaining Scientific Consensus: The Case of Mendelian GeneticsKyung-Man Kim. Isis 87 (1):198-199.
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  39. Eric Barnes (1996). Thoughts on Maher's Predictivism. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):401-410.
    Predictivism asserts that where evidence E confirms theory T, E provides stronger support for T when E is predicted on the basis of T and then confirmed than when E is known before T's construction and 'used', in some sense, in the construction of T. Among the most interesting attempts to argue that predictivism is a true thesis (under certain conditions) is that of Patrick Maher (1988, 1990, 1993). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of predictivism (...)
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  40. Paul Bartha (1998). Domenico Costantini and Maria Carla Galavotti, Eds., Probability, Dynamics and Causality: Essays in Honour of Richard C. Jeffrey Reviewed By. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 18 (5):321-323.
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  41. K. K. Baublys (1973). ACHINSTEIN, P. - "Concepts of Science: A Philosophical Analysis". [REVIEW] Mind 82:463.
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  42. William H. Baumer (1969). W. C. Salmon's "The Foundations of Scientific Inference". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (3):472.
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  43. Erica Beecher-Monas (2006). Evaluating Scientific Evidence: An Interdisciplinary Framework for Intellectual Due Process. Cambridge University Press.
    Scientific evidence is crucial in a burgeoning number of litigated cases, legislative enactments, regulatory decisions, and scholarly arguments. Evaluating Scientific Evidence explores the question of what counts as scientific knowledge, a question that has become a focus of heated courtroom and scholarly debate, not only in the United States, but in other common law countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. Controversies are rife over what is permissible use of genetic information, whether chemical exposure causes disease, whether future (...)
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  44. Darrin W. Belousek (1998). Husserl on Scientific Method and Conceptual Change: A Realist Appraisal. Synthese 115 (1):71-98.
    Husserl claimed that all theoretical scientific concepts originate in and are valid in reference to 'life-world' experience and that scientific traditions preserve the sense and validity of such concepts through unitary and cumulative change. Each of these claims will, in turn, be sympathetically laid out and assessed in comparison with more standard characterizations of scientific method and conceptual change as well as the history of physics, concerning particularly the challenge they may pose for scientific realism. The Husserlian phenomenological framework is (...)
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  45. Avner Ben-Zaken (2011). Intellectual Curiosity and the Scientific Revolution: A Global Perspective. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Science 44 (4):585-587.
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  46. Seth Benardete (1983). Gott Und "Theoria" Bei Aristoteles. Review of Metaphysics 37 (1):112-113.
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  47. Geneviève Benezra (1979). External Pressures on Scientific Evaluation in a Politically Oriented Support Program. In János Farkas (ed.), Sociology of Science and Research. Akadémiai Kiadó. pp. 61.
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  48. Russell Berg (2009). Evaluating Scientific Theories. Philosophy Now 74:14-17.
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  49. Arianna Betti (2010). Leśniewski's Characteristica Universalis. Synthese 174 (2):295-314.
    Leśniewski’s systems deviate greatly from standard logic in some basic features. The deviant aspects are rather well known, and often cited among the reasons why Leśniewski’s work enjoys little recognition. This paper is an attempt to explain why those aspects should be there at all. Leśniewski built his systems inspired by a dream close to Leibniz’s characteristica universalis: a perfect system of deductive theories encoding our knowledge of the world, based on a perfect language. My main claim is that Leśniewski (...)
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  50. Arianna Betti & Willem R. de Jong (2010). Introduction. Synthese 174 (2):181-183.
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