Scientific Practice

This preprint introduces a falsifiable methodology for identifying latent systems not by assumption, but by the dominance of one dynamic. System Detection via Synergic Dominance (SDSD) inverts the canonical approach: instead of defining a system and seeking its structure, it detects systems from the outside-in, based on observed monopolisation of synergy. Grounded in the General Systemic Balance (GSB) and the Law of Structuring Systemic Emergence (LESSE), SDSD formalises a five-step protocol with operational metrics (ICS, CNS, MDO, SDI). Applications range from (...) gravitational dominance fields to symbolic saturation in media ecosystems. Where one dynamic rules them all, a system reveals itself. This work expands the Systemic Continuum Paradigm (SCP) from ontological framework to diagnostic toolkit. -/- Where there is synergic dominance, there is a system waiting to be named. (shrink)

An explanation is a convincing, deductively valid argument that cites at least one law of nature. – This could be a definition of a scientific explanation that takes the notion of understanding seriously because explanation and understanding are intertwined concepts. To arrive at this conclusion, this analysis starts with the question of what makes an explanation an explanation. Philosophers of science have discussed this issue extensively since Carl G. Hempel presented his deductive-nomological model of explanation. It seems that the DN-model (...) offers necessary but not sufficient conditions for explanation. Two prominent problems for sufficient conditions are the problem of irrelevance and the problem of symmetry. For the last seventy years philosophers of science tried to solve those problems, also proposing other possible conceptualizations of explanation, by invoking, for example, causality or contextuality. Those accounts can be brought together in order to solve the problems of the DN-model: By looking at understanding, a new combined account for explanation and understanding could be obtained. After highlighting the advantages and problems of some of the most prominent accounts of explanation, the concept of understanding is analyzed with respect to the notion of hermeneutics. Through Gadamer’s discussion of hermeneutics and understanding as well as Kuhn’s concept of paradigms, it can be shown that the natural sciences are also deeply rooted in hermeneutics and involve understanding. In the end, it can be demonstrated that understanding and explanation are two interwoven concepts. Understanding is the missing piece of the puzzle to solve the problems of explanation. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Johann Christoph Sturm’s eclectic scientific method reveals an unexpected indebtedness to Francis Bacon’s thought. Sturm’s reception of Bacon is particularly surprising given that the German academic context in the second half of the seventeenth century was still largely Aristotelian. Sturm is indebted to Bacon in the following respects: (1) the critique of the current state of knowledge, (2) eclecticism, (3) a fluid transition from natural history to natural philoso-phy, (4) the conception of science as (...) hypothetical and dynamic and (5) experimental philosophy and the use of instruments. Given that Sturm mentions Francis Bacon in important places in his work, these respects should not easily be dismissed as commonplace. Bacon is one of Sturm’s salient sources and they are both deeply concerned with a thoroughgoing reform of existing scientific practices. (shrink)

Demonstrating Information Theory of Aging's robustness and practicality through deductive reasoning. Potentially anti-aging vaccines will automatically mass produce. Information Theory of Aging is the most robust and practical out of current theories explaining human age. Aging is a disease best explained as information loss. Damage theory does not account for damage’s possible necessity towards human personal growth. A cellular error is difficult to define, thus, error theory also lacks veracity. When is an error actually an adaptive mutation? When is damage (...) actually adaptive mutation? Plus, information theory of aging is uniquely accessible to computer assistance. Unfortunately, death may be inevitable, a sequel to this essay, to hopefully map the afterlife, will be Critical Rationalist Parapsychology. (shrink)

This Correspondence argues in response to Coolsaet et al. (2024) that there is an important role to play for stance-independent justice discussions that are not tied to specific social, political or critical perspectives. These can be valuable for climate research audiences, but also as a basis upon which to critically debate and research injustices.

Open science is good for both epistemic and social reasons, but in nonobvious ways, it can have detrimental epistemic side effects. Drawing on case studies and the social epistemology of science, I show how practices intended to increase transparency, communication, and information sharing in science can backfire. We should not reject Open Science, just implement it carefully. I argue that we can do so by treating openness as a governing value in science, and thus, that our pursuit of openness needs (...) to be balanced against our pursuit of the whole scheme of values that govern science. (shrink)

Post-truth politics comes forward as a challenge to the credibility of science through its association with skepticism and denialism about scientific approaches and findings. While debates over the nature of facts and the social character of scientific knowledge have mainly taken place in an academic setting, the current concerns about science skepticism have connected them to wider social issues. This chapter will examine this question with the focus on biomedical and physiological sciences and cast doubt on the claim that particular (...) strands of research from the ‘science wars’ period have enabled post-truth politics. Exploring the backdrop of controversies over the objectivity of science and relativism, I will show that the causes of the erosion of trust in science are better traced to socio-economic conditions that feed into legitimate distrust in science alongside other institutions. I will further argue that, quite paradoxically for the critics of relativism, construing science as social and sketching out ways of producing knowledge relevant to those who have good reasons for skepticism and distrust can help counter post-truth politics. (shrink)

Sociality of science has long been the topic of investigation in science studies and the social constructivist approaches advanced within critical race theory and feminist epistemology. Helen Longino’s career has provided a number of canonical and crucial advances in philosophical understanding of the sociality of science, and recently, she has argued that it is the sociality of interaction within scientific groups that makes them knowledge producing. In this article, forthcoming in a volume dedicated to the work of Longino's career, we (...) use case studies in potato science research to offer a friendly but important amendment to Longino's recent analysis of the sociality of interaction. (shrink)

What sort of philosophical work are natural kinds suited for? Scientific realists often contend that they provide the ‘aboutness’ of successful of scientific classification and explain their epistemic utility (among other side hustles). Recent history has revealed this to be a tricky job — particularly given the present naturalistic climate of philosophy of science. As a result, we’ve seen an explosion of different sorts of theories. This phenomenon that has suggested to some that philosophical theorizing about natural kinds has reached (...) a sort of ‘scholastic twilight’ and that the concept (or family of concepts) has outlived its utility: perhaps there’s no work natural kinds are suited for. While I think this pessimistic take is unwarranted, I will argue that it is worth rethinking the roles to which a reasonably naturalistic account of natural kinds can be fruitfully put. Natural kinds deserve a shorter work week. (shrink)

Background: Exposomics, the study of the exposome, is flourishing, but the field is not well defined. The term “exposome” refers to all environmental influences and associated biological responses throughout the lifespan. However, this definition is very similar to that of the term “environment”—the external elements and conditions that surround and affect the life and development of an organism. Consequently, the exposome seems to be nothing more than a synonym for the environment, and exposomics a synonym for environmental research. As a (...) result, some have rebranded their “standard” environmental health research with the neologistic exposome term, whereas others ignore or seek to abandon the seemingly redundant concept of the exposome. -/- Objectives: We argue that exposomics needs to sharpen its mission focus to counteract this apparent redundancy. Exposomics should be defined as a research program in environmental health aimed at enabling a comprehensive and discovery-driven approach to identifying environmental determinants of human health. Similar to the aim of the Human Genome Project, exposomics aims to analyze the complete complexity of exposures and their corresponding biological responses. Exposomics’ primary premise is that the existence of undiscovered, potentially interconnected, nongenetic (environmental) risk factors for health necessitates a comprehensive discovery-driven analysis approach. -/- Discussion: We argue that exposomics researchers should adopt our reconceptualization of exposomics and focus on the productiveness and integrity of their research program: its purpose and principles. We suggest that exposomics researchers should coordinate the writing of reviews that assess the program’s productiveness and integrity, as well as provide a platform for exposomics researchers to define their vision for the field. (shrink)

Recent efforts in a range of scientific fields have emphasised research and methods concerning individual differences and individualisation. This article brings together various scientific disciplines—ecology, evolution, and animal behaviour; medicine and psychiatry; public health and sport/exercise science; sociology; psychology; economics and management science—and presents their research on individualisation. We then clarify the concept of individualisation as it appears in the disciplinary casework by distinguishing three kinds of individualisation studied in and across these disciplines: Individualisation ONE as creating/changing individual differences (the (...) process that generates differences between individuals: intrapopulation or intraspecific variation/heterogeneity); Individualisation TWO as individualising applications (the tailoring or customising of something—information, treatment, a product or service, etc.—for an individual or specific group of individuals); and Individualisation THREE as social changes influencing autonomy, risk, and responsibilities (the process discussed under the rubric of sociological individualisation theory). Moreover, we analyse conceptual links between individualisation and individuality, and characterise different sorts of individuality that the disciplines study. This paper aims to promote interdisciplinary research concerning individualisation by establishing a common conceptual-theoretical basis, while leaving room for disciplinary differences. (shrink)

In this article, I will explore how the underlying research values of ‘openness’ and ‘mutual responsiveness’, which are central to open science practices, can be integrated into a new ethos of science. Firstly, I will revisit Robert Merton's early contribution to this issue, examining whether the ethos of science should be understood as a set of norms for scientists to practice ‘good’ science or as a set of research values as a functional requirement of the scientific system to produce knowledge, (...) irrespective of individual adherence to these norms. Secondly, I will analyse the recent codification of scientific practice in terms of ‘scientific integrity’, a framework that Merton did not pursue. Based on this analysis, and illustrated on the case of COVID-19 as a case in which the institution of science was challenged to deliver urgently on societal desirable outcomes, I will argue that promoting open science and its core norms of collaboration and openness requires broader governance of the institution of science in its relationship with society at large, rather than relying solely on self-governance within the scientific community through a new ethos of science. This conclusion has implications for re-evaluating research assessments, suggesting that the evaluation of the scientific system should take precedence over evaluating individual researchers, and that incentives should be provided to encourage specific research behaviour rather than solely focusing on individual research outputs. This article is followed up by Commentaries of Carl Mitcham, Alfred Nordmann, Sabina Leonelli, Lukas Fuchs, Monica Edwards-Schachter. (shrink)

This essay argues for the importance of an organismic perspective in plant biology and considers some of its implications. These include an increased attention to plant-environment interaction and an emphasis on integrated approaches. Furthermore, this essay contextualizes the increased emphasis on the concept of organism in recent years and places the concept in a longer history. Recent developments in biology and worsening environmental crises have led researchers to study plant responses to changing environments with whole plant approaches that situate plants (...) in their environments, emphasizing the intricate and dynamic interaction between them. This renewed attention to the organism recalls the debates of the early twentieth century, when organicism was one of the three main frameworks in biology (along with vitalism and mechanism). Some scholars see this renewed importance today as a “return” of this earlier period. This essay argues that including insights from plant biology will benefit philosophy of biology research that examines the concept of organism and organicism now and in earlier periods. A comprehensive account of the concept of organism should involve a botanical conception of the organism as well as a zoological one (which is more frequently considered). Although this essay does not aim to present a conceptual analysis, it presents examples of how an organismic perspective can be useful for understanding concepts (such as phenotype, stress, etc.) and research processes (such as experiment set-ups, data processes, etc.) in plant biology. Philosophy of biology investigations that aim at a comprehensive understanding of the concept of organism can benefit greatly from examinations of cases in plant biology, both now and in the past. (shrink)

Reciprocal Ethics is a novel ethical framework rooted in praxeology, the study of purposeful action. It represents an entirely new paradigm in moral philosophy, placing interaction at the core of universal ethics. Traditional ethical theories often divorce thought from action. Reciprocal Ethics contends that they are two aspects of the same phenomenon in the human experience, removing the traditional boundary between theoretical and practical ethics. The system categorizes all social interaction as either “self-directed” or “other-directed”, and by introducing the concept (...) of "normative signaling" it also exerts legitimate prescriptive power. The theory is a self-consistent, purely descriptive approach to ethics, that suggests that one's actions serve as semiotic signs that signal one's ethical stance in social interaction. Hence actions do not only define individual moral profiles, but also the moral ecosystem within which one actually operates. The theory operates in real time, adapting to the complexity of reality by taking into account uncertainty, incomplete data and social asymmetries. Reconciling elements of consequentialism and deontological theories, Reciprocal Ethics delivers a streamlined, yet comprehensive ethical system for social interaction, offering tangible insights for navigating complex moral dilemmas. By synthesizing descriptive metaethics and normative moral philosophy into one comprehensive formal theory, a bold assertion arises: Reciprocal Ethics becomes the Formal Science of Ethics. (shrink)

"This 2-volume set within the SAGE Reference Series on Leadership tackles issues relevant to leadership in the realm of science and technology. To encompass the key topics in this arena, this handbook features 100 topics arranged under eight headings. Volume 1 concentrates on general principles of science and technology leadership and includes sections on social-scientific perspectives on S&T leadership; key scientific concepts about leading and innovating in S&T; characteristics of S&T leaders and their environments; and strategies, tactics, and tools of (...) S&T leadership. Volume 2 provides case studies of leadership in S&T, with sections considering leadership in informal communities of scientists and engineers; leadership in government projects and research initiatives; leadership in industry research, development, and innovation; and finally, leadership in education and university-based research. By focusing on key topics within 100 brief chapters, this unprecedented reference resource offers students more detailed information and depth of discussion than typically found in an encyclopedia entry but not as much jargon, detail or density as in a journal article or a research handbook chapter. Entries are written in language and style that is broadly accessible, and each is followed by cross-references and a brief bibliography and further readings. A detailed index and an online version of the work enhances accessibility for today's student audience"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Basal cognition investigates cognition working upward from nonneuronal organisms. Because basal cognition is committed to empirically testable hypotheses, a methodological challenge arises: how can experiments avoid using zoocentric assumptions that ignore the ecological contexts that might elicit cognitively driven behavior in nonneuronal organisms? To meet this challenge, I articulate the principle of dynamic holism (PDH), a methodological principle for guiding research on nonneuronal cognition. I describe PDH’s relation to holistic research programs in human-focused cognitive science and psychology then present an (...) argument from analogy based on holistic developmental biology. Last, I examine two experiments exemplifying the need for PDH. (shrink)

Das Positionspapier adressiert Probleme und Schwierigkeiten, die sich aus dem elektronischen Publizieren und den derzeitigen bibliometrischen Bewertungsverfahren wissenschaftlicher Expertise ergeben. Hierzu zählen u.a. der ‚Markt‘ der Informationen (Stichwort: Verlagsoligopole), das Wissenschaftler:innen-Tracking und die Metrisierung der Wissenschaft. -/- Es richtet sich insbesondere an Vertreter:innen die akademischen Philosophie als Fachdisziplin. Das Papier enthält Empfehlungen dazu, wie die identifizierten Problempunkte innerhalb der Disziplin lösungsorientiert angegangen werden können. Folgende Punkte werden zur Diskussion gestellt: -/- - Diamond-Open-Access im Bereich des elektronischen Publizierens: Infrastruktur in die (...) Hände der wissenschaftlichen Community - Peer Review: Begutachtung nach Kriterien der Wissenschaftlichkeit - Bewerbungsverfahren: Nutzung von Visualisierungen statt Metriken - Promotionsphase: Trennung der Rollen von Betreuung und Begutachtung - Datenhoheit: Unterbindung des Wissenschaftler-Trackings -/- Die Empfehlungen zielen auf eine unmittelbare Stärkung der Autonomie des Wissenschaftsbetriebs. (shrink)

إن وسم الأدب بالظاهرة الاجتماعية العامة ارتگز بالأساس على العلاقة الوثيقة التي تربط الأدب بالمجتمع في ظل الح قائق الاجتماعية التي تواجه المؤلِّف باعتباره كائناً اجتماعيا. وقد شكلت سوسيولوجيا والأدب والتواصل هماً معرفيا لدى النقاد والمؤلفين، وجعلت من حقلها مكاناً خصباً للبحث والتحليل خصوصا في عصرنا الحالي، فتعددت مقاربات الأدب، وتنوعت مناهج التواصل، فيما رسمت براديغمات رئي سة خطابات السوسيولوجيا، وحدت مواقعها وعلاقاتها بالمجتمع. وخضعت لمقاربات منهجية كثيرة غلب عليها الوصف والتصنيف على الرغم من تطورها واعتمادها على منظور تحلیل ی (...) و تفسیري بنيوي مستوحى من الأدوات المفهومية التي وفرتها اللسانيات؛ إلا أن مناهج سوسيولوجيا الأدب والتواصل أظهرت كفاءة كبيرة في دراسة هذا الحقل وبخاصة علاقة الأدب وا لتواصل، وما يحيط بهما، وما يؤدي إليهما، إلى جانب البعد السوسيولوجي الذي يتناول مواضيع التربية كوقائع اجتما عية، من خلال دراسة وتحليل النماذج التربوية، والطرق والتقنيات والأساليب التربوية، ومعالجة القضايا والمشكلات داخل نسقها الاجتماعي، في إطار نظرية شمولية تدرك مختلف العلاقات القائمة بين الأدب والتوا صل، وتفاعل مكونات البنية والنسق التي توجد ضمه ظاهرة التربية عموماً. Revue Brochures Éducatives. n12, 2024. (shrink)

En este artículo se presenta una caracterización del concepto de falacia, con énfasis en la llamada ‘falacia de apelación a lo natural’. Se explica el alcance de esta falacia, y su peligrosidad, en particular en el ámbito de las ciencias de la salud y de alimentos.

This paper argues that the linguistic approach to analyzing induction, according to which induction is a type of inference or argument composed of statements or propositions, is unsuitable to account for scientific reasoning. Consequently, a novel approach to induction in model-based science is suggested. First, in order to show their adherence to the linguistic treatment of induction, two strategies are reviewed: (i) Carnap and Reichenbach’s attempts to justify induction and (ii) Norton’s recent material theory of induction. Second, three reasons are (...) provided to support the claim that the linguistic treatment of induction is insufficient in accounting for model-based reasoning in science. Finally, a framework focused on models—rather than statements or propositions—is suggested to address induction in science. William Whewell’s theory of induction is briefly outlined as an example of a non-propositional treatment of induction that is consistent with model-based scientific practice. (shrink)

In light of the recent credibility crisis in psychology, this paper argues for a greater emphasis on theorizing in scientific research. Although reliable experimental evidence, preregistration, methodological rigor, and new computational frameworks for modeling are important, scientific progress also relies on properly functioning theories. However, the current understanding of the role of theorizing in psychology is lacking, which may lead to future crises. Theories should not be viewed as mere speculations or simple inductive generalizations. To address this issue, the author (...) introduces a framework called “cognitive metascience,” which studies the processes and results of evaluating scientific practice. This study should proceed both qualitatively, as in traditional science and technology studies and cognitive science, and quantitatively, by analyzing scientific discourse using language technology. By analyzing theories as cognitive artifacts that support cognitive tasks, this paper aims to shed more light on their nature. This perspective reveals that multiple distinct theories serve entirely different roles, and studying these roles, along with their epistemic vices and virtues, can provide insight into how theorizing should proceed. The author urges a change in research culture to appreciate the variety of distinct theories and to systematically advance scientific progress. . (shrink)

A cognitive ethnography of how bioengineering scientists create innovative modeling methods. In this first full-scale, long-term cognitive ethnography by a philosopher of science, Nancy J. Nersessian offers an account of how scientists at the interdisciplinary frontiers of bioengineering create novel problem-solving methods. Bioengineering scientists model complex dynamical biological systems using concepts, methods, materials, and other resources drawn primarily from engineering. They aim to understand these systems sufficiently to control or intervene in them. What Nersessian examines here is how cutting-edge bioengineering (...) scientists integrate the cognitive, social, material, and cultural dimensions of practice. Her findings and conclusions have broad implications for researchers in philosophy, science studies, cognitive science, and interdisciplinary studies, as well as scientists, educators, policy makers, and funding agencies. In studying the epistemic practices of scientists, Nersessian pushes the boundaries of the philosophy of science and cognitive science into areas not ventured before. She recounts a decades-long, wide-ranging, and richly detailed investigation of the innovative interdisciplinary modeling practices of bioengineering researchers in four university laboratories. She argues and demonstrates that the methods of cognitive ethnography and qualitative data analysis, placed in the framework of distributed cognition, provide the tools for a philosophical analysis of how scientific discoveries arise from complex systems in which the cognitive, social, material, and cultural dimensions of problem-solving are integrated into the epistemic practices of scientists. Specifically, she looks at how interdisciplinary environments shape problem-solving. Although Nersessian’s case material is drawn from the bioengineering sciences, her analytic framework and methodological approach are directly applicable to scientific research in a broader, more general sense, as well. (shrink)

The ‘psychologist’s green thumb’ refers to the argument that an experimenter needs an indeterminate set of skills to successfully replicate an effect. This argument is sometimes invoked by psychological researchers to explain away failures of independent replication attempts of their work. In this paper, I assess the psychologist’s green thumb as a candidate explanation for individual replication failure and argue that it is potentially costly for psychology as a field. I also present other, more likely reasons for these replication failures. (...) I conclude that appealing to a psychologist’s green thumb is not a convincing explanation for replication failure. (shrink)

Leonelli (2016) suggested a relational view of data against a representational view by emphasizing data-centric biology rather than the theory-centric tradition in the philosophy of science. This is because the first view allows for data journeys across laboratories using public database resources, whereas the second does not. This paper examines Leonelli’s strategies to defend the relational view of data. Contrary to Leonelli’s intention, it indicates that her strategies led to unnecessary misunderstandings of the relationships among data, representation, and evidential values. (...) It will be argued that evidential values of data are inevitably based on a representational feature and that it is better to reconcile both views of data as complementary rather than contrasting. (shrink)

Scientists may sometimes generalize from their samples to broader populations when they have not yet sufficiently supported this generalization. Do such hasty generalizations also occur in experimental philosophy? To check, we analyzed 171 experimental philosophy studies published between 2017 and 2023. We found that most studies tested only Western populations but generalized beyond them without justification. There was also no evidence that studies with broader conclusions had larger, more diverse samples, but they nonetheless had higher citation impact. Our analyses reveal (...) important methodological limitations of many experimental philosophy studies and suggest that philosophical training may not protect against hasty generalizations. (shrink)

Historical contingency is commonly associated with unpredictability and outcome variability. As such, it can be seen as an undesirable aspect of experimental investigations. Many might agree that experimental methodologies that include enough control help to by-pass this problem and thereby make for more secure knowledge. Against this received view, we argue that, for at least some historically contingent processes, an over-emphasis on control might mislead by obscuring the very object of investigation or by preventing fruitful discoveries. In discussing cases from (...) evolutionary biology, developmental biology, and geochemistry/astrophysics, we show how investigating through approaches that don’t prioritize environmental control, while allowing for greater variability of outcomes, better respects the object/environment entanglement of these systems. Finally, we defend the idea that, despite the lower level of control, these types of experiments do not have a lower epistemic value than more highly controlled experiments. (shrink)

In the latter half of the twentieth century, foundationalist approaches to epistemology and philosophy of science were widely rejected in favour of holist and coherentist approaches. Kuhn may be regarded as a contributor to this anti-foundationalist tendency. In this paper, I wish to consider the extent to which Kuhn’s epistemological thinking was coherentist in nature. This is a task that has already begun in the work of Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen. However, I wish to go beyond Kuukkanen by raising a number of (...) questions that he does not address. First, I present Kuukkanen’s coherentist interpretation of Kuhn. In the next section, I argue that the interpretation fails to show that Kuhn rejects non-doxastic justification in favour of coherence relations among beliefs. In the fourth section, I present a standard objection to coherentism that any adequate formulation of the doctrine must confront, the “input objection”. I then frame the objection in terms of Kuhn’s model. In the fifth section, I argue that Kuhn’s account of science is able to satisfactorily deal with the input objection. In the sixth section, I explore the relationship between Kuhn’s treatment of perception and the anti-foundationalist tendency that contributed to the rise of coherentism. (shrink)

Discussions on the status of definitions of life have long been dominated by a position known as definitional pessimism. Per the definitional pessimist, there is no point in trying to define life. This claim is defended in different ways, but one of the shared assumptions of all definitional pessimists is that our attempts to define life are attempts to provide a list of all necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as alive. In other words, a definition of life (...) is a strict, descriptive definition. Against this, several pragmatic alternatives have been put forward. On these pragmatic accounts, definitions of life are not strictly, but rather loosely descriptive. Their purpose is not to be true, but to be useful to scientists by guiding scientific practice. More recently, this position has come under attack for not being able to explain how our attempts to define life are connected to scientific progress within the biological sciences. Here, I argue to the contrary by showing how pragmatic definitions of life can be, and in fact are, conducive to scientific progress. Additionally, I show how the pragmatic account of definitions of life can be brought to bear upon our normative discussions involving definitions of life. (shrink)

‚Wie sehr vertrauen Sie Wissenschaft und Forschung?‘ – eine Frage, die nicht erst seit der Corona-Pandemie viel diskutiert wird. Manch einer würde kritisch korrigieren: ‚Vertrauen Sie überhaupt in Wissenschaft und Forschung?‘ Schlagwörter wie Vertrauens- und Glaubwürdigkeitskrise kommen damit in den Sinn. Oft angeführt wird hier der normative Rahmen wissenschaftlicher Praxis, auf welchen sich das Vertrauen dennoch stützen könne. Was passiert aber, wenn die zugrunde liegende Praxis massiv durch die zunehmende Digitalisierung ihrer Prozesse verändert wird?

With the powerful analyses and resources they enable, digital humanities tools have captivated researchers from many different fields who want to use them to study science. Digital tools, as well as funding agencies, research communities, and academic administrators, require researchers to think carefully about how they conceptualize, manage, and store data, and about what they plan to do with that data once a given project is over. The difficulties of developing strategies to address these problems can prevent new researchers from (...) sticking with digital tools and flummox even experienced researchers. To help overcome the data hurdle, we present five principles to help researchers, novice and experienced alike, conceptualize and plan for their data. We illustrate the use of those principles with two digital projects from the history of science, the Embryo Project and the Marine Biological Laboratory History Project, and their associated HPS Repository for data. The principles apply beyond the digital realm, so those who collect and manage data by more traditional means will also find them useful. (shrink)

Biologists often study particular biological systems as models of a phenomenon of interest even if they already know that the phenomenon is produced by diverse mechanisms and hence none of those systems alone can sufficiently represent it. To understand this modeling practice, the present paper provides an account of how multiple model systems can be used to study a phenomenon that is produced by diverse mechanisms. Even if generalizability of results from a single model system is significantly limited, generalizations concerning (...) specific aspects of mechanisms often hold across certain ranges of biological systems, which enables multiple model systems to jointly represent such a phenomenon. Comparing mechanisms that operate in different biological systems as examples of the same phenomenon also facilitates characterization and investigation of individual mechanisms. I also compare my account with two existing accounts of the use of multiple model systems and argue that my account is distinct from and complementary to them. (shrink)

"But science in the making, science as an end to be pursued, is as subjective and psychologically conditioned as any other branch of human endeavor-- so much so that the question, What is the purpose and meaning of science? receives quite different answers at different times and from different sorts of people" (Einstein 1934, p. 112).

Jag tror att det är ett misstag att kräva av humanvetenskaperna (d.v.s. humaniora, samhälls- och beteendevetenskaperna) att de imiterar naturvetenskapernas forskningsmetodik. Humanvetenskaperna studerar meningsfulla fenomen vilkas natur är på ett grundläggande sätt annorlunda än de blott fysiska fenomen som naturvetenskapen studerar. Den största skillnaden är att meningsfulla fenomen inte uppenbarligen är lagbundna på samma sätt som fysiska fenomen och uppvisar därför inte samma regelbundenhet och förutsägbarhet som fysiska fenomen. För att studera meningsfulla fenomen krävs därför andra forskningsmetoder. Trots att humanvetenskaperna (...) studerar fenomen som inte är lagbundna och är på ett visst sätt subjektiva, så vill jag mena att de studerar objektivt verkliga fenomen och kan få giltig kunskap om dem. Att subjektiva fenomen också kan vara objektivt verkliga kan låta märkligt för vissa läsare, varför jag rundar av med en diskussion om vad det egentligen innebär för något att vara objektivt verkligt. Enligt den definition jag föreslår så framstår att meningsfulla fenomen, också de som kallas ”sociala konstruktioner”, kan förstås som objektivt verkliga företeelser trots att de på ett betydelsefullt sätt också är subjektiva. (shrink)

I propose that the intensification of meat production ironically makes meat concepts available to be populated by plants. I argue that what I call “technologies of effacement” facilitate the intensification of animal farming and slaughter by blocking face-to-face encounters between animals and people (Levinas 1969; Efstathiou 2018, 2019). My previous ethnographic work on animal research identifies technologies of effacement as including (a) architectures and the built environment, (b) entry and exit rules, (c) special garments, (d) naming and labeling procedures, and (...) (e) protocols for handling animals (Efstathiou 2018, 2019). Building on ethnographic research by Dawn Coppin (2003) and Nöellie Vialles (1994), in the United States and France respectively, I propose that (a) Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation (CAFO) buildings, gestation, and farrowing crates; (b) rules for entering and exiting the slaughterhouse; (c) white slaughterhouse garments; (d) unique identification systems; and (e) “trapping” animals before stunning can all operate as technologies of effacement. Though developed to serve other manifest aims, like hygiene, expediency, or safety, these technologies operate to sustain routine, inviting one to look at animals as tokens of a known type while blocking encounters between humans and animals (and also among animals) as radically different, morally significant Others (Efstathiou 2018, 2019). (shrink)

While the pursuitworthiness of philosophical ideas has changed over time, philosophical practice and methodology have not kept pace. The worthiness of a philosophical pursuit includes not only the ideas and objectives one pursues but also the methods with which one pursues them. In this paper, we articulate how empirical approaches benefit philosophy of science, particularly advocating for the use of qualitative methods for understanding the social and normative aspects of scientific inquiry. After situating qualitative methods within empirical philosophy of science, (...) we discuss how to adapt these traditionally sociological methods to empirically inform philosophical questions. Our aim is to normalize and legitimize qualitative methods for philosophical purposes and discuss how they can elucidate descriptive and normative components of scientific practice in a more generalizable non-idealized manner. We contend that qualitative methods are particularly well suited to philosophical interest in the social norms of science, their achievability, and their mutability. Furthermore, unlike more historical case studies in philosophy, qualitative methods enable more confidence in generalizability, albeit limited, from a concrete sample to a larger class. We conclude by addressing anxieties about the distinctness of empirical philosophy of science from social epistemology and from sociology of science. (shrink)

This is the Introduction and Chapter 1.1 of the book ‘Scientific Testimony. Its roles in science and society’ (OUP 2022). The introduction contains a brief survey of the book’s chapters and main conclusions, which I hope will be useful to the curious ones.

Numerous scholarly works focus solely on scientific metaphysics or biological practice, but few attempt to bridge the two subjects. This volume, the latest in the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science series, explores what a scientific metaphysics grounded in biological practices could look like and how it might impact the way we investigate the world around us. From Biological Practice to Scientific Metaphysics examines how to reconcile the methods of biological practice with the methods of metaphysical cosmology, notably regarding (...) the origins of life. The contributors take up a wide range of traditional metaphysics and philosophy of science topics, including natural kinds, medicine, ecology, genetics, scientific pluralism, reductionism, operationalism, mechanisms, the nature of information, and more. Many of the chapters represent the first philosophical treatments of significant biological practices. From causality and complexity to niche constructions and inference, the contributors review and discuss long-held objections to metaphysics by natural scientists. They illuminate how, in order to learn about the world as it truly is, we must look not only at what scientists say but also what they do: for ontology cannot be read directly from scientific claims. (shrink)

There are many ways in which biases can enter processes of scientific reasoning. One of these is what Ludwik Fleck has called a “harmony of illusions”. In this paper, Fleck’s ideas on the relevance of social mechanisms in epistemic processes and his detailed description of publication processes in science will be used as a starting point to investigate the connection between cognitive processes, social dynamics, and biases in this context. Despite its usefulness as a first step towards a more detailed (...) analysis, Fleck’s account needs to be updated in order to take the developments of digital communication technologies of the 21st century into account. Taking a closer look at today’s practices of science communication shows that information and communication technologies (ICTs) play a major role here. By presenting a detailed case study concerning the database SCOPUS, the question will be investigated how such ICTs can influence the division of epistemic labour. The result will be that they potentially undermine the epistemic benefits of social dynamics in science communication due to their inherent tendency to reduce the diversity of scientific hypotheses and ideas. (shrink)

The Noble Ape Simulation offers an account of the mind as something that can be observed, measured, and ultimately simulated through external effects. This version of the applied mind is not created through a single method but through layering three simulations relating to information chemistry, social constraints, and evolving narrative. As examples, additional simulation elements in Noble Ape are presented to offer the simulation methodology of Noble Ape. This chapter, rather than being a theoretical critique, is intended as a project (...) report relating to three distinct yet interoperating simulated models of the mind. These are presented both as individual simulations and also the simulations’ interactions. This produces a novel account of the applied mind. The methods used in creating such an applied mind provide an interesting insight into the possible origin of mind through pragmatic application rather than conjecture. (shrink)

Computers are supposed to be smart, yet they frustrate both ordinary users and computer technologists. Why are people frustrated by smart machines? Computers don’t fit people. People think in terms of comparisons, stories, and analogies, and seek feedback, whereas computers are based on a fundamental design that does not fit with analogical and feedback thinking. They impose a binary, an all-or-nothing, approach to everything. Moreover, the social world and institutions that have developed around computer technology hide and reinforce the lack (...) of alignment between computers and people. This book suggests a solution: we do not have to accept the way things are now and work around the bad social and technical design of computers. Rather, it proposes a diverse, distributed, critical discussion of how to design and build both computer technology and its social institutions. (shrink)

Introduction : towards philosophy of scientific practice -- The origin of the concept of practice -- Scientific practice: significance, types and scopes -- The nature of scientific practice -- The nature of knowledge : the local knowledge -- Knowledge and power -- The contextual normativity of scientific practice -- Philosophy of scientific practice and naturalism (I) -- Philosophy of scientific practices and naturalism (II) -- Philosophy of scientific practice and relativism -- Partner of philosophy of scientific practice : philosophy of (...) scientific experimentation -- New empiricism : close relative of philosophy of scientific practice -- The starting point of scientific research: opportunity, question, or observation? -- New solution for the old problem : the relationship among observation, experiment and theory -- New studies on replicability of scientific experiment -- Local knowledge (I) : traditional chinese medicine (TCM) -- Local knowledge (II) : chinese theory of fengshui -- Local knowledge (III) : ethnobotany -- Conclusion : scientific practice in ongoing and unlimited process. (shrink)

Se explora cómo la ciencia ciudadana promueve una mejora epistémica tanto en las instituciones científicas como en la sociedad a gran escala. En este sentido, se ofrece una caracterización de la ciencia ciudadana y a partir de ella se muestra cómo la participación de no especialistas contribuye al fortalecimiento epistémico a través de la pluralidad. Además, se examina cómo la inclusión de miembros de la sociedad en la investigación científica es capaz de promover la mejora epistémica de individuos mediante la (...) formación de pensadores críticos. Las conclusiones indican que la ciencia ciudadana puede optimizar estos dos tipos de mejora epistémica por medio del diseño de proyectos que, aunado a la persecución de objetivos propiamente científicos, se dirijan a la obtención de estos bienes. (shrink)

Das Verhältnis von Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft befindet sich mit ungewissem Ausgang in stetiger Bewegung. In diesem Prozess ist das treibende Element die Wissenschaft, die Technisierungen ermöglicht und mit ihren Erkenntnissen die Welt überzieht. Trotz der fortschreitenden Verwissenschaftlichung hat sich die Lebenswelt jedoch ihre Eigenständigkeit bewahrt. Die vorliegenden Studien tragen zur Aufklärung dieses erstaunlichen Phänomens bei. Sie weisen Strukturdifferenzen der beiden Erfahrungsweisen auf und zeigen, wie sie mit- und gegeneinander existieren. Zugleich wird deutlich, dass ein Ende der lebensweltlichen Eigenständigkeit einen fundamentalen (...) Wandel für die gesellschaftliche Stellung nichtwissenschaftlicher Erfahrung bedeuten würde. Die Untersuchungen sind begrifflich, wissenschaftstheoretisch und phänomenologisch orientiert. Sie gehen von einem weitgefassten Wissenschaftsbegriff aus, der auch Technikwissenschaften sowie wissenschaftliche Anwendungen umfasst. In den Fallbeispielen kommt den Naturwissenschaften und dem Naturbegriff eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit zu. Der Lebensweltbegriff schließt in kritischer Distanz an die Sozialphänomenologie von Alfred Schütz und die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls an. (shrink)

In this paper, the epistemological and conceptual limits of our ability to conceive and reason about future possibilities are analyzed. It is argued that more attention should be paid in futures studies on these epistemological and conceptual limits. Drawing on three cases from philosophy of science, the paper argues that there are deep epistemological and conceptual limits in our ability to conceive and reason about alternatives to the current world. The nature and existence of these limits are far from obvious (...) and become visible only through careful investigation. The cases establish that we often are unable to conceive relevant alternatives; that historical and counterfactual considerations are more limited than has been suggested; and that the present state of affairs reinforces its hegemony through multiple conceptual and epistemological mechanisms. The paper discusses the reasons behind the limits of the conceivability and the consequences that follow from the considerations that make the limits visible. The paper suggests that the epistemological and conceptual limits in our ability to conceive and reason about possible futures should be mapped systematically. The mapping would provide a better understanding of the creative and critical bite of futures studies. (shrink)