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  1. How is Neuroscience Possible?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that neuroscience not only is not complemented, but rather is positively undermined, by the substantive commitments of materialist philosophers of mind. Thus, we can have neuroscience or "neurophilosophy" but not both. Since neuroscience is a real science, to the extent that it is in tension with materialistic neurophilosophy, the latter should be abandoned and the former retained.
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  2. Evidential Equivalence.Ioannis Votsis - manuscript
    In this article I probe the consequences and limits of the underdetermination thesis and the empirical equivalence thesis, using Laudan and Leplin's fecund article as a springboard. Although a realist at heart, my primary intention is not to undermine the anti-realist arguments but rather to try to precisify the challenge the realist, and more generally the participant in the scientific realism debate, faces.
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  3. 50 Words for Snow.John Wilkins - manuscript
    Scientists and philosophers routinely talk about phenomena, and the ways in which they relate to explanation, theory and practice in science. However, there are very few definitions of the term, which is often used synonymously with "data'', "model'' and in older literature, "hypothesis''. In this paper I will attempt to clarify how phenomena are recognized, categorized and the role they play in scientific epistemology. I conclude that phenomena are not necessarily theory-based commitments, but that they are what explanations are called (...)
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  4. Pan-Perspectival Realism Explained and Defended.Paul Teller - 2016
    Conventional scientific realism is just the doctrine that our theoretical terms refer. Conventional antirealism denies, for various reasons, theoretical reference and takes theory to give us only information about the word of the perceptual where reference, it would appear, is secure. But reference fails for the perceptual every bit as much for the perceptual as for the theoretical, and for the same reason: the world is too complicated for us to succeed in attaching specific referents to our terms. That would (...)
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  5. Acerca de la Relación entre el Realismo Científico y la Metafísica Científica.Anjan Chakravartty - forthcoming - In B. Borge & N. Gentile (eds.), La ciencia y el mundo inobservable: Discusiones contemporáneas en torno al realismo científico. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
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  6. Expanding the Empirical Realm: Constructive Empiricism and Augmented Observation.Finnur Dellsén - forthcoming - In Michael Frauchiger (ed.), Themes from van Fraassen (Lauener Library of Analytical Philosophy). De Gruyter.
    Manifestationalism holds that science aims only to give us theories that are correct about what has been observed thus far. Several philosophers, including Bas van Fraassen, have argued that manifestationalism cannot make sense of the scientific impetus to make new observations, since such observations only risk turning manifestationally adequate theories into inadequate ones. This paper argues that a strikingly similar objection applies to van Fraassen’s own constructive empiricism, the view that science aims only to find theories that are empirically adequate. (...)
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  7. The Ontic Return: The Current Epochal Shift From Meaning to Being.J. E. Ford (ed.) - forthcoming - Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  8. Is the Reality Criterion Analytic?David Glick & Florian J. Boge - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-7.
    Tim Maudlin has claimed that EPR’s Reality Criterion is analytically true. We argue that it is not. Moreover, one may be a subjectivist about quantum probabilities without giving up on objective physical reality. Thus, would-be detractors must reject QBism and other epistemic approaches to quantum theory on other grounds.
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  9. Contemporary Scientific Realism: The Challenge From the History of Science.Timothy D. Lyons & Peter Vickers (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    [In Press, Expected Publication, January 2021] -/- Scientific realists claim we can justifiably believe that science is getting at the truth. But they have long faced historical challenges: various episodes across history appear to demonstrate that even strongly supported scientific theories can be overturned and left behind. In response, realists have developed new positions and arguments. As a result of specific challenges from the history of science, and realist responses, we find ourselves with an ever increasing data-set bearing on the (...)
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  10. Introduction: Contemporary Scientific Realism and the Challenge From the History of Science.Timothy D. Lyons & Peter Vickers - forthcoming - In Timothy D. Lyons & Peter Vickers (eds.), Contemporary Scientific Realism: The Challenge from the History of Science.
  11. Realism, Physical Meaningfulness, and Molecular Spectroscopy.Teru Miyake & George E. Smith - forthcoming - In Timothy D. Lyons & Peter Vickers (eds.), Contemporary Scientific Realism: The Challenge from the History of Science. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 159-182.
  12. The Relativity of Theory by Moti Mizrahi: Reply by the Author.Moti Mizrahi - forthcoming - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.
  13. Conceptions of Scientific Progress in Scientific Practice: An Empirical Study.Moti Mizrahi - forthcoming - Synthese.
    The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate over the nature of scientific progress in philosophy of science by taking a quantitative, corpus-based approach. By employing the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, the following philosophical accounts of scientific progress are tested empirically: the semantic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of truth), the epistemic account of scientific progress (i.e., scientific progress in terms of knowledge), and the noetic account of scientific progress (i.e., (...)
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  14. Visions Visualised? On the Evidential Status of Scientific Visualisations.Nicola Mößner - forthcoming - In Erna Fiorentini (ed.), On Visualization. A Multicentric Critique beyond Infographics. Berlin et al.:
    ‘Visualisations play an important role in science’, this seems to be an uncontroversial statement today. Scientists not only use visual representations as means to communicate their research results in publications or talks, but also often as surrogates for their objects of interest during the process of research. Thus, we can make a distinction between two contexts of usage here, namely the explanatory and the exploratory context. The focus of this paper is on the latter one. Obviously, using visualisations as surrogates (...)
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  15. Realism and Instrumentalism.Mark Sprevak - forthcoming - In H. Pashler (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Mind. SAGE Publications.
    The choice between realism and instrumentalism is at the core of concerns about how our scientific models relate to reality: Do our models aim to be literally true descriptions of reality, or is their role only as useful instruments for generating predictions? Realism about X, roughly speaking, is the claim that X exists and has its nature independent of our interests, attitudes, and beliefs. An instrumentalist about X denies this. She claims that talk of X should be understood as no (...)
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  16. The Relativity of Theory by Moti Mizrahi: Pandemics and Pathogens: What’s at Stake in the Debate Over Scientific Realism? [REVIEW]Margaret Greta Turnbull - forthcoming - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.
    I provide a critical review of Moti Mizrahi's The Relativity of Theory, expounding on the book's strengths and then providing an extended argument that Mizrahi mischaracterizes the epistemic attitude of concern to antirealism about science as well as the practical stakes involved in adopting the antirealist position.
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  17. Kuhn and the Contemporary Realism/Antirealism Debates.K. Brad Wray - forthcoming - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science:000-000.
    Thomas Kuhn was never a player in the contemporary realism/anti-realism debates, the debate that gained momentum around 1980 or so, with the publication of Bas van Fraassen’s Scientific Image and Larry Laudan’s “Confutation of Convergent Realism”. But I argue that Kuhn had a significant influence on these debates. Kuhn played a significant role in focusing philosophers’ attention on a different issue than the focus of the realism/anti-realism debate of the 1950s and 1960s. Instead of focusing on the meaning of theoretical (...)
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  18. Ernst Mach and Friedrich Nietzsche. On the Prejudices of Scientists.Pietro Gori - 2021 - In John Preston (ed.), Interpreting Mach. Critical Essays. Cambridge, Regno Unito: pp. 123-141.
    The paper provides a thorough account of the relationship between Ernst Mach’s thought and that of an apparently more intellectually distant near-contemporary, Friedrich Nietzsche. The consistency of their views is in fact substantial, as I try to show within the paper. Despite their interests being different, both Mach and Nietzsche were concerned with the same issues about our intellectual relationship with the external world, dealing with the same questions and pursuing a common aim of eliminating worn-out philosophical conceptions. Moreover, it (...)
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  19. What Is Metascientific Ontology?François Maurice - 2021 - Mεtascience 2:online.
    Metascientific ontology differs from philosophical ontologies in its objectives, objects and methods. By an examination of the ontological theories of Mario Bunge, we will show their main objective is a unified representation of the world as known through the sciences, that their objects of study are scientific concepts, and that their methods do not differ from those that one expects to find in any rational activity. Metascientific ontology is therefore not transcendent because it does not seek to represent non-concrete objects (...)
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  20. Qu'est-ce que l'ontologie métascientifique?François Maurice - 2021 - Mεtascience 2:prépublication.
    L’ontologie métascientifique se distingue des ontologies philosophiques par ses objectifs, ses objets et ses méthodes. Par un examen des théories ontologiques de Mario Bunge, nous montrerons que leur principal objectif est l’élaboration d’une représentation unifiée du monde tel que connu via les sciences, que leurs objets d’étude sont les concepts scientifiques, et que leurs méthodes ne diffèrent pas de celles qu’on s’attend à trouver dans toute activité rationnelle. L’ontologie métascientifique n’est donc pas transcendante parce qu’elle ne cherche pas à représenter (...)
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  21. In Defense of Relative Realism: A Reply to Park.Moti Mizrahi - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (1):1-6.
    In this paper, I reply to Seungbae Park’s (2020) critique of the view I defend in Chapter 6 of The Relativity of Theory: Key Positions and Arguments in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate (Cham: Springer, 2020), namely, Relative Realism. Relative Realism is the view that, of a set of competing scientific theories, the more predictively successful theory is comparatively true. Comparative truth is a relation between competing theories. So, to say that T1 is comparatively true is to say that T1 (...)
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  22. Le scientisme au-delà de ses détracteurs.Andrés Pereyra Rabanal - 2021 - Mεtascience 2:prépublication.
    Le scientisme a plus de notoriété que l’histoire proprement dite, car il a été identifié avec le « positivisme », le « réductionnisme », le « matérialisme » ou le « marxisme », ou même tenu responsable de la domination de la science sur leur autres activités humaines. L’idée que la recherche scientifique produit les meilleures connaissances possible réside dans la définition même du « scientisme ». Cependant, alors même que la science peut se prévaloir d’un nombre considérable de succès (...)
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  23. Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science.Howard Sankey - 2021 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):5-20.
    The paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontological objectivity and the objectivity of truth. As background, T.S. Kuhn’s idea that scientific theory-choice is based on shared scientific values with a role for both objective and subjective factors is discussed. Kuhn’s values are epistemologically ungrounded, hence provide a minimal sense of objectivity. A robust account of epistemic objectivity on which methodological norms are reliable means of arriving at the truth is presented. (...)
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  24. Why Scientific Realists Should Reject the Second Dogma of Quantum Mechanics.Valia Allori - 2020 - In Meir Hemmo & Orly Shenker (eds.), Quantum, Probability, Logic: Itamar Pitowsky’s Work and Influence. Springer. pp. 19-48.
    The information-theoretic approach to quantum mechanics, proposed by Bub and Pitowsky, is a realist approach to quantum theory which rejects the “two dogmas” of quantum mechanics: in this theory measurement results are not analysed in terms of something more fundamental, and the quantum state does not represent physical entities. Bub and Pitowsky’s approach has been criticized because their rejection of the first dogma relies on their argument that kinematic explanations are more satisfactory than dynamical ones. However, little attention has been (...)
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  25. Platonism and the Objects of Science.Scott Berman - 2020 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.
  26. Does Criminal Responsibility Rest Upon a False Supposition? No.Luke William Hunt - 2020 - Washington University Jurisprudence Review 13 (1):65-84.
    Our understanding of folk and scientific psychology often informs the law’s conclusions regarding questions about the voluntariness of a defendant’s action. The field of psychology plays a direct role in the law’s conclusions about a defendant’s guilt, innocence, and term of incarceration. However, physical sciences such as neuroscience increasingly deny the intuitions behind psychology. This paper examines contemporary biases against the autonomy of psychology and responds with considerations that cast doubt upon the legitimacy of those biases. The upshot is that (...)
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  27. A Realistic Argument for Scientific Realism: How to Be a Realist Without Really Knowing It.Samuel Kahn - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1901-1914.
    In this paper I provide a novel argument for scientific realism. In contrast to most recent defenses of SR, my defense of SR does not rely on the no-miracles argument. Instead, I take a more unconventional approach: I focus on the different kinds of justification available to different individuals in relation to different kinds of propositions. I maintain that this alternative focus shows that most people are warranted in believing many propositions about unobservables. The paper is divided into three main (...)
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  28. On the Untrustworthiness of Axiomatic-Founded Science.Spyridon Kakos - 2020 - Harmonia Philosophica.
    The idea of science being the best – or the only – way to reach the truth about our cosmos has been a major belief of modern civilization. Yet, science has grown tall on fragile legs of clay. Every scientific theory uses axioms and assumptions that by definition cannot be proved. This poses a serious limitation to the use of science as a tool to find the truth. The only way to search for the latter is to redefine the former (...)
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  29. The Relativity of Theory: Key Positions and Arguments in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate.Moti Mizrahi - 2020 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
    This book offers a close and rigorous examination of the arguments for and against scientific realism and introduces key positions in the scientific realism/antirealism debate, which is one of the central debates in contemporary philosophy of science. On the one hand, scientific realists argue that we have good reasons to believe that our best scientific theories are approximately true because, if they were not even approximately true, they would not be able to explain and predict natural phenomena with such impressive (...)
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  30. Getting to Know the World Scientifically: An Objective View.Paul Needham - 2020 - Cham, Schweiz: Springer.
    This undergraduate textbook introduces some fundamental issues in philosophy of science for students of philosophy and science students. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with knowledge and values. Chap. 1 presents the classical conception of knowledge as initiated by the ancient Greeks and elaborated during the development of science, introducing the central concepts of truth, belief and justification. Aspects of the quest for objectivity are taken up in the following two chapters. Moral issues are broached in (...)
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  31. Physical Entity As Quantum Information.Vasil Penchev - 2020 - Philosophy of Science eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 13 (35):1-15.
    Quantum mechanics was reformulated as an information theory involving a generalized kind of information, namely quantum information, in the end of the last century. Quantum mechanics is the most fundamental physical theory referring to all claiming to be physical. Any physical entity turns out to be quantum information in the final analysis. A quantum bit is the unit of quantum information, and it is a generalization of the unit of classical information, a bit, as well as the quantum information itself (...)
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  32. Quine's Scientific Realism Revisited.Raimund Pils - 2020 - Theoria 86 (5):612-642.
    In order to reconnect Quine's views to the current debate on scientific realism, I reframe Quine's scientific realism into a semantic, a metaphysical, and an epistemological dimension. With this conceptual background, I review the historical development of Quine's scientific realism from the late 1940s until his death in 2000. I challenge Soames's view that Quine is a phenomenalist at the time of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) and show that he remains agnostic between a realist and an anti‐realist conceptual scheme (...)
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  33. Introduction to Positivism and the External Real World and Positivism and Realism.Michael Shaffer - 2020 - In Positivism and the External Real World and Positivism and Realism.
  34. Representing and Coordinating Ethnobiological Knowledge.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 84:101328.
    Indigenous peoples possess enormously rich and articulated knowledge of the natural world. A major goal of research in anthropology and ethnobiology as well as ecology, conservation biology, and development studies is to find ways of integrating this knowledge with that produced by academic and other institutionalized scientific communities. Here I present a challenge to this integration project. I argue, by reference to ethnographic and cross-cultural psychological studies, that the models of the world developed within specialized academic disciplines do not map (...)
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  35. Still Resisting: Replies to My Critics.K. Brad Wray - 2020 - Metascience 29 (1):33-40.
    This is a reply piece to a series of book symposium contributions to my book, Resisting Scientific Realism. The contributions were by Steven French, Peter Vickers, Stathis Psillos, and Kyle Stanford.
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  36. David Landy. Hume’s Science of Human Nature: Scientific Realism, Reason, and Substantial Explanation. London: Routledge, 2018. Pp. Xi+266. £120.00 . ISBN 978-1-138-50313-7. [REVIEW]Tamás Demeter & Krisztián Pete - 2019 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 9 (2):415-419.
  37. Kusch and van Fraassen on Microscopic Experience.Alessio Gava - 2019 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 45 (1):7-31.
    Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen’s controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not ‘windows on an invisible world’, but rather ‘image generators’. The two authors also claim that, since in a microscopic detection it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between all the elements involved, one is entitled to maintain an agnostic stance about the reality of the entity allegedly represented by the produced image. In this paper I argue that, contrary (...)
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  38. Pragmatic Encroachment on Scientific Knowledge?Mikkel Gerken - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    Pragmatic encroachment theories of knowledge may be characterized as views according to which practical factors may partly determine the truth-value of ascriptions that S knows that p – even though these factors do not partly determine S’s belief that p or p itself. The pros and cons of variations of pragmatic encroachment are widely discussed in epistemology. But despite a long pragmatist tradition in the philosophy of science, few efforts have been devoted to relate this particular view to issues in (...)
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  39. Against the Realistic Interpretation of the Theory of Relativity.Spyridon Kakos - 2019 - Harmonia Philosophica.
    The Theory of Relativity has been portrayed as a theory that redefined the way we look at the cosmos, enabling us to unlock the reality we live in. Its proponents are constantly reminding us of how Einstein managed to reveal the true nature of the universe with his groundbreaking theory, which has been proved multiple times until now. Yet, philosophy of science teaches us that no theory has any privileged connection with what we call reality per se. The role of (...)
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  40. An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (5):515-527.
    In this paper, I respond to Sterpetti’s attempt to defend Kyle P. Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and his New Induction over the History of Science from my reductio argument outlined in Mizrahi :59–68, 2016a). I discuss what I take to be the ways in which Sterpetti has misconstrued my argument against Stanford’s NIS, in particular, that it is a reductio, not a dilemma, as Sterpetti erroneously thinks. I argue that antirealists who endorse Stanford’s NIS still face an absurd consequence (...)
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  41. Correction to: An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (5):529-529.
    In the Introduction section, 6th point under the paragraph “Given the parallels between Stanford’s PUA and the PUO, and those between Stanford’s NIS and the NIP, I have sketched the following reductio against Stanford’s NIS (Mizrahi 2016a, pp. 63–64):….. should read as -/- (6) Scientific antirealism is a philosophical theory.
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  42. Should Scientists Embrace Scientific Realism or Antirealism?Seungbae Park - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (1):147-158.
    If scientists embrace scientific realism, they can use a scientific theory to explain and predict observables and unobservables. If, however, they embrace scientific antirealism, they cannot use a scientific theory to explain observables and unobservables, and cannot use a scientific theory to predict unobservables. Given that explanation and prediction are means to make scientific progress, scientists can make more scientific progress, if they embrace scientific realism than if they embrace scientific antirealism.
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  43. Scientific Realism: What It is, the Contemporary Debate, and New Directions.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):451-484.
    First, I answer the controversial question ’What is scientific realism?’ with extensive reference to the varied accounts of the position in the literature. Second, I provide an overview of the key developments in the debate concerning scientific realism over the past decade. Third, I provide a summary of the other contributions to this special issue.
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  44. Towards a Realistic Success-to-Truth Inference for Scientific Realism.Peter Vickers - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):571-585.
    A success-to-truth inference has always been at the heart of scientific realist positions. But all attempts to articulate the inference have met with very significant challenges. This paper reconstructs the evolution of this inference, and brings together a number of qualifications in an attempt to articulate a contemporary success-to-truth inference which is realistic. I argue that this contemporary version of the inference has a chance, at least, of overcoming the historical challenges which have been proffered to date. However, there is (...)
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  45. Cutting the Cord: A Corrective for World Navels in Cartography and Science.Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther - 2019 - Cartographic Journal 57 (2):147-159.
    A map is not its territory. Taking a map too seriously may lead to pernicious reification: map and world are conflated. As one family of cases of such reification, I focus on maps exuding the omphalos syndrome, whereby a centred location on the map is taken to be the world navel of, for instance, an empire. I build on themes from my book _When Maps Become the World_, in which I analogize scientific theories to maps, and develop the tools of (...)
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  46. Realism and Theories of Truth.Jamin Asay - 2018 - In Juha Saatsi (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. London: Routledge. pp. 383-393.
    The topic of truth has long been thought to be connected to scientific realism and its opposition. In this essay, I discuss the various ways that truth might be related to realism. First, I consider how truth might be of use when defining scientific realism and its opposition. Second, I consider whether various stances regarding realism require specific stances on the nature of truth. I survey "neutralist" views that argue that one's stance on realism is independent of one's view on (...)
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  47. Indispensability, Causation and Explanation.Sorin Bangu - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (2):219-232.
    When considering mathematical realism, some scientific realists reject it, and express sympathy for the opposite view, mathematical nominalism; moreover, many justify this option by invoking the causal inertness of mathematical objects. The main aim of this note is to show that the scientific realists’ endorsement of this causal mathematical nominalism is in tension with another position some of them also accept, the doctrine of methodological naturalism. By highlighting this conflict, I intend to tip the balance in favor of a rival (...)
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  48. What is Scientific Realism?Anjan Chakravartty & Bas C. Van Fraassen - 2018 - Spontaneous Generations 9 (1):12-25.
    Decades of debate about scientific realism notwithstanding, we find ourselves bemused by what different philosophers appear to think it is, exactly. Does it require any sort of belief in relation to scientific theories and, if so, what sort? Is it rather typified by a certain understanding of the rationality of such beliefs? In the following dialogue we explore these questions in hopes of clarifying some convictions about what scientific realism is, and what it could or should be. En route, we (...)
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  49. Sellars's Two Images as a Philosopher's Tool.Stefanie Dach - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (4):568-588.
    The distinction between the manifest and the scientific image of man- in-the-world is widely seen as crucial to Wilfrid Sellars's philosophical work. The present essay agrees with this view. It contends, however, that precisely because the distinction is important, we should not hurry to a quick and superficial understanding of it. The essay identifies several oversimplifications that can be found in the literature on the topic and argues that they are at least partly rooted in too rigid a view of (...)
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  50. Should Scientific Realists Embrace Theoretical Conservatism?Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A:30-38.
    A prominent type of scientific realism holds that some important parts of our best current scientific theories are at least approximately true. According to such realists, radically distinct alternatives to these theories or theory-parts are unlikely to be approximately true. Thus one might be tempted to argue, as the prominent anti-realist Kyle Stanford recently did, that realists of this kind have little or no reason to encourage scientists to attempt to identify and develop theoretical alternatives that are radically distinct from (...)
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