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  1. added 2020-06-03
    Science as Social Existence: Heidegger and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.Jeff Kochan - 2017 - Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers.
    REVIEW (1): "Jeff Kochan’s book offers both an original reading of Martin Heidegger’s early writings on science and a powerful defense of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) research program. Science as Social Existence weaves together a compelling argument for the thesis that SSK and Heidegger’s existential phenomenology should be thought of as mutually supporting research programs." (Julian Kiverstein, in Isis) ---- REVIEW (2): "I cannot in the space of this review do justice to the richness and range of Kochan's (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-03
    Contrastive Explanation and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.Jeff Kochan - 2010 - Social Studies of Science 40 (1):127-44.
    In this essay, I address a novel criticism recently levelled at the Strong Programme by Nick Tosh and Tim Lewens. Tosh and Lewens paint Strong Programme theorists as trading on a contrastive form of explanation. With this, they throw valuable new light on the explanatory methods employed by the Strong Programme. However, as I shall argue, Tosh and Lewens run into trouble when they accuse Strong Programme theorists of unduly restricting the contrast space in which legitimate historical and sociological explanations (...)
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  3. added 2020-06-03
    Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.Jeff Kochan - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):21 – 38.
    In this essay, I respond to Tim Lewens's proposal that realists and Strong Programme theorists can find common ground in reliabilism. I agree with Lewens, but point to difficulties in his argument. Chief among these is his assumption that reliabilism is incompatible with the Strong Programme's principle of symmetry. I argue that the two are, in fact, compatible, and that Lewens misses this fact because he wrongly supposes that reliabilism entails naturalism. The Strong Programme can fully accommodate a reliabilism which (...)
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  4. added 2020-04-02
    Platonism and the Objects of Science.Scott Berman - 2020 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.
  5. added 2020-03-10
    The Dangers of Pragmatic Virtue.Daniel Nolan - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):623-644.
    Many people want to hold that some theoretical virtues—simplicity, elegance, familiarity or others—are only pragmatic virtues. That is, these features do not give us any more reason to think a theory is true, or close to true, but they justify choosing one theoretical option over another because they are desirable for some other, practical purpose. Using pragmatic virtues in theory choice apparently brings with it a dilemma: if we are deciding what to accept on the basis of considerations that are (...)
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  6. added 2020-02-29
    On the Implications and Extensions of Luk’s Theory and Model of Scientific Study.Robert Luk - 2018 - Foundations of Science 23 (1):103-118.
    Recently, Luk tried to establish a model and a theory of scientific studies. He focused on articulating the theory and the model, but he did not emphasize relating them to some issues in philosophy of science. In addition, they might explain some of the issues in philosophy of science, but such explanation is not articulated in his papers. This paper explores the implications and extensions of Luk’s work in philosophy of science or science in general.
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  7. added 2020-02-29
    Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison * Objectivity. [REVIEW]N. Jardine - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):885-893.
  8. added 2020-02-11
    Critical Scientific Realism.Stathis Psillos - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):454-458.
  9. added 2020-02-03
    Realism and the Epistemic Objectivity of Science.Howard Sankey - forthcoming - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy.
    The paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontological objectivity and the objectivity of truth. As background, T.S. Kuhn’s idea that scientific theory-choice is based on shared scientific values with a role for both objective and subjective factors is discussed. Kuhn’s values are epistemologically ungrounded, hence provide a minimal sense of objectivity. A robust account of epistemic objectivity on which methodological norms are reliable means of arriving at the truth is presented. (...)
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  10. added 2020-01-24
    Still resisting: replies to my critics.K. Brad Wray - forthcoming - Metascience:1-8.
    This is a reply piece to a series of book symposium contributions to my book, Resisting Scientific Realism. The contributions were by Steven French, Peter Vickers, Stathis Psillos, and Kyle Stanford.
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  11. added 2019-11-16
    Kusch and van Fraassen on Microscopic Experience.Alessio Gava - 2019 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 45 (1):7-31.
    Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen’s controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not ‘windows on an invisible world’, but rather ‘image generators’. The two authors also claim that, since in a microscopic detection it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between all the elements involved, one is entitled to maintain an agnostic stance about the reality of the entity allegedly represented by the produced image. In this paper I argue that, contrary (...)
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  12. added 2019-11-05
    Is the Reality Criterion Analytic?David Glick & Florian J. Boge - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-7.
    Tim Maudlin has claimed that EPR’s Reality Criterion is analytically true. We argue that it is not. Moreover, one may be a subjectivist about quantum probabilities without giving up on objective physical reality. Thus, would-be detractors must reject QBism and other epistemic approaches to quantum theory on other grounds.
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  13. added 2019-09-23
    Correction to: An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (5):529-529.
    In the Introduction section, 6th point under the paragraph “Given the parallels between Stanford’s PUA and the PUO, and those between Stanford’s NIS and the NIP, I have sketched the following reductio against Stanford’s NIS (Mizrahi 2016a, pp. 63–64):….. should read as -/- (6) Scientific antirealism is a philosophical theory.
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  14. added 2019-09-23
    Separating the Why From the What: Reply to Jonas and Markon.P. D. Harms, Dustin Wood & Seth M. Spain - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (1):84-89.
  15. added 2019-07-25
    Against the Realistic Interpretation of the Theory of Relativity.Spyridon Kakos - 2019 - Harmonia Philosophica.
    The goal of this paper is to show that the realistic interpretation of the Theory of Relativity is something wrong, the result of false axioms and principles. By analyzing why Einstein’s famous theory cannot and should not be seen as something “physically true”, what Harmonia Philosophica has been postulating for many years now will become even more obvious: Scientific theories are nothing but useful tools to create scientific models of the cosmos, but not methods to reach what philosophers call “truth”.
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  16. added 2019-06-21
    Scientific Realism: What It is, the Contemporary Debate, and New Directions.Darrell Rowbottom - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):451-484.
    First, I answer the controversial question ’What is scientific realism?’ with extensive reference to the varied accounts of the position in the literature. Second, I provide an overview of the key developments in the debate concerning scientific realism over the past decade. Third, I provide a summary of the other contributions to this special issue.
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  17. added 2019-06-15
    Dispositions for Scientific Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2013 - In Ruth Groff & John Greco (eds.), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism. New York, NY, USA: pp. 113-127.
    This chapter aims to investigate the question of what work can be done by the notion of dispositions in a specific context within the philosophy of science. It considers one profound consequence of dispositional realism in this arena: the prospect of a positive transformation in discussions regarding how best to formulate the idea of scientific realism itself. The chapter examines a second benefit of disposition realism: the prospect of an economical unification of the core metaphysical presuppositions of this newly synthesized (...)
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  18. added 2019-06-14
    Truth and Reality in Social Constructivism.Howard Sankey & Geoffrey Bowker - 1993/1994 - Arena Journal 2:233-252.
    This is a co-authored dialogue which explores epistemological and metaphysical questions raised by a social constructivist approach to science.
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  19. added 2019-06-10
    Acerca de la Relación entre el Realismo Científico y la Metafísica Científica.Anjan Chakravartty - forthcoming - In B. Borge & N. Gentile (eds.), La ciencia y el mundo inobservable: Discusiones contemporáneas en torno al realismo científico. Buenos Aires: Eudeba.
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  20. added 2019-06-10
    Case Studies, Selective Realism, and Historical Evidence.Anjan Chakravartty - 2017 - In Michela Massimi, Jan-Willem Romeijn & Gerhard Schurz (eds.), EPSA15 Selected Papers: The 5th conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association in Düsseldorf. Springer. pp. 13-23.
    Case studies of science concerning the interpretation of specific theories and the nature of theory change over time are often presented as evidence for or against forms of selective realism: versions of scientific realism that advocate belief in connection with certain components of theories as opposed to their content as a whole. I consider the question of how probative case studies can be in this sphere, focusing on two prominent examples of selectivity: explanationist realism, which identifies realist commitment with components (...)
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  21. added 2019-06-09
    What is Scientific Realism?Anjan Chakravartty & Bas C. Van Fraassen - 2018 - Spontaneous Generations 9 (1):12-25.
    Decades of debate about scientific realism notwithstanding, we find ourselves bemused by what different philosophers appear to think it is, exactly. Does it require any sort of belief in relation to scientific theories and, if so, what sort? Is it rather typified by a certain understanding of the rationality of such beliefs? In the following dialogue we explore these questions in hopes of clarifying some convictions about what scientific realism is, and what it could or should be. En route, we (...)
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  22. added 2019-06-07
    Reflections on New Thinking About Scientific Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3379-3392.
    In August 2014 the Universities of Pretoria and Johannesburg hosted a major international conference in Cape Town, ‘New Thinking about Scientific Realism’, to assess extant discussions of the view in hopes of opening up new avenues of research, and to sow the seeds of further development and consideration of these prospective lines of inquiry. In this, the concluding essay of the Special Issue collecting some of the descendants of these earlier presentations, I extract some of the more striking themes to (...)
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  23. added 2019-06-06
    A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable – Anjan Chakravartty.Jacob Busch - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):368-371.
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  24. added 2019-06-06
    Getting Rid of the Ether. Could Physics Have Achieved It Sooner, with Better Assistance From Philosophy?Roberto Torretti - 2007 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (3):353-374.
    Assuming, with Hasok Chang, that the history and philosophy of science can contribute to scientific knowledge, particularly when it is a matter of disposing of groundless or useless notions, I examine the case of the luminiferous ether, and seek to ascertain what factors may have kept it alive until 1905, when Einstein declared it superfluous.
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  25. added 2019-06-06
    The Electrons of the Dinosaurs and the Center of the Earth: Comments on D.D. Turner’s ‘The Past Vs. The Tiny: Historical Science and the Abductive Arguments for Realism’. [REVIEW]Christián C. Carman - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (1):171-173.
    Turner [The past vs. the tiny: Historical science and the abductive arguments for realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 35A 1] claims that the arguments in favor of realism do not support with the same force both classes of realism, since they supply stronger reasons for experimental realism than for historical realism. I would like to make two comments, which should be seen as amplifications inspired by his proposal, rather than as a criticism. First, it is important to (...)
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  26. added 2019-06-06
    Polanyians on Realism: An Introduction.Andy F. Sanders - 1999 - Tradition and Discovery 26 (3):6-14.
    This introduction to a special Tradition and Discovery issue on Polanyi’s realism summarizes, and comments on the views of Jha, Gulick, Mullins, Cannon, Puddefoot, Meek and Sanders. All agree that Polanyi advocated a scientific realism hanging on the theses that reality is independent of human conceptualizations and that it is partially and fallibly knowable. Major differences concern its scope. All agree that it is comprehensive, pertaining not only to common sense and science but to intrinsic and ultimate values, and perhaps (...)
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  27. added 2019-06-06
    Empiricism Vs. Realism: High Points in the Debate During the Past 150 Years.Craig Dilworth - 1990 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (3):431.
  28. added 2019-06-06
    J. J. C. Smart's "Philosophy and Scientific Realism". [REVIEW]George Dickie - 1965 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1):138.
    During the past few years, Smart has published a series of provocative articles in which he has argued for a "tough-Minded" scientific materialism. In this book, Which makes use of the articles and combines them with new material, He boldly defends the possibility of a synthetic philosophy which attempts to think clearly and comprehensively about the nature of the universe and the principles of conduct. Starting with a critique of phenomenalism, He argues that the physicist's picture of the world is (...)
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  29. added 2019-06-06
    Philosophy and Scientific Realism.J. J. C. Smart - 1963 - Routledge.
    Originally published in 1963. In an introductory chapter the author argues that philosophy ought to be more than the art of clarifying thought and that it should concern itself with outlining a scientifically plausible world view. Early chapters deal with phenomenalism and the reality of theoretical entities, and with the relation between the physical and biological sciences. Free will, issues of time and space and man’s place in nature are covered in later chapters.
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  30. added 2019-06-05
    The Eyes Don’T Have It: Fracturing the Scientific and Manifest Images.P. Kyle Stanford - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (21):19-44.
    Wilfrid Sellars famously argued that we find ourselves simultaneously presented with the scientific and manifest images and that the primary aim of philosophy is to reconcile the competing conceptions of ourselves and our place in the world they offer. I first argue that Sellars’ own attempts at such a reconciliation must be judged a failure. I then go on to point out that Sellars has invited us to join him in idealizing and constructing the manifest and scientific images by conflating (...)
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  31. added 2019-05-22
    The Bohr and Einstein Debate - Copenhagen Interpretation Challenged.Rochelle Marianne Forrester - unknown
    The Bohr Einstein debate on the meaning of quantum physics involved Einstein inventing a series of thought experiments to challenge the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics. Einstein disliked many aspects of the Copenhagen Interpretation especially its idea of an observer dependent universe. Bohr was able to answer all Einstein’s objections to the Copenhagen Interpretation and so is usually considered as winning the debate. However the debate has continued into the present time as many scientists have been unable to accept the (...)
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  32. added 2019-03-22
    Science, Realism and Correlationism. A Phenomenological Critique of Meillassoux' Argument From Ancestrality.Harald A. Wiltsche - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):808-832.
    Quentin Meillassoux has recently launched a sweeping attack against ‘correlationism’. Correlationism is an umbrella term for any philosophical system that is based on ‘the idea [that] we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other’. Thus construed, Meillassoux' critique is indeed a sweeping one: It comprises major parts of the philosophical tradition since Kant, both in its more continental and in its more analytical outlooks. In light of (...)
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  33. added 2019-03-11
    Comments on P. Kyle Stanford’s “Getting Real” The Hypothesis of Organic Fossil Origins”.Derek Turner - 2010 - Modern Schoolman 87 (3/4):245-250.
  34. added 2019-02-22
    An Absurd Consequence of Stanford’s New Induction Over the History of Science: A Reply to Sterpetti.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (5):515-527.
    In this paper, I respond to Sterpetti’s attempt to defend Kyle P. Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and his New Induction over the History of Science from my reductio argument outlined in Mizrahi :59–68, 2016a). I discuss what I take to be the ways in which Sterpetti has misconstrued my argument against Stanford’s NIS, in particular, that it is a reductio, not a dilemma, as Sterpetti erroneously thinks. I argue that antirealists who endorse Stanford’s NIS still face an absurd consequence (...)
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  35. added 2018-10-14
    Thoughts, Things, and Theories.Mr Blake Winter - manuscript
    We to critique the following question: can we have reasonable certainty that the terms in speculative or empirical theories correspond meaningfully to things in the ontological structure of the world, or are they only convenient fictions useful for predicting phenomena? We first justify this question as meaningful, and capable of admitting a meaningful answer. We then analyze question itself with examples from physics and biology. We conclude that we can be reasonably certain that the terms in an empirical theory have (...)
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  36. added 2018-10-14
    Physics and the Ontological Problem.G. N. M. Tyrrell - 1932 - Philosophy 7 (28):404 - 413.
    If there is one question which stands forth pre-eminently from among the many problems with which physical science bristles, it is that of the ontological status of the world which physics is exploring. What is reality in the eyes of science, and what are we to understand the physicist to mean when he refers to the “real world”? Can we agree with him when he assures us that physical science represents a progress towards pure truth? There seems to be a (...)
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  37. added 2018-09-20
    Truth and Scientific Change.Gila Sher - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (3):371-394.
    The paper seeks to answer two new questions about truth and scientific change: What lessons does the phenomenon of scientific change teach us about the nature of truth? What light do recent developments in the theory of truth, incorporating these lessons, throw on problems arising from the prevalence of scientific change, specifically, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction?
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  38. added 2018-09-03
    Sellars's Two Images as a Philosopher's Tool.Stefanie Dach - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (4):568-588.
    The distinction between the manifest and the scientific image of man- in-the-world is widely seen as crucial to Wilfrid Sellars's philosophical work. The present essay agrees with this view. It contends, however, that precisely because the distinction is important, we should not hurry to a quick and superficial understanding of it. The essay identifies several oversimplifications that can be found in the literature on the topic and argues that they are at least partly rooted in too rigid a view of (...)
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  39. added 2018-09-01
    Pragmatic Encroachment on Scientific Knowledge?Mikkel Gerken - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    Pragmatic encroachment theories of knowledge may be characterized as views according to which practical factors may partly determine the truth-value of ascriptions that S knows that p – even though these factors do not partly determine S’s belief that p or p itself. The pros and cons of variations of pragmatic encroachment are widely discussed in epistemology. But despite a long pragmatist tradition in the philosophy of science, few efforts have been devoted to relate this particular view to issues in (...)
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  40. added 2018-08-14
    Should Scientific Realists Embrace Theoretical Conservatism?Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A:30-38.
    A prominent type of scientific realism holds that some important parts of our best current scientific theories are at least approximately true. According to such realists, radically distinct alternatives to these theories or theory-parts are unlikely to be approximately true. Thus one might be tempted to argue, as the prominent anti-realist Kyle Stanford recently did, that realists of this kind have little or no reason to encourage scientists to attempt to identify and develop theoretical alternatives that are radically distinct from (...)
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  41. added 2018-07-29
    Hermann von Helmholtz, Philosophische Und Populärwissenschaftliche Schriften. 3 Bände.Gregor Schiemann, Michael Heidelberger & Helmut Pulte (eds.) - 2017 - Hamburg: Meiner.
    Aus dem vielfältigen Werk von Hermann von Helmholtz versammelt diese Ausgabe die im engeren Sinne philosophischen Abhandlungen, vor allem zur Wissenschaftsphilosophie und Erkenntnistheorie, sowie Vorträge und Reden, bei denen der Autor seine Ausnahmestellung im Wissenschaftsbetrieb nutzte, um die Wissenschaften und ihre Institutionen in der bestehenden Form zu repräsentieren und zu begründen. -/- Ein Philosoph wollte Helmholtz nicht sein, aber er legte der philosophischen Reflexion wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis und wissenschaftlichen Handelns große Bedeutung bei. Vor allem bezog er, in der Regel ausgehend von (...)
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  42. added 2018-05-31
    Realism in Context: The Examples of Lifeworld and Quantum Physics.Gregor Schiemann - 2009 - Human Affairs 19 (2):211-222.
    Lifeworld realism and quantum-physical realism are taken as experience-dependent conceptions of the world that become objects of explicit reflection when confronted with context-external discourses. After a brief sketch of the two contexts of experience—lifeworld and quantum physics—and their realist interpretations, I will discuss the quantum world from the perspective of lifeworld realism. From this perspective, the quantum world—roughly speaking—has to be either unreal or else constitute a different reality. Then, I invert the perspective and examine the lifeworld from the standpoint (...)
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  43. added 2018-05-31
    The Significance of the Hypothetical in Natural Science.Michael Heidelberger & Gregor Schiemann (eds.) - 2009 - De Gruyter.
    How was the hypothetical character of theories of experience thought about throughout the history of science? The essays cover periods from the middle ages to the 19th and 20th centuries. It is fascinating to see how natural scientists and philosophers were increasingly forced to realize that a natural science without hypotheses is not possible.
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  44. added 2018-05-28
    Elements of Contextual Realism.Francois-Igor Pris - 2018 - Lambert.
  45. added 2018-05-25
    Visual Representations in Science - Concept and Epistemology.Nicola Mößner - 2018 - London AND New York: Routledge.
    Visual representations (photographs, diagrams, etc.) play crucial roles in scientific processes. They help, for example, to communicate research results and hypotheses to scientific peers as well as to the lay audience. In genuine research activities they are used as evidence or as surrogates for research objects which are otherwise cognitively inaccessible. Despite their important functional roles in scientific practices, philosophers of science have more or less neglected visual representations in their analyses of epistemic methods and tools of reasoning in science. (...)
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  46. added 2018-05-24
    Scientific Realism with Correspondence Truth: A Reply to Asay (2018).Brian D. Haig & Denny Borsboom - 2018 - Theory and Psychology 28 (3):398-404.
    Asay (2018) criticizes our contention that psychologists do best to adhere to a substantive theory of correspondence truth. He argues that deflationary theory can serve the same purposes as correspondence theory. In the present article we argue that (a) scientific realism, broadly construed, requires a version of correspondence theory and (b) contrary to Asay’s suggestion, correspondence theory does have important additional resources over deflationary accounts in its ability to support generalizations over classes of true sentences.
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  47. added 2018-04-04
    The Bohr Atom, Models, and Realism.R. I. G. Hughes - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (2):71-84.
  48. added 2018-04-03
    The “Positive Argument” for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best Explanation.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):461–466.
    In this paper, I argue that the “positive argument” for Constructive Empiricism (CE), according to which CE “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does” (van Fraassen 1980, 73), is an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). But constructive empiricists are critical of IBE, and thus they have to be critical of their own “positive argument” for CE. If my argument is sound, then constructive empiricists are in the awkward position of having to reject their own (...)
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  49. added 2018-03-08
    50 Words for Snow.John Wilkins - manuscript
    Scientists and philosophers routinely talk about phenomena, and the ways in which they relate to explanation, theory and practice in science. However, there are very few definitions of the term, which is often used synonymously with "data'', "model'' and in older literature, "hypothesis''. In this paper I will attempt to clarify how phenomena are recognized, categorized and the role they play in scientific epistemology. I conclude that phenomena are not necessarily theory-based commitments, but that they are what explanations are called (...)
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  50. added 2018-02-23
    Four Challenges to Epistemic Scientific Realism—and the Socratic Alternative.Timothy D. Lyons - 2018 - Spontaneous Generations 9 (1):146-150.
    Four Challenges to Epistemic Scientific Realism—and the Socratic Alternative.
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