About this topic
Summary The idea that science advances by a series of fundamental upheavals known as scientific revolutions was made famous by Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  A variety of philosophical questions arise in relation to this idea, including questions about relativism and the rationality of choice between theories, as well as issues to do with conceptual and meaning change in science.
Key works The key work in this area is Kuhn 1962, and later editions, e.g. Kuhn 1962
Introductions Nickles 2010; Bird 2008
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329 found
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1 — 50 / 329
  1. Philosophy in Revolution. [REVIEW]C. P. A. - 1957 - Review of Metaphysics 11 (1):167-168.
  2. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Joseph Agassi - 1966 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 4 (4):351-354.
  3. Stegmüller Squared.Joseph Agassi & John R. Wettersten - 1980 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 11 (1):86-94.
    Wolfgang Stegmüller, the leading German philosopher of science, considers the status of scientific revolutions the central issue in the field ever since "the famous Popper-Lakatos-Kuhn discussion" of a decade and a half ago, comments on "almost all contributions to this problem", and offers his alternative solutions in a series of papers culminating with, and summarized in, his recent "A Combined Approach to Dynamics of Theories. How To Improve Historical Interpretations of Theory Change By Applying Set Theoretical Structures", published in Gerard (...)
  4. Quantum Mechanics and Paradigm Shifts.Valia Allori - 2015 - Topoi 2015 (2):313-323.
    It has been argued that the transition from classical to quantum mechanics is an example of a Kuhnian scientific revolution, in which there is a shift from the simple, intuitive, straightforward classical paradigm, to the quantum, convoluted, counterintuitive, amazing new quantum paradigm. In this paper, after having clarified what these quantum paradigms are supposed to be, I analyze whether they constitute a radical departure from the classical paradigm. Contrary to what is commonly maintained, I argue that, in addition to radical (...)
  5. The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker & Xiang Chen - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
    Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions became the most widely read book about science in the twentieth century. His terms 'paradigm' and 'scientific revolution' entered everyday speech, but they remain controversial. In the second half of the twentieth century, the new field of cognitive science combined empirical psychology, computer science, and neuroscience. In this book, the theories of concepts developed by cognitive scientists are used to evaluate and extend Kuhn's most influential ideas. Based on case studies of the Copernican revolution, (...)
  6. Encyclopedia of the Scientific Revolution From Copernicus to Newton.Wilbur Applebaum (ed.) - 2000 - Routledge.
    With unprecedented current coverage of the profound changes in the nature and practice of science in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, this comprehensive reference work addresses the individuals, ideas, and institutions that defined culture in the age when the modern perception of nature, of the universe, and of our place in it is said to have emerged. Covering the historiography of the period, discussions of the Scientific Revolution's impact on its contemporaneous disciplines, and in-depth analyses of the importance of historical context (...)
  7. Problems of Scientific Revolution.Gavin Ardley - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 27:417-419.
  8. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Gavin Ardley - 1964 - Philosophical Studies 13:183-192.
  9. Quantum Gravity and the Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Jürgen Audretsch - 1981 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 12 (2):322-339.
    Summary In a case study Kuhn's morphology of scientific revolutions is put to the test in confronting it with the contemporary developments in physics. It is shown in detail, that Kuhn's scheme is not compatible with the situation in physics today.
  10. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. [REVIEW]R. J. B. - 1963 - Review of Metaphysics 16 (4):804-804.
  11. Seventeenth Century Science and the Arts.J. H. B. - 1962 - Review of Metaphysics 15 (4):683-684.
  12. Classifying Scientific Controversies.Aristides Baltas - 2000 - In Peter K. Machamer, Marcello Pera & Aristeidēs Baltas (eds.), Scientific Controversies: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 40.
  13. Revolutions in Science and Society.Johannes Balthasar - 1981 - Philosophy and History 14 (1):27-29.
  14. Popper, Refutation and 'Avoidance' of Refutation.Greg Bamford - 1989 - Dissertation, The University of Queensland
    Popper's account of refutation is the linchpin of his famous view that the method of science is the method of conjecture and refutation. This thesis critically examines his account of refutation, and in particular the practice he deprecates as avoiding a refutation. I try to explain how he comes to hold the views that he does about these matters; how he seeks to make them plausible; how he has influenced others to accept his mistakes, and how some of the ideas (...)
  15. The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Peter Barker - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (3):445-465.
    For historical epistemology to succeed, it must adopt a defensible set of categories to characterise scientific activity over time. In historically orientated philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the original categories of theory and observation were supplemented or replaced by categories like paradigm, research program and research tradition. Underlying all three proposals was talk about conceptual systems and conceptual structures, attributed to individual scientists or to research communities, however there has been little general agreement on the nature of these (...)
  16. The Ash Wednesday Supper.J. Barnouw - 1979 - Review of Metaphysics 32 (4):742-743.
  17. Historical and Transcendental Factors in the Construction of the Sciences.Hervé Barreau - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 96 (1):33-47.
    The hermeneutic context of scientific activity requires that scientific discovery be attributed not only to historical factors but also to transcendental factors (in the sense exemplified by Kant and Husserl, but without their respective idealism). Together these factors can account for a scientific discovery. This is manifest in the invention of Relativity by Einstein. Thomas Kuhn considered the first factors and neglected the seconds. As a consequence the "paradigms" are, for him, incommensurable. But this negligence is the effect of a (...)
  18. The phenomenon of transdisciplinary cognitive revolution.V. A. Bazhanov & A. G. Kraeva - 2016 - Liberal Arts in Russia 5 (2):91-107.
    Phenomenon of transdisciplinarity was put into the fore of analysis rather recently. In the article an attempt is made to find out whether it is possible to attribute this phenomenon not only to a science of the 21st century, or we have here the case where some scientific realities come to the attention of researchers with certain delay and has its value for the culture in general? It is possible to judge even the emergence of a kind of cognitive revolution (...)
  19. Criticism and Revolutions.Mara Beller - 1997 - Science in Context 10 (1).
  20. A World on Paper: Studies on the Second Scientific Revolution.Enrico Bellone - 1980 - MIT Press.
  21. Intellectual Curiosity and the Scientific Revolution: A Global Perspective. [REVIEW]Avner Ben-Zaken - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Science 44 (4):585-587.
  22. A View Of The Chemical Revolution Through Contemporary Textbooks: Lavoisier, Fourcroy and Chaptal.Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent - 1990 - British Journal for the History of Science 23 (4):435-460.
    Scientific textbooks are often said to deliver a stereotyped kind of knowledge, which conceals rather than reveals the real making of science. They may, however, alternatively be regarded as of peculiar interest for historians of science. An over-mechanical application of the Kuhnian concepts of ‘scientific revolution’ and ‘normal science’ can lead to the neglect of the internal dynamics of ‘normal science’. Scientific textbooks may provide a better understanding of the process of normalization in science.
  23. The Starry Messenger and the Polar Star: Scientific Relations Between Italy and Sweden From 1500 to 1800.Marco Beretta & H. G. Van Bueren - 1996 - Annals of Science 53 (6):636-636.
  24. Some Practical Issues in the Recent Controversy on the Nature of Scientific Revolutions.William Berkson - 1994 - Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14:197-210.
  25. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Richard J. Bernstein - 1963 - Review of Metaphysics 16 (4):804-804.
  26. What Was Revolutionary About the Chemical Revolution?Nicholas W. Best - 2016 - In Eric Scerri & Grant Fisher (eds.), Essays in the Philosophy of Chemistry. Oxford University Press. pp. 37-59.
    Lavoisier and his allies should be regarded as philosophers of chemistry, for they took it upon themselves to carry out a scientific revolution. Inspired by enlightenment philosophy, they introduced new assumptions, apparatus and methods of experimentation. They provided a linguistic framework that would ensure These reforms, as much as any theoretical changes, are what make this period revolutionary. Moreover, by reading these scientists as philosophers of chemistry, we see that the Chemical Revolution was in many ways more revolutionary than Thomas (...)
  27. What Can Cognitive Science Tell Us About Scientific Revolutions?Alexander Bird - 2012 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (3):293-321.
    Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which it drew on the results of cognitive psychology. These naturalistic elements were not well received and Kuhn did not subsequently develop them in his published work. Nonetheless, in a philosophical climate more receptive to naturalism, we are able to give a more positive evaluation of Kuhn’s proposals. Recently, philosophers such as Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen, Barker, and Chen have used the results of work on case-based reasoning, analogical thinking, dynamic (...)
  28. What Can Cognitive Science Tell Us About Scientific Revolutions?Alexander Bird - 2012 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 27 (3):293-321.
  29. Scientific Revolutions and Inference to the Best Explanation.Alexander Bird - 1999 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 34:25--42.
  30. Osler, Margaret J., Ed. Rethinking the Scientific Revolution.Richard J. Blackwell - 2001 - Review of Metaphysics 54 (3):668-669.
  31. The Scientific Revolution, 1500-1800. The Formation of the Modern Scientific AttitudeA. R. Hall.Marie Boas - 1955 - Isis 46 (3):304-305.
  32. Kuhn’s Social Epistemology and the Sociology of Science.Alisa Bokulich & William J. Devlin - 2015 - In William J. Devlin & Alisa Bokulich (eds.), Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On. Springer. pp. 167-183.
    This chapter discusses Kuhn’s conception of the history of science by focussing on two respects in which Kuhn is an historicist historian and philosopher of science. I identify two distinct, but related, aspects of historicism in the work of Hegel and show how these are also found in Kuhn’s work. First, Kuhn held tradition to be important for understanding scientific change and that the tradition from which a scientific idea originates must be understood in evaluating that idea. This makes Kuhn (...)
  33. David Marshall Miller, Representing Space in the Scientific Revolution. [REVIEW]Patrick J. Boner - 2016 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 6 (1):172-173.
  34. A Revolution in Metaphysics and in Science.John Elof Boodin - 1938 - Philosophy of Science 5 (3):267-275.
  35. The Newtonian Revolution as a Revolution in Scientific Reasoning.Pierre J. Boulos - unknown -
  36. The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution by C. P. Snow.P. W. Bridgman - 1960 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 3 (4):565-566.
  37. The Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution.John Brockman & Ann Dally - 1997 - History of Science 35:111-112.
  38. Reduction and Scientific Revolutions.Harold I. Brown - 1976 - Erkenntnis 10 (3):381 - 385.
  39. Pourquoi les Grecs Avaient-Ils Horreur des Révolutions?Patrice Brun - 2009 - In Gianpaolo Urso (ed.), Ordine E Sovversione Nel Mondo Greco E Romano: Atti Del Convegno Internazionale, Cividale Del Friuli, 25-27 Settembre 2008. ETS.
  40. Will Cognitive Revolutions Ever Stop.Jerome Bruner - 1997 - In David Martel Johnson & Christina E. Erneling (eds.), The Future of the Cognitive Revolution. Oxford University Press. pp. 279--292.
  41. Exploring the Limits of Classical Physics: Planck, Einstein, and the Structure of a Scientific Revolution.Jochen Büttner, Jürgen Renn & Matthias Schemmel - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 34 (1):37-59.
  42. The Scientific Revolution, 1500-1800: The Formation of the Modern Scientific Attitude. [REVIEW]L. C. - 1957 - Review of Metaphysics 10 (3):539-539.
  43. The Second Scientific Revolution.M. Capek - 1968 - Diogenes 16 (63):114-133.
  44. Revolutions: Finished and Unfinished, From Primal to Final.Paul Caringella, Wayne Cristaudo & Glenn Hughes (eds.) - 2012 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
  45. Explaining Scientific Progress: Lakatos' Methodological Account of Kuhnian Patterns of Theory Change.Martin Carrier - 2002 - In G. Kampis, L.: Kvasz & M. Stöltzner (eds.), Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 53--72.
  46. Kuhn E a Racionalidade da Escolha Científica.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (3):439.
    In this paper, I try to articulate and clarify the role of the epistemic authority of experts in Kuhn’s explanation for the transition process between rival paradigms in the scientific revolutionary period. If science progresses, that process should contribute to the attainment of the cognitive aim of science, namely, the articulation of paradigms increasingly successful at the resolution of problems. It is hard to see that process as rational and as attaining the cognitive aim of science without the consideration of (...)
  47. Kuhn's Missed Opportunity and the Multifaceted Lives of Bachelard: Mythical, Institutional, Historical, Philosophical, Literary, Scientific.Teresa Castelão-Lawless - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (4):873-881.
  48. Intermediate Causes and Explanations: The Key to Understanding the Scientific Revolution.Alan Chalmers - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (4):551-562.
    It is instructive to view the scientific revolution from the point of view of Robert Boyle’s distinction between intermediate and ultimate causes. From this point of view, the scientific revolution involved the identification of intermediate causes and their investigation by way of experiment as opposed to the specification of ultimate causes of the kind involved in the corpuscular matter theories of the mechanical philosophers. The merits of this point of view are explored in this paper by focussing on the hydrostatics (...)
  49. The Chemical Revolution Revisited.Hasok Chang - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:91-98.
  50. The Quantum Counter-Revolution: Internal Conflicts in Scientific Change.Hasok Chang - 1995 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 26 (2):121-136.
    Many of the experiments that produced the empirical basis of quantum mechanics relied on classical assumptions that contradicted quantum mechanics. Historically this did not cause practical problems, as classical mechanics was used mostly when it did not happen to diverge too much from quantum mechanics in the quantitative sense. That fortunate circumstances, however, did not alleviate the conceptual problems involved in understanding the classical experimental reasoning in quantum-mechanical terms. In general, this type of difficulty can be expected when a coherent (...)
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