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  1. On the Inference of Personal Authorship: Enhancing Experienced Agency by Priming Effect Information☆.Henk Aarts, Ruud Custers & Daniel M. Wegner - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (3):439-458.
    Three experiments examined whether the mere priming of potential action effects enhances people’s feeling of causing these effects when they occur. In a computer task, participants and the computer independently moved a rapidly moving square on a display. Participants had to press a key, thereby stopping the movement. However, the participant or the computer could have caused the square to stop on the observed position, and accordingly, the stopped position of the square could be conceived of as the potential effect (...)
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  2. The Unconscious Relational Self.Susan M. Andersen, Inga Reznik & Noah S. Glassman - 2005 - In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. pp. 421-481.
  3. Electrical Sorting: The Missing Link Between Membrane Potential and Intracellular Vesicle Traffic?B. M. Anner - 1987 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 30 (4):537.
  4. Brain Patterns of Self-Awareness.Alarik T. Arenander & Frederick T. Travis - 2004 - In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co. pp. 112-126.
  5. A Unity of the Self or a Multiplicity of Locations? How the Graphesthesia Task Sheds Light on the Role of Spatial Perspectives in Bodily Self-Consciousness.Arnold Gabriel, Spence Charles & Auvray Malika - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 56:100-114.
  6. Self-Awareness and Other-Awareness.J. B. Asendorpf, V. Warkentin & P. Baudonniere - 1996 - Ii 32.
  7. Affective Neuroscience and the Philosophy of Self.Stephen T. Asma - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19.
    The nature of self awareness and the origin and persistence of personal identity still loom large in contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers have been wooed by the computational approach to consciousness, and they attempt to find the self amidst the phenomenon of neocortical information processing. Affective neuroscience offers another pathway to understanding the evolution and nature of self. This paper explores how affective neuroscience acts as a positive game-changer in the philosophical pursuit of self. In particular, we focus on (...)
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  8. Attention, Self, and Conscious Self-Monitoring.Bernard J. Baars - 1998 - In A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
    ?In everday language, the word ?attention? implies control of access to consciousness, and we adopt this usage here. Attention itself can be either voluntary or automatic. This can be readily modeled in the theory. Further, a contrastive analysis of spontaneously self?attributed vs. self?alien experiences suggests that ?self? can be interpreted as the more enduring, higher levels of the dominant context hierarchy, which create continuity over the changing flow of events. Since context is by definition unconscious in GW theory, self in (...)
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  9. Self-Awareness After Acquired and Traumatic Brain Injury.Laura J. Bach & Anthony S. David - 2006 - Neuropsychological Rehabilitation 16 (4):397-414.
  10. Self-Awareness in Human and Chimpanzee Infants: What is Measured and What is Meant by the Mark and Mirror Test?Kim A. Bard, Brenda K. Todd, Chris Bernier, Jennifer Love & David A. Leavens - 2006 - Infancy 9 (2):191-219.
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  11. Extending Self-Consciousness Into the Future.John Barresi - 2001 - In C. Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum. pp. 141-161.
    As adults we have little difficulty thinking of ourselves as mental beings extended in time. Even though our conscious thoughts and experiences are constantly changing, we think of ourselves as the same self throughout these variations in mental content. Indeed, it is so natural for adults to think this way that it was not until the 18th century—at least in Western thought—that the issue of how we come to acquire such a concept of an identical but constantly changing self was (...)
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  12. The Schizophrenias as Disorders of Self Consciousness.Sean E. Baumann - 2005 - South African Psychiatry Review 8 (3):95-99.
  13. Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain.Mario Beauregard (ed.) - 2004 - John Benjamins.
  14. Self-Consciousness in Cognitive Systems.Ansgar Beckermann - 2003 - Schriftenreihe-Wittgenstein Gesellschaft 31:174-188.
    Dualism, but he seems at least to have acknowledged the possibility that Descartes might be right on this issue, i.e., that the real self is a _res cogitans_. Maybe this is why talk of.
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  15. Psychological Mindedness and Awareness of Self and Others.Mark Beitel, Elena Ferrer & John J. Cecero - 2005 - Journal of Clinical Psychology 61 (6):739-750.
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  16. Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment.Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair - 2004 - W.W.Norton.
  17. Why Self-Awareness?Bernard D. Beitman, Jyotsna Nair & George I. Viamontes - 2004 - In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co. pp. 3-23.
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  18. Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language.Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, John Searle & Daniel N. Robinson - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
    In _Neuroscience and Philosophy_ three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's _Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience_, which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond. Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of central themes: the (...)
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  19. Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language.Maxwell Bennett, Daniel Dennett, Peter Hacker, John Searle & Daniel N. Robinson - 2007 - Columbia University Press.
    In _Neuroscience and Philosophy_ three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's _Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience_, which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond. Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of central themes: the (...)
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  20. Nelkin, N.-Consciousness and the Origins of Thought.J. L. Bermudez - 1998 - Philosophical Books 39:258-259.
  21. Self-Consciousness.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
  22. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2000 - Psycoloquy 11 (35).
    Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (...)
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  23. Precis of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness.Jose Luis Bermudez - 1999 - Psycoloquy 10 (35).
  24. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness.Jose Luis Bermudez - 1998 - MIT Press.
  25. The Body and the Self.Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.) - 1995 - MIT Press.
  26. Empirical Evidence for a Narrative Concept of Self.John Bickle - 2003 - In Gary D. Fireman, T. E. McVay & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), Narrative and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
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  27. Why Are We Certain That We Exist?Alexandre Billon - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):723-759.
    Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of (...)
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  28. Does Consciousness Entail Subjectivity? The Puzzle of Thought Insertion.Alexandre Billon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.
    (2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.
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  29. The Dialogue of the Soul with Itself.James A. Blachowicz - 2002 - In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. pp. 5-6.
    What is the cognitive significance of talking to ourselves? I criticize two interpretations of this function , and offer a third: I argue that inner speech is a genuine dialogue, not a monologue; that the partners in this dialogue represent the independent interests of experienced meaning and logical articulation; that the former is either silent or capable only of abbreviated speech; that articulation is a logical, not a social demand; and that neither partner is a full-time subordinate of the other. (...)
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  30. Consciousness in Meme Machines.Susan J. Blackmore - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):19-30.
    Setting aside the problems of recognising consciousness in a machine, this article considers what would be needed for a machine to have human-like conscious- ness. Human-like consciousness is an illusion; that is, it exists but is not what it appears to be. The illusion that we are a conscious self having a stream of experi- ences is constructed when memes compete for replication by human hosts. Some memes survive by being promoted as personal beliefs, desires, opinions and pos- sessions, leading (...)
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  31. Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients. Neurobiology. Assessment and Treatment. [REVIEW]Petr Bob - 2006 - Journal of Analytical Psychology 51 (2):311-312.
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  32. Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness.Radu J. Bogdan - 2010 - Bradford.
    An argument that in response to sociocultural pressures, human minds develop self-consciousness by activating a complex machinery of self-regulation.
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  33. The Missing Link.Charles Booth - 2003 - The Philosophers' Magazine 22:59-59.
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  34. How Observations on Oneself Can Be Scientific.David A. Booth - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):262-263.
    The design and interpretation of self-experimentation need to be integrated with existing scientific knowledge. Otherwise observations on oneself cannot make a creative contribution to the advance of empirical understanding.
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  35. A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion.Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
    Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts. We argue that by (...)
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  36. Psychology of the Moral Self.B. Bosanquet - 1898 - Philosophical Review 7 (2):213-215.
    After more than ten years teaching ancient Greek history and philosophy at University College, Oxford, the British philosopher and political theorist Bernard Bosanquet resigned from his post to spend more time writing. He was particularly interested in contemporary social theory, including the social ramifications of the growing field of psychology, and this book, published in 1897, is a collection of his lectures on this topic. The ten lectures explore many aspects of psychology and its relationship to larger philosophical and ethical (...)
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  37. Psychology of the Moral Self.Bernard Bosanquet - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    After more than ten years teaching ancient Greek history and philosophy at University College, Oxford, the British philosopher and political theorist Bernard Bosanquet resigned from his post to spend more time writing. He was particularly interested in contemporary social theory, including the social ramifications of the growing field of psychology, and this book, published in 1897, is a collection of his lectures on this topic. The ten lectures explore many aspects of psychology and its relationship to larger philosophical and ethical (...)
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  38. Varieties of Self-Systems Worth Having.Pascal Boyer, Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):647-660.
  39. The Existence.Miro Brada - manuscript
    In 1995, I wrote an essay 'Existence'. From the analysis of the process of self-consciousness, I concluded: "All I know, only I know", because if YOU know 'what I know', only I know that 'YOU know 'what I know'', and if you know that 'only I know that 'YOU know 'what I know''', only I know that... etc. At every moment, I know something more (I know that YOU know), or something less (I don't know that YOU know that I (...)
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  40. Gottfried Vosgerau, Mental Representation and Self‐Consciousness. From Basic Self‐Representation to Self‐Related Cognition, Paderborn: Mentis, 2009, 179 Pp., € 24.00, ISBN: 3897856271. [REVIEW]Cordula Brand - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (2):248-252.
  41. Bodily Awareness and the Self.Bill Brewer - 1995 - In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge: Mass: Mit Press. pp. 291-€“303.
    In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of (...)
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  42. The Primacy of the We?Ingar Brinck, Vasudevi Reddy & Dan Zahavi (eds.) - 2016 - MIT Press.
    The question of the relation between the collective and the individual has had a long but patchy history within both philosophy and psychology. In this chapter we consider some arguments that could be adopted for the primacy of the we, and examine their conceptual and empirical implications. We argue that the we needs to be seen as a developing and dynamic identity, not as something that exists fully fledged from the start. The concept of we thus needs more nuanced and (...)
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  43. Waiting for the World to Make Me Talk and Tell Me What I Meant.Richard P. Brinker & Julian Jaynes - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):554.
  44. A Developmental Model of Self-Awareness.A. S. Briskin - 1974 - Counseling and Values 18:79-85.
  45. Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: A Disorder of Self-Awareness.Richard J. Burch - 2004 - In Bernard D. Beitman & Jyotsna Nair (eds.), Self-Awareness Deficits in Psychiatric Patients: Neurobiology, Assessment, and Treatment. W.W. Norton & Co. pp. 229-254.
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  46. The Role of Conscious Attention in Perception.Hermann Burchard - 2011 - Foundations of Science 16 (1):67-99.
    Impressions, energy radiated by phenomena in the momentary environmental scene, enter sensory neurons, creating in afferent nerves a data stream. Following Kant, by our inner sense the mind perceives its own thoughts as it ties together sense data into an internalized scene. The mind, residing in the brain, logically a Language Machine, processes and stores items as coded grammatical entities. Kantian synthetic unity in the linguistic brain is able to deliver our experience of the scene as we appear to see (...)
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  47. The Role of Abstract Reference in Mead's Account of Human Origins.Tom Burke - 2005 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41 (3):567-601.
    This paper addresses issues regarding human origins, drawing particularly on George Herbert Mead 's account of the emergence of self consciousness as a product of social and physical evolution. Some of John Dewey's ideas on the nature of thought and language are added to that account. The so called "great leap" in human evolution that occurred some 50,000 years ago is attributed not just to the emergence of symbols or language but to the development of fully recursive languages suited for (...)
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  48. Self and Others in the Field of Perception: The Role of Micro-Dialogue, Feeling, and Emotion in Perception.Ian Burkitt - 2013 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 33 (4):267.
  49. The Social Construction of Consciousness, Part 2: Individual Selves, Self-Awareness, and Reflectivity.Tom R. Burns - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):166-184.
  50. Are We Our Brains?Stephen Burwood - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):113-133.
    My aim in this paper is to destabilise the brain-is-self thesis, something that is now regarded in some quarters as philosophical commonsense. My contention is that it is the epithelial body that enters into the formation of our sense of self and that largely bears the burden of personal identity as well as playing the key role in grounding our psychological ascriptions. Lacking any sensorimotor or social presence of its own, the brain by itself cannot "underlie" selfhood, but only as (...)
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