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  1. added 2018-11-08
    Consequentialism and Moral Worth.Nathaniel Sharadin - forthcoming - Utilitas:1-20.
    Sometimes, agents do the right thing for the right reason. What’s the normative significance of this phenomenon? According to proponents of the special status view, when an agent acts for the right reason, her actions enjoy a special normative status, namely, worthiness. Proponents of this view claim that self-effacing forms of consequentialism cannot say this plausible thing, and, worse, are blocked from having a perspicuous view of matters by the self-effacing nature of their consequentialism. In this paper, I argue that (...)
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  2. added 2014-09-03
    Reactive Attitudes and the Hare–Williams Debate: Towards a New Consequentialist Moral Psychology.D. E. Miller - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):39-59.
    Bernard Williams charges that the moral psychology built into R. M. Hare’s utilitarianism is incoherent in virtue of demanding a bifurcated kind of moral thinking that is possible only for agents who fail to reflect properly on their own practical decision making. I mount a qualified defence of Hare’s view by drawing on the account of the ‘reactive attitudes’ found in P. F. Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Against Williams, I argue that the ‘resilience’ of the reactive attitudes ensures that our (...)
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  3. added 2014-03-22
    Has Dancy Shown a Problem in Consequentialism?Klemens Kappel - 1999 - Theoria 65 (2-3):193-211.
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  4. added 2014-03-15
    How Indirect Can Indirect Utilitarianism Be?Eric Wiland - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):275-301.
    Most act-utilitarians now reject the direct utilitarianism of Bentham. They do so because they are convinced of what I call the paradox of utilitarianism -- the thought that one cannot maximize happiness if one is trying to maximize happiness. Instead, they adopt some form of indirect utilitarianism (IU), arguing that the optimal decision procedure may differ markedly from the criterion of rightness for actions. Here I distinguish between six different versions of indirect utilitarianism, arguing that the weaker versions of IU (...)
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  5. added 2014-02-16
    Rejecting The Publicity Condition: The Inevitability of Esoteric Morality.Ben Eggleston - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):29-57.
    It is often thought that some version of what is generally called the publicity condition is a reasonable requirement to impose on moral theories. In this article, after formulating and distinguishing three versions of the publicity condition, I argue that the arguments typically used to defend them are unsuccessful and, moreover, that even in its most plausible version, the publicity condition ought to be rejected as both question-begging and unreasonably demanding.
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  6. added 2013-04-13
    The Principle of Moral Harmony.Fred Feldman - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):166-179.
  7. added 2011-07-11
    Secrecy in Consequentialism: A Defence of Esoteric Morality.Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer - 2010 - Ratio 23 (1):34-58.
    Sidgwick's defence of esoteric morality has been heavily criticized, for example in Bernard Williams's condemnation of it as 'Government House utilitarianism.' It is also at odds with the idea of morality defended by Kant, Rawls, Bernard Gert, Brad Hooker, and T.M. Scanlon. Yet it does seem to be an implication of consequentialism that it is sometimes right to do in secret what it would not be right to do openly, or to advocate publicly. We defend Sidgwick on this issue, and (...)
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  8. added 2011-07-11
    Implications of a Self-Effacing Consequentialism.William L. Langenfus - 1989 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):479-493.
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  9. added 2009-11-04
    Consequentialism and Decision Procedures.Toby Ord - unknown
    Consequentialism is often charged with being self-defeating, for if a person attempts to apply it, she may quite predictably produce worse outcomes than if she applied some other moral theory. Many consequentialists have replied that this criticism rests on a false assumption, confusing consequentialism’s criterion of the rightness of an act with its position on decision procedures. Consequentialism, on this view, does not dictate that we should be always calculating which of the available acts leads to the most good, but (...)
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  10. added 2009-06-12
    Publicity in Morality.Brad Hooker - unknown
    Consider the idea that moral rules must be suitable for public acknowledgement and acceptance, i.e., that moral rules must be suitable for being ‘widely known and explicitly recognized’, suitable for teaching as part of moral education, suitable for guiding behaviour and reactions to behaviour, and thus suitable for justifying one’s behaviour to others. This idea is now most often associated with John Rawls, who traces it back through Kurt Baier to Kant.[1] My book developing ruleconsequentialism, Ideal Code, Real World, accepted (...)
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  11. added 2009-05-14
    Consequentialism and Self-Defeat.Paul K. Moser - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162):82-85.
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