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  1. Is There an Element of Immediacy in Knowledge?R. I. Aaron & C. M. Campbell - 1934 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 13 (1):203-236.
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  2. On Thinking. By Gilbert Ryle.Malcolm Acock - 1982 - Modern Schoolman 60 (1):64-65.
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  3. Privileged Access.Joseph Agassi - 1969 - Inquiry 12 (1-4):420 – 426.
    That everyone has some privileged access to some information is trivially true. The doctrine of privileged access is that I am the authority on all of my own experiences. Possibly this thesis was attacked by Wittgenstein (the thesis on the non?existence of private languages). The thesis was refuted by Freud (I know your dreams better than you), Duhem (I know your methods of scientific discovery better than you), Malinowski (I know your customs and habits better than you), and perception theorists (...)
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  4. Kitab Al- Ismah.I. Ahmad ibn Zayn al-din Ahsa - 1993 - Al-Dar Al- Alamiyah.
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  5. Historicism and Knowledge, by Robert D'Amico.Linda Alcoff - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):241-243.
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  6. The Self in Psychology.A. H. B. Allen - 1937 - Philosophy 12 (47):378-378.
  7. The Paradoxes of Self-Deception.R. T. Allen - 1990 - Irish Philosophical Journal 7 (1/2):160-170.
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  8. Introspection, Anton's Syndrome, and Human Echolocation.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Philosophers have recently argued that since there are people who are blind, but don't know it, and people who echolocate, but don't know it, conscious introspection is highly unreliable. I contend that a second look at Anton's syndrome, human echolocation, and ‘facial vision’ suggests otherwise. These examples do not support skepticism about the reliability of introspection.
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  9. Knowledge Externalism.Marc Alspector-kelly - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):289–300.
    A popular counterexample directed against externalist epistemological views is that of an agent (Lehrer's "Truetemp" for example) whose beliefs are clearly neither justified nor known but that were generated in the manner that the externalist requires, thereby demonstrating externalism to be insufficient. In this essay I develop and defend an externalist account of knowledge – essentially an elaboration of Fred Dreske's information-theoretic account – that is not susceptible to those criticisms. I then briefly discuss the relationship between knowledge and justification.
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  10. The Authority of the First Person-Wittgenstein's Basic Insight.E. Ammereller - 1999 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 106 (1):1-17.
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  11. On Davidson's View of First-Person Authority.Bruce Aune - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press.
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  12. On Davidson's View of First—Person Authority.Bruce Aune - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press. pp. 214.
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  13. Knowing Our Own Minds.Anita Avramides - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):465-471.
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  14. Critical Notice.Kent Bach - 1988 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.
    As philosophical topics go, self-deception has something for everyone. It raises basic questions about the nature of belief and the relation of belief to thought, desire, and the will. It provokes further questions on such topics as reasoning, attention, self-knowledge, the unity of the self, intentional action, motivation, self-esteem, psychic defenses, the unconscious, personal character, and interpersonal relations. There are two basic questions about self-deception itself, which each take a familiar philosophical form: What is it? How is it possible? These (...)
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  15. The Paradoxes of Self-Deception: A Reply to R. T. Allen.Maria Baghramian - 1990 - Irish Philosophical Journal 7 (1/2):171-179.
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  16. Strategies of Self-Deception.Maria Baghramian - 1986 - Irish Philosophical Journal 3 (2):83-97.
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  17. Why Transparency Undermines Economy.Derek Baker - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):3037-3050.
    Byrne offers a novel interpretation of the idea that the mind is transparent to its possessor, and that one knows one’s own mind by looking out at the world. This paper argues that his attempts to extend this picture of self-knowledge force him to sacrifice the theoretical parsimony he presents as the primary virtue of his account. The paper concludes by discussing two general problems transparency accounts of self-knowledge must address.
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  18. Objects and Persons.LR Baker - unknown
  19. Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a non-Cartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us (...)
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  20. An Interpretation and Assessment of First-Person Authority in the Writings of Philosopher Donald Davidson.Eivind Balsvik - 2003
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  21. Triangulation, Interpretation, and First-Person Authority: An Essay on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.Eivind Balsvik - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Miami
    This dissertation provides an interpretation and assessment of Donald Davidson's work on first-person authority. First-person authority is the thesis that subjects have a privileged non-evidence-based form of epistemic warrant for self-ascriptions of psychological concepts that does not attach to third-person evidence-based ascriptions of the same concepts. Davidson thinks the fact that we do have first-person authority over self-ascriptions of psychological concepts gives rise to two connected philosophical problems. The epistemic problem: How can non-evidence based self-ascriptions of psychological concepts be more (...)
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  22. Speaking My Mind.Dorit Bar-On - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):1-34.
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  23. The Self and Self-Knowledge Ed. By Annalisa Coliva.Richard Baron - 2013 - Philosophy Now 97:47-47.
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  24. Privileged Access and Repression.Anne Bartsch & Christoph Jäger - 2002 - In Verena Mayer & Sabine A. Döring (eds.), Die Moralität der Gefühle. De Gruyter. pp. 59-80.
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  25. Die Transparenz des Geistes.Wolfgang Barz - 2012 - Suhrkamp.
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  26. Self-Deception.Patrick K. Bastable - 1969 - Philosophical Studies 18:254-256.
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  27. Individualism and Self-Knowledge: Tu Quoque.Kelly Becker - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):289 - 295.
  28. The Place and Object of Infallibility.Seely Beggiani - 1973 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):256-265.
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  29. Interpretation and First-Person Authority.David Beisecker - 2003 - Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (1):89-96.
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  30. Epistemic Virtues and Transparency.Hilan Bensusan & Manuel De Pinedo - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):257-266.
    Transparency is commonly held to be a property of one’s beliefs: it is enough for me to examine an issue to establish my beliefs about it. Recent challenges to first-person authority over the content of one’s beliefs potentially undermine transparency. We start considering some consequences in terms of variations of Moore’s paradox. Then we study cases where, in the process of acquiring and managing beliefs, one pays excessive attention to how reliable, empirically adequate, coherent, or widely accepted they are from (...)
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  31. A New Perspective on the Access Process.Henning Bergenholtz & Rufus Gouws - 2010 - Hermes 44:103-127.
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  32. Externalism and Skepticism.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):159-194.
  33. Deception as the Self in Zamyatin's We.Michael Berman - 2009 - In Leslie Anne Boldt-Irons, Corrado Federici & Ernesto Virgulti (eds.), Disguise, Deception, Trompe-L'oeil: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Peter Lang.
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  34. The Alleged Infallibility of Councils.Luis M. Bermejo - 2013 - Bijdragen 38 (2):128-162.
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  35. Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and Past-Tense Memory Judgements.J. L. Bermudez - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):211-220.
    Autobiographical memories typically give rise either to memory reports (“I remember going swimming”) or to first person past-tense judgements (“I went swimming”). This article focuses on first person past-tense judgements that are (epistemically) based on autobiographical memories. Some of these judgements have the IEM property of being immune to error through misidentification. This article offers an account of when and why first person past-tense judgements have the IEM property.
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  36. An Introduction to Historical Epistemology: The Authority of Knowledge.Luis Bermudez - 1996 - Philosophical Books 37 (2):124-125.
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  37. Representationalism, First-Person Authority, and Second-Order Knowledge.Sven Bernecker - 2011 - In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 33-52.
    This paper ties in with my longstanding project of using representationalism to dispel Cartesian superstitions about the scope of first-person authority. While my earlier work dealt with privileged self-knowledge of one’s belief states, this paper is concerned with privileged self-knowledge of one’s knowledge states. Is it a priori knowable, from a first-person perspective, that one knows that p? I argue that one cannot know a priori that one knows that p as opposed to being incapable of having any knowledge states; (...)
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  38. McKinsey, Causes and Intentions.Rod Bertolet - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):619-632.
  39. Obvious Knowledge.Carolyn Black - 1983 - Synthese 56 (3):373 - 385.
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  40. Epistemic Tit for Tat.Michel J. Blais - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (7):363-375.
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  41. Reasoning and Reflection: A Reply to Kornblith.Paul Boghossian - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):41-54.
    Hilary Kornblith’s book is motivated by the conviction that philosophers have tended to overvalue and overemphasize reflection in their accounts of central philosophical phenomena. He seeks to pinpoint this tendency and to correct it. -/- Kornblith’s claim is not without precedent. It is an oft-repeated theme of 20th-century philosophy that philosophers have tended to give ‘overly intellectualized’ accounts of important phenomena. One thinks here of Wittgenstein, Ryle and many others. -/- One version of this charge is that philosophers have tended (...)
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  42. Basic Self-Knowledge and Transparency.Cristina Borgoni - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    Cogito-like judgments, a term coined by Burge, comprise thoughts such as, I am now thinking, I [hereby] judge that Los Angeles is at the same latitude as North Africa, or I [hereby] intend to go to the opera tonight. It is widely accepted that we form cogito-like judgments in an authoritative and not merely empirical manner. We have privileged self-knowledge of the mental state that is self-ascribed in a cogito-like judgment. Thus, models of self-knowledge that aim to explain privileged self-knowledge (...)
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  43. Deception in Psychology : Moral Costs and Benefits of Unsought Self-Knowledge.Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli - 2006 - Accountability in Research 13:259-275.
    Is it ethical to deceive the individuals who participate in psychological experiments for methodological reasons? We argue against an absolute ban on the use of deception in psychological research. The potential benefits of many psychological experiments involving deception consist in allowing individuals and society to gain morally significant self-knowledge that they could not otherwise gain. Research participants gain individual self-knowledge which can help them improve their autonomous decision-making. The community gains collective self-knowledge that, once shared, can play a role in (...)
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  44. Critical Study: Cassam on Self‐Knowledge for Humans.Matthew Boyle - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):337-348.
    This paper is a critical study of Quassim Cassam’s Self-Knowledge for Humans (Oxford University Press, 2014). Cassam claims that theorists who emphasize the “transparency” of questions about our own attitudes to questions about the wider world are committed to an excessively rationalistic conception of human thought. I dispute this, and make some clarificatory points about how to understand the relevant notion of “transparency”. I also argue that Cassam’s own “inferentialist” account of attitudinal self-knowledge entails an unacceptable alienation from our own (...)
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  45. II—Matthew Boyle: Transparent Self-Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):223-241.
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  46. Review of Lucy O'Brien, Matthew Soteriou (Eds.), Mental Actions[REVIEW]Matthew Boyle - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (2).
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  47. A Case of Deception?Katrina A. Bramstedt & Robert Macauley - 2005 - Hastings Center Report 35 (6):13-14.
  48. Knowledge and Object. [REVIEW]Daniel J. Bronstein - 1933 - Journal of Philosophy 30 (26):719-720.
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  49. Difficulties in Generating Scepticism About Knowledge of Content.A. Brueckner - 1999 - Analysis 59 (1):59-62.
  50. Two Recent Approaches to Self-Knowledge.Anthony Brueckner - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):251-271.
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