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Summary According to Self-representational Theories of Consciousness, conscious mental states are conscious in virtue of representing themselves. This is taken by defenders to be an account of consciousness superior to that offered by other representational approaches, such as (first-order) representationalism and higher-order theories. According to representationalism, conscious states are conscious in virtue of representing the environment, whereas according to higher-order theories, they are conscious in virtue of being represented by numerically distinct higher-order states. Debates surrounding the self-representational theory concern mostly (i) what it means for a mental state to represent itself, and whether all conscious states in fact do; (ii) how self-representational theories fare in comparison to representational and higher-order theories; (iii) whether self-representational theories can help bridge the explanatory gap.
Key works A prominent early theory of consciousness in a self-representational vein is in Brentano 1874, though it has been argued that the theory goes back to Aristotle (see Caston 2002). In modern philosophy of mind, self-representation is prominently used as a central part of the account of consciousness first in Smith 1986. More recently, the theory has enjoyed something of a revival - see Kriegel & Williford 2006 and Kriegel 2009 for book-length treatments. Prominent critiques of the view include Levine 2006, Weisberg 2008, and Gennaro 2008.
Introductions For an early self-representational approach to consciousness, see Smith 1986. For the basic attraction of self-representational theories, see the introduction to Kriegel & Williford 2006. For discussion of some of the options for self-representational theories, see Kriegel 2005 and Kriegel 2006.
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  1. added 2020-10-19
    The Phenomenology of Mentality.Arnaud Dewalque - forthcoming - In Denis Fisette, Guillaume Frechette & Hynek Janoušek (eds.), Franz Brentano’s Philosophy after Hundred Years – From History of Philosophy to Reism. New York: Springer.
    This paper offers a phenomenological interpretation of Brentano’s view of mentality. The key idea is that mental phenomena are not only characterized by intentionality; they also exhibit a distinctive way of appearing or being experienced. In short, they also have a distinctive phenomenology. I argue this view may be traced back to Brentano’s theory of inner perception. Challenging the self-representational reading of IP, I maintain the latter is best understood as a way of appearing, that is, in phenomenological terms. Section (...)
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  2. added 2020-10-19
    Consciousness: Qualitative Character and Subject Aspect.Paul Bernier - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57:5-10.
    As it has been pointed out in the literature, a Theory of Consciousness should satisfy two desiderata: i) account for the particular qualitative character of any particular conscious state, and ii) account for the fact that a conscious state is conscious ‘for the subject’.. Many have claimed that the RepresentationaI Theory of Consciousness can satisfy the first desideratum. It obviously fails, however, to meet the second desideratum. Higher-Order Approaches to Consciouness satisfy the second desideratum straightforwardly, but it remains unclear whether (...)
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  3. added 2020-10-19
    Dignāga on Reflexive Awareness.Paul Bernier - 2015 - Philosophy East and West 65 (1):125-156.
  4. added 2020-08-21
    Does Inner Awareness Always Accompany Outer Awareness During Perception?Madhu Mangal Chaturvedi & A. V. Ravishankar Sarma - 2019 - Problemos 96.
    In the present paper, we defend the thesis that outer-world-directed perceptual consciousness is always accompanied by an inner awareness. This is contrary to the view that outer-world-directed conscious mental states are not accompanied by an inner awareness, which is held by Gennaro against Kriegel’s self-representationalism. We attempt to show why philosophers like Gennaro get it wrong when they deny the IAOA thesis by critically examining his arguments against it and by giving arguments in its favour.
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  5. added 2020-08-21
    Brentanian Inner Consciousness and the Infinite Regress Problem.Andrea Marchesi - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):129-147.
    By “Brentanian inner consciousness” I mean the conception of inner consciousness developed by Franz Brentano. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, to present Brentano’s account of inner consciousness; second, to discuss this account in light of the mereology outlined by Brentano himself; and third, to decide whether this account incurs an infinite regress. In this regard, I distinguish two kinds of infinite regress: external infinite regress and internal infinite regress. I contend that the most plausible reading of Brentano’s (...)
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  6. added 2020-08-17
    From “Fichte’s Original Insight” to a Moderate Defence of Self-Representationalism.Manfred Frank - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:36-78.
    Fifty years ago, Dieter Henrich wrote an influential little text on ‘Fichte’s Origi­nal Insight’. Seldom so much food for thought has been put in a nutshell. The essay, bearing such an unremarkable title, delivers a diagnosis of why two hundred years of penetrating thought about the internal structure of subjectivity have ended up so fruitless. Henrich’s point was: Self-consciousness cannot be explained as the result of a higher-order act, bending back upon a first-order one, given that “what reflection finds, must (...)
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  7. added 2020-08-17
    From Non-Self-Representationalism to the Social Structure of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness.Kristina Musholt - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:243-263.
    Why should we think that there is such a thing as pre-reflective self-awareness? And how is this kind of self-awareness to be characterized? This paper traces a theoretical and a phenomenological line of argument in favor of the notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness and explores how this notion can be further illuminated by appealing to recent work in the analytical philosophy of language and mind. In particular, it argues that the self is not represented in the content of experience, but is (...)
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  8. added 2020-08-17
    Sartre: A Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness.Esteban Diego Ortiz Medina - 2018 - Journal of Humanities of Valparaiso 11:115-137.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness from Sartre. For it I will clarify and show the closeness of two ideas. The first of these is the so-called self-representational theory of consciousness, which holds that a mental state is conscious if and only if it represents itself in the right way. The second of these are the descriptions of consciousness from Sartre, which say that all consciousness is self-consciousness of itself, or more precisely: (...)
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  9. added 2019-11-26
    Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo sin saber que las creo.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Critica 49 (146):37-60.
    En un artículo publicado recientemente en esta revista, Javier Vidal argumenta que toda creencia de primera persona es una creencia consciente, una conclusión que pone en jaque ciertas teorías de la consciencia, como él mismo expone. El razonamiento de Vidal se basa en un argumento que muestra que uno conoce toda creencia de primera persona que tiene y en un principio que vincula conocimiento y consciencia. Mi objetivo en este trabajo es mostrar que el razonamiento de Vidal no es sólido. (...)
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    Comments on Denis Fisette, “Franz Brentano and Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness".Bruno Leclercq - forthcoming - Argumentos.
  11. added 2019-06-05
    Receptivity and Phenomenal Self‐Knowledge.Thomas McClelland - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):293-302.
    In this article, I argue that an epistemic question about knowledge of our own phenomenal states encourages a certain metaphysical picture of consciousness according to which phenomenal states are reflexive mental representations. Section 1 describes and motivates the thesis that phenomenal self- knowledge is ‘receptive’: that is, the view that a subject has knowledge of their phenomenal states only insofar as they are inwardly affected by those states. In Sections 4 and 3, I argue that this model of phenomenal self- (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-05
    Der Begriff der Inneren Erfahrung Bei Petrus Johannis Olivi.Christian Rode - 2008 - Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 13 (1):123-141.
    The concept of inner experience in Peter John Olivi. This article discusses the notion of inner experience and self-knowledge in Peter John Olivi. According to Olivi, each act of cognition is accompanied by some sort of self-awareness or self-experience. Therefore, the problem of an infinite regress of acts of self-awareness arises. Olivi tries to solve this problem by drawing on a theory of reflection which bears a striking resemblance to modern self-representational or dispositional accounts of consciousness. Thus, in order to (...)
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  13. added 2019-04-11
    More of Me! Less of Me!: Reflexive Imperativism About Affective Phenomenal Character.Luca Barlassina & Max Khan Hayward - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1013-1044.
    Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive (...)
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  14. added 2019-04-07
    Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness.Tom McClelland - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    To understand Self-Representationalism you need to understand its family. Self-Representationalism is a branch of the Meta-Representationalist family, and according to theories in this family what distinguishes conscious mental representations from unconscious mental representations is that conscious ones are themselves the target of a mental meta¬-representational state. A mental state M1 is thus phenomenally conscious in virtue of being suitably represented by some mental state M2. What distinguishes the Self-Representationalist branch of the family is the claim that M1 and M2 must (...)
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  15. added 2019-01-31
    Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. [REVIEW]Miguel Ángel Sebastian - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (32):413-417.
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  16. added 2018-12-21
    Can We Reflexively Access the Contents of Our Own Perceptions? Ockham on the Reflexive Cognition of the Contents of Intuitions.Lydia Deni Gamboa - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (5):921-940.
    ABSTRACTIn the recent secondary literature on Ockham’s philosophy of mind, it has been debated whether Ockham proposed an externalist or an internalist view of the intentional contents of intuitive...
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  17. added 2018-12-21
    Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton.Susan Brower-Toland - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12:1-29.
    My aim in this paper is to advance our understanding of medieval approaches to consciousness by focusing on a particular but, as it seems to me, representative medieval debate. The debate in question is between William Ockham and Walter Chatton over the existence of what these two thinkers refer to as “reflexive intellective intuitive cognition”. Although framed in the technical terminology of late-medieval cognitive psychology, the basic question at issue between them is this: Does the mind (or “intellect”) cognize its (...)
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  18. added 2018-12-19
    Sartre: A Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness.Esteban Diego Ortiz Medina - 2018 - Humanities Journal of Valparaiso 11:115-137.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness from Sartre. For it I will clarify and show the closeness of two ideas. The first of these is the so-called self-representational theory of consciousness, which holds that a mental state is conscious if and only if it represents itself in the right way. The second of these are the descriptions of consciousness from Sartre, which say that all consciousness is self-consciousness of itself, or more precisely: (...)
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  19. added 2018-11-12
    The Simplicity of Self-Knowledge After Avicenna.Peter Adamson - 2018 - Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 28 (2):257-277.
    Alongside his much-discussed theory that humans are permanently, if only tacitly, self-aware, Avicenna proposed that in actively conscious self-knowers the subject and object of thought are identical. He applies to both humans and God the slogan that the self-knower is “intellect, intellecting, and object of intellection (‘aql, ‘āqil, ma‘qūl)”. This paper examines reactions to this idea in the Islamic East from the 12th-13th centuries. A wide range of philosophers such as Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Šahrastānī, Šaraf al-Dīn al-Mas‘ūdī, (...)
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  20. added 2018-11-12
    The Several Factors of Consciousness.David Woodruff Smith - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3):291-302.
    : In prior essays I have sketched a “modal model” of consciousness. That model “factors” out several distinct forms of awareness in the phenomenological structure of a typical act of consciousness. Here we consider implications of the model à propos of contemporary theories of consciousness. In particular, we distinguish phenomenality from other features of awareness in a conscious experience: “what it is like” to have an experience involves several different factors. Further, we should see these factors as typical of consciousness, (...)
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  21. added 2018-11-10
    Is Consciousness Reflexively Self‐Aware? A Buddhist Analysis.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):389-401.
    This article examines contemporary Buddhist defences of the idea that consciousness is reflexively aware or self-aware. Call this the Self-Awareness Thesis. A version of this thesis was historically defended by Dignāga but rejected by Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika Buddhists. Prāsaṅgikas historically advanced four main arguments against this thesis. In this paper I consider whether some contemporary defence of the Self-Awareness Thesis can withstand these Prāsaṅgika objections. A problem is that contemporary defenders of the Self-Awareness Thesis have subtly different accounts with different assessment (...)
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  22. added 2018-10-12
    The Pre-reflective Situational Self.Robert W. Clowes & Klaus Gärtner - 2018 - Topoi:1-15.
    It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role (...)
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  23. added 2018-10-04
    The Regress Objection to Reflexive Theories of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):293-308.
    According to a reflexive theory of consciousness, a person is in a conscious state only if they are conscious of, or aware of, being in the state. This paper reconsiders the well-known regress objection against theories of this sort, according to which they entail that if you are in one conscious state, you are in an infinity of such states. I distinguish two versions of the reflexive theory, a cognitive version and a phenomenal version, and argue that, while the cognitive (...)
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  24. added 2018-09-22
    Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2018 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of higher-order representational theories of consciousness. Representational theories of consciousness attempt to reduce consciousness to “mental representations” rather than directly to neural or other physical states. This approach has been fairly popular over the past few decades. Examples include first-order representationalism (FOR) which attempts to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of world-directed (or first-order) intentional states (Tye 2005) as well as several versions of higher-order representationalism (HOR) which holds that what makes a mental state M conscious is (...)
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  25. added 2018-09-17
    Brentano's Mind.Mark Textor - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Mark Textor presents a critical study of the work of Franz Brentano, one of the most important thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work has influenced analytic philosophers like Russell as well as phenomenologists like Husserl and Sartre, and continues to shape debates in the philosophy of mind. Brentano made intentionality a central topic in the philosophy of mind by proposing that 'directedness' is the distinctive feature of the mental. The first part of the book investigates Brentano's intentionalism as well (...)
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  26. added 2018-02-17
    A Cross-Order Integration Hypothesis for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):897-912.
    One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness, face is what we might call “the why question”: why would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the cross-order integration theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation (...)
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  27. added 2018-01-06
    Adverbial Account of Intransitive Self-Consciousness.Roberto Sá Pereira - 2015 - Abstracta 8 (2).
    This paper has two aims. First, it aims to provide an adverbial account of the idea of an intransitive self-consciousness and, second, it aims to argue in favor of this account. These aims both require a new framework that emerges from a critical review of Perry’s famous notion of the “unarticulated constituents” of propositional content. First, I aim to show that the idea of an intransitive self-consciousness can be phenomenologically described in an analogy with the adverbial theory of perception. In (...)
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  28. added 2018-01-06
    The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness. [REVIEW]William Seager - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):563-566.
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  29. added 2018-01-06
    Perceptual Consciousness and the Reflexive Character of Attention. Fern - 1999 - In Jos Falguera (ed.), La Filosof. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U..
  30. added 2018-01-06
    Perceptual Consciousness and the Reflexive Character of Attention.Olga Prat Fernández - 1999 - In La Filosofia Analitica En El Cambio de Milenio. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U.
  31. added 2018-01-06
    Sartre and Brentano on Consciousness:" Pre-Reflexive Cogito" and" Internal Consciousness".S. Sportelli - 1998 - Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 53 (3):495-521.
  32. added 2018-01-06
    Phenomenology and the Dialectic: A Study of Pre-Reflexive Consciousness in the Phenomenological Theories of Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.Richard Timothy Murphy - 1963 - Dissertation, Fordham University
  33. added 2017-10-09
    What Kind of Awareness is Awareness of Awareness?Michelle Montague - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):359-380.
    _ Source: _Volume 94, Issue 3, pp 359 - 380 In this paper the author discusses and defends a theory of consciousness inspired by Franz Brentano, according to which every conscious experience involves a certain kind of immediate awareness of itself. All conscious experience is in a certain fundamental sense ‘self-intimating’—it constitutively involves awareness of that very awareness. The author calls this ‘the awareness of awareness thesis’, and she calls the phenomenon that it concerns ‘awareness of awareness’. The author attempts (...)
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  34. added 2017-09-26
    Untersuchungen zum Problem der Evidenz der inneren Wahrnehmung.Hugo Bergmann - 1908 - Halle: Max Niemeyer.
  35. added 2017-09-11
    Self-Representationalism.Tom McClelland - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    To understand Self-Representationalism you need to understand its family. Self-Representationalism is a branch of the Meta-Representationalist family, and according to theories in this family what distinguishes conscious mental representations from unconscious mental representations is that conscious ones are themselves the target of a mental meta¬-representational state. A mental state M1 is thus phenomenally conscious in virtue of being suitably represented by some mental state M2. What distinguishes the Self-Representationalist branch of the family is the claim that M1 and M2 must (...)
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  36. added 2017-09-10
    Reflexive Theories of Consciousness and Unconscious Perception.Graham Peebles - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):25-43.
    A core commitment of the reflexive theory of consciousness is that conscious states are themselves necessarily the contents of mental states. The strongest argument for this claim—the necessity of inner-content for consciousness—is the argument from unconscious perception. According to this argument, we find evidence for the necessity claim from cases of alleged unconscious perception, the most well-known and widely discussed of these being blindsight. However, the reflexive theory cannot partake in this argument and therefore, must rely on at least one (...)
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  37. added 2017-09-10
    What is It to Be Aware of Your Awareness of Red? A Review Essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given.Giulia Martina & Simon Wimmer - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):992-1012.
    In this review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given we focus on the central thesis in the book: the awareness of awareness thesis. On that thesis, a state of awareness constitutively involves an awareness of itself. In Section 2, we discuss what the awareness of awareness thesis amounts to, how it contrasts with the transparency of experience, and how it might be motivated. In Section 3, we discuss one of Montague’s two theoretical arguments for the awareness of awareness thesis. A (...)
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  38. added 2017-09-10
    A Response to Martina and Wimmer’s Review of The Given.Michelle Montague - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):1013-1017.
    In this paper I respond to Martina and Wimmer’s review of The Given, focusing on their criticisms of the awareness of awareness thesis.
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  39. added 2017-05-11
    Dignāga's Argument for the Awareness Principle: An Analytic Refinement.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Philosophy East and West 69:144-156.
    Contemporary theories of consciousness can be divided along several major fault lines, but one of the most prominent concerns the question of whether they accept the principle that a mental state's being conscious involves essentially its subject being aware of it. Call this the awareness principle: For any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious only if S is aware of M. Although analytic philosophers divide sharply on whether to accept the principle, the philosophy-of-mind literature appears to (...)
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  40. added 2017-04-10
    The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What's at Stake in a Tibetan Debate?Jay L. Garfield - 2006 - Philosophy East and West 56 (2):201-228.
    ‘Ju Mipham Rinpoche, (1846-1912) an important figure in the _Ris med_, or non- sectarian movement influential in Tibet in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries, was an unusual scholar in that he was a prominent _Nying ma_ scholar and _rDzog_ _chen_ practitioner with a solid dGe lugs education. He took dGe lugs scholars like Tsong khapa and his followers seriously, appreciated their arguments and positions, but also sometimes took issue with them directly. In his commentary to Candrak¥rti’s _Madhyamakåvatåra, _Mi (...)
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  41. added 2017-03-04
    Mental Ownership and Higher Order Thought.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):496-501.
    Mental ownership concerns who experiences a mental state. According to David Rosenthal (2005: 342), the proper way to characterize mental ownership is: ‘being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. And being conscious of a state as belonging to somebody other than oneself would plainly not make it a conscious state’. In other words, if a mental state is consciously present to a subject in virtue of a higher-order thought (HOT), then the (...)
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  42. added 2017-02-17
    Self-Awareness (Svasaṃvedana) and Infinite Regresses: A Comparison of Arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.Birgit Kellner - 2011 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4-5):411-426.
    This paper compares and contrasts two infinite regress arguments against higher-order theories of consciousness that were put forward by the Buddhist epistemologists Dignāga (ca. 480–540 CE) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660). The two arguments differ considerably from each other, and they also differ from the infinite regress argument that scholars usually attribute to Dignāga or his followers. The analysis shows that the two philosophers, in these arguments, work with different assumptions for why an object-cognition must be cognised: for Dignāga it must (...)
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  43. added 2017-02-17
    Self-Awareness in Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya and -Vṛtti: A Close Reading.Birgit Kellner - 2010 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):203-231.
    The concept of “self-awareness” ( svasaṃvedana ) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and - vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the means (...)
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  44. added 2016-12-27
    Representation and Regress.Maiya Jordan - 2017 - Husserl Studies 33 (1):19-43.
    I defend a Husserlian account of self-consciousness against representationalist accounts: higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism. Of these, self-representationalism is the harder to refute since, unlike higher-order representationalism, it does not incur a regress of self-conscious acts. However, it incurs a regress of intentional contents. I consider, and reject, five strategies for avoiding this regress of contents. I conclude that the regress is inherent to self-representationalism. I close by showing how this incoherence obtrudes in what must be the self-representationalist’s account of the (...)
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  45. added 2016-12-12
    Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and (...)
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  46. added 2016-12-08
    Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? Uriah Kriegel offers an answer. His aim is a comprehensive theory of the features that all and only conscious mental events have. The key idea is that consciousness arises when self-awareness and world-awareness are integrated in the right way. Conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. (...)
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  47. added 2016-12-08
    Is There a Simple Argument for Higher-Order Representation Theories of Awareness Consciousness?Mikkel Gerken - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (2):243-259.
    William Lycan has articulated “a simple argument” for higher-order representation (HOR) theories of a variety of consciousness sometimes labeled ‘awareness consciousness’ (Lycan, Analysis 61.1, January 3–4, 2001). The purpose of this article is to critically assess the influential argument-strategy of the simple argument. I argue that, as stated, the simple argument fails since it is invalid. Moreover, I argue that an obvious “quick fix” would beg the question against competing same-order representation (SOR) theories of awareness consciousness. I then provide a (...)
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  48. added 2016-12-08
    Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Peter Carruthers's essays on consciousness and related issues have had a substantial impact on the field, and many of his best are now collected here in revised form. The first half of the volume is devoted to developing, elaborating, and defending against competitors one particular sort of reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness, which Carruthers now refers to as 'dual-content theory'. Phenomenal consciousness - the feel of experience - is supposed to constitute the 'hard problem' for a scientific world view, and (...)
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  49. added 2016-09-08
    Can Self-Representationalism Explain Away the Apparent Irreducibility of Consciousness?Tom McClelland - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1-22.
    Kriegel’s self-representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness pursues two projects. The first is to offer a positive account of how conscious experience arises from physical brain processes. The second is to explain why consciousness misleadingly appears to be irreducible to the physical i.e. to ‘demystify’ consciousness. This paper seeks to determine whether SR succeeds on the second project. Kriegel trades on a distinction between the subjective character and qualitative character of conscious states. Subjective character is the property of being a conscious (...)
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  50. added 2016-05-25
    Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):79-98.
    Brentano's theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of mind. Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano's theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano's theory, as interpreted here, a conscious experience of a tree is a mental state that can be simultaneously thought of, or framed, equally accurately as an awareness of a tree or an awareness of an awareness of (...)
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