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Summary According to Self-representational Theories of Consciousness, conscious mental states are conscious in virtue of representing themselves. This is taken by defenders to be an account of consciousness superior to that offered by other representational approaches, such as (first-order) representationalism and higher-order theories. According to representationalism, conscious states are conscious in virtue of representing the environment, whereas according to higher-order theories, they are conscious in virtue of being represented by numerically distinct higher-order states. Debates surrounding the self-representational theory concern mostly (i) what it means for a mental state to represent itself, and whether all conscious states in fact do; (ii) how self-representational theories fare in comparison to representational and higher-order theories; (iii) whether self-representational theories can help bridge the explanatory gap.
Key works A prominent early theory of consciousness in a self-representational vein is in Brentano 1874, though it has been argued that the theory goes back to Aristotle (see Caston 2002). In modern philosophy of mind, self-representation is prominently used as a central part of the account of consciousness first in Smith 1986. More recently, the theory has enjoyed something of a revival - see Kriegel & Williford 2006 and Kriegel 2009 for book-length treatments. Prominent critiques of the view include Levine 2006, Weisberg 2008, and Gennaro 2008.
Introductions For an early self-representational approach to consciousness, see Smith 1986. For the basic attraction of self-representational theories, see the introduction to Kriegel & Williford 2006. For discussion of some of the options for self-representational theories, see Kriegel 2005 and Kriegel 2006.
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  1. A Unified Theory of Consciousness.Andrew Brook & Paul Raymont - forthcoming - MIT Press.
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  2. Attentional Structuring, Subjectivity, and the Ubiquity of Reflexive Inner Awareness.Amit Chaturvedi - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Some have argued that a subject has an inner awareness of its conscious mental states by virtue of the non-introspective, reflexive awareness that any conscious state has of itself. But, what exactly is it like to have a ubiquitous and reflexive inner awareness of one’s conscious states, as distinct from one’s outer awareness of the apparent world? This essay derives a model of ubiquitous inner awareness (UIA) from Sebastian Watzl’s recent theory of attention as the activity of structuring consciousness into (...)
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  3. Whose Consciousness? Reflexivity and the Problem of Self-Knowledge.Christian Coseru - forthcoming - In Mark Siderits, Ching Keng & John Spackman (eds.), Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness Tradition and Dialogue. Leiden: pp. 121-153.
    If I am aware that p, say, that it is raining, is it the case that I must be aware that I am aware that p? Does introspective or object-awareness entail the apprehension of mental states as being of some kind or another: self-monitoring or intentional? That is, are cognitive events implicitly self-aware or is “self-awareness” just another term for metacognition? Not surprisingly, intuitions on the matter vary widely. This paper proposes a novel solution to this classical debate by reframing (...)
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  4. The Phenomenology of Mentality.Arnaud Dewalque - forthcoming - In Denis Fisette, Guillaume Frechette & Hynek Janoušek (eds.), Franz Brentano’s Philosophy after Hundred Years – From History of Philosophy to Reism. New York: Springer.
    This paper offers a phenomenological interpretation of Brentano’s view of mentality. The key idea is that mental phenomena are not only characterized by intentionality; they also exhibit a distinctive way of appearing or being experienced. In short, they also have a distinctive phenomenology. I argue this view may be traced back to Brentano’s theory of inner perception. Challenging the self-representational reading of IP, I maintain the latter is best understood as a way of appearing, that is, in phenomenological terms. Section (...)
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  5. A Defense of Inner Awareness: The Memory Argument Revisited.Anna Giustina - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    The psychological reality of an inner awareness built into conscious experience has traditionally been a central element of philosophy of consciousness, from Aristotle, to Descartes, Brentano, the phenomenological tradition, and early and contemporary analytic philosophy. Its existence, however, has recently been called into question, especially by defenders of so-called transparency of experience and first-order representationalists about phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I put forward a defense of inner awareness based on an argument from memory. Roughly, the idea is that since (...)
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  6. Comments on Denis Fisette, “Franz Brentano and Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness".Bruno Leclercq - forthcoming - Argumentos.
  7. Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness.Tom McClelland - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    To understand Self-Representationalism you need to understand its family. Self-Representationalism is a branch of the Meta-Representationalist family, and according to theories in this family what distinguishes conscious mental representations from unconscious mental representations is that conscious ones are themselves the target of a mental meta¬-representational state. A mental state M1 is thus phenomenally conscious in virtue of being suitably represented by some mental state M2. What distinguishes the Self-Representationalist branch of the family is the claim that M1 and M2 must (...)
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  8. Self-Representationalism.Tom McClelland - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    To understand Self-Representationalism you need to understand its family. Self-Representationalism is a branch of the Meta-Representationalist family, and according to theories in this family what distinguishes conscious mental representations from unconscious mental representations is that conscious ones are themselves the target of a mental meta¬-representational state. A mental state M1 is thus phenomenally conscious in virtue of being suitably represented by some mental state M2. What distinguishes the Self-Representationalist branch of the family is the claim that M1 and M2 must (...)
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  9. The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐Intentional Awareness.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The (...)
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  10. Is There a Persuasive Argument for an Inner Awareness Theory of Consciousness?Daniel Stoljar - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Abstract: According to (what I will call) an inner awareness theory of consciousness, you are in a (phenomenally) conscious state only if you are aware, in some sense, of your being in the state. This theory is widely held, but what arguments are there for holding it? In this paper, I gather together in a systematic way the main arguments for holding the theory and suggest that none of them is persuasive. I end the paper by asking what our attitude (...)
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  11. More of Me! Less of Me!: Reflexive Imperativism About Affective Phenomenal Character.Luca Barlassina & Max Khan Hayward - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1013-1044.
    Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive (...)
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  12. Does Inner Awareness Always Accompany Outer Awareness During Perception?Madhu Mangal Chaturvedi & A. V. Ravishankar Sarma - 2019 - Problemos 96.
    In the present paper, we defend the thesis that outer-world-directed perceptual consciousness is always accompanied by an inner awareness. This is contrary to the view that outer-world-directed conscious mental states are not accompanied by an inner awareness, which is held by Gennaro against Kriegel’s self-representationalism. We attempt to show why philosophers like Gennaro get it wrong when they deny the IAOA thesis by critically examining his arguments against it and by giving arguments in its favour.
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  13. From “Fichte’s Original Insight” to a Moderate Defence of Self-Representationalism.Manfred Frank - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:36-78.
    Fifty years ago, Dieter Henrich wrote an influential little text on ‘Fichte’s Origi­nal Insight’. Seldom so much food for thought has been put in a nutshell. The essay, bearing such an unremarkable title, delivers a diagnosis of why two hundred years of penetrating thought about the internal structure of subjectivity have ended up so fruitless. Henrich’s point was: Self-consciousness cannot be explained as the result of a higher-order act, bending back upon a first-order one, given that “what reflection finds, must (...)
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  14. Can We Reflexively Access the Contents of Our Own Perceptions? Ockham on the Reflexive Cognition of the Contents of Intuitions.Lydia Deni Gamboa - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (5):921-940.
    ABSTRACTIn the recent secondary literature on Ockham’s philosophy of mind, it has been debated whether Ockham proposed an externalist or an internalist view of the intentional contents of intuitive...
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  15. Dignāga's Argument for the Awareness Principle: An Analytic Refinement.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Philosophy East and West 69:144-156.
    Contemporary theories of consciousness can be divided along several major fault lines, but one of the most prominent concerns the question of whether they accept the principle that a mental state's being conscious involves essentially its subject being aware of it. Call this the awareness principle: For any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious only if S is aware of M. Although analytic philosophers divide sharply on whether to accept the principle, the philosophy-of-mind literature appears to (...)
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  16. Brentanian Inner Consciousness and the Infinite Regress Problem.Andrea Marchesi - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):129-147.
    By “Brentanian inner consciousness” I mean the conception of inner consciousness developed by Franz Brentano. The aim of this paper is threefold: first, to present Brentano’s account of inner consciousness; second, to discuss this account in light of the mereology outlined by Brentano himself; and third, to decide whether this account incurs an infinite regress. In this regard, I distinguish two kinds of infinite regress: external infinite regress and internal infinite regress. I contend that the most plausible reading of Brentano’s (...)
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  17. From Non-Self-Representationalism to the Social Structure of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness.Kristina Musholt - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:243-263.
    Why should we think that there is such a thing as pre-reflective self-awareness? And how is this kind of self-awareness to be characterized? This paper traces a theoretical and a phenomenological line of argument in favor of the notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness and explores how this notion can be further illuminated by appealing to recent work in the analytical philosophy of language and mind. In particular, it argues that the self is not represented in the content of experience, but is (...)
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  18. The Simplicity of Self-Knowledge After Avicenna.Peter Adamson - 2018 - Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 28 (2):257-277.
    Alongside his much-discussed theory that humans are permanently, if only tacitly, self-aware, Avicenna proposed that in actively conscious self-knowers the subject and object of thought are identical. He applies to both humans and God the slogan that the self-knower is “intellect, intellecting, and object of intellection (‘aql, ‘āqil, ma‘qūl)”. This paper examines reactions to this idea in the Islamic East from the 12th-13th centuries. A wide range of philosophers such as Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Šahrastānī, Šaraf al-Dīn al-Mas‘ūdī, (...)
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  19. Consciousness: Qualitative Character and Subject Aspect.Paul Bernier - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57:5-10.
    As it has been pointed out in the literature, a Theory of Consciousness should satisfy two desiderata: i) account for the particular qualitative character of any particular conscious state, and ii) account for the fact that a conscious state is conscious ‘for the subject’.. Many have claimed that the RepresentationaI Theory of Consciousness can satisfy the first desideratum. It obviously fails, however, to meet the second desideratum. Higher-Order Approaches to Consciouness satisfy the second desideratum straightforwardly, but it remains unclear whether (...)
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  20. The Pre-Reflective Situational Self.Robert W. Clowes & Klaus Gärtner - 2018 - Topoi 39 (3):623-637.
    It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role (...)
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  21. Is Consciousness Reflexively Self‐Aware? A Buddhist Analysis.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):389-401.
    This article examines contemporary Buddhist defences of the idea that consciousness is reflexively aware or self-aware. Call this the Self-Awareness Thesis. A version of this thesis was historically defended by Dignāga but rejected by Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika Buddhists. Prāsaṅgikas historically advanced four main arguments against this thesis. In this paper I consider whether some contemporary defence of the Self-Awareness Thesis can withstand these Prāsaṅgika objections. A problem is that contemporary defenders of the Self-Awareness Thesis have subtly different accounts with different assessment (...)
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  22. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2018 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of higher-order representational theories of consciousness. Representational theories of consciousness attempt to reduce consciousness to “mental representations” rather than directly to neural or other physical states. This approach has been fairly popular over the past few decades. Examples include first-order representationalism (FOR) which attempts to explain conscious experience primarily in terms of world-directed (or first-order) intentional states (Tye 2005) as well as several versions of higher-order representationalism (HOR) which holds that what makes a mental state M conscious is (...)
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  23. Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):79-98.
    Brentano's theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of mind. Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano's theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano's theory, as interpreted here, a conscious experience of a tree is a mental state that can be simultaneously thought of, or framed, equally accurately as an awareness of a tree or an awareness of an awareness of (...)
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  24. Sartre: A Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness.Esteban Diego Ortiz Medina - 2018 - Journal of Humanities of Valparaiso 11:115-137.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness from Sartre. For it I will clarify and show the closeness of two ideas. The first of these is the so-called self-representational theory of consciousness, which holds that a mental state is conscious if and only if it represents itself in the right way. The second of these are the descriptions of consciousness from Sartre, which say that all consciousness is self-consciousness of itself, or more precisely: (...)
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  25. Sartre: A Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness.Esteban Diego Ortiz Medina - 2018 - Humanities Journal of Valparaiso 11:115-137.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness from Sartre. For it I will clarify and show the closeness of two ideas. The first of these is the so-called self-representational theory of consciousness, which holds that a mental state is conscious if and only if it represents itself in the right way. The second of these are the descriptions of consciousness from Sartre, which say that all consciousness is self-consciousness of itself, or more precisely: (...)
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  26. Reflexive Theories of Consciousness and Unconscious Perception.Graham Peebles - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):25-43.
    A core commitment of the reflexive theory of consciousness is that conscious states are themselves necessarily the contents of mental states. The strongest argument for this claim—the necessity of inner-content for consciousness—is the argument from unconscious perception. According to this argument, we find evidence for the necessity claim from cases of alleged unconscious perception, the most well-known and widely discussed of these being blindsight. However, the reflexive theory cannot partake in this argument and therefore, must rely on at least one (...)
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  27. The Regress Objection to Reflexive Theories of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):293-308.
    According to a reflexive theory of consciousness, a person is in a conscious state only if they are conscious of, or aware of, being in the state. This paper reconsiders the well-known regress objection against theories of this sort, according to which they entail that if you are in one conscious state, you are in an infinity of such states. I distinguish two versions of the reflexive theory, a cognitive version and a phenomenal version, and argue that, while the cognitive (...)
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  28. Inner Awareness is Essential to Consciousness: A Buddhist-Abhidharma Perspective.Monima Chadha - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):83-101.
    This paper defends the realist representationalist version of the Buddhist-Abhidharma account of consciousness. The account explains the intentionality and the phenomenality of conscious experiences by appealing to the doctrine of self-awareness. Concerns raised by Buddhist Mādhyamika philosophers about the compatibility of reflexive awareness and externality of the objects of perception are addressed. Similarly, the Hindu critiques on the incoherence of the Buddhist doctrine of reflexive awareness with the doctrines of no-self and momentariness are also answered.
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  29. Fact-Introspection, Thing-Introspection, and Inner Awareness.Anna Giustina & Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):143-164.
    Phenomenal beliefs are beliefs about the phenomenal properties of one's concurrent conscious states. It is an article of common sense that such beliefs tend to be justified. Philosophers have been less convinced. It is sometimes claimed that phenomenal beliefs are not on the whole justified, on the grounds that they are typically based on introspection and introspection is often unreliable. Here we argue that such reasoning must guard against a potential conflation between two distinct introspective phenomena, which we call fact-introspection (...)
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  30. Representation and Regress.Maiya Jordan - 2017 - Husserl Studies 33 (1):19-43.
    I defend a Husserlian account of self-consciousness against representationalist accounts: higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism. Of these, self-representationalism is the harder to refute since, unlike higher-order representationalism, it does not incur a regress of self-conscious acts. However, it incurs a regress of intentional contents. I consider, and reject, five strategies for avoiding this regress of contents. I conclude that the regress is inherent to self-representationalism. I close by showing how this incoherence obtrudes in what must be the self-representationalist’s account of the (...)
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  31. What is It to Be Aware of Your Awareness of Red? A Review Essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given.Giulia Martina & Simon Wimmer - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):992-1012.
    In this review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given we focus on the central thesis in the book: the awareness of awareness thesis. On that thesis, a state of awareness constitutively involves an awareness of itself. In Section 2, we discuss what the awareness of awareness thesis amounts to, how it contrasts with the transparency of experience, and how it might be motivated. In Section 3, we discuss one of Montague’s two theoretical arguments for the awareness of awareness thesis. A (...)
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  32. A Response to Martina and Wimmer’s Review of The Given.Michelle Montague - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):1013-1017.
    In this paper I respond to Martina and Wimmer’s review of The Given, focusing on their criticisms of the awareness of awareness thesis.
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  33. What Kind of Awareness is Awareness of Awareness?Michelle Montague - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):359-380.
    _ Source: _Volume 94, Issue 3, pp 359 - 380 In this paper the author discusses and defends a theory of consciousness inspired by Franz Brentano, according to which every conscious experience involves a certain kind of immediate awareness of itself. All conscious experience is in a certain fundamental sense ‘self-intimating’—it constitutively involves awareness of that very awareness. The author calls this ‘the awareness of awareness thesis’, and she calls the phenomenon that it concerns ‘awareness of awareness’. The author attempts (...)
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  34. Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo sin saber que las creo.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Critica 49 (146):37-60.
    En un artículo publicado recientemente en esta revista, Javier Vidal argumenta que toda creencia de primera persona es una creencia consciente, una conclusión que pone en jaque ciertas teorías de la consciencia, como él mismo expone. El razonamiento de Vidal se basa en un argumento que muestra que uno conoce toda creencia de primera persona que tiene y en un principio que vincula conocimiento y consciencia. Mi objetivo en este trabajo es mostrar que el razonamiento de Vidal no es sólido. (...)
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  35. Brentano's Mind.Mark Textor - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Mark Textor presents a critical study of the work of Franz Brentano, one of the most important thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work has influenced analytic philosophers like Russell as well as phenomenologists like Husserl and Sartre, and continues to shape debates in the philosophy of mind. Brentano made intentionality a central topic in the philosophy of mind by proposing that 'directedness' is the distinctive feature of the mental. The first part of the book investigates Brentano's intentionalism as well (...)
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  36. Brentano on Consciousness.Mark Textor - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 49-60.
    Consider a perceptual activity such as seeing a colour, hearing a tone, tasting a flavour. How are these activities related to one’s awareness of them? I will use Brentano’s struggle with this question to guide the reader through the development of his view on consciousness. My starting point will be Brentano’s book Die Psychologie des Aristoteles (Brentano 1867), in which he developed an inner sense view of consciousness (§§1-2). Brentano’s early view is underexplored in the literature, but crucial for understanding (...)
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  37. Can Self-Representationalism Explain Away the Apparent Irreducibility of Consciousness?Tom McClelland - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1-22.
    Kriegel’s self-representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness pursues two projects. The first is to offer a positive account of how conscious experience arises from physical brain processes. The second is to explain why consciousness misleadingly appears to be irreducible to the physical i.e. to ‘demystify’ consciousness. This paper seeks to determine whether SR succeeds on the second project. Kriegel trades on a distinction between the subjective character and qualitative character of conscious states. Subjective character is the property of being a conscious (...)
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  38. The Several Factors of Consciousness.David Woodruff Smith - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (3):291-302.
    : In prior essays I have sketched a “modal model” of consciousness. That model “factors” out several distinct forms of awareness in the phenomenological structure of a typical act of consciousness. Here we consider implications of the model à propos of contemporary theories of consciousness. In particular, we distinguish phenomenality from other features of awareness in a conscious experience: “what it is like” to have an experience involves several different factors. Further, we should see these factors as typical of consciousness, (...)
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  39. Dignāga on Reflexive Awareness.Paul Bernier - 2015 - Philosophy East and West 65 (1):125-156.
  40. Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54.
    According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the (...)
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  41. Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory.Sam Coleman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.
    Due to their reliance on constitutive higher-order representing to generate the qualities of which the subject is consciously aware, I argue that the major existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness insulate us from our first-order sensory states. In fact on these views we are never properly conscious of our sensory states at all. In their place I offer a new higher-order theory of consciousness, with a view to making us suitably intimate with our sensory states in experience. This theory relies (...)
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  42. The 'Of' of Intentionality and the 'Of' of Acquaintance.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2015 - In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Morando (eds.), Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 317-341.
    I first provide some background on Sartre’s theory of consciousness and prereflective self-awareness, especially with respect to how it might be favorably compared to my own version of HOT theory. I then critically examine a few initial attempts to understand the ‘acquaintance’ relation and to link it with Sartre’s notion of prereflective self-awareness. I then briefly address a related problem often raised against HOT theory, namely, the problem of misrepresentation. I also critique several further attempts to explain the acquaintance relation (...)
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  43. Franz Brentano Était-Il Cartésien ? L’Interprétation D’Ordre Supérieur de la Psychologie Descriptive.Maxime Julien - 2015 - Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 11.
    Dans son ouvrage Consciousness and Mind, David Rosenthal propose une interprétation originale de la psychologie descriptive de Brentano qui mène directement à une théorie d’ordre supérieur de la con- science. Rosenthal défend lui-même une version particulière de théorie d’ordre supérieur, selon laquelle, un état mental est « conscient » s’il est accompagné par une pensée distincte qui le représente. Dans cette théorie fonctionnaliste de l’esprit, la conscience est une relation intentionnelle entre deux états d’ordre ou de niveau différent. La question (...)
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  44. The Idols of Inner-Sense.Chad Kidd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1759-1782.
    Many philosophers hold one of two extreme views about our capacity to have phenomenally conscious experience : either that inner-sense enables us to know our experience and its properties infallibly or the contrary conviction that inner-sense is utterly fallible and the evidence it provides completely defeasible. Both of these are in error. This paper presents an alternative conception of inner-sense, modeled on disjunctive conceptions of perceptual awareness, that avoids both erroneous extremes, but that builds on the commonsense intuitions that motivate (...)
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  45. Self, Belonging, and Conscious Experience: A Critique of Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Timothy Lane - 2015 - In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 103-140.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been made to explain seemingly (...)
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  46. Reflexivity, Subjectivity, and the Constructed Self: A Buddhist Model.Matthew MacKenzie - 2015 - Asian Philosophy 25 (3):275-292.
    The aim of this article is to take up three closely connected questions. First, does consciousness essentially involve subjectivity? Second, what is the connection, if any, between pre-reflective self-consciousness and subjectivity? And, third, does consciousness necessarily involve an ego or self? I will draw on the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka synthesis of Śāntarakṣita to develop an account of the relation between consciousness, subjectivity, and the self. I will argue, first, that phenomenal consciousness is reflexive or self-illuminating. Second, I will argue that consciousness necessarily (...)
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  47. Affording Introspection: An Alternative Model of Inner Awareness.Tom McClelland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2469-2492.
    The ubiquity of inner awareness thesis states that all conscious states of normal adult humans are characterised by an inner awareness of that very state. UIA-Backers support this thesis while UIA-Skeptics reject it. At the heart of their dispute is a recalcitrant phenomenological disagreement. UIA-Backers claim that phenomenological investigation reveals ‘peripheral inner awareness’ to be a constant presence in their non-introspective experiences. UIA-Skeptics deny that their non-introspective experiences are characterised by inner awareness, and maintain that inner awareness is only gained (...)
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  48. Adverbial Account of Intransitive Self-Consciousness.Roberto Sá Pereira - 2015 - Abstracta 8 (2).
    This paper has two aims. First, it aims to provide an adverbial account of the idea of an intransitive self-consciousness and, second, it aims to argue in favor of this account. These aims both require a new framework that emerges from a critical review of Perry’s famous notion of the “unarticulated constituents” of propositional content. First, I aim to show that the idea of an intransitive self-consciousness can be phenomenologically described in an analogy with the adverbial theory of perception. In (...)
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  49. "Inner Perception Can Never Become Inner Observation”: Brentano on Awareness and Observation.Mark Textor - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Self-representational theories of consciousness hold that a mental phenomenon is conscious if, and only if, it presents, among other things, itself. But in conscious perception one may lose oneself in the object perceived and not be aware of one’s perceiving. The paper develops a Brentano-inspired response to this objection. He follows Aristotle in holding that one is aware of one’s perceiving only ‘on the side’: when one perceives something one’s perception neither is nor can become observation of itself. I argue (...)
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  50. Diversité du représentationnalisme de la conscience.Paul Bernier - 2014 - Philosophiques 41 (1):37-56.
    Paul Bernier | : Cet article discute de diverses versions du représentationnalisme de la conscience. L’objectif principal est de défendre une interprétation de la théorie auto-représentationnelle de la conscience (TARC) selon laquelle le contenu d’un état mental conscient serait une proposition de re qui est constituée, en partie, par l’état mental conscient lui-même. Je souligne d’abord certains problèmes importants auxquels est confrontée une des théories de la conscience les plus influentes, soit la théorie représentationnelle de la conscience (TRC) et soutiens (...)
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