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  1. Realism, Anti-Realism, and Absolute Idealism.James W. Allard - 2007 - In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court. pp. 31--127.
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  2. Realism and Antirealism.William P. Alston (ed.) - 2002 - Cornell Up.
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  3. Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology.William P. Alston, Roderick M. Chisholm, Donald Davidson, Gilbert Harman, Richard Rorty & John R. Searle - 1997 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    This landmark collection of essays by six renowned philosophers explores the implications of the contentious realism/antirealism debate for epistemology. The essays examine issues such as whether epistemology needs to be realist, the bearing of a realist conception of truth on epistemology, and realism and antirealism in terms of a pragmatist conception of epistemic justification. Richard Rorty's essay provides a critical commentary on the other five.
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  4. Why God is Not a Semantic Realist.D. L. Anderson - 2002 - In William P. Alston (ed.), Realism and Antirealism. Cornell Up. pp. 131--48.
    Traditional theists are, with few exceptions, global semantic realists about the interpretation of external world statement. Realism of this kind is treated by many as a shibboleth of traditional Christianity, a sine qua non of theological orthodoxy. Yet, this love affair between theists and semantic realism is a poor match. I suggest that everyone (theist or no) has compelling evidence drawn from everyday linguistic practice to reject a realist interpretation of most external world statements. But theists have further reason to (...)
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  5. Consciousness and Realism.David Leech Anderson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):1-17.
    There is a long and storied history of debates over 'realism' that has touched literally every academic discipline. Yet realism- antirealism debates play a relatively minor role in the contemporary study of consciousness. In this paper four basic varieties of realism and antirealism are explored and their potential impact on the study of consciousness is considered. Reasons are offered to explain why there is not more debate over these issues, including a discussion of the powerful influence of externalist versions of (...)
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  6. A Dogma of Metaphysical Realism.David Leech Anderson - 1995 - American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1):1-11.
    There is a dogma about metaphysical realism that is well nigh universal: "If one is a metaphysical realist about the external world, then one ought to be a semantic realist about external- world statements". I argue that this dogma should be rejected. It is possible for a metaphysical realist to be a "semantic dualist", holding that some middle- sized object statements receive a realist interpretation, but that most such statements require an antirealist interpretation. To show that a semantically dual language (...)
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  7. The Realism-Idealism Debate: Theoretical and Practical.David Leech Anderson - 1987 - Dissertation, Harvard University
    The thesis of this dissertation is that "the realism-idealism debate" is both a theoretical and a practical dispute. The practical dimension has been largely ignored because the deficiencies in the theoretical positions have gone unnoticed. As theoretical doctrines, realism and idealism are best interpreted as semantic theories specifying the conditions in virtue of which our statements are true and false. As semantic doctrines, however, both realism and idealism are false. Neither semantic theory is consistent with other philosophical positions to which (...)
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  8. Semantic Challenges to Scientific Realism.Holger Andreas - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):17 - 31.
    This paper is concerned with connections between scientific and metaphysical realism. It is not difficult to show that scientific realism, as expounded by Psillos (1999) clearly qualifies as a kind of metaphysical realism in the sense of Putnam (1980). The statement of scientific realism therefore must not only deal with underdetermination and the dynamics of scientific theories but also answer the semantic challenges to metaphysical realism. As will be argued, the common core of these challenges is the proposition that a (...)
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  9. For Truth in Semantics.Anthony Appiah - 1986 - Blackwell.
  10. Realism, Meaning and Truth.Nicholas Asher & Crispin Wright - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (1):107.
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  11. What is Realism?: Michael Ayres.Michael Ayres - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):91–110.
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  12. Barry Taylor, Ed., Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy Reviewed By.Kent Bach - 1990 - Philosophy in Review 10 (4):160-162.
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  13. Putnam on Truth: Metaphysical Realism Vs. Kantian Constructivism.Ann Michelle Baker - 1990 - Dissertation, University of Washington
    This dissertation concerns Putnam's objections to the realist conception of truth and his alternative, "internal realist," conception. I evaluate two main kinds of argument that Putnam advances against the realist conception of truth. First, the realist conception requires that we are talking about a kind of world we could never, according to Putnam, be talking about, namely a world that exists in itself, independent of minds. He argues that our powers of representation could never establish the right kind of connection (...)
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  14. Anti-Realism and Speaker Knowledge.Dorit Bar-On - 1996 - Synthese 106 (2):139 - 166.
    Dummettian anti-realism repudiates the realist's notion of verification-transcendent truth. Perhaps the most crucial element in the Dummettian attack on realist truth is the critique of so-called realist semantics, which assigns verification-transcendent truth-conditions as the meanings of (some) sentences. The Dummettian critique charges that realist semantics cannot serve as an adequate theory of meaning for a natural language, and that, consequently, the realist conception of truth must be rejected as well. In arguing for this, Dummett and his followers have appealed to (...)
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  15. Semantic Verificationism, Linguistic Behaviorism, and Translation.Dorit Bar-On - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 66 (3):235 - 259.
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  16. Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth.James Beebe - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.
    In order to shed light on the question of whether reliabilism entails or excludes certain kinds of truth theories, I examine two arguments that purport to establish that reliabilism cannot be combined with antirealist and epistemic theories of truth. I take antirealism about truth to be the denial of the recognition-transcendence of truth, and epistemic theories to be those that identify truth with some kind of positive epistemic status. According to one argument, reliabilism and antirealism are incompatible because the former (...)
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  17. Dummett on Semantic Anti-Realism: A Critique.S. Behera - 1998 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1):67-78.
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  18. Dummett, Realism and Other Minds.Akeel Bilgrami - 1994 - In Brian McGuiness & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 205--228.
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  19. Anti-Anti-Realism.Roman Bonzon - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (2):141 - 169.
    Realism figures in current debates as the view that knowledge of the meanings of statements concerning a particular subject matter requires knowledge of their truth conditions, regarded as possibly transcending verification. Appealing to Wittgenstein's dictum that meaning is use, Michael Dummett has influentially argued that realistically-conceived truth conditions can play no role in an account of linguistic understanding. The present essay argues that, when such truth conditions are correctly understood, it will be seen that they are in fact indispensable to (...)
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  20. Respecting Realism.Roman Alfonso Ma Peregrino Bonzon - 1989 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    A dominant concern of contemporary philosophy has been the debate between the realist and his critic, a debate that has been conducted both on a broad front in the philosophy of language, and in such local theatres as the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of science, and moral theory. The dissertation is mainly concerned to evaluate the influential general argument put forward by Michael Dummett against a particular conception of realism, the argument which prompted the modern version of the debate (...)
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  21. Principle Of Sufficient Reason In The Context Of The Realism–Antirealism Semantic Controversy.Jarosław Boruszewski - 2013 - Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 8 (1):7-23.
    The topic of this article is the cognitive and semantic status of Michael Dummett’s principle C. According to the principle, if a statement is true, there must be something in virtue of which it is true. The author suggests the interpretation of principle C in terms of the sufficient reason principle as a contemporary, weaker and semantic counterpart of the classical version of the principle. Considerations include such problems as: the distinction between the reason-consequence relationship and cause-effect relationship; the reductionism (...)
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  22. Could Aquinas Reject Semantic Realism? Reply to de Anna.Stephen J. Boulter - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):515-518.
  23. Could Aquinas Accept Semantic Anti-Realism?Stephen J. Boulter - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):504-513.
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  24. Antirealism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):123–139.
    In his presidential address to the APA, ‘‘How to be an Anti-realist’’ (1982, 64–66), Alvin Plantinga argues that the only sensible way to be an antirealist is to be a theist.1 Anti-realism (AR) in this context is the epistemic analysis of truth that says, (AR) necessarily, a statement is true if and only if it would be believed by an ideally [or sufficiently] rational agent/community in ideal [or sufficiently good] epistemic circumstances. Plantinga demonstrates, with modest modal resources, that AR entails (...)
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  25. Von einem realistischen Standpunkt. [REVIEW]Alex Burri - 1995 - Erkenntnis 42 (3):403-404.
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  26. Gardiner on Anti-Realism: A Defence of Dummett.Darragh Byrne - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (01):3-.
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  27. Ruling-Out Realism.Peter Carruthers - 1985 - Philosophia 15 (1-2):61-78.
    The case for anti-realism in the theory of meaning, as presented by Dummen and Wright, 1 is only partly convincing. There is, I shall suggest, a crucial lacuna in the argument, that can only be filled by the later Wittgenstein's following-a-rule considerations. So it is the latter that provides the strongest argument for the rejection of semantic realism.
    By 'realism', throughout, I should be taken as referring to any conception of meaning that leaves open the possibility that a sentence may have (...)
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  28. Realism, Meaning and Truth.Quassim Cassam - 1989 - Philosophical Books 30 (1):10-16.
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  29. Memory and the Concept of Time.Hoerl Christoph - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. London: Routledge. pp. 207-218.
    According to what I term the Dependency Thesis, the ability to grasp the concept of the past depends on possession of episodic memory, i.e., the capacity to recollect particular past events. I consider two questions regarding the Dependency Thesis. First, suppose the Dependency Thesis is true. How exactly should we think of the role that episodic memory plays in grasp of the concept of the past? Secondly, is the Dependency Thesis actually true?
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  30. Devitt's Realism and Truth.Cleve James Van - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):657-663.
  31. Realism and Epistemic Theories of Truth.Damian Cox - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):473-486.
    This paper explores the relation between epistemic conceptions of truth and different kinds of commitment to realism and antirealism. It argues that all epistemic conceptions of truth are versions of antirealism. Although epistemic conceptions of truth can make various concessions to realist intuition, these remain concessions only. One cannot concede all claims to antirealism and remain within the orbit of a genuinely epistemic conception of truth.
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  32. Introduzione a Dummett.Cesare Cozzo - 2008 - Laterza.
    This is an introduction to Michael Dummett’s philosophy. Unlike other books on Dummett, this work considers the historical development of his philosophical thought: 1) Dummett in Oxford in the Fifties; 2) the discovery of Frege and the context principle; 3) a critique of realism in 1959; 4) theories of meaning; 5) truth-conditional, realist theories of meaning; 6) justificationist theories of meaning; 7) philosophy of time; 8) philosophy, science and religion; 9) Chronology of life and work; 10) History of the reception (...)
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  33. Epistemic Truth and Excluded Middle.Cesare Cozzo - 1998 - Theoria 64 (2-3):243-282.
    Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemic conception of truth and the principle of excluded middle. In PART II I give a historical overview of different attitudes regarding the problem. In PART III I sketch a possible holistic solution.
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  34. Concepts and Reality: An Examination of Realism.Margaret Ann Crouch - 1985 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    The issue of realism has been with us, in various forms, since at least the time of Plato. The dispute between realists and their opponents is currently attracting a considerable amount of attention in the philosophical community. However, there is often a lack of clarity in discussions of the dispute. This is due, in part, to the many ways in which the dispute and the positions involved are characterized. ;The dissertation seeks to understand the precise nature of the dispute between (...)
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  35. On the Road to Antirealism.Gregory Currie - 1993 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):465 – 483.
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  36. Horwich on 'Semantic' and 'Metaphysical' Realism.David Davies - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (4):539-557.
    Horwich argues that we should reject metaphysical realism, but that we can preserve semantic realism by adhering to a redundancy theory of truth and a confirmationist account of linguistic understanding. But the latter will give us semantic realism only if it allows that the truth-values of sentences may transcend our recognitional capacities, and this is possible only insofar as we covertly reintroduce metaphysical realism. In spite of its intuitive appeal, we should not endorse semantic realism, but this need not bear (...)
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  37. Two Kinds of Mental Realism.Tamás Demeter - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):59-71.
    I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse as the central component (...)
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  38. Against Crude Semantic Realism?Florian Demont - 2010 - ILLC Technical Notes (X) Series.
  39. Buying Logical Principles with Ontological Coin: The Metaphysical Lessons of Adding Epsilon to Intuitionistic Logic.David DeVidi & Corey Mulvihill - 2017 - IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications 4 (2):287-312.
    Hilbert’s choice operators τ and ε, when added to intuitionistic logic, strengthen it. In the presence of certain extensionality axioms they produce classical logic, while in the presence of weaker decidability conditions for terms they produce various superintuitionistic intermediate logics. In this thesis, I argue that there are important philosophical lessons to be learned from these results. To make the case, I begin with a historical discussion situating the development of Hilbert’s operators in relation to his evolving program in the (...)
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  40. Realism and Truth.Michael Devitt - 1991 - Blackwell.
  41. Dummett's Anti-Realism.Michael Devitt - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):73-99.
    Devitt (1983) "Dummett's Anti-Realism".
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  42. Truth and the Past.Michael Dummett - 2004 - Columbia University Press.
    In "Truth and the Past, " Dummett, best known as a proponent of antirealism, clarifies his current positions on the metaphysical issue of realism and the ...
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  43. Language and Truth.Michael Dummett - 1983 - In Roy Harris (ed.), Approaches to Language. Pergamon Press.
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  44. Realism.Michael Dummett - 1982 - Synthese 52 (1):145--165.
    Realism concerning a given subject-matter is characterised as a semantic doctrine with metaphysical consequences, namely as the adoption, for the relevant class of statements, of a truth-conditional theory of meaning resting upon the classical two-valued semantics. it is argued that any departure from classical semantics may, though will not necessarily, be seen as in conflict with some variety of realism. a sharp distinction is drawn between the rejection of realism and the acceptance of a reductionist thesis; though intimately related, neither (...)
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  45. Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.
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  46. The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
    Such a conception, says Dummett, will form "a base camp for an assault on the metaphysical peaks: I have no greater ambition in this book than to set up a base ...
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  47. Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael A. E. Dummett - 1978 - Harvard University Press.
  48. What is a Theory of Meaning?Michael A. E. Dummett - 1975 - In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press.
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  49. Anti-Realist Truth and Concepts of Superassertibility.Jim Edwards - 1996 - Synthese 109 (1):103 - 120.
    Crispin Wright offers superassertibility as an anti-realist explication of truth. A statement is superassertible, roughly, if there is a state of information available which warrants it and it is warranted by all achievable enlargements of that state of information. However, it is argued, Wright fails to take account of the fact that many of our test procedures are not sure fire, even when applied under ideal conditions. An alternative conception of superassertibility is constructed to take this feature into account. However, (...)
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  50. Book Review. Realism and Antirealism. William Alston. [REVIEW]Matti Eklund - 2005 - Dialogue 44:786-88.
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