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  1. How to Solve the Knowability Paradox with Transcendental Epistemology.Andrew Stephenson - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
    A novel solution to the knowability paradox is proposed based on Kant’s transcendental epistemology. The ‘paradox’ refers to a simple argument from the moderate claim that all truths are knowable to the extreme claim that all truths are known. It is significant because anti-realists have wanted to maintain knowability but reject omniscience. The core of the proposed solution is to concede realism about epistemic statements while maintaining anti-realism about non-epistemic statements. Transcendental epistemology supports such a view by providing for a (...)
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  2. Ernst Mach’ın Anti-Realizminin Fenomenalist Temeli ve Öznel İdealist Sonucu: Mach Solipsist Bir Düşünür Olabilir Mi?Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı - 2020 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):469-487.
    This article initially presents Ernst Mach's anti-realist or instrumentalist stance that underpin his opposition to atomism and reveal his idea that science should be based totally on objectively observable facts. Then, the details of Mach's phenomenalist arguments which recognize only sensations as real are revealed. Phenomenalist thought is not compatible with the idea of realism, which evaluates unobservable entities such as atom, molecule and quark as mind-independent things. In this context, Mach considers the atom as a thought symbol or a (...)
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  3. The Manifestation Challenge: The Debate Between McDowell and Wright.Ali Hossein Khani & Saeedeh Shahmir - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 12 (24): 287-306.
    In this paper, we will discuss what is called the “Manifestation Challenge” to semantic realism, which was originally developed by Michael Dummett and has been further refined by Crispin Wright. According to this challenge, semantic realism has to meet the requirement that knowledge of meaning must be publically manifested in linguistic behaviour. In this regard, we will introduce and evaluate John McDowell’s response to this anti-realistic challenge, which was put forward to show that the challenge cannot undermine realism. According to (...)
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  4. Elements of Contextual Realism.Francois-Igor Pris - 2018 - Lambert.
  5. Memory and the Concept of Time.Hoerl Christoph - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. London: Routledge. pp. 207-218.
    According to what I term the Dependency Thesis, the ability to grasp the concept of the past depends on possession of episodic memory, i.e., the capacity to recollect particular past events. I consider two questions regarding the Dependency Thesis. First, suppose the Dependency Thesis is true. How exactly should we think of the role that episodic memory plays in grasp of the concept of the past? Secondly, is the Dependency Thesis actually true?
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  6. Buying Logical Principles with Ontological Coin: The Metaphysical Lessons of Adding Epsilon to Intuitionistic Logic.David DeVidi & Corey Mulvihill - 2017 - IfCoLog Journal of Logics and Their Applications 4 (2):287-312.
    We discuss the philosophical implications of formal results showing the con- sequences of adding the epsilon operator to intuitionistic predicate logic. These results are related to Diaconescu’s theorem, a result originating in topos theory that, translated to constructive set theory, says that the axiom of choice (an “existence principle”) implies the law of excluded middle (which purports to be a logical principle). As a logical choice principle, epsilon allows us to translate that result to a logical setting, where one can (...)
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  7. Autologos. Ein Dialog über die Fundamentallogik.Gregor Damschen - 2015 - In Gregor Damschen & Alejandro G. Vigo (eds.), Dialog und Verstehen. Klassische und moderne Perspektiven. Berlin: Lit. pp. 229–244.
    Autologos. A dialogue on fundamental logic. - In this dialogue of three dialogue partners, an attempt is made to prove the logical prerequisites of any meaningful dialogue by using transcendental arguments. Among these inescapable logical premises are a semantics as strong as that of modal logic S5, and an epistemic anti-realism.
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  8. Mental Language in Aquinas?Joshua P. Hochschild - 2015 - In Gyula Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy. New York: Fordham University. pp. 29-45.
    Ockham is usually considered the first to hold a proper theory of mental language, but Aquinas is willing to call the concept, or the act of intellect by which something is understood, a verbum mentis or “mental word.” This essay explores the sense in which Aquinas regarded concepts as language-like. It argues that Aquinas's understanding of concepts and their objects meant that his application of syntactic and semantic analysis to them did not and could not lead in the direction of (...)
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  9. What is Wrong with Classical Negation?Nils Kürbis - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92 (1):51-86.
    The focus of this paper are Dummett's meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett's outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular, I (...)
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  10. Davidson’s Antirealism?Alexander Miller & Ali Hossein Khani - 2015 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 27 (40):265.
    Frederic Stoutland (1982a, 1982b) has argued that a Davidsonian theory of meaning is incompatible with a realist view of truth, on which the truth-conditions of sentences consist of mind-independent states of affairs or concatenations of extra-linguistic objects. In this paper we show that Stoutland’s argument is a failure.
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  11. Review of Michael Devitt's Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. [REVIEW]Jussi Suikkanen - 2015 - Mind 124 (493):327-331.
    This is a review of Michael Devitt's collection of previously published articles entitled Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. The review also suggests a new way of formulation the realism/anti-realism contrast on the basis of Devitt's work. This contrast is understood in terms explanatory priority: should we in a given domain begin our theorizing from metaphysics (realism) or semantics (anti-realism)?
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  12. Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy: The Semantic Approach.Patrick Girard & Luca Moretti - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):761-783.
    The expression conditional fallacy identifies a family of arguments deemed to entail odd and false consequences for notions defined in terms of counterfactuals. The antirealist notion of truth is typically defined in terms of what a rational enquirer or a community of rational enquirers would believe if they were suitably informed. This notion is deemed to entail, via the conditional fallacy, odd and false propositions, for example that there necessarily exists a rational enquirer. If these consequences do indeed follow from (...)
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  13. Realism: Metaphysical, Scientific, and Semantic.Panu Raatikainen - 2014 - In Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.), Realism, Science, and Pragmatism. Routledge. pp. 139-158.
    Three influential forms of realism are distinguished and interrelated: realism about the external world, construed as a metaphysical doctrine; scientific realism about non-observable entities postulated in science; and semantic realism as defined by Dummett. Metaphysical realism about everyday physical objects is contrasted with idealism and phenomenalism, and several potent arguments against these latter views are reviewed. -/- Three forms of scientific realism are then distinguished: (i) scientific theories and their existence postulates should be taken literally; (ii) the existence of unobservable (...)
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  14. Wahrheit, Bedeutung und Glaube.Gäb Sebastian - 2014 - Münster: Mentis.
    Two theses are defended: First, that realism is a semantic thesis; second, that religious language ought to be interpreted realistically. The first part from chapter 1 to 4 is concerned with the first thesis, the second part from chapter 5 to 6 with the second. I first give an overview on the subject of realism and antirealism explaining the core problem of the debate that any satisfying interpretation of realism should be able to solve. Then I develop a solution based (...)
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  15. Semantic Antirealism: Last Gasp.Gerald Vision - 2014 - In Javier Cumpa, Greg Jesson & Guido Bonino (eds.), Defending Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Investigations. De Gruyter. pp. 323-340.
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  16. Principle Of Sufficient Reason In The Context Of The Realism–Antirealism Semantic Controversy.Jarosław Boruszewski - 2013 - Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 8 (1):7-23.
    The topic of this article is the cognitive and semantic status of Michael Dummett’s principle C. According to the principle, if a statement is true, there must be something in virtue of which it is true. The author suggests the interpretation of principle C in terms of the sufficient reason principle as a contemporary, weaker and semantic counterpart of the classical version of the principle. Considerations include such problems as: the distinction between the reason-consequence relationship and cause-effect relationship; the reductionism (...)
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  17. Arguments in Favour of Global Antirealism.Stanisław Judycki - 2013 - Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 8.
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  18. How Fundamental is the Fundamental Assumption?Nils Kurbis - 2012 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):5-19.
    The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ project of (...)
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  19. Manifestability and Epistemic Truth.Julien Murzi - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):17-26.
    I argue that the standard anti-realist argument from manifestability to intuitionistic logic is either unsound or invalid. Strong interpretations of the manifestability of understanding are falsified by the existence of blindspots for knowledge. Weaker interpretations are either too weak, or gerrymandered and ad hoc. Either way, they present no threat to classical logic.
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  20. Truth as an Epistemic Notion.Dag Prawitz - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):9-16.
    What is the appropriate notion of truth for sentences whose meanings are understood in epistemic terms such as proof or ground for an assertion? It seems that the truth of such sentences has to be identified with the existence of proofs or grounds, and the main issue is whether this existence is to be understood in a temporal sense as meaning that we have actually found a proof or a ground, or if it could be taken in an abstract, tenseless (...)
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  21. Semantic Challenges to Scientific Realism.Holger Andreas - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):17 - 31.
    This paper is concerned with connections between scientific and metaphysical realism. It is not difficult to show that scientific realism, as expounded by Psillos (1999) clearly qualifies as a kind of metaphysical realism in the sense of Putnam (1980). The statement of scientific realism therefore must not only deal with underdetermination and the dynamics of scientific theories but also answer the semantic challenges to metaphysical realism. As will be argued, the common core of these challenges is the proposition that a (...)
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  22. Mind-Independence and the Logical Space of Wright's Realist-Relevant Axes.Deborah C. Smith - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):164-191.
    This paper continues the work begun by Crispin Wright of identifying, articulating, and explaining the relations between various realist-relevant axes that emerge when it is conceded that any predicate capable of satisfying a small range of platitudes is syntactically and semantically adequate to count as a truth predicate for a discourse. I argue that the fact that a given discourse satisfies the three realist-relevant axes that remain if evidence-transcendent truth and reference to evidence-transcendent facts are ruled out by Dummettian meaning-theoretic (...)
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  23. Closure on Knowability.Mark Jago - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):648-659.
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  24. Arguments For Global Antirealism.Stanisław Judycki - 2010 - Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 5 (2):17-32.
    The paper is an analysis of main arguments for the so-called global antirealism. The arguments assume that: conformity of opinion, actual or potential, in all domains of discourse does not exist; for this reason objectivity must be interpreted as intersubjectivity; different conceptual schemes are employed to interpret different kinds of data, correspondence theory of truth has to be replaced by means of the so called epistemic theory of truth. The arguments assume also the verificationist theory of meaning and the possibility (...)
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  25. On Michael Dummett’s Anti-realism and Verificationist View. (In Persian).Ali Hossein Khani - 2010 - Metaphysik 2 (7):63-78.
  26. Davidson's View of Meaning and Dummett's Objections to It. (In Persian).Ali Hossein Khani - 2010 - Methodology of Social Science and Humanities Journal 16 (64-65):211-236.
  27. Two Directions for Analytic Kantianism : Naturalism and Idealism.Paul Redding - 2010 - In Mario de Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism and Normativity. Columbia University Press.
    Usually, analytic philosophy is thought of as standing firmly within the tradition of empiricism, but recently attention has been drawn to the strongly Kantian features that have characterized this philosophical movement throughout a considerable part of its history. Those charting the history of early analytic philosophy sometimes point to a more Kantian stream of thought feeding it from both Frege and Wittgenstein, and as countering a quite different stream flowing from the early Russell and Moore. In line with this general (...)
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  28. Two Kinds of Mental Realism.Tamás Demeter - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):59-71.
    I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse as the central component (...)
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  29. Against Crude Semantic Realism.Florian Demont - 2009 - ILLC Technical Notes (X) Series.
  30. The Main Challenges between Dummett and McDowell: On Theories of Meaning and Adequate Descriptions of Speakers' Linguistic Behaviour. (In Persian).Ali Hossein Khani - 2009 - Nameh-YE-Mofid Journal 5 (2):109-126.
    بررسی اصلی‌ترین چالش‌های میان دامت و مک داول در باب نظریة معنا و توصیف مناسب رفتار زبانی .
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  31. The Semantic Realism/Anti-Realism Dispute and Knowledge of Meanings.Panu Raatikainen - 2009 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:1-13.
    Here the relationship between understanding and knowledge of meaning is discussed from two different perspectives: that of Dummettian semantic anti-realism and that of the semantic externalism of Putnam and others. The question addressed is whether or not the truth of semantic externalism would undermine a central premise in one of Dummetts key arguments for anti-realism, insofar as Dummetts premise involves an assumption about the transparency of meaning and semantic externalism is often taken to undermine such transparency. Several notions of transparency (...)
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  32. Introduzione a Dummett.Cesare Cozzo - 2008 - Roma-Bari (Italy): Laterza.
    This is an introduction to Michael Dummett’s philosophy. Unlike other books on Dummett, this work considers the historical development of his philosophical thought: 1) Dummett in Oxford in the Fifties; 2) the discovery of Frege and the context principle; 3) a critique of realism in 1959; 4) theories of meaning; 5) truth-conditional, realist theories of meaning; 6) justificationist theories of meaning; 7) philosophy of time; 8) philosophy, science and religion; 9) Chronology of life and work; 10) History of the reception (...)
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  33. What is at Issue Between Epistemic and Traditional Accounts of Truth?John Fox - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):407 – 420.
    I will discuss those epistemic accounts of truth that say, roughly and at least, that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe. They have been defended on the grounds that they can solve sceptical problems that traditional accounts cannot surmount, and that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional (and particularly, minimal) accounts cannot; they have been attacked on the grounds that they collapse into idealism. (...)
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  34. How Basic is the Basic Revisionary Argument?Luca Incurvati & Julien Murzi - 2008 - Analysis 68 (4):303-309.
    Anti-realists typically contend that truth is epistemically constrained. Truth, they say, cannot outstrip our capacity to know. Some anti-realists are also willing to make a further claim: if truth is epistemically constrained, classical logic is to be given up in favour of intuitionistic logic. Here we shall be concerned with one argument in support of this thesis - Crispin Wright's Basic Revisionary Argument, first presented in his Truth and Objectivity. We argue that the reasoning involved in the argument, if correct, (...)
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  35. Semantic Challenges to Realism.Drew Khlentzos - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  36. Realism.Alexander Miller - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  37. Brogaard and Salerno on Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy.Luca Moretti - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):229 - 246.
    Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno's argument relies on a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, "Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association", 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, "Nous," 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting (...)
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  38. Dummett and the Problem of the Vanishing Past.Luca Moretti - 2008 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 7:37-47.
    Dummett has recently presented his most mature and sophisticated version of justificationism, i.e. the view that meaning and truth are to be analysed in terms of justifiability. In this paper, I argue that this conception does not resolve a difficulty that also affected Dummett’s earlier version of justificationism: the problem that large tracts of the past continuously vanish as their traces in the present dissipate. Since Dummett’s justificationism is essentially based on the assumption that the speaker has limited (i.e. non-idealized) (...)
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  39. Review: The Anti-Realist's Past. [REVIEW]Sanford Shieh - 2008 - History and Theory 47 (2):270-278.
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  40. Two-Dimensional Truth.Wolfgang Spohn - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):194-207.
    The paper identifies two major strands of truth theories, ontological and epistemological ones, and argues that both are of equal primacy and find their home within two-dimensional semantics. Contrary to received views, it argues further that epistemological truth theories operate on Lewisian possible worlds and ontological truth theories on Wittgensteinian possible worlds and that both are mediated by the so-called epistemic-ontic map the further specification of which is of utmost philosophical importance.
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  41. Truth, Meaning and Realism - by A.C. Grayling.Graham Stevens - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (3):269-270.
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  42. Realism, Anti-Realism, and Absolute Idealism.James W. Allard - 2007 - In R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Open Court. pp. 31--127.
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  43. Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth.James Beebe - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.
    In order to shed light on the question of whether reliabilism entails or excludes certain kinds of truth theories, I examine two arguments that purport to establish that reliabilism cannot be combined with antirealist and epistemic theories of truth. I take antirealism about truth to be the denial of the recognition-transcendence of truth, and epistemic theories to be those that identify truth with some kind of positive epistemic status. According to one argument, reliabilism and antirealism are incompatible because the former (...)
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  44. Truth, Meaning and Realism.A. C. Grayling - 2007 - Continuum.
    The ten essays gathered together in this book treat of truth, meaning, realism, natural kind terms, and related topics. Almost all began life as invited contributions to conferences. From the Preface we learn that Grayling, in contrast to those colleagues whose perfectionism leads them to publish too little, preferred to ‘venture ideas as if they were letters to friends’. The style could hardly be called epistolary, however; a high level of generality is maintained throughout, and there is much plotting of (...)
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  45. Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright’s Antirealist.Deborah C. Smith - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):129-139.
    In _Truth and Objectivity_, Crispin Wright argues that the notion of superassertibility affords the antirealist (with respect to a given range of discourse) a viable alternative to the realist’s more robust notion of truth. Toward this end, he endeavors to prove that a superassertibility predicate can satisfy the traditional equivalence schema: it is true that P iff P. (Wright takes satisfaction of this schema to be a criterion of adequacy for any viable truth predicate.) In this paper, I will argue (...)
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  46. Realism and Antirealism.Alexander Miller - 2006 - In Barry C. Smith (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 983.
    This article questions whether, once the conception of metaphysics as grounded in the philosophy of language has been jettisoned, Dummett's arguments against semantic realism can retain any relevance to the realist/antirealist debate. By focussing on realism about the external world as an example, it reaches the conclusion that even without Dummett's conception of philosophy as grounded in the theory of meaning, his arguments against semantic realism do retain a limited but nevertheless genuine significance for the metaphysical debate. It emerges, though, (...)
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  47. Fitch's Paradox and the Problem of Shared Content.Thorsten Sander - 2006 - Abstracta 3 (1):74-86.
    According to the “paradox of knowability”, the moderate thesis that all truths are knowable – ... – implies the seemingly preposterous claim that all truths are actually known – ... –, i.e. that we are omniscient. If Fitch’s argument were successful, it would amount to a knockdown rebuttal of anti-realism by reductio. In the paper I defend the nowadays rather neglected strategy of intuitionistic revisionism. Employing only intuitionistically acceptable rules of inference, the conclusion of the argument is, firstly, not ..., (...)
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  48. Models, Truth, and Realism.Barry Taylor - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    Barry Taylor's book mounts a major new argument against one of the fundamental tenets of much contemporary philosophy, the idea that we can make sense of reality as existing objectively, independently of our capacities to come to know it. He concludes that there is no defensible notion of truth which preserves the theses of traditional realism, nor any extant position sufficiently true to the ideals of that doctrine to inherit its title. In presenting his case Taylor engages with many key (...)
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  49. Antirealism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):123–139.
    In his presidential address to the APA, ‘‘How to be an Anti-realist’’ (1982, 64–66), Alvin Plantinga argues that the only sensible way to be an antirealist is to be a theist.1 Anti-realism (AR) in this context is the epistemic analysis of truth that says, (AR) necessarily, a statement is true if and only if it would be believed by an ideally [or sufficiently] rational agent/community in ideal [or sufficiently good] epistemic circumstances. Plantinga demonstrates, with modest modal resources, that AR entails (...)
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  50. Realism and Antirealism Edited by William P. Alston Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002, Viii + 303 Pp. [REVIEW]Matti Eklund - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (4):786-788.
1 — 50 / 191