Sensation and Perception

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. La Base de la Sensación, La Actividad de Los Órganos de Los Sentidos.E. D. Adrian - 1949 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 5 (2):239-240.
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  2. The Site of Affect in Husserl's Phenomenology: Sensations and the Constitution of the Lived Body.Alia Al-Saji - 2000 - Philosophy Today 44 (Supplement):51-59.
  3. The Subjectivity of Sensation.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1974 - Ajatus 36:3-18.
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  4. The Origins of the Sensation/Perception Distinction.Margaret Atherton - 2002 - In Dieter Heyer & Rainer Mausfeld (eds.), Perception and the Physical World. Wiley. pp. 1--19.
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  5. A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure.Murat Aydede - forthcoming - In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. Oxford University Press.
    [This is the penultimate version, please send me an email for the final version]. Some sensations are pleasant, some unpleasant, and some are neither. Furthermore, those that are pleasant or unpleasant are so to different degrees. In this essay, I want to explore what kind of a difference is the difference between these three kinds of sensations. I will develop a comprehensive three-level account of sensory pleasure that is simultaneously adverbialist, functionalist and is also a version of a satisfied experiential-desire (...)
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  6. Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - forthcoming - In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Nature of Pain.
    Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, critically (...)
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  7. Talking About Sensations.Winston H. F. Barnes - 1953 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 54:261-278.
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  8. Foundations for a Presentative Theory of Perception and Sensation.Charles A. Baylis - 1965 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:41-54.
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  9. The Passivity Assumption of the Sensation-Perception Distinction.Aaron Ben-Zeev - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (December):327-343.
    The sensation-perception distinction did not appear before the seventeenth century, but since then various formulations of it have gained wide acceptance. This is not an historical accident and the article suggests an explanation for its appearance. Section 1 describes a basic assumption underlying the sensation-perception distinction, to wit, the postulation of a pure sensory stage--viz. sensation--devoid of active influence of the agent's cognitive, emotional, and evaluative frameworks. These frameworks are passive in that stage. I call this postulation the passivity assumption. (...)
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  10. The Landscape of Sensation.Ronald Bogue - 2009 - In Eugene W. Holland, Daniel W. Smith & Charles J. Stivale (eds.), Gilles Deleuze: Image and Text. Continuum.
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  11. A Study in Deflated Acquaintance Knowledge: Sense-Datum Theory and Perceptual Constancy.Derek H. Brown - 2016 - In Sorin Costreie (ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy: New Perspectives on the Tradition. Springer. pp. 99-125.
    We perceive the objective world through a subjective perceptual veil. Various perceived properties, particularly “secondary qualities” like colours and tastes, are mind-dependent. Although mind-dependent, our knowledge of many facts about the perceptual veil is immediate and secure. These are well-known facets of sense-datum theory. My aim is to carve out a conception of sense-datum theory that does not require the immediate and secure knowledge of a wealth of facts about experienced sense-data (§1). Such a theory is of value on its (...)
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  12. Wittgenstein on Sensuous Experiences.Malcolm Budd - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):174-195.
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  13. The Nature of Sensations in Reid.Todd Buras - 2005 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (3):221 - 238.
    For Reid, sensations do not enter into the analysis of perception proper. Instead they “intervene” between the effects of bodily qualities on our sense organs and our perception of those qualities (Inq VI xxi, 174).1 The question addressed in this essay is: What sort of thing does Reid take this interloper to be?2 The answer defended is that sensations are reflexive mental acts, i.e., acts which take themselves as objects.
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  14. Descartes on Sensation: A Defense of the Semantic-Causation Model.Andrew Chignell - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9 (5):1-22.
    Descartes's lack of clarity about the causal connections between brain states and mental states has led many commentators to conclude that he has no coherent account of body-mind relations in sensation, or that he was simply confused about the issue. In this paper I develop what I take to be a coherent account that was available to Descartes, and argue that there are both textual and systematic reasons to think that it was his considered view. The account has brain states (...)
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  15. Criterion of Truth.Joseph M. Christianson - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Research 23:353-398.
    This article may be of significant interest to those who may want to reconsider Aristotelian principles in the light of the philosophy of science---i. e. , the Aristotelian Thomistic philosophy of sensation as harmonizable with recent findings in the physics/chemistry/physiology of sensation, especially in correlation with research in colorimetry and spectrophotometry. Primarily metaphysical and epistemological in orientation, this paper makes a case for “methodological realism”---viz. , how evidence may be grasped, judged, and interpreted in a way that recognizes extemal sense (...)
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  16. Sensory and Perceptual Consciousness.Austen Clark - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
    Asked on the Dick Cavett show about her former Stalinist comrade Lillian Hellman, Mary McCarthy replied, "Every word she says is a lie, including 'and' and 'the'." The language used to describe sensory and perceptual consciousness is worthy of about the same level of trust. One must adapt oneself to the fact that every ordinary word used to describe this domain is ambiguous; that different theoreticians use the same words in very different ways; and that every speaker naturally thinks that (...)
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  17. Thomas Reid on Aesthetic Perception.Rebecca Copenhaver - 2015 - In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value.
  18. Thomas Reid on Acquired Perception.Rebecca Copenhaver - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):285-312.
    Thomas Reid's distinction between original and acquired perception is not merely metaphysical; it has psychological and phenomenological stories to tell. Psychologically, acquired perception provides increased sensitivity to features in the environment. Phenomenologically, Reid's theory resists the notion that original perception is exhaustive of perceptual experience. James Van Cleve has argued that most cases of acquired perception do not count as perception and so do not pose a threat to Reid's direct realism. I argue that acquired perception is genuine perception and (...)
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  19. Analysis And Metaphysics.James W. Cornman - 1975 - Reidel.
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  20. Chisholm on Sensing and Perceiving.James W. Cornman - 1975 - In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Analysis And Metaphysics. Reidel. pp. 11--33.
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  21. A Question About Sensations.David J. Crossley - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (June):355-360.
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  22. A Physical Theory of Sensation.James T. Culbertson - 1942 - Philosophy of Science 9 (April):197-226.
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  23. Pappas on the Role of Sensations in Reid's Theory of Perception.Phillip D. Cummins - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):755-762.
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  24. Definition of "Sensation".William L. Davidson - 1881 - Mind 6 (24):551-557.
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  25. Sensation and Perception. I: The Genetic Relationship.Grace A. de Laguna - 1916 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (20):533-547.
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  26. Sensation and Perception II: The Analytic Relation.Grace A. de Laguna - 1916 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (23):617-630.
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  27. The Method of Contrast and the Perception of Causality in Audition.E. Di Bona - 2014 - In Fabio Bacchini at al (ed.), New Advances in Causation, Agency and Moral Responsibility. pp. 79-93.
  28. Some Considerations on Pitch.E. Di Bona - 2013 - Phenomenology and Mind 4:244-54.
    Pitch is an audible quality of sound which can be explained not only in terms of strong correlation with sound waves’ properties, but also by a neat correlation to the properties of the sounding object. This seems to be in favour of the theory of sound labelled “distal view”, according to which sound is the vibration of the sounding object.
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  29. Sensation and Perception.F. Dretske - 1988 - In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
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  30. Essays on Nonconceptual Content.Fred Dretske - 2003 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
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  31. Sensation and Perception (1981).Fred Dretske - 2003 - In Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
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  32. Thomas Reid's Theory of Sensation.Timothy J. Duggan - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (1):90-100.
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  33. Could Sensation Be a Bodily Act?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    Hylomorphists claim that sensation is a bodily act. In this essay, I attempt to make sense of this notion but conclude that sensation is not a bodily act, but a mental one occurring in an intentional field of awareness.
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  34. Wittgenstein on Sensation and 'Seeing-As'.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 1984 - Synthese 60 (September):349-368.
    This essay begins by providing a new account of wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein's rejection of a "cartesian" account of mind is examined, And it is argued that this rejection carries no commitment to behaviorism, Or to the view that sensation terms have public meanings and private references. Part ii of the essay attempts to forge a link between the two parts of the "philosophical investigations", By arguing that wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing-As" reinforces and illuminates his account of how sensation (...)
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  35. On Some Alleged Distinctions Between Thought and Feeling.Richard C. Flint - 1877 - Mind 2 (5):112-118.
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  36. The Ontology of Some Afterimages.Bryan Frances - forthcoming - In Manuel Curado & Steven Gouvei (eds.), Untitled Philosophy of Mind Book.
    A good portion of the work in the ontology of color focuses on color properties, trying to figure out how they are related to more straightforwardly physical properties. Another focus is realism: are ordinary material objects such as pumpkins really colored? A third emphasis is the nature of what is referred to by the terms ‘what it’s like’ or ‘phenomenal character’, as applied to color. In contrast, this essay is exclusively about select color tokens. I will be arguing that whether (...)
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  37. Why Afterimages Are Metaphysically Mysterious.Bryan Frances - forthcoming - Think.
    A short essay for a popular audience on why afterimages are difficult to fit into any ontology.
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  38. The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science.Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.) - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    Cognitive science is a cross-disciplinary enterprise devoted to understanding the nature of the mind. In recent years, investigators in philosophy, psychology, the neurosciences, artificial intelligence, and a host of other disciplines have come to appreciate how much they can learn from one another about the various dimensions of cognition. The result has been the emergence of one of the most exciting and fruitful areas of inter-disciplinary research in the history of science. This volume of original essays surveys foundational, theoretical, and (...)
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  39. Reid and Condillac on Sensation and Perception.Giovanni B. Grandi - 2008 - Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):191-200.
    In order to illustrate the difference between sensation and perception, Reid imagines a blind man that by ‘some strange distemper’ has lost all his notions of external objects, but has retained the power of sensation and reasoning. Reid argues that since sensations do not resemble external objects, the blind man could not possibly infer from them any notion of primary qualities. Condillac proposed a similar thought experiment in the Treatise on Sensations. I argue that Condillac can reach a conclusion opposite (...)
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  40. Reid's Direct Realism About Vision.Giovanni B. Grandi - 2006 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (3):225 - 241.
    Thomas Reid presented a two-dimensional geometry of the visual field in his Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764). The axioms of this geometry are different from those of Euclidean plane geometry. The ‘geometry of visibles’ is the same as the geometry of the surface of the sphere, described without reference to points and lines outside the surface itself. In a recent article, James Van Cleve has argued that Reid can secure a non-Euclidean geometry of visibles only at the cost of (...)
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  41. Psychological Findings and Sensory Experience.A. P. Greenway - 1973 - International Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1):99-110.
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  42. The Passage From Stimulus to Sensation.Edmund Gurney - 1882 - Mind 7 (26):295-298.
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  43. The Elusive Illusion of Sensation.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):662-663.
    The sensation of will is not the same thing as the will itself any more than the sensation of hunger is the same thing as being devoid of nutrients. This is not a really surprising claim, but it is the only claim to which Wegner is entitled in his book.
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  44. Sensation and Perception. By D. W. Hamlyn. International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961. Pp. Xi+210. Price 25s.). [REVIEW]Jonathan Harrison - 1963 - Philosophy 38 (144):190.
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  45. Sensation in Psychology and Philosophy.Charles Hartshorne - 1963 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):3-14.
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  46. Activity and Passivity in Theories of Perception: Descartes to Kant.Gary Hatfield - 2014 - In José Filipe Silva & Mikko Yrjönsuuri (eds.), Active Perception in the History of Philosophy: From Plato to Modern Philosophy. Springer. pp. 275–89.
    In the early modern period, many authors held that sensation or sensory reception is in some way passive and that perception is in some way active. The notion of a more passive and a more active aspect of perception is already present in Aristotle: the senses receive forms without matter more or less passively, but the “primary sense” also recognizes the salience of present objects. Ibn al-Haytham distinguished “pure sensation” from other aspects of sense perception, achieved by “discernment, inference and (...)
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  47. Love in the Time of Cholera.Benj Hellie - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press. pp. 241–261.
    We begin with a theory of the structure of sensory consciousness; a target phenomenon of 'presentation' can be clearly located within this structure. We then defend the rational-psychological necessity of presentation. We conclude with discussion of these philosophical challenges to the possibility of presentation. One crucial aspect of the discussion is recognition of the <cite>nonobjectivity</cite> of consciousness (a technical appendix explains what I mean by that). The other is a full-faced stare at the limitations of rational psychology: much of the (...)
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  48. Stimulus, Sensation, and Meaning.Glenn D. Higginson - 1935 - Journal of Philosophy 32 (24):645-650.
    We can find no place in psychology for the concept of stimulus as a physical agent to which an individual responds in a psychological manner. Moreover, we can find no place for sensation and image when considered as simple mental elements. We would also purge ...
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  49. This is Visual Sensation.J. Michael Hinton - 1974 - In Wisdom: Twelve Essays. Blackwell.
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  50. XI—Writing on the Page of Consciousness.Christoph Hoerl - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):187-209.
    I identify one particular strand of thought in Thomas Nagel's ‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’, which I think has helped shape a certain conception of perceptual consciousness that is still prevalent in the literature. On this conception, perceptual consciousness is to be explained in terms of a special class of properties perceptual experiences themselves exhibit. I also argue that this conception is in fact in conflict with one of the key ideas that supposedly animates Nagel's argument in (...)
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