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  1. added 2020-09-24
    The Gödel Incompleteness Theorems (1931) by the Axiom of Choice.Vasil Penchev - 2020 - Econometrics: Mathematical Methods and Programming eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 13 (39):1-4.
    Those incompleteness theorems mean the relation of (Peano) arithmetic and (ZFC) set theory, or philosophically, the relation of arithmetical finiteness and actual infinity. The same is managed in the framework of set theory by the axiom of choice (respectively, by the equivalent well-ordering "theorem'). One may discuss that incompleteness form the viewpoint of set theory by the axiom of choice rather than the usual viewpoint meant in the proof of theorems. The logical corollaries from that "nonstandard" viewpoint the relation of (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-15
    Теоремата на Мартин Льоб във философска интерпретация.Vasil Penchev - 2011 - Philosophical Alternatives 20 (4):142-152.
    А necessary and sllmcient condilion that а given proposition (о Ье provable in such а theory that allows (о Ье assigned to the proposition а Gödеl пunbег fог containing Реanо arithmetic is that Gödеl number itself. This is tlle sense о[ Martin LöЬ's theorem (1955). Now wе сan рut several philosophpllical questions. Is the Gödеl numbег of а propositional formula necessarily finite or onthe contrary? What would the Gödel number of а theorem be containing Реanо arithmetic itself? That is the (...)
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  3. added 2020-06-14
    Неразрешимост на първата теорема за непълнотата. Гьоделова и Хилбертова математика.Vasil Penchev - 2010 - Philosophical Alternatives 19 (5):104-119.
    Can the so-ca\led first incompleteness theorem refer to itself? Many or maybe even all the paradoxes in mathematics are connected with some kind of self-reference. Gбdel built his proof on the ground of self-reference: а statement which claims its unprovabllity. So, he demonstrated that undecidaЬle propositions exist in any enough rich axiomatics (i.e. such one which contains Peano arithmetic in some sense). What about the decidabllity of the very first incompleteness theorem? We can display that it fulfills its conditions. That's (...)
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  4. added 2020-05-28
    A New Reading and Comparative Interpretation of Gödel’s Completeness (1930) and Incompleteness (1931) Theorems.Vasil Penchev - 2016 - Логико-Философские Штудии 13 (2):187-188.
    Peano arithmetic cannot serve as the ground of mathematics for it is inconsistent to infinity, and infinity is necessary for its foundation. Though Peano arithmetic cannot be complemented by any axiom of infinity, there exists at least one (logical) axiomatics consistent to infinity. That is nothing else than a new reading at issue and comparative interpretation of Gödel’s papers (1930; 1931) meant here. Peano arithmetic admits anyway generalizations consistent to infinity and thus to some addable axiom(s) of infinity. The most (...)
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  5. added 2016-12-08
    Abstraction Reconceived.J. P. Studd - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2):579-615.
    Neologicists have sought to ground mathematical knowledge in abstraction. One especially obstinate problem for this account is the bad company problem. The leading neologicist strategy for resolving this problem is to attempt to sift the good abstraction principles from the bad. This response faces a dilemma: the system of ‘good’ abstraction principles either falls foul of the Scylla of inconsistency or the Charybdis of being unable to recover a modest portion of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with its intended generality. This article (...)
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  6. added 2016-12-08
    A Note on Induction, Abstraction, and Dedekind-Finiteness.G. Aldo Antonelli - 2012 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 53 (2):187-192.
    The purpose of this note is to present a simplification of the system of arithmetical axioms given in previous work; specifically, it is shown how the induction principle can in fact be obtained from the remaining axioms, without the need of explicit postulation. The argument might be of more general interest, beyond the specifics of the proposed axiomatization, as it highlights the interaction of the notion of Dedekind-finiteness and the induction principle.
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  7. added 2016-03-22
    Against Limitation of Size.Øystein Linnebo - 2005 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1.
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  8. added 2015-09-09
    Extensionalizing Intensional Second-Order Logic.Jonathan Payne - 2015 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 56 (1):243-261.
    Neo-Fregean approaches to set theory, following Frege, have it that sets are the extensions of concepts, where concepts are the values of second-order variables. The idea is that, given a second-order entity $X$, there may be an object $\varepsilon X$, which is the extension of X. Other writers have also claimed a similar relationship between second-order logic and set theory, where sets arise from pluralities. This paper considers two interpretations of second-order logic—as being either extensional or intensional—and whether either is (...)
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  9. added 2014-04-02
    Second Order Logic or Set Theory?Jouko Väänänen - 2012 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):91-121.
    We try to answer the question which is the “right” foundation of mathematics, second order logic or set theory. Since the former is usually thought of as a formal language and the latter as a first order theory, we have to rephrase the question. We formulate what we call the second order view and a competing set theory view, and then discuss the merits of both views. On the surface these two views seem to be in manifest conflict with each (...)
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  10. added 2014-03-29
    Abstractionist Class Theory : Is There Any Such Thing?Michael Potter - 2010 - In T. J. Smiley, Jonathan Lear & Alex Oliver (eds.), The Force of Argument: Essays in Honor of Timothy Smiley. Routledge.
    A discussion of the philosophical prospects for basing a neo-Fregean theory of classes on a principle that attempts to articulate the limitation-of-size conception.
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  11. added 2014-03-20
    Julius Caesar and Basic Law V.Richard G. Heck - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (2):161–178.
    This paper dates from about 1994: I rediscovered it on my hard drive in the spring of 2002. It represents an early attempt to explore the connections between the Julius Caesar problem and Frege's attitude towards Basic Law V. Most of the issues discussed here are ones treated rather differently in my more recent papers "The Julius Caesar Objection" and "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I 10". But the treatment here is more accessible, in many ways, providing more context and a better (...)
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  12. added 2012-12-24
    Higher-Order Logic or Set Theory: A False Dilemma.S. Shapiro - 2012 - Philosophia Mathematica 20 (3):305-323.
    The purpose of this article is show that second-order logic, as understood through standard semantics, is intimately bound up with set theory, or some other general theory of interpretations, structures, or whatever. Contra Quine, this does not disqualify second-order logic from its role in foundational studies. To wax Quinean, why should there be a sharp border separating mathematics from logic, especially the logic of mathematics?
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  13. added 2012-10-18
    To Be or to Be Not, That is the Dilemma.Juan José Luetich - 2012 - Identification Transactions of The Luventicus Academy (ISSN 1666-7581) 1 (1):4.
    A set is precisely defined. A given element either belongs or not to a set. However, since all of the elements being considered belong to the universe, if the element does not belong to the set, it belongs to its complement, that is, what remains after all of the elements from the set are removed from the universe.
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  14. added 2012-01-12
    How Set Theory Impinges on Logic.Jesus Mosterin - unknown
    Standard (classical) logic is not independent of set theory. Which formulas are valid in logic depends on which sets we assume to exist in our set-theoretical universe. Second-order logic is just set theory in disguise. The typically logical notions of validity and consequence are not well defined in second-order logic, at least as long as there are open issues in set theory. Such contentious issues in set theory as the axiom of choice, the continuum hypothesis or the existence of inaccessible (...)
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