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  1. added 2019-01-10
    Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles About Material Objects.Bradley Rettler - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Mereological nihilism is the view that no objects have proper parts. Despite how counter‐intuitive it is, it is taken quite seriously, largely because it solves a number of puzzles in the metaphysics of material objects – or so its proponents claim. In this article, I show that for every puzzle that mereological nihilism solves, there is a similar puzzle that (a) it doesn’t solve, and (b) every other solution to the original puzzle does solve. Since the solutions to the new (...)
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  2. added 2018-10-22
    Natural Properties, Supervenience, and Mereology.Andrea Borghini & Giorgio Lando - 2011 - Humana Mente 4 (19).
    The interpretation of Lewis‘s doctrine of natural properties is difficult and controversial, especially when it comes to the bearers of natural properties. According to the prevailing reading – the minimalist view – perfectly natural properties pertain to the micro-physical realm and are instantiated by entities without proper parts or point-like. This paper argues that there are reasons internal to a broadly Lewisian kind of metaphysics to think that the minimalist view is fundamentally flawed and that a liberal view, according to (...)
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  3. added 2018-09-06
    What is an Ersatz Part?Kristie Miller & Johann Hariman - forthcoming - New Content is Available for Grazer Philosophische Studien.
    This paper develops four proposals for explicating the notion of an ersatz part. It then evaluates each proposal with respect to a number of jobs for which ersatz parts are posited. We argue that each of the four notions of ersatz parthood do better with respect to some jobs, and worse with respect to others. Thus, we think, it’s horses for courses: which notion of ersatz part one chooses will be sensitive to which metaphysical project one is pursuing.
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  4. added 2018-06-05
    Why Simples?: A Reply to Donald Rutherford.Samuel Levey - 2008 - The Leibniz Review 18:225-247.
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  5. added 2017-10-18
    Quantum Holism: Reconciling Extended Simples with Supersubstantivalism.Gaeun Kim - manuscript
    I argue that the extended simples picture (ESP) is compatible with supersubstantivalism under the quantum holism model, and that reevaluating our limits on the ways an object may be located by fusing the two ontologies can benefit our understanding of modern physics. I first illustrate the explanatory utility of extended simples, using examples of superposition and entanglement. Second, I advocate the use of supersubstantivalism as a way to understand the interface between objects and spacetime, and argue that the ESP suitably (...)
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  6. added 2017-10-17
    Composition and Relative Counting.Massimiliano Carrara & Giorgio Lando - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (4):489-529.
    According to the so-called strong variant of Composition as Identity (CAI), the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals can be extended to composition, by resorting to broadly Fregean relativizations of cardinality ascriptions. In this paper we analyze various ways in which this relativization could be achieved. According to one broad variety of relativization, cardinality ascriptions are about objects, while concepts occupy an additional argument place. It should be possible to paraphrase the cardinality ascriptions in plural logic and, as a consequence, relative (...)
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  7. added 2017-06-14
    Enduring Through Gunk.Matt Leonard - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):753-771.
    According to one of the more popular endurantist packages on the market, a package I will call multilocational endurantism, enduring objects are exactly located at multiple instantaneous regions of spacetime. However, for all we know, the world might turn out to be spatiotemporally gunky and spatiotemporal gunk entails that this package is false. The goal of this paper is to sketch a view which retains the spirit of multilocational endurantism while also recognizing the possibility of certain types of objects which (...)
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  8. added 2017-03-04
    Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?Kristie Miller - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):619-646.
    This paper presents the strongest version of a non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism: a theory according to which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in space-time, but not in virtue of having maximal temporal parts. The aims of considering such a view are twofold. First, to evaluate whether such an account could provide a plausible middle ground between the two main competitor accounts of persistence: three-dimensionalism and perdurantist four-dimensionalism. Second, to see what light such a theory sheds on the debate between these two competitor (...)
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  9. added 2017-02-08
    Simples, Stuff, and Simple People.Ned Markosian - 2004 - The Monist 87 (3):405-428.
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  10. added 2017-01-29
    Geração Simples E Matéria Prima Em G.C. I.David Charles & Luis Fontes - 2003 - Cadernos de História E Filosofia da Ciência 13 (2).
    At the end of I.3, 319a29ff, Aristotle asks a series of questions. This difficult and condensed passage, whose translation is controversial at some points, raises two questions: what is what is not without qualification? and is the matter of earth and fire the same or different? In this essay, I shall focus on the second question.
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  11. added 2017-01-28
    À Propos De La Liberté Du Théologien. Simples Réflexions.G. Chantraine - 1969 - Nouvelle Revue Théologique 91 (5):531-538.
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  12. added 2017-01-28
    La Métaphysique des Simples.G. Isaye - 1960 - Nouvelle Revue Théologique 82 (7):673-698.
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  13. added 2017-01-27
    Van Inwagen and Gunk: A Response to Sider.Kelly Salsbery - 1996 - Sorites 7:21-27.
    In a recent article, Theodore Sider raises an interesting objection to some of the ontological views of Peter van Inwagen. In van Inwagen's view, all material things are either mereological atoms or living things composed of such mereological atoms. Sider claims that it is possible for there to be worlds at which matter consists of atomless gunk. He argues that the possible existence of atomless gunk undermines van Inwagen's claims . I argue that the possible existence of atomless gunk does (...)
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  14. added 2017-01-26
    The Nature And Necessity Of Composite Simples,E.G., Ontic Predicates.Donald Mertz - 2004 - Metaphysica 5 (1):89-133.
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  15. added 2017-01-26
    The Existence of Simples (1).John Troyer - 1978 - In Elisabeth Leinfellner (ed.), Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought: Proceedings of the Second International Wittgenstein Symposium, 29th August to 4th September 1977, Kirchberg/Wechsel (Austria) ; Editors, Elisabeth Leinfellner ... [Et Al.]. D. Reidel Pub. Co.. pp. 2--121.
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  16. added 2017-01-24
    Les Formes simpLes de L'Attention.Gaston Rageot - 1903 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 56:113 - 141.
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  17. added 2017-01-23
    Simples, Third Men and Logical Constructions.John King-Farlow - 1985 - Philosophical Inquiry 7 (1):13-20.
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  18. added 2017-01-22
    Gunk and Continuous Variation.Frank Arntzenius & John Hawthorne - 2005 - The Monist 88 (4):441-465.
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  19. added 2017-01-22
    Grit or Gunk.Peter Forrest - 2004 - The Monist 87 (3):351-370.
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  20. added 2017-01-22
    Extended Simples.Peter Simons - 2004 - The Monist 87 (3):371--85.
    I argue that the assumptions that physically basic things are either mereologically atomic, or that they are continuous and there are no atoms, both face difficult conceptual problems. Both views tend to presuppose a largely unquestioned assumption, that things have parts corresponding to the geometric parts of the regions they occupy. To avoid these problems I propose a third view, that physically simple things occupy a finite volume without themselves having parts. This view is examined enough to tease out some (...)
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  21. added 2017-01-22
    Hume's Treatment of Simples.C. Maund - 1934 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 35:209 - 228.
  22. added 2017-01-19
    Hudson on Location. [REVIEW]Josh Parsons - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):427 - 435.
    Paper begins: Chapter 4 of Hud Hudson’s stimulating book The metaphysics of hyperspace contains an discussion of the notion of location in a container spacetime. Hudson uses this idea to define a number of what we might call modes of extension or ways of being extended. A pertended object is what most people think of as a typical extended object — it is made up of spatial parts, one part for each region the object pervades. An entended object is an (...)
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  23. added 2017-01-19
    Are There Ultimate Simples?Julius R. Weinberg - 1935 - Philosophy of Science 2 (4):387-399.
  24. added 2017-01-15
    MaxCon Extended Simples and the Dispositionalist Ontology of Laws.Travis Dumsday - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).
    Extended simples are physical objects that, while spatially extended, possess no actual proper parts. The theory that physical reality bottoms out at extended simples is one of the principal competing views concerning the fundamental composition of matter, the others being atomism and the theory of gunk. Among advocates of extended simples, Markosian’s ‘MaxCon’ version of the theory has justly achieved particular prominence. On the assumption of causal realism, I argue here that the reality of MaxCon simples would entail the reality (...)
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  25. added 2017-01-14
    Atoms, Gunk, and the Limits of ‘Composition’.Hsing-Chien Tsai & Achille C. Varzi - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):231-235.
    It is customary practice to define ‘x is composed of the ys’ as ‘x is a sum of the ys and the ys are pairwise disjoint ’. This predicate has played a central role in the debate on the special composition question and on related metaphysical issues concerning the mereological structure of objects. In this note we show that the customary characterization is nonetheless inadequate. We do so by constructing a mereological model where everything qualifies as composed of atoms even (...)
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  26. added 2017-01-14
    Atoms Vs. Extended Simples: Towards a Dispositionalist Reconciliation.Travis Dumsday - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1023-1033.
    There are four main theories concerning the ultimate constitution of matter: atomism version 1, atomism version 2, the theory of gunk, and the theory of extended simples. These four theories are usually seen as diametrically opposed. Here I take a stab at ecumenism, and argue that atomism version 1 and the theory of extended simples can be reconciled and rendered compatible by reference to the reality of dispositions.
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  27. added 2016-12-09
    What Do We Want to Know When We Ask the Simple Question?David Mark Kovacs - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):254-266.
    The Simple Question (SQ) asks: “What are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions any x must satisfy in order for it to be true that x is a simple?” The main motivation for asking SQ stems from the hope that it could teach us important lessons for material-object ontology. It is universally accepted that a proper answer to it has to be finite, complete and devoid of mereological expressions. This paper argues that we should stop treating SQ as the central (...)
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  28. added 2016-12-08
    Monism and Gunk.Jacek Brzozowski - 2016 - In Mark Jago (ed.), Reality Making. Oxford University Press. pp. 57-74.
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  29. added 2016-12-08
    Stoic Gunk.Daniel Nolan - 2006 - Phronesis 51 (2):162-183.
    The surviving sources on the Stoic theory of division reveal that the Stoics, particularly Chrysippus, believed that bodies, places and times were such that all of their parts themselves had proper parts. That is, bodies, places and times were composed of gunk. This realisation helps solve some long-standing puzzles about the Stoic theory of mixture and the Stoic attitude to the present.
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  30. added 2016-12-08
    Homogeneous Simples.Mark Scala - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):393 - 397.
    I give reasons to suggest that the various ‘homogeneous substance’ objections to perdurance theory should not be regarded as raising serious difficulties. The main strategy is to show that there are equally exotic possibilities involving extended mereological simples that may turn the tables on the endurance theorist, insofar as she will have difficulties with these cases analogous to those she raises for the perdurantist. I conclude that such exotic cases are less useful that we might suppose in adjudicating between these (...)
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  31. added 2016-12-05
    9. On Locating Composite Objects.Jacek Brzozowski - 2008 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 4--193.
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  32. added 2016-11-03
    What is an Ersatz Part?Kristie Miller & Johann Hariman - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):524-551.
    _ Source: _Page Count 28 This paper develops four proposals for explicating the notion of an ersatz part. It then evaluates each proposal with respect to a number of jobs for which ersatz parts are posited. We argue that each of the four notions of ersatz parthood do better with respect to some jobs, and worse with respect to others. Thus, we think, it’s horses for courses: which notion of ersatz part one chooses will be sensitive to which metaphysical project (...)
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  33. added 2016-10-13
    Two Thoughts on "A Tale of Two Parts".Joshua Spencer - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):485-490.
    In “A Tale of Two Simples,” I presented an argument against the possibility of extended heterogeneous simples that relied on the possibility of extended atomic regions of space. Andrew Jaeger has presented a parody of one part of my argument for a clearly absurd conclusion. In this short paper, I defend my argument by showing that there is a significant disanalogy between my support for a key premise in my argument and Jaeger’s support for the corresponding premise in his parody (...)
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  34. added 2016-09-14
    Indefinite Divisibility.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):239-263.
    Some hold that the lesson of Russell’s paradox and its relatives is that mathematical reality does not form a ‘definite totality’ but rather is ‘indefinitely extensible’. There can always be more sets than there ever are. I argue that certain contact puzzles are analogous to Russell’s paradox this way: they similarly motivate a vision of physical reality as iteratively generated. In this picture, the divisions of the continuum into smaller parts are ‘potential’ rather than ‘actual’. Besides the intrinsic interest of (...)
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  35. added 2016-09-08
    Unextended Complexes.Martin Pickup - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):257-264.
    Extended simples are fruitfully discussed in metaphysics. They are entities which are located in a complex region of space but do not themselves have parts. In this paper, I will discuss unextended complexes: entities which are not located at a complex region of space but do themselves have parts. In particular, I focus on one type of unextended complex: pointy complexes. Four areas are indicated where pointy complexes might prove philosophically useful. Unextended complexes are therefore philosophically fruitful, in much the (...)
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  36. added 2016-06-19
    Ontology and the Logistic Analysis of Reality.Barry Smith - 1993 - In Nicola Guarino & Roberto Poli (eds.), Proceedings of the International Workshop on Formal Ontology in Conceptual Analysis and Knowledge Representation. Italian National Research Council. pp. 51-68.
    I shall attempt in what follows to show how mereology, taken together with certain topological notions, can yield the basis for future investigations in formal ontology. I shall attempt to show also how the mereological framework here advanced can allow the direct and natural formulation of a series of theses – for example pertaining to the concept of boundary – which can be formulated only indirectly (if at all) in set-theoretic terms.
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  37. added 2016-05-06
    Mereological Monism and Humean Supervenience.Andrea Borghini & Giorgio Lando - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    According to Lewis, mereology is the general and exhaustive theory of ontological composition, and every contingent feature of the world supervenes upon some fundamental properties instantiated by minimal entities. A profound analogy can be drawn between these two basic contentions of his metaphysics, namely that both can be intended as a denial of emergentism. In this essay, we study the relationships between Humean supervenience and two philosophical spin-offs of mereological monism: the possibility of gunk and the thesis of composition as (...)
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  38. added 2016-03-01
    The Physics of Extended Simples.D. Braddon-Mitchell & K. Miller - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):222-226.
    The idea that there could be spatially extended mereological simples has recently been defended by a number of metaphysicians (Markosian 1998, 2004; Simons 2004; Parsons (2000) also takes the idea seriously). Peter Simons (2004) goes further, arguing not only that spatially extended mereological simples (henceforth just extended simples) are possible, but that it is more plausible that our world is composed of such simples, than that it is composed of either point-sized simples, or of atomless gunk. The difficulty for these (...)
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  39. added 2016-02-28
    The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence.Damiano Costa - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (2):57-75.
    This paper develops an endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic tenet, which concerns existence at a time – the relation between an object and the times at which that object is present. According to this tenet, which I call transcendentism, for an object to exist at a time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. I argue that transcendentism is a semantically grounded and metaphysically fruitful. It is semantically grounded, (...)
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  40. added 2015-11-21
    Eliminativism and Gunk.Jiri Benovsky - 2016 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (1):59-66.
    Eliminativism about macroscopic material objects claims that we do not need to include tables in our ontology, and that any job – practical or theoretical – they have to do can be done by 'atoms arranged tablewise'. This way of introducing eliminativism faces the worry that if there are no 'atoms', that is, if there are no simples and the world is 'gunky', there are no suitable entities to be 'arranged tablewise'. In this article, I discuss various strategies the eliminativist (...)
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  41. added 2015-10-05
    Natural Properties, Supervenience, and Mereology.Andrea Borghini & Giorgio Lando - 2011 - Humana Mente 4 (19):79-104.
    The interpretation of Lewis‘s doctrine of natural properties is difficult and controversial, especially when it comes to the bearers of natural properties. According to the prevailing reading – the minimalist view – perfectly natural properties pertain to the micro-physical realm and are instantiated by entities without proper parts or point-like. This paper argues that there are reasons internal to a broadly Lewisian kind of metaphysics to think that the minimalist view is fundamentally flawed and that a liberal view, according to (...)
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  42. added 2015-09-29
    Composition.Daniel Z. Korman & Chad Carmichael - 2016 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
    When some objects are the parts of another object, they compose that object and that object is composite. This article is intended as an introduction to the central questions about composition and a highly selective overview of various answers to those questions. In §1, we review some formal features of parthood that are important for understanding the nature of composition. In §2, we consider some answers to the question: which pluralities of objects together compose something? As we will see, the (...)
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  43. added 2015-08-28
    Ought a Four-Dimensionalist to Believe in Temporal Parts?Kristie Miller - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 619-646.
    This paper presents the strongest version of a non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism: a theory according to which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in space-time, but not in virtue of having maximal temporal parts. The aims of considering such a view are twofold. First, to evaluate whether such an account could provide a plausible middle ground between the two main competitor accounts of persistence: three-dimensionalism and perdurantist four-dimensionalism. Second, to see what light such a theory sheds on the debate between these two competitor (...)
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  44. added 2015-08-24
    Fundamentality and Ontological Minimality.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2018 - In Ricki Bliss & Graham Priest (eds.), Reality and its Structure. Oxford University Press. pp. 237-253.
    In this chapter, a generic definition of fundamentality as an ontological minimality thesis is sought and its applicability examined. Most discussions of fundamentality are focused on a mereological understanding of the hierarchical structure of reality, which may be combined with an atomistic, object-oriented metaphysics. But recent work in structuralism, for instance, calls for an alternative understanding and it is not immediately clear that the conception of fundamentality at work in structuralism is commensurable with the mereological conception. However, it is proposed (...)
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  45. added 2015-04-06
    Abstract Atomism.Jeffrey Grupp - manuscript
    atomism involves point-sized philosophical atoms that are indistinguishable from one another, and that are nonphysical bits of energy that flash in and out of existence. In other words, they are nonphysical particles (hence the word "abstract"): they are not nonphysical in the way that some philosophers might believe a mind or number to be alleged to be nonphysical, but rather they are nonphysical merely because, I argue in an article, that they are ultimate building blocks that in no way can (...)
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  46. added 2015-04-05
    Some Ontological Consequences of Atomism.Travis Dumsday - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):119-134.
    Is there a fundamental layer of objects in nature? And if so what sorts of things populate it? Among those who answer ‘yes’ to the first question, a common answer to the second is ‘atoms,’ where an atom is understood in the original sense of an object that is spatially unextended, indivisible, and wholly lacking in proper parts. Here I explore some of the ontological consequences of atomism. First, if atoms are real, then whatever motion they appear to undergo must (...)
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  47. added 2015-03-28
    Zeno Objects and Supervenience.Simon Prosser - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):18 - 26.
    Many philosophers accept a ‘layered’ world‐view according to which the facts about the higher ontological levels supervene on the facts about the lower levels. Advocates of such views often have in mind a version of atomism, according to which there is a fundamental level of indivisible objects known as simples or atoms upon whose spatiotemporal locations and intrinsic properties everything at the higher levels supervenes.1 Some, however, accept the possibility of ‘gunk’ worlds in which there are parts ‘all the way (...)
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  48. added 2015-03-07
    Brutal Simples.Kris McDaniel - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3:233.
    I argue that there are is no informative statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for being a mereological simple.
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  49. added 2015-02-12
    Borderline Simple or Extremely Simple.Katherine Hawley - 2004 - The Monist 87 (3):385-404.
    In his Material Beings, Peter van Inwagen distinguishes two questions about parthood. What are the conditions necessary and sufficient for some things jointly to compose a whole? What are the conditions necessary and sufficient for a thing to have proper parts? The first of these, the Special Composition Question (SCQ), has been widely discussed, and David Lewis has argued that an important constraint on any answer to the SCQ is that it should not permit borderline cases of composition. This is (...)
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  50. added 2014-12-27
    Back to the Primitive: From Substantial Capacities to Prime Matter.Andrew J. Jaeger - 2014 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):381-395.
    We often predicate capacities of substances in such a way so as to modify the way that they exist . However, sometimes a capacity is not for the modification of a substance but for the existence of one. Moreover, we have reason to think that these capacities are just as real as other capacities. If that’s right, then the question arises: if these capacities are real features in the world, what they are real features of? Part I argues that they (...)
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