Skepticism, Misc

Edited by Everett Fulmer (Loyola University, New Orleans)
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  1. added 2020-06-21
    On The Hypothetical Given.Adam Marushak - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    My aim in this paper is to assess the viability of a perceptual epistemology based on what Anil Gupta calls the “hypothetical given”. On this account, experience alone yields no unconditional entitlement to perceptual beliefs. Experience functions instead to establish relations of rational support between what Gupta calls “views” and perceptual beliefs. I argue that the hypothetical given is a genuine alternative to the prevailing theories of perceptual justification but that the account faces a dilemma: on a natural assumption about (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-18
    The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism.Douglas C. Long - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):67-84.
    The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism [ABSTRACT] Douglas C. Long Philosophical skepticism arises from a Cartesian first-person perspective that initially rejects as unjustified any appeal to sense perception. I argue that, contrary to the cogito argument, when a “purely subjective” epistemology cuts one off from justified beliefs about the world in this way, it undermines justified belief about one’s own existence as an individual in the world as well. Therefore, philosophical doubt expressed in the form: “I know that I exist but (...)
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  3. added 2020-06-16
    Schaffer's Demon.Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):552-559.
    Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has summoned a new sort of demon – which he calls the debasing demon – that apparently threatens all of our purported knowledge. We show that any debasing skeptical argument must attack the justification condition and can do so only if a plausible thesis about justification is false.
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  4. added 2020-06-16
    On Intellectual Skepticism: A Selection of Skeptical Arguments and Tusi's Criticisms, with Some Comparative Notes.Pirooz Fatoorchi - 2013 - Philosophy East and West 63 (2):213-250.
    This essay deals with a selected part of an epistemological controversy provided by Tūsī in response to the skeptical arguments reported by Rāzī that is related to what might be called "intellectual skepticism," or skepticism regarding the judgments of the intellect, particularly in connection with self-evident principles. It will be shown that Rāzī has cited and exposed a position that seems to be no less than a medieval version of empiricism. Tūsī, in contrast, has presented us with a position that (...)
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  5. added 2020-06-03
    Skolem and the Skeptic.Paul Benacerraf & Crispin Wright - 1985 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 59:85-137.
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  6. added 2020-05-17
    Numbers Scepticism, Equal Chances and Pluralism: Taurek Revisited.Gerald Lang & Rob Lawlor - 2016 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 15 (3):298-315.
    The ‘standard interpretation’ of John Taurek’s argument in ‘Should the Numbers Count?’ imputes two theses to him: first, ‘numbers scepticism’, or scepticism about the moral force of an appeal to the mere number of individuals saved in conflict cases; and second, the ‘equal greatest chances’ principle of rescue, which requires that every individual has an equal chance of being rescued. The standard interpretation is criticized here on a number of grounds. First, whilst Taurek clearly believes that equal chances are all-important, (...)
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  7. added 2020-04-13
    12 Is There a Reason for Skepticism?Joseph Cruz - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O.’Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press. pp. 287.
    Two compelling and persistent projects of contemporary epistemology are engaging skepticism and searching for adequate epistemic principles. The former, of course, can be traced in various forms through the ancients and moderns, and the last decade has seen skepticism debated with renewed vigor. The centrality of skepticism in epistemology is manifest. It both presents a foil against which positive epistemic theses may be modified and tested, and offers powerful arguments that perhaps even lead to the conclusion that skepticism correctly captures (...)
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  8. added 2020-02-12
    Reason and Scepticism.Fred I. Dretske - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):47-53.
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  9. added 2020-02-11
    The Sceptical Challenge.Charles Landesman - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):503-506.
  10. added 2020-02-11
    The Price of Doubt.John Greco - 2002 - Mind 111 (441):149-152.
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  11. added 2020-01-30
    What Pessimism Is.Paul Prescott - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:337-356.
    On the standard view, pessimism is a philosophically intractable topic. Against the standard view, I hold that pessimism is a stance, or compound of attitudes, commitments and intentions. This stance is marked by certain beliefs—first and foremost, that the bad prevails over the good—which are subject to an important qualifying condition: they are always about outcomes and states of affairs in which one is personally invested. This serves to distinguish pessimism from other views with which it is routinely conflated— including (...)
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  12. added 2019-12-10
    Debunking Biased Thinkers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):141--162.
    ABSTRACT: Most of what we believe comes to us from the word of others, but we do not always believe what we are told. We often reject thinkers' reports by attributing biases to them. We may call this debunking. In this essay, I consider how debunking might work and then examine whether, and how often, it can help to preserve rational belief in the face of disagreement.
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  13. added 2019-11-21
    "Introduction" - Ch 1 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification.
    In this introduction I present the topic of the investigation carried out in this book and the central theses defended in it. I also clarify some assumption of my research, specify the intended audience of this book and summarize its structure.
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  14. added 2019-10-12
    Descartes Foundationalism: An Answer to the Skeptics’ or A Way Out?Ncha Gabriel Bubu - 2019 - Social Sciences Studies Journal 5 (44):5232-5237.
    The phenomenon of knowledge is a fundamental issue in epistemology as a main branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge related problems. Over time, epistemologists attempted to give us or provide clues as to what reality actually is, that is the question of the certainty of knowledge has always been topical in any epistemic enterprise. The search for knowledge becomes more cumbersome when one considers the challenge of the skeptics and sophists about the ability of man knowing anything for certain. To (...)
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  15. added 2019-09-26
    Epistemologia Analítica, Vol .1: debates contemporâneos.Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues (ed.) - 2019 - Editora Fi.
    O presente volume se trata de uma coletânea de artigos que reúne alguns dos trabalhos propostos para o evento “III International Colloquium of Analytic Epistemology and VII Conference of Social Epistemology”, realizado entre os dias 27 e 30 de Novembro de 2018, na Universidade Federal de Santa Maria. O “III International Colloquium of Analytic Epistemology and VII Conference of Social Epistemology” é um dos principais eventos de Epistemologia analítica da América Latina e reúne especialistas do Brasil e do exterior para (...)
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  16. added 2019-09-25
    Review: "Righting Epistemology: Hume's Revolution," by Bredo Johnsen. [REVIEW]Matt Carlson - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (5):32-38.
  17. added 2019-09-23
    Reason and Experience in Buddhist Epistemology.Christian Coseru - 2013 - In Steven Emmanuel (ed.), A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. West Sussex, UKL: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. pp. 241–255.
    Among the key factors that play a crucial role in the acquisition of knowledge, Buddhist philosophers list (i) the testimony of sense experience, (ii) introspective awareness (iii) inferences drawn from these directs modes of acquaintance, and (iv) some version of coherentism, so as guarantee that truth claims remains consistent across a diverse philosophical corpus. This paper argues that when Buddhists employ reason, they do so primarily in order to advance a range of empirical and introspective claims. As a result, reasoning, (...)
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  18. added 2019-09-07
    New Lessons From Old Demons: The Case For Reliabilism.Thomas Grundmann - 2016 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 90-110.
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  19. added 2019-07-09
    Types of Boltzmann Brains.Alexey Turchin & Roman Yampolskiy - manuscript
    Abstract. Boltzmann brains (BBs) are minds which randomly appear as a result of thermodynamic or quantum fluctuations. In this article, the question of if we are BBs, and the observational consequences if so, is explored. To address this problem, a typology of BBs is created, and the evidence is compared with the Simulation Argument. Based on this comparison, we conclude that while the existence of a “normal” BB is either unlikely or irrelevant, BBs with some ordering may have observable consequences. (...)
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  20. added 2019-07-08
    O argumento da ilusão/alucinação e o disjuntivismo: Ayer versus Austin.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2015 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 12:85-106.
    The argument from illusion/hallucination have been proposed many times as supporting the strong conclusion that we are always perceiving directly sense-data. In Sense & Sensibilia, Austin argues that this argument is based on a “mass of seductive (mainly verbal) fallacies”. In this paper, I argue that Austin's argumentative moves to deconstruct the argument from illusion is better understood if they are seen as due to his implicit commitment to some disjunctivist conception of perception. His considerations should be taken as a (...)
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  21. added 2019-06-17
    The Disappearance of Ignorance.Robin McKenna - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-17.
    Keith DeRose’s new book The Appearance of Ignorance (TAI) is a welcome companion volume to his 2009 book The Case for Contextualism (TCC). Where TCC focused on contextualism as a view in the philosophy of language, TAI focuses on how contextualism contributes to our understanding of (and solution to) some perennial epistemological problems, with the skeptical problem being the main focus of six of the seven chapters. DeRose’s view is that a solution to the skeptical problem must do two things. (...)
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  22. added 2019-06-07
    Skepsis: Le Débat des Modernes Sur le Scepticisme. By Gianni Paganini. [REVIEW]John Christian Laursen - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):68-71.
  23. added 2019-06-06
    Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction. By Barry Stroud. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. 184. Price £32.50.).Matthew Parrott - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):883-886.
  24. added 2019-06-06
    Skepticism and Education: In Search of Another Filial Tie of Philosophy to Education.Duck‐joo Kwak - 2012 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 44 (5):535-545.
    As a way of participating in the discussion on the disciplinary nature of philosophy of education, this article attempts to find another distinctive way of relating philosophy to education for the studies in philosophy of education. Recasting philosophical skepticism, which has been dismissed by Dewey and Rorty in their critiques of modern epistemology, it explores whether Cavell's romantic interpretation of it can allow us to conceive of skepticism as an exemplary practice of education, especially internal to the learner. This opens (...)
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  25. added 2019-06-06
    Reply to Baize on “The Skeptic’s Predicament”.Brian Hutchinson - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (2):67-70.
  26. added 2019-06-06
    Beyond the Philosopher's Fear: A Cavellian Reading of Gender, Origin, and Religion in Modern Skepticism,. [REVIEW]Berislav Marušić - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):315-320.
  27. added 2019-06-06
    Skepticism, Externalism, and Inference to the Best Explanation.Jochen Briesen - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (1):5-26.
    This paper focuses on a combination of the antiskeptical strategies offered by semantic externalism and the inference to the best explanation. I argue that the most difficult problems of the two strategies can be solved, if the strategies are combined: The strategy offered by semantic externalism is successful against standard skeptical brain-in-a-vat arguments. But the strategy is ineffective, if the skeptical argument is referring to the recent-envatment scenario. However, by focusing on the scenario of recent envatment the most difficult problems (...)
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  28. added 2019-06-06
    Idealism, Scepticism, and Internal Relations: Remarks on Hymers’s Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses.Philip P. Hanson - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):577-586.
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  29. added 2019-06-06
    Can They Say What They Want? A Transcendental Argument Against Utilitarianism.Olaf L. Mueller - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):241-259.
    Let us imagine an ideal ethical agent, i.e., an agent who (i) holds a certain ethical theory, (ii) has all factual knowledge needed for determining which action among those open to her is right and which is wrong, according to her theory, and who (iii) is ideally motivated to really do whatever her ethical theory demands her to do. If we grant that the notions of omniscience and ideal motivation both make sense, we may ask: Could there possibly be an (...)
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  30. added 2019-06-06
    Epistemological Skepticism(s) and Rational Self-Control.Brian Ribeiro - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):468-477.
    In this paper I aim to do two things. First, I attempt to illustrate an interesting pattern of argument one can find in Hume's work. Next, I employ this Humean pattern of argument to show that IF there is a cogent and intuitive argument for any form of epistemological skepticism, which despite its cogency and intuitiveness has a unbelievable conclusion, THEN we lack a very important form of doxastic self-control, which I call rational self-control, over the beliefs problematized by that (...)
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  31. added 2019-06-06
    Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses. [REVIEW]Rockney Jacobsen - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (1):199-201.
    Philosophers continue to locate themselves on a landscape in which scepticism is a prominent feature. By treating sceptical scenarios, from evil demons to brains-in-vats, as "real possibilities" that would, if actual, suffice to "explain our experience as of a world beyond our senses", we can locate the strong independence of the world from knowledge characteristic of metaphysical realism. But, by taking scepticism this seriously, realists deprive themselves of any justification for other theses they nonetheless continue to advocate. In order to (...)
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  32. added 2019-06-06
    Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Edited by Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996. Pp.Xx +240. [REVIEW]Hsiu-Chen Chang - 1998 - Journal of Chinese Philosophy 25 (2):269-271.
  33. added 2019-06-06
    Ideas, Reason, and Skepticism: Replies to My Critics.Don Garrett - 1998 - Hume Studies 24 (1):171-194.
  34. added 2019-06-06
    An Introduction to the Philosophy of Knowledge.Jonathan Harrison - 1985 - Philosophical Quarterly 35 (138):95-104.
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  35. added 2019-06-06
    COVAL, S.-"Scepticism and the First Person". [REVIEW]Antony Flew - 1968 - Philosophy 43:170.
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  36. added 2019-05-07
    Identity Politics, Irrationalism, and Totalitarianism: Karl Popper and the Contemporary Malaise.Danny Frederick - 2019 - Cosmos + Taxis 6 (6-7):31-32.
    Introduction to my three essays on the relevance of Karl Popper to contemporary social, political and philosophical problems.
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  37. added 2019-05-06
    Review of R. Fogelin, Walking the Tightrope of Reason: The Precarious Life of a Rational Animal (OUP, 2003). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (1):188-191.
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  38. added 2019-05-02
    Brains in Vats? Don't Bother!Peter Baumann - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):186-199.
    Contemporary discussions of epistemological skepticism - the view that we do not and cannot know anything about the world around us - focus very much on a certain kind of skeptical argument involving a skeptical scenario (a situation familiar from Descartes’ First Meditation). According to the argument, knowing some ordinary proposition about the world (one we usually take ourselves to know) requires knowing we are not in some such skeptical scenario SK; however, since we cannot know that we are not (...)
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  39. added 2019-05-01
    Radical Scepticism and the Epistemology of Confusion.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (3):1-15.
    The lack of knowledge—as Timothy Williamson (2000) famously maintains—is ignorance. Radical sceptical arguments, at least in the tradition of Descartes, threaten universal ignorance. They do so by attempting to establish that we lack any knowledge, even if we can retain other kinds of epistemic standings, like epistemically justified belief. If understanding is a species of knowledge, then radical sceptical arguments threaten to rob us categorically of knowledge and understanding in one fell swoop by implying universal ignorance. If, however, understanding is (...)
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  40. added 2019-04-25
    Between Forteana and Skepticism. [REVIEW]M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (11):48-52.
    A review of Bernard Will's "Believing Weird Things".
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  41. added 2019-04-24
    The Malthus-Ricardo Correspondence: Sequential Structure, Argumentative Patterns, and Rationality.Marcelo Dascal & Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1999 - Journal of Pragmatics 31 (9):1129-1172.
    Although the controversy between Malthus and Ricardo has long been considered to be an important source for the history of economic thought, it has hardly been the object of a careful study qua controversy, i.e. as a polemical dialogical exchange. We have undertaken to fill this gap, within the framework of a more ambitious project that places controversies at the center of an account of the history of ideas, in science and elsewhere. It is our contention that the dialogical co-text (...)
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  42. added 2019-04-22
    Are There Any Good Reasons?Danny Frederick - manuscript
    David Miller argues that there are no good reasons, either sufficient or insufficient. I show that most of his arguments are invalid or unsound. Several of his arguments depend upon the false claim that every deductively valid argument is circular. I accept one of Miller's arguments for the conclusion that there are no good reasons which are less-than-sufficient. I accept one of his arguments to the conclusion that there are no probative sufficient reasons. But I explain how there are epistemic (...)
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  43. added 2019-04-16
    Philosophical Assumptions and Philosophies of Sciences: (Meta-Philosophy).Ulrich De Balbian - 2019 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    Explorations of different philosophies of science, their (metaphysical, epistemological, ontological and other assumptions).These are the institutionalized empiricist approaches and the post-cognitive ones, but still anthropo-centered and (inter) subject-oriented ones. Their pre-suppositions are identified and alternatives are suggested.
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  44. added 2019-03-22
    What's the Point of Knowledge?: A Function-First Epistemology.Michael Hannon - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    This book is about knowledge and its value. The central hypothesis is that humans think and speak of knowing in order to identify reliable informants, which is vital for human survival, cooperation, and flourishing. This simple idea is used to answer an array of complex and consequential philosophical questions. -/- (Here's a promotion code to save 30% if you order online at Oxford University Press: AAFLYG6).
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  45. added 2019-02-23
    Disagreement Skepticism and the Rationality of Religious Belief.Jonathan Matheson - 2019 - In Kevin McCain & Ted Poston (eds.), The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations. Brill. pp. 83-104.
    The Equal Weight View is a view about the epistemic significance of disagreement that is thought to have significant skeptical consequences. In this paper I do two things: (i) apply the Equal Weight View to cases of religious disagreement, and (ii) evaluate some consequences of that application for the rationality of religious beliefs. With regard to (i), I argue that the Equal Weight View implies that awareness of the current state of disagreement over religious propositions, such as God exists or (...)
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  46. added 2019-02-13
    Knowledge, Ignorance and Climate Change (New York Times).N. Ángel Pinillos - 2018 - The New York Times 2018 (nov 26).
    Philosophers have been talking about skepticism for a long time. Some of those insights can shed light on our public discourse regarding climate change.
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  47. added 2019-02-01
    A Critical Introduction to Skepticism by Allan Hazlett: London: Bloomsbury, 2014, Pp. X + 212, US$49.99.Andrea Borghini - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):408-409.
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  48. added 2018-12-04
    Making Philosophically Relevant Ideas.Ulrich De Balbian - unknown
    How does anything become philosophy? How does anything become philosophically relevant? What is it that makes something, any thing, philosophically relevant? What are the ingredients or components of something philosophical? What must such a thing contain so as to be philosophically relevant? How can one make anything of relevance to the discourse of philosophy? What is it that makes anything and/or thought or idea of and about anything philosophical. and of philosophical relevance? What is the nature, the characteristics and components (...)
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  49. added 2018-12-03
    Cavell, Skepticism, and the Idea of Philosophical Criticism.Arata Hamawaki - 2014 - In Andrea Kern & James Conant (eds.), Varieties of Skepticism: Essays After Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell. De Gruyter. pp. 389-428.
  50. added 2018-10-02
    Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism.Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press.
    Ordinarily, people take themselves to know a lot. I know where I was born, I know that I have two hands, I know that two plus two equals four, and I also think I know a lot of other stuff too. However, the project of trying to provide a philosophically satisfying account of knowledge, one that holds up against skeptical challenges, has proven surprisingly difficult. Either one aims for an account of justification (and knowledge) that is epistemologically demanding, in an (...)
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