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  1. EL RELATIVISMO FILOSÓFICO.Miguel Acosta & José María Garrido (eds.) - 2005 - Madrid, Spain: Instituto de Humanidades Ángel Ayala-CEU (Fundación Universitaria San Pablo CEU).
    Esta obra compila los estudios presentados en las I Jornadas de Filosofía del Instituto CEU de Humanidades Ángel Ayala y está prologada por Abelardo Lobato, O. P. Los filósofos tienen el deber de buscar y alcanzar la verdad apelando a las fuerzas de la razón, la cual, por cierto, no impide otras vías genuinas de conocimiento, como la fe. La búsqueda intelectual exige un trabajo de análisis que debe afinarse ante las obcecaciones que a menudo se interponen en el horizonte (...)
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  2. Review Essay: Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive. [REVIEW]Jonathan E. Adler - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):506-520.
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  3. Citizen Skeptic: Cicero’s Academic Republicanism.Scott Aikin - 2015 - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 2 (3):275–285.
    The skeptical challenge to politics is that if knowledge is in short supply and it is a condition for the proper use of political power, then there is very little just politics. Cicero’s Republicanism is posed as a program for political legitimacy wherein both citizens and their states are far from ideal. The result is a form of what is termed negative conservatism, which shows political gridlock in a more positive light.
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  4. Absolutely Certain Beliefs.Timo Airaksinen - 1985 - Philosophy Research Archives 11:393-406.
    This paper presents a critical review and discussion of three recent major theories of epistemic scepticism. Odegard and Rescher both agree that real knowledge entails certain beliefs. But they both fail to see how beliefs could be absolutely certain. Klein’s book, Certainty: A Refutationof Scepticism, presents the strongest possible view in favor of absolute certainty. I pay attention to its technical details and development by Klein. My conclusion is that Klein’s theory rests on some presupposed ideas that are either counterintuitive (...)
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  5. No More This Than That: Skeptical Impression or Pyrrhonian Dogma?Necip Fikri Alican - 2017 - ΣΧΟΛΗ (Scholē): Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 11 (1):7–60.
    This is a defense of Pyrrhonian skepticism against the charge that the suspension of judgment based on equipollence is vitiated by the assent given to the equipollence in question. The apparent conflict has a conceptual side as well as a practical side, examined here as separate challenges with a section devoted to each. The conceptual challenge is that the skeptical transition from an equipollence of arguments to a suspension of judgment is undermined either by a logical contradiction or by an (...)
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  6. A Tale of Two Scepticisms or Relying on What Comes Naturally or the Problem with Deriving an Epistemology From Literary Theory.James Allan - 2000 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (2):181–194.
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  7. Defeasibility and Scepticism.Robert Almeder - 1973 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):238 – 244.
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  8. A Kommunikációs Tér Filozófiája.Ferenc András - 2010 - Gondolat.
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  9. Anonymous Skeptics Swinburne, Hick, and Alston.Lance Ashdown - 2002
    My theses are that skepticism is a deep philosophical doubt about the sense of language, that it is a necessary consequence of a pervasive philosophical picture of human life that can be called "externalism," that this picture is a confusion based on a misunderstanding of what it is for human beings to speak a language, and that Richard Swinburne, John Hick, and William Alston are three contemporary philosophers who are externalists and so are "anonymous skeptics," i.e., philosophers whose theories unwittingly (...)
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  10. A Problem for the Closure Argument.Philip Atkins & Ian Nance - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):36-49.
    Contemporary discussions of skepticism often frame the skeptic's argument around an instance of the closure principle. Roughly, the closure principle states that if a subject knows p, and knows that p entails q, then the subject knows q. The main contention of this paper is that the closure argument for skepticism is defective. We explore several possible classifications of the defect. The closure argument might plausibly be classified as begging the question, as exhibiting transmission failure, or as structurally inefficient.
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  11. Deductive Closure, Defeasibility and Scepticism: A Reply to Feldman.Robert Audi - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):494-499.
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  12. Mere Faith and Entitlement.Yuval Avnur - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):297-315.
    The scandal to philosophy and human reason, wrote Kant, is that we must take the existence of material objects on mere faith . In contrast, the skeptical paradox that has scandalized recent philosophy is not formulated in terms of faith, but rather in terms of justification, warrant, and entitlement. I argue that most contemporary approaches to the paradox (both dogmatist/liberal and default/conservative) do not address the traditional problem that scandalized Kant, and that the status of having a warrant (or justification) (...)
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  13. Wezel. The Dark Side of the Enlightenment. Sceptical Life-Philosophy Between the Later Enlightenment and Early Romanticism.Rainer Baasner - 1987 - Philosophy and History 20 (1):25-26.
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  14. Giving Your Knowledge Half a Chance.Andrew Bacon - 2014 - Philosophical Studies (2):1-25.
    One thousand fair causally isolated coins will be independently flipped tomorrow morning and you know this fact. I argue that the probability, conditional on your knowledge, that any coin will land tails is almost 1 if that coin in fact lands tails, and almost 0 if it in fact lands heads. I also show that the coin flips are not probabilistically independent given your knowledge. These results are uncomfortable for those, like Timothy Williamson, who take these probabilities to play a (...)
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  15. Science and Scepticism.Brian Baigrie - 1987 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 17 (4):535-541.
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  16. Rediscovering Scepticism.Alan Bailey - unknown - Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 8.
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  17. The Skeptic’s Predicament.Micah Baize - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):147-155.
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  18. Scepticism, Rules & Language.G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker - 1988 - Noûs 22 (4):618-624.
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  19. Counterfactual Philosophers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):368-387.
    I argue that reflection on philosophers who could have been working among us but aren’t can lead us to give up our philosophical beliefs.
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  20. Schaffer's Demon.Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):552-559.
    Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has summoned a new sort of demon – which he calls the debasing demon – that apparently threatens all of our purported knowledge. We show that any debasing skeptical argument must attack the justification condition and can do so only if a plausible thesis about justification is false.
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  21. Sosa’s Dream.Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):249-252.
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  22. Sosa's Dream.Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):249 - 252.
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  23. Performative Transcendental Arguments.Adrian Bardon - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):69-95.
    ‘Performative’ transcendental arguments exploit the status of a subcategory of self-falsifying propositions in showing that some form of skepticism is unsustainable. The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between performatively inconsistent propositions and transcendental arguments, and then to compare performative transcendental arguments to modest transcendental arguments that seek only to establish the indispensability of some belief or conceptual framework. Reconceptualizing transcendental arguments as performative helps focus the intended dilemma for the skeptic: performative transcendental arguments directly confront the (...)
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  24. Clarity and the Grammar of Skepticism.Chris Barker - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):253-273.
    Why ever assert clarity? If It is clear that p is true, then saying so should be at best superfluous. Barker and Taranto (2003) and Taranto (2006) suggest that asserting clarity reveals information about the beliefs of the discourse participants, specifically, that they both believe that p . However, mutual belief is not sufficient to guarantee clarity ( It is clear that God exists ). I propose instead that It is clear that p means instead (roughly) 'the publicly available evidence (...)
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  25. CAMPBELL, C. A. -Scepticism and Construction. [REVIEW]H. Barker - 1932 - Mind 41:242.
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  26. Begrenzte Erkenntnisse?Peter Baumann - 2010 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (3):483-489.
    This is a crtiical discussion of Gabriel's "An den Grenzen der Erkenntnistheorie".
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  27. Reading 'On Certainty' Through the Lens of Cavell: Scepticism, Dogmatism and the 'Groundlessness of Our Believing'.Chantal Bax - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):515 - 533.
    While Cavell is well known for his reinterpretation of the later Wittgenstein, he has never really engaged himself with post-Investigations writings like On Certainty. This collection may, however, seem to undermine the profoundly anti-dogmatic reading of Wittgenstein that Cavell has developed. In addition to apparently arguing against what Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ – a phrase contested by other Wittgensteinians – On Certainty may seem to justify the rejection of whoever dares to question one’s basic presuppositions. According to On (...)
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  28. 'Communicative Competence' and the Skeptic.Joseph Beatty - 1979 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 6 (3):268-287.
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  29. Scepticism and Reliable Belief.Kelly Becker - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):241-244.
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  30. A Priori Skepticism and the KK Thesis.James R. Beebe - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):315-326.
    _ Source: _Page Count 12 In a previous article, I argued against the widespread reluctance of philosophers to treat skeptical challenges to our a priori knowledge of necessary truths with the same seriousness as skeptical challenges to our a posteriori knowledge of contingent truths. Hamid Vahid has recently offered several reasons for thinking the unequal treatment of these two kinds of skepticism is justified, one of which is a priori skepticism’s seeming dependence upon the widely scorned kk thesis. In the (...)
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  31. A Priori Skepticism.James R. Beebe - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):583-602.
    In this article I investigate a neglected form of radical skepticism that questions whether any of our logical, mathematical and other seemingly self-evident beliefs count as knowledge. ‘A priori skepticism,’ as I will call it, challenges our ability to know any of the following sorts of propositions: (1.1) The sum of two and three is five. (1.2) Whatever is square is rectangular. (1.3) Whatever is red is colored. (1.4) No surface can be uniformly red and uniformly blue at the same (...)
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  32. Scepticism and the Continuum.P. Beeley - 1997 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 8.
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  33. Skolem and the Skeptic.Paul Benacerraf - 1985 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:85-115.
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  34. Skolem and the Skeptic.Paul Benacerraf & Crispin Wright - 1985 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 59 (1):85-138.
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  35. A Pragmatist Conception of Certainty: Wittgenstein and Santayana.Guy Bennett-Hunter - 2012 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 4 (2):146-157.
    The ways in which Wittgenstein was directly influenced by William James (by his early psychological work as well his later philosophy) have been thoroughly explored and charted by Russell B. Goodman. In particular, Goodman has drawn attention to the pragmatist resonances of the Wittgensteinian notion of hinge propositions as developedand articulated in the posthumously edited and published work, On Certainty. This paper attempts to extend Goodman’s observation, moving beyond his focus on James (specifically, James’s Pragmatism) as his pragmatist reference point. (...)
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  36. Skepticism.Boran Berčić - 2001 - Theoria 44 (1-4):7-94.
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  37. Skeptical Rationalism.William Berkson - 1987 - In Joseph Agassi & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Inquiry. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 21--43.
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  38. Knowledge: A Treatise on Our Cognitive Situation.Niels Ole Bernsen - 1978 - Odense University Press.
  39. The Concept of Existence and Absolute Skepticism.Bhaswati Bhattacharya - 1974 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 1 (3):241-266.
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  40. Slow Switching and Authority of Self-Knowledge.Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht - 2012 - Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 32:443-449.
    Based on content externalism, the question of whether self-knowledge is authoritative or not has launched a real controversy in the philosophy of mind. Boghossian proposed slow switching argument in defense of incompatibility of the two views. This argument has been criticized by some philosophers through different approaches. Vahid is one of them. He claimed that Boghossian's argument appeals to some controversial assumptions without which it cannot achieve its conclusion. In this article, I criticize Vahid's response to slow switching argument and (...)
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  41. On the 'Simulation Argument' and Selective Scepticism.Jonathan Birch - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):95-107.
    Nick Bostrom’s ‘Simulation Argument’ purports to show that, unless we are confident that advanced ‘posthuman’ civilizations are either extremely rare or extremely rarely interested in running simulations of their own ancestors, we should assign significant credence to the hypothesis that we are simulated. I argue that Bostrom does not succeed in grounding this constraint on credence. I first show that the Simulation Argument requires a curious form of selective scepticism, for it presupposes that we possess good evidence for claims about (...)
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  42. Scepticism and Scandinavian Legal Realists.Jes Bjarup - 2006 - In J. W. Harris, Timothy Andrew Orville Endicott, Joshua Getzler & Edwin Peel (eds.), Properties of Law: Essays in Honour of Jim Harris. Oxford University Press.
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  43. Doubts.Carolyn Black - 1982 - Philosophical Investigations 5 (3):205-214.
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  44. Scepticism and the Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge. The Case of the Boundary-Layer.David Bloor - manuscript
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  45. A Vindication of the Equal-Weight View.Tomas Bogardus - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):324-335.
    Some philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other's assessment the same weight as her own. I first make the antecedent of this Equal-Weight View more precise, and then I motivate the View by describing cases in which it gives the intuitively correct verdict. Next I introduce some apparent counterexamples – cases of apparent peer disagreement in which, intuitively, one should not give equal weight to the other party's assessment. To defuse these apparent (...)
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  46. Medieval Skepticism.Charles Bolyard - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  47. The Basing Relation and the Impossibility of the Debasing Demon.Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Descartes’ demon is a deceiver: the demon makes things appear to you other than as they really are. However, as Descartes famously pointed out in the Second Meditation, not all knowledge is imperilled by this kind of deception. You still know you are a thinking thing. Perhaps, though, there is a more virulent demon in epistemic hell, one from which none of our knowledge is safe. Jonathan Schaffer (2010) thinks so. The “Debasing Demon” he imagines threatens knowledge not via the (...)
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  48. Nozick, Externalism, and Skepticism.Laurence BonJour - 1987 - In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Rowman & Littlefield.
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  49. Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation.Laurence BonJour & James W. Cornman - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):612.
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  50. Scepticism Under New Colors? Stroud's Criticism of Carnap.Thomas Bonk - 2003 - In Language, Truth and Knowledge. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 133--147.
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