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Summary The Sleeping Beauty Problem concerns a perfectly rational agent who is put to sleep for two days. Depending on the toss of a fair coin, she is awakened once (Heads) or twice (Tails). However, after each waking, she is put back to sleep with a drug that erases her memories of the waking. The question which constitutes the problem is this: "When she is first awakened, what degree of belief will she have that the outcome of the coin toss is Heads?" The problem has proven exceedingly difficult to solve and attracts attention both for its intrinsic interest and because of the many connections between the correct answer to the problem and a wide variety of other philosophical topics including: the status of chance-credence and frequency-credence principles, the evidential relevance of essentially indexical information, the acceptability of conditionalization principles, the proper understanding of Dutch Book arguments, the status of indifference principles, and the proper interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Key works The problem was first raised in the philosophical literature by Elga 2000, who defended the 1/3 answer. Lewis 2001 responded, defending the 1/2 answer.  Important early papers defending 1/3 include Arntzenius 2003, Dorr 2002, Horgan 2004, and Hitchcock 2004. Important early papers defending 1/2 include White 2006 and Meacham 2008. The literature has since exploded in size.
Introductions Elga 2000Titelbaum 2013
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123 found
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1 — 50 / 123
  1. added 2020-02-18
    Bayesian Beauty.Silvia Milano - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    The Sleeping Beauty problem has attracted considerable attention in the literature as a paradigmatic example of how self-locating uncertainty creates problems for the Bayesian principles of Conditionalization and Reflection. Furthermore, it is also thought to raise serious issues for diachronic Dutch Book arguments. I show that, contrary to what is commonly accepted, it is possible to represent the Sleeping Beauty problem within a standard Bayesian framework. Once the problem is correctly represented, the ‘thirder’ solution satisfies standard rationality principles, vindicating why (...)
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  2. added 2019-10-10
    Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief.David Builes - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    The epistemology of self-locating belief concerns itself with how rational agents ought to respond to certain kinds of indexical information. I argue that those who endorse the thesis of Time-Slice Rationality ought to endorse a particular view about the epistemology of self-locating belief, according to which "essentially indexical" information is never evidentially relevant to non-indexical matters. I close by offering some independent motivations for endorsing Time-Slice Rationality in the context of the epistemology of self-locating belief.
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  3. added 2019-09-16
    The Snow White Problem.Sylvia9 Wenmackers - forthcoming - Synthese.
    The SnowWhite problem is introduced to demonstrate how learning something of which one could not have learnt the opposite can change an agent’s probability assignment. This helps us to analyse the Sleeping Beauty problem, which is deconstructed as a combinatorial engine and a subjective wrapper. The combinatorial engine of the problem is analogous to Bertrand’s boxes paradox and can be solved with standard probability theory. The subjective wrapper is clarified using the Snow White problem. Sample spaces for all three problems (...)
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  4. added 2019-09-16
    Self-Locating Uncertainty and the Origin of Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics.Charles T. Sebens & Sean M. Carroll - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1):axw004.
    A longstanding issue in attempts to understand the Everett (Many-Worlds) approach to quantum mechanics is the origin of the Born rule: why is the probability given by the square of the amplitude? Following Vaidman, we note that observers are in a position of self-locating uncertainty during the period between the branches of the wave function splitting via decoherence and the observer registering the outcome of the measurement. In this period it is tempting to regard each branch as equiprobable, but we (...)
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  5. added 2019-06-15
    Temporal Logic and Selection in the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Marc Burock - unknown
    The Sleeping Beauty Problem is a polarizing thought experiment involving a fair coin toss, memory erasure and temporal uncertainty. Despite its simplicity there is no agreed upon solution. In this work I put forward a set of arguments that support the so-called Halfer or 1/2 solution to the problem, while undermining the competing Thirder or 1/3 solution. In analyzing Elga’s original argument for the 1/3 solution, I bring to light a subtle but clear contradiction in his reasoning using temporal logic. (...)
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    Another Attempt to Put Sleeping Beauty to Rest.Robert Stalnaker - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):25-39.
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  7. added 2019-05-17
    The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism.Alastair Wilson - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    This book defends a radical new theory of contingency as a physical phenomenon. Drawing on the many-worlds approach, it argues that quantum theories are best understood as telling us about the space of genuine possibilities, rather than as telling us solely about actuality.
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  8. added 2019-03-29
    The Sleeping Beauty Problem Demystified.Ulrike Grömping - manuscript
    A perfectly rational Sleeping Beauty is put to sleep on Sunday night, and intermittently awoken either on Monday only (if a fair coin shows Heads) or on both Monday and Tuesday (if the fair coin shows Tails). According to experimental conditions, she neither remembers previous awakenings nor knows about passage of time, but she is aware of experimental conditions. Her credence for the coin having come up Heads is at the center of a scientific (mostly philosophical) controversy: halfers insist it (...)
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  9. added 2018-11-19
    Perspective Reasoning and the Solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Xianda Gao - manuscript
    This paper proposes a new explanation for the paradoxes related to anthropic reasoning. Solutions to the Sleeping Beauty Problem and the Doomsday argument are discussed in detail. The main argument can be summarized as follows: -/- Our thoughts, reasonings and narratives inherently comes from a certain perspective. With each perspective there is a center, or using the term broadly, a self. The natural first-person perspective is most primitive. However we can also think and express from others’ perspectives with a theory (...)
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  10. added 2018-08-18
    Self-Locating Beliefs.Michael Huemer - 2018 - In Paradox Lost. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 219-243.
    Beauty is put to sleep and woken up either once or twice, depending on the flip of a coin; after each waking, she will fall asleep and forget having woken. Upon waking, what should be her credence that the coin came up heads? Some say 1/2; others say 1/3. I propose that evidence supports a theory for you when your having that qualitative evidence would be more likely if the theory were true than if it were false. This view supports (...)
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  11. added 2018-08-01
    The Exchange Continued: Response to Pust's Response to My Reply.Terry Horgan - 2017 - In Essays on Paradoxes. New York, USA: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 226-224.
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  12. added 2018-08-01
    Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust.Terry Horgan - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):155-159.
    I maintain, in defending “thirdism,” that Sleeping Beauty should do Bayesian updating after assigning the “preliminary probability” 1/4 to the statement S: “Today is Tuesday and the coin flip is heads.” (This preliminary probability obtains relative to a specific proper subset I of her available information.) Pust objects that her preliminary probability for S is really zero, because she could not be in an epistemic situation in which S is true. I reply that the impossibility of being in such an (...)
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  13. added 2018-07-29
    Monty Hall Drives a Wedge Between Judy Benjamin and the Sleeping Beauty: A Reply to Bovens.Luc Bovens & Jose-Luis Ferreira - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):473 - 481.
    In “Judy Benjamin is a Sleeping Beauty” (2010) Bovens recognises a certain similarity between the Sleeping Beauty (SB) and the Judy Benjamin (JB). But he does not recognise the dissimilarity between underlying protocols (as spelled out in Shafer (1985). Protocols are expressed in conditional probability tables that spell out the probability of coming to learn various propositions conditional on the actual state of the world. The principle of total evidence requires that we not update on the content of the proposition (...)
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  14. added 2018-07-29
    The Puzzle of the Hats.Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):57-78.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and (...)
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  15. added 2018-06-21
    Evidence Without Priors.Kai Draper - 2010 - Philo 13 (1):18-22.
    I argue that it is possible to acquire evidence that has no probability, not even zero, prior to its acquisition. If I am right then, contrary to certain Bayesian models of confirmation, conditionalization is not the only possible basis upon which a rational agent will alter her credence in some hypothesis in response to new evidence. My conclusion follows from certain analyses of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Because those analyses are controversial, however, I alter the Sleeping Beauty scenario to generate (...)
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  16. added 2018-06-05
    Sleeping Beauty: Exploring a Neglected Solution.Laureano Luna - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    The strong law of large numbers and considerations concerning additional information strongly suggest that Beauty upon awakening has probability 1⁄3 to be in a heads-awakening but should still believe the probability that the coin landed heads in the Sunday toss to be 1⁄2. The problem is that she is in a heads-awakening if and only if the coin landed heads. So, how can she rationally assign different probabilities or credences to propositions she knows imply each other? This is the problem (...)
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  17. added 2018-05-28
    Self‐Locating Evidence and the Metaphysics of Time.David Builes - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):478-490.
    I argue that different views in the metaphysics of time make different observational predictions in both classical and relativistic cases. Because different views in the metaphysics of time differ over which facts are merely indexical facts, they make different observational predictions about certain self-locating propositions. I argue for this thesis by distinguishing the three main updating procedures that apply in cases of self-locating uncertainty, and I present a series of cases which cumulatively show that every one of these updating procedures (...)
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  18. added 2018-04-09
    A Logical Analysis of Monty Hall and Sleeping Beauty.Allen L. Mann & Ville Aarnio - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (6):1123-1162.
    Hintikka and Sandu’s independence-friendly logic is a conservative extension of first-order logic that allows one to consider semantic games with imperfect information. In the present article, we first show how several variants of the Monty Hall problem can be modeled as semantic games for IF sentences. In the process, we extend IF logic to include semantic games with chance moves and dub this extension stochastic IF logic. Finally, we use stochastic IF logic to analyze the Sleeping Beauty problem, leading to (...)
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  19. added 2018-04-02
    Sleeping Beauty on Monty Hall.Michel Janssen & Sergio Pernice - unknown
    We present a game show that we claim can serve as a proxy for the notorious Sleeping Beauty Problem. This problem has divided commentators into two camps, 'halfers' and 'thirders'. In our game show, the potential awakenings of Sleeping Beauty, during which she will be asked about the outcome of the coin toss that determined earlier how many times she is awakened and asked, are replaced by potential contestants, deciding whether to choose heads or tails in a bet they will (...)
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  20. added 2018-03-23
    When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments.Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):119-127.
    If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...)
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  21. added 2018-02-22
    Beauty, Odds, and Credence.Masahiro Yamada - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1247-1261.
    This paper considers fair betting odds for certain bets that might be placed in the situation discussed in the so-called Sleeping Beauty Problem. This paper examines what Thirders, Halfers, and Double Halfers must say about the odds as determined by various decision theoretic approaches and argues that Thirders and Halfers have difficulties formulating plausible and coherent positions concerning the relevant betting odds. Double Halfers do not face this problem and that is an important consideration in favor of Double Halfers.
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  22. added 2017-12-01
    When Sleeping Beauty First Awakes.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 238:129-150.
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  23. added 2017-08-09
    The Sleeping Beauty Controversy.Peter Winkler - 2017 - The American Mathematical Monthly 124:589-587.
    In 2000, Adam Elga posed the following problem: -/- Some researchers are going to put you to sleep. During the two days that your sleep will last, they will briefly wake you up either once or twice, depending on the toss of a fair coin (Heads: once; Tails: twice). After each waking, they will put you back to sleep with a drug that makes you forget that waking. When you are first awakened, to what degree ought you believe that the (...)
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  24. added 2017-03-16
    Even for Objectivists, Sleeping Beauty Isn’T so Simple.Kai Draper - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):29-37.
    Writing collectively as the Oscar Seminar in 2008, John Pollock and several colleagues advance an objectivist argument for a 1/3 solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. In 2011, Joel Pust raises a serious objection to their argument to which Paul D. Thorn, a member of the Oscar Seminar, offers a subtle reply. I argue that the Oscar Seminar s argument for 1/3 is unsound. I do not, however, defend Pust’s objection. Rather I develop a new objection, one that is not (...)
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  25. added 2017-01-30
    Sleeping Beauty: Why Violations of Probability Laws Are `Deal' Breakers.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
    Technical criticism of Jacob Ross's "Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity and Rational Dilemmas" and Double Halfing.
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  26. added 2017-01-30
    Agreement Theorems for Self-Locating Belief.Michael Caie - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):380-407.
  27. added 2017-01-16
    Choosing Beauty.Simon Friederich - unknown
    Reasoning that takes into account self-locating evidence in apparently plausible ways sometimes yields the startling conclusion that rational credences are such as if agents had bizarre causal powers. The present paper introduces a novel version of the Sleeping Beauty problem—Choosing Beauty—for which the response to the problem advocated by David Lewis unappealingly yields this conclusion. Furthermore, it suggests as a general desideratum for approaches to problems of self-locating belief that they should not recommend credences that are as if anyone had (...)
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  28. added 2017-01-14
    Sleeping Beauty: A Critical Survey.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscript
    Rambling, largely unreadable survey of the Sleeping Beauty literature.
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  29. added 2016-12-08
    The Puzzle of the Hats.Rabinowicz Wlodek & Bovens Luc - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):57-78.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which credences and (...)
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  30. added 2016-10-16
    Agreement and Updating For Self-Locating Belief.Michael Caie - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):513-547.
    In this paper, I argue that some plausible principles concerning which credences are rationally permissible for agents given information about one another’s epistemic and credal states have some surprising consequences for which credences an agent ought to have in light of self-locating information. I provide a framework that allows us to state these constraints and draw out these consequences precisely. I then consider and assess the prospects for rejecting these prima facie plausible principles.
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  31. added 2016-08-27
    Essays on Paradoxes.Terry Horgan - 2017 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This volume brings together Terence Horgan's essays on paradoxes, both published and new. A common theme unifying these essays is that philosophically interesting paradoxes typically resist either easy solutions or solutions that are formally/mathematically highly technical. Another unifying theme is that such paradoxes often have deep-sometimes disturbing-philosophical morals.
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  32. added 2016-08-01
    Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II.Terry Horgan - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):811-839.
    In “Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem,” Anna Mahtani and I offer a new argument for thirdism that relies on what we call “generalized conditionalization.” Generalized conditionalization goes beyond conventional conditionalization in two respects: first, by sometimes deploying a space of synchronic, essentially temporal, candidate-possibilities that are not “prior” possibilities; and second, by allowing for the use of preliminary probabilities that arise by first bracketing, and then conditionalizing upon, “old evidence.” In “Beauty and Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and Mahtani,” (...)
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  33. added 2016-02-04
    Sleeping Beauty Goes to the Lab: The Psychology of Self-Locating Evidence.Matteo Colombo, Jun Lai & Vincenzo Crupi - unknown - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (1):173-185.
    Analyses of the Sleeping Beauty Problem are polarised between those advocating the “1/2 view” and those endorsing the “1/3 view”. The disagreement concerns the evidential relevance of self-locating information. Unlike halfers, thirders regard self-locating information as evidentially relevant in the Sleeping Beauty Problem. In the present study, we systematically manipulate the kind of information available in different formulations of the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Our findings indicate that patterns of judgment on different formulations of the Sleeping Beauty Problem do not fit (...)
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  34. added 2016-01-26
    How to Reason About Self-Locating Belief.David Shulman - unknown
    When reasoning about self-locating belief, one should reason as if one were a randomly selected bit of information. This principle can be considered to be an application of Bostrom's Strong Self-Sampling Assumption\cite{Bostrom} according to which one should reason as if one were a randomly selected element of some suitable reference class of observer-moments. The reference class is the class of all observer-moments. In order to randomly select an observer-moment from the reference class, one first randomly chooses a possible world $w$ (...)
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  35. added 2016-01-26
    Sleeping Beauty in Quantumland.Lev Vaidman - unknown
    It is argued that thirder resolution of the Lewis - Elga controversy about Sleeping Beauty is more clear when the coin toss is replaced by a quantum measurement and the analysis is performed in the framework of the Many-Worlds Interpretation.
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  36. added 2016-01-25
    Independent Repeated Sleeping Beauty.David Shulman - unknown
    In this paper, I shall provide a simple argument for the thirder analysis of the usual version of Sleeping Beauty\c and the hslfer analysis of a bare-bones version of the scenario. This argument depends upon a calculation of relative frequencies when the Sleeping Beauty experiment is repeated, but it is crucial that we be dealing with independent repetitions of the same experiment. The versions of repeated Sleeping Beauty discussed in the literature violate the independence requirement.
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  37. added 2015-12-11
    The Role of the Protocol in Anthropic Reasoning.Joseph Y. Halpern - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:195-206.
    I show how thinking in terms of the protocol used can help clarify problems related to anthropic reasoning and self-location, such as the Doomsday Argument and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.
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  38. added 2015-10-28
    Reply to Kim’s “Two Versions of Sleeping Beauty”.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1237-1243.
    I begin by discussing a conundrum that arises when Bayesian models attempt to assess the relevance of one claim to another. I then explain how my formal modeling framework manages this conundrum. Finally, I apply my modeling methodology to respond to Namjoong Kim’s objection to my framework.
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  39. added 2015-09-18
    Sleeping Beauty in a Grain of Rice.David Haig - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (1):23-37.
    In the Sleeping Beauty problem, Beauty is woken once if a coin lands heads or twice if the coin lands tails but promptly forgets each waking on returning to sleep. Philosophers have divided over whether her waking credence in heads should be a half or a third. Beauty has centered beliefs about her world and about her location in that world. When given new information about her location she should update her worldly beliefs before updating her locative beliefs. When she (...)
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  40. added 2015-06-01
    Lost Memories and Useless Coins: Revisiting the Absentminded Driver.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):3011-3036.
    The puzzle of the absentminded driver combines an unstable decision problem with a version of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Its analysis depends on the choice between “halfing” and “thirding” as well as that between “evidential” and “causal” decision theory. I show that all four combinations lead to interestingly different solutions, and draw some general lessons about the formulation of causal decision theory, the interpretation of mixed strategies and the connection between rational credence and objective chance.
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  41. added 2015-06-01
    Can Rational Choice Guide Us to Correct de Se Beliefs?Vincent Conitzer - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4107-4119.
    Significant controversy remains about what constitute correct self-locating beliefs in scenarios such as the Sleeping Beauty problem, with proponents on both the “halfer” and “thirder” sides. To attempt to settle the issue, one natural approach consists in creating decision variants of the problem, determining what actions the various candidate beliefs prescribe, and assessing whether these actions are reasonable when we step back. Dutch book arguments are a special case of this approach, but other Sleeping Beauty games have also been constructed (...)
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  42. added 2015-06-01
    Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy.Nick Bostrom - 2002 - Routledge.
    _Anthropic Bias_ explores how to reason when you suspect that your evidence is biased by "observation selection effects"--that is, evidence that has been filtered by the precondition that there be some suitably positioned observer to "have" the evidence. This conundrum--sometimes alluded to as "the anthropic principle," "self-locating belief," or "indexical information"--turns out to be a surprisingly perplexing and intellectually stimulating challenge, one abounding with important implications for many areas in science and philosophy. There are the philosophical thought experiments and paradoxes: (...)
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  43. added 2015-02-23
    Sleeping Beauty: A New Problem for Halfers.Michael Nielsen - manuscript
    I argue against the halfer response to the Sleeping Beauty case by presenting a new problem for halfers. When the original Sleeping Beauty case is generalized, it follows from the halfer’s key premise that Beauty must update her credence in a fair coin’s landing heads in such a way that it becomes arbitrarily close to certainty. This result is clearly absurd. I go on to argue that the halfer’s key premise must be rejected on pain of absurdity, leaving the halfer (...)
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  44. added 2015-02-23
    A Dutch Book Against Sleeping Beauties Who Are Evidential Decision Theorists.Vincent Conitzer - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2887-2899.
    In the context of the Sleeping Beauty problem, it has been argued that so-called “halfers” can avoid Dutch book arguments by adopting evidential decision theory. I introduce a Dutch book for a variant of the Sleeping Beauty problem and argue that evidential decision theorists fall prey to it, whether they are halfers or thirders. The argument crucially requires that an action can provide evidence for what the agent would do not only at other decision points where she has exactly the (...)
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  45. added 2015-02-09
    Titelbaum’s Theory of De Se Updating and Two Versions of Sleeping Beauty.Namjoong Kim - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1217-1236.
    In his “Relevance of Self-locating Belief”, Titelbaum suggests a general theory about how to update one’s degrees of self-locating belief. He applies it to the Sleeping Beauty problem, more specifically, Lewis’s :171–176, 2001) version of that problem. By doing so, he defends the Thirder solution to the puzzle. Unfortunately, if we modify the puzzle very slightly, and if we apply his general updating theory to the thus modified version, we get the Halfer view as a result. In this paper, we (...)
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  46. added 2014-12-18
    A Mathematical Analysis of the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Jeffrey Rosenthal - 2009 - The Mathematical Intelligencer 31:32-33.
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  47. added 2014-11-10
    Synchronizing Diachronic Uncertainty.Alistair Isaac & Tomohiro Hoshi - 2011 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (2):137-159.
    Diachronic uncertainty, uncertainty about where an agent falls in time, poses interesting conceptual difficulties. Although the agent is uncertain about where she falls in time, this uncertainty can only obtain at a particular moment in time. We resolve this conceptual tension by providing a transformation from models with diachronic uncertainty relations into “equivalent” models with only synchronic uncertainty relations. The former are interpreted as capturing the causal structure of a situation, while the latter are interpreted as capturing its epistemic structure. (...)
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  48. added 2014-09-26
    A Devastating Example for the Halfer Rule.Vincent Conitzer - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):1985-1992.
    How should we update de dicto beliefs in the face of de se evidence? The Sleeping Beauty problem divides philosophers into two camps, halfers and thirders. But there is some disagreement among halfers about how their position should generalize to other examples. A full generalization is not always given; one notable exception is the Halfer Rule, under which the agent updates her uncentered beliefs based on only the uncentered part of her evidence. In this brief article, I provide a simple (...)
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  49. added 2014-09-22
    Revealing the Beauty Behind the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Ioannis Mariolis - manuscript
    A large number of essays address the Sleeping Beauty problem, which undermines the validity of Bayesian inference and Bas Van Fraassen's 'Reflection Principle'. In this study a straightforward analysis of the problem based on probability theory is presented. The key difference from previous works is that apart from the random experiment imposed by the problem's description, a different one is also considered, in order to negate the confusion on the involved conditional probabilities. The results of the analysis indicate that no (...)
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  50. added 2014-06-26
    Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Michael G. Titelbaum presents a new Bayesian framework for modeling rational degrees of belief—the first of its kind to represent rational requirements on agents who undergo certainty loss.
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