Social and Political Philosophy, Misc

In this chapter, against the backdrop of campus responses to Israel and Gaza, I consider the mission of the university and whether that mission is served by institutional neutrality. On my view, it is not so easy (and may be impossible) to prise apart universities’ core functions and “public matters.” I argue that institutional neutrality is at best a useful fiction and at worst a way of concealing universities’ commitments and reinscribing the status quo. Along the way, I offer a (...) primer on academic and expressive freedoms in the context of universities, and on the importance of articulating and balancing core university values, including the duty of care. I conclude by offering advice on when universities should take a public stand on socio-political matters. -/- [This chapter is forthcoming in 2026 in an as-yet untitled edited collection edited by Marc Spooner and James McNinch and published by University of Regina Press.]. (shrink)

John Searle, in several articles and books, has contended that institutions incorporating status functions with deontic powers are created by collective acceptance that is not analysable into individual acceptance. I point out three self-contradictions in Searle’s exposition.

Robin Dembroff (Real Talk about the Metaphysics of Gender, 2018) believes that ‘non-binary’ is a social kind. I have my doubts about this, but if it is a social kind, then it is a very special one. The membership conditions of the social kind ‘non-binary’ are only accessible to non-binary persons. They establish and police their own membership conditions (Dembroff 2018: 36f.): ‘Individuals are granted authority over their gender kind membership.’ So, if this is indeed a ‘social kind’, then it (...) is a highly unusual one. (shrink)

După încheierea Războiului Rece, guvernele și agențiile de informații au continuat să utilizeze modelul convențional pentru a evalua amenințările de stat. Dar conceptele de securitate s-au îndepărtat de o confruntare extrem de militarizată între adversari cunoscuți și a crescut îngrijorarea față de amenințările nestatale mai greu de identificat. Actorii nestatali au devenit amenințări strategice, conceptul de "terorism strategic" fiind dezvoltat imediat după atacurile din septembrie 2001. Au existat acțiuni teroriste și în trecut, dar bin Laden a fost primul care a (...) folosit terorismul strategic pe scară largă împotriva unei superputeri. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.14144.58883. (shrink)

The analysts are in the field of "knowledge". Intelligence refers to knowledge and the types of problems addressed are knowledge problems. So, we need a concept of work based on knowledge. We need a basic understanding of what we know and how we know, what we do not know, and even what can be known and what is not known. The analysis should provide a useful basis for conceptualizing intelligence functions, of which the most important are "estimation" and "prediction". The (...) intelligence itself, in its basic form, has a decision-making function. Intelligence analysis applies individual and collective cognitive methods to assess data and test assumptions in a secret socio-cultural context. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25298.40646. (shrink)

Identity is a concept that evolves over the course of life. Identity develops over time and can evolve, sometimes drastically; depending on what directions we take in our life. In the age of globalization, a human being is more aware than old times regarding his community, social and national affairs. A person who identifies himself as part of a particular political party, of a particular faith, and who sees himself as upper-middle class, might discover that in later age, he's a (...) very different person. Perhaps he's no longer interested in politics, he's changed his religion, and he's living on less money than when he was in his younghood. Any variation is possible during a person's life span. -/- Religious Identity: A person's religious identity is the name of the religion that they identify themselves with. In this society people want to know, "What religion are you?" Generally they expect a one-word answer with the name of a religion that expresses their religious identity. A person might say they are a Buddhist - or a Christian - or a Jew - or a Muslim - or a Hindu. These are examples of religious identities. Recent developments in the field of social sciences in general and sociology in particular suggest a gradual tendency towards revival of interest on the issue of religion and identity. It is plausible that religion and identity may be positively correlated. The link between religion and identity can be contextualized through the exploration of the self. -/- Identity Politics: Identity politics is a political style that focuses on the issues relevant to various groups defined by a wide variety of shared characteristics, including, but not limited to, race, social class, religion, sex, gender, ethnicity, ideology, nationality, sexual orientation, gender expression, culture, currency, shared history, medical conditions, profession, and other of the many ways in which people differ from each other, and into which they may be classified or classify themselves. This concept played an important role in shaping social and national sphere. -/- Social Justice: Social justice denotes the equal treatment of all citizens without any social distinction based on caste, colour, race, religion, sex and so on. It means absence of privileges being extended to any particular section of the society, and improvement in the conditions of backward classes (SCs, STs, and OBCs) and women. Social Justice is the foundation stone of Indian Constitution. Indian Constitution makers were well known to the use and minimality of various principles of justice. Social justice found useful for everyone in its kind and flexible form. -/- Although social justice is not defined anywhere in the constitution but it is an ideal element of feeling which is a goal of constitution. Feeling of social justice is a form of relative concept that is changeable by the time, circumstances, culture and ambitions of the people. Social inequalities of India expect solution equally. Under Indian Constitution the use of social justice is accepted in wider sense, which includes social and economical justice both. -/- The major objective of this paper is to critical analyze all the above mentioned conceptions and see their relation with reference to a national character building as the present scenario of India showed a identity crisis between individual’s religious identity and secular objectives of the constitutions. The negative effect of the identity politics ruin ideal nation’s character and negatively affects the concept of social justice too. For a better nation we should a balanced state of affairs where every citizen has a space to develop him/her self and a motivation to contribute in development of India. -/- Note : This is submitted for a Three-Day Philosophy Teachers' Meet of North-Western Zone sponsored by ICPR, New Delhi to be organized by the Department of Guru Nanak Studies, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar on 29th to 31st Dec. 2015 with the theme "The Crisis of Multiple Identities in Contemporary World" . (shrink)

The focus of this paper is the necessity of developing a political philosophy based on Sadrian views. This requires a more intensive study of Sadrian political thought so that we can believe in it and present it to others. The important point here is to learn about the principles of the basic political thoughts of our society. Then we should see whether these principles lend themselves to criticism and conform to our social standards.

In this short paper, I critically examine Veli Mitova’s proposal that social-identity groups can have collective epistemic reasons. My primary focus is the role of privileged access in her account of how collective reasons become epistemic reasons for social-identity groups. I argue that there is a potentially worrying structural asymmetry in her account of two different types of cases. More specifically, the mechanisms at play in cases of “doxastic reasons” seem fundamentally different from those at play in cases of “epistemic-conduct (...) reasons”. The upshot is a need for further explanation of what unifies these dimensions of the account. (shrink)

Given the link between over-population and climate change, and the high levels of consumption in affluent societies, several scholars have recently raised scepticism that there is a human right to decide the spacing and number of one’s children, or even that there is a human right to procreate at all. In this chapter, I depart from this philosophical trend and explain why there is a human right to choose to procreate and to have multiple children. I argue that philosophical accounts (...) advocating for limited procreation tend to rely on at least one of three problematic assumptions. These are assumptions about children’s moral status, parental entitlements, and the actual value of the parent-child relationship as compared to other environmentally unfriendly activities. (shrink)

The Implementation Problem for conceptual engineering is, roughly, the problem conceptual engineers face when attempting to bring about the conceptual change they support. An important aspect of this problem concerns the extent to which attempting to implement concepts can lead to unintended negative consequences. Not only can conceptual engineers fail to implement their proposals, but their interventions can produce outcomes directly counter to their goals. It is therefore important to think carefully about the prospect of attempted implementation leading to unintended (...) negative consequences: what sort of negative consequences can conceptual engineers expect? Are some forms of conceptual engineering more likely than others to lead to such consequences? And is conceptual engineering still viable even given the risk of such consequences? This paper addresses such questions. I begin by outlining different forms of conceptual engineering (Section 1), before examining how they can produce unintended negative consequences (Section 2). I then discuss some implications of the fact that attempted implementation can produce unintended negative consequences, suggesting that, among other things, some forms of conceptual engineering are less viable than others (Section 3). I conclude, though, by considering some of the ways in which conceptual engineering is nonetheless a worthwhile pursuit (Section 4). (shrink)

Do salient normative claims about politics require moral premises? Political moralists think they do, political realists think they do not. We defend the viability of realism in a two-pronged way. First, we show that a number of recent attacks on realism, as well as realist responses to those attacks, unduly conflate distinctively political normativity and non-moral political normativity. Second, we argue that Alex Worsnip and Jonathan Leader-Maynard’s recent attack on realist arguments for a distinctively political normativity depends on assuming moralism (...) as the default view, which places an excessive burden on the viability of realism, and so begs the question. Our discussion, though, does not address the relative merits of realism and moralism, so its upshot is relatively ecumenical: moralism need not be the view that all apt normative political judgments are moral judgments, and realism need not be the view that no apt normative political judgments are moral judgments. (shrink)

Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition has recently been criticised on the grounds that it conceives of the relationship between recognition and power in terms of an opposition. According to Honneth’s critics, this is too simple because recognition and power are often intertwined. My aim in this article is twofold: On the one hand, I seek to understand why Honneth conceives of recognition and power as opposed. As I will argue, this is not the result of bad theorising; rather, there are (...) important methodological considerations that account for this conception – specifically, the idea that one can develop an immanent critique of power in line with the tradition of the Frankfurt School only by adopting the participant perspective. On the other hand, I agree with the gist of what Honneth’s critics say and want to make a systematic proposal as to why opposing recognition and power is too simple. This proposal will build on the argument developed in the first part and will consist in the claim that to treat recognition and power as opposed is to consider recognition relations exclusively from the participant perspective in contrast to the observer perspective. As a result, the potential entanglement of recognition with problematic social arrangements cannot come into view. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of gentrification have tended to focus on residential displacement. However, the prevalence of residential displacement is fiercely contested, with many urban geographers regarding it as quite uncommon. This lends some urgency to the underexplored question of how one should evaluate other forms of gentrification. In this paper, I argue that one of the most important harms suffered by victims of displacement gentrification is loss of access to the goods conferred by membership in a thriving local community. Leveraging the (...) social scientific literature, I go on to argue that non-displacement gentrification also often damages local communities. One can hence extend existing philosophical critiques of displacement gentrification to argue that non-displacement gentrification likewise poses a threat to relational equality, and often violates certain basic occupancy rights. Focusing on the value that inheres in thriving local communities also suggests some new possibilities for critiquing gentrification. For instance, existing occupancy rights critiques focus on incumbent land users’ interests in stability. However, one can also argue in a Lockean mode that incumbent land users’ occupancy rights are at least partially grounded in their community having laboured together to create objects of value. An extension of Michael Walzer’s theory of justice to incorporate community goods as a separate ‘sphere’ might also have widespread appeal. Taken together, these arguments constitute a sustained and theoretically ecumenical case for the pro tanto moral objectionability of gentrification. (shrink)

This paper examines how radical realism, a form of ideology critique grounded in epistemic rather than moral normativity, can illuminate the relationship between ideology and political power. The paper argues that radical realism can has both an evaluative and a diagnostic function. Drawing on reliabilist epistemology, the evaluative function shows how beliefs shaped by power differentials are often epistemically unwarranted, e.g. due to the influence of motivated reasoning and the suppression of critical scrutiny. The paper clarifies those mechanisms in order (...) to address some recent critiques of radical realism. The paper then builds on those clarifications to explore the how tracing the genealogy of legitimation stories can diagnose the distribution of power in society, even if ideology does not play a direct stabilising role. This diagnostic function creates a third position in the debate on ideology between culturalists and classical Marxists, and it can help reconciling aspects of structural and relational theories of power. (shrink)

In the last two decades Anglophone political theory witnessed a renewed interest in social-scientific empirical findings—partly as a reaction against normative theorizing centred on the formulation of abstract, intuition-driven moral principles. This brief paper begins by showing how this turn has taken two distinct forms: (i) a non-ideal theoretical orientation, which seeks to balance the emphasis on moral principles with feasibility and urgency considerations, and (ii) a fact-centric orientation, which seeks to ground normative conclusions in empirical results. The core of (...) the paper then compares and contrast three variants of fact-centric political theory: normative behaviourism, grounded normative theory, and radical realism. The upshot: normative behaviourism achieves focus on observable behaviour at the cost of status quo bias, grounded normative theory achieves radicalism at the cost of endorsing an activist orientation to theorising, and radical realism combines a non-activist orientation with the potential for far-reaching critique of the status quo. (shrink)

Discussion surrounding first contact with extra-terrestrial intelligence (ETI) is hotly debated in the literature. This paper responds to claims made by Jebari and Olsson-Yaouzis that the ‘dominant thought’ in the philosophy of language indicates that communication with ETI would not be possible, and that the resultant uncertainty forces us into the Hobbesian Trap—the proclivity to adopt pre-emptive military strategies as a function of mutual distrust and fear of imminent attack. The ‘dominant thought’ in the philosophy of language constitutes largely behaviourist (...) thinking and hinges on ‘shared human context.’ However, shared universal contexts, together with the potential existence of post-biological ETI, suggest that communication at a level sufficient to interpret basic dispositions (what I call the level of ‘performative function’) may be possible. -/- Deploying both philosophical and game theoretical analyses, this paper provides several refutations and a repudiation of Jebari and Olsson-Yaouzis's claims: I correct the assumption that ETI would necessarily adopt a game theoretical rationality, critique the notion that ETI would choose a risk-dominant strategy rather than a payoff-dominant strategy, repudiate the claim that communication with ETI would not be possible, and show how the Hobbesian equivalence principle is violated in a proximal first-contact situation. Finally, in the absence of game theoretic decision-making (and inline with the calls from the Billingham report), this paper commences work on the development of an incomplete set of Axioms of First Contact from which to generate a definitive groundwork for both post-detection protocol and rules of engagement. An open invitation to other contributors to criticise, augment, and advance this bottom-up approach to first contact is extended. (shrink)

¿Puede tener la ciudadanía un derecho a recibir noticias de calidad? Hay quien cree que semejante derecho es inviable porque las obligaciones que de él se seguirían implicarían una supresión de facto de las libertades periodísticas. En este artículo defiendo que ese problema afecta solo al derecho a las noticias si se lo concibe como derecho jurídico subjetivo. Concebido como un derecho moral, el derecho de la ciudadanía a las noticias es no solo compatible con las libertades periodísticas, sino el (...) fundamento moral de la institución periodística misma. Además, argumento que el derecho a las noticias puede (y debe) tener importantes efectos jurídicos, ya que impone a las administraciones públicas una obligación de adoptar medidas para protegerlo, las cuales clasifico en directas e indirectas. (shrink)

This article offers a comparative exploration of the practices of resistance Theodor Adorno and Michel Foucault champion against the structures of modern power their enquiries have the merit to illuminate and contest. After a preliminary examination of their views about the relationship between theory and praxis, I shall pursue two goals: first, I shall illustrate the limitations of Adorno’s negativist portrait of an ethics of resistance and contrast it with Foucault’s more promising notion of resistance as strategic counter-conduct, which in (...) his late ethico-political writings becomes the heart of a distinctive politics of the governed. Second, despite their dissimilarities, I shall argue that their ideas can be brought together to elaborate a ‘compounded’ account of resistance, where Adorno’s politics of suffering figures as the necessary pre-condition for the creative practices of freedom Foucault seeks to encourage. (shrink)

This article responds to recent criticism regarding the application of consequentialism and rational choice theory in the social and moral sciences. It clarifies the limited scope of the presented criticism and its overly simplistic view of social scientific inquiry that, together, lead to the presentation of an argument that claims more than it warrants. Moreover, I argue that the criticism overlooks one of the most important uses of instrumentalism in moral theory that may be considered the most challenging case for (...) the application of rational choice theory. (shrink)

En Occidente nos aferrábamos, casi ideológicamente, a unas expectativas de paz perdurable suscitadas en 1995. En aquel entorno, tras la unificación de Alemania y superada la Guerra Fría, celebrábamos los doscientos años de la publicación del opúsculo La Paz perpetua de Immanuel Kant (1795-1995). Treinta años después el mundo ha cambiado, hemos entrado en una nueva época con dos guerras importantes vivas, sin fin a la vista, una en Europa (Ucrania) y otra en Oriente próximo (Israel), con crecientes tensiones y (...) el riesgo de arrastrar al mundo a un conflicto de mayor amplitud. Además, crecen numerosas crisis: en el Mar Rojo, por el hostigamiento de los hutíes del Yemen; la alta tensión entre las dos Coreas; en el Indo Pacífico la continua presión de China a Taiwán y su asertiva presencia en el Mar de la China Meridional. Hay brasas encendidas en otros conflictos como Nagorno ? Karabaj; los territorios Kurdos de Turquía; los conflictos civiles en Siria, Yemen, Sudán del Sur, República Centroafricana y Birmania. Hemos entrado en una era de conflictos. Este giro del curso histórico plantea diversos interrogantes decisivos para su estudio científico: ¿Qué ha ocurrido? ¿Cómo se ha llegado a esto? ¿Estamos ante el declive de la democracia? ¿Hay nuevamente una confrontación hegemónica? ¿Se ha roto la globalización e iniciamos un periodo de desglobalización? ¿Nos encontramos en un punto de inflexión en la historia reciente (Zeitenwende)? ¿Afloran síntomas de una decadencia de occidente? ¿Entramos de nuevo en un pasaje hacia una "civilización brutalizada"? Estas y otras preguntas se tratan aquí de la mano de grandes especialistas y académicos como Aquilino Cayuela, Jerónimo Molina, Enrique Bonete, Carlos Pérez del Valle, Miguel Ángel Belmonte, Domingo González y Juan Carlos Valderrama. Nos ofrecen con este libro un riguroso trabajo científico y reflexivo, centrado en el esclarecimiento, la evaluación y la crítica de los marcos morales y políticos del presente. (shrink)