Social and Political Philosophy, Miscellaneous

En el presente artículo se abordarán los aportes realizados por Gramsci en la construcción de la figura del intelectual. Para ello, se caracterizarán los rasgos distintivos del determinismo histórico marxista, para luego enfocarnos en el pensamiento gramsciano. A partir de allí nos centraremos de manera expresa en los argumentos desplegados por Gramsci al procurarle una función activa a la figura del intelectual, en tanto intelectual colectivo que se va conformando encarnado en el partido revolucionario de la clase obrera. De esta (...) manera, plantearemos que esta disposición del intelectual colectivo se enlaza con los problemas de la vida social en la búsqueda de unificar teoría y praxis, y pretende crear así una nueva hegemonía, puesto que admite la indeterminabilidad de la historia según leyes. (shrink)

Several studies have lately revealed that social media conceal at least three dangerous pitfalls. Firstly, social media can negatively impact sociopolitical processes in advanced liberal democracies by becoming vehicles for the spread of false information that augments political polarization (Lee et al. 2017; Ostillio 2018). Secondly, as a result of the first point, social mediacan rapidly become a source of incorrect beliefs for those subjects with low digital literacy (Guess et al. 2019). Thirdly, because of the first and second points, (...) intentionally deceitful manipulations of social media content are potent generators of information cascades that increase group polarizations across groups of vulnerable social media users (Jang and Kim2018, Wang et al. 2018, Colliander 2019). These findings support the claim that the circulation of biased content on social media potentially threatens sociopolitical stability in liberal Western democracies (Duffy 2018; Sunstein 2018). Although this claim is far from being speculative, as shown by the FacebookFile investigations (Wall Street Journal 2019) and the center for humane technology’s recen tresearch, it introduces a thorny dilemma regarding the founding principles of liberal Western democracies. Namely, should Western legislators limit free speech by introducing severe penalties for those who spread fake news and the likes on social media? Or should they let the free market autonomously produce efficient technology allowing people to identify biased social media content?In other words, is a libertarian solution to the plight of online fake news and the like preferable to adequate legislation that punishes those who spread such content? Though appealing, it is unrealistic to believe that the free market can resolve this problem. On the other hand, it is realistic to suppose that Western governments should engage in a merciless battle against biased social media content. For instance, following the publication of the Report of the independent High level Group on fake news and online disinformation in 2018, the European Union introduced new directives to limit the spread of fake news online in 2021, when the Covid19 pandemic started fading. Although initiatives as such might look like limitations of free speech, there is solid philosophical ground to defend such initiatives. To prove this contention, we resort to Hobbes’s (1651, Part II, §18 and §29) argument that humans can avoid falling back into the Hobbesian state of war only if they stipulate a covenant. Specifically, we appeal to Hobbes’s (1651) argument in favor of bestowing the sovereign the right to ban those seditious doctrines that might undermine peace and sociopolitical stability in the Hobbesian Commonwealth. In this regard, we show that the Hobbesian covenant resolves conflict among humans in the same way a correlated equilibrium limits noncooperation in game theory. Namely, like game theory players, citizens enjoy greater welfare whenever they observe rules that mitigate conflict (Slomp 2010). Accordingly, we argue that citizens would be better off only if Western governments introduced severe penalties for those who intentionally spread fake news. Notably, we argue that effective regulation would create disincentives for spreading biased content and incentives for spreading truthful content. Furthermore, we argue that effective regulation against online fake news would assuage the polarizing effects of online availability cascades on social networks. Importantly, we provide empirical evidence supporting these claims by showing that the lack of effective regulation led the American government to miserably fail to contain the devasting effects of the online infodemic (i.e., the epidemic of false online information)that took place during the first two waves of the Covid19 pandemic (Evanega et al. 2020, Milosh et al. 2020). (shrink)

Hierarchy and inequality are deeply rooted in Indian tradition. They are found in practice in the form of unequal placement of caste and class groups in the civilizing system of Indian society. The notions of dharma (normative order), karma (personnel moral commitment) and jāti (caste) that constitute the basic principles of Indian culture, making the Indian cultural tradition a unique cultural tradition, are also the principles of hierarchy and social stratification. In this paper, an attempt has been made to present (...) a comprehensive and investigative view of different scholars concerning the deep-rooted traditional characteristics of caste in Indian society. (shrink)

He claims he wants it to bring moments of calmness. Maybe, but I found it to be more of a fun way to spark some creativity… and thinking.

David Estlund holds that ultimate normative principles are insensitive to bad facts. This is a deliberately twisted appropriation of Jerry Cohen’s famous dictum that ultimate normative principles are fact-insensitive. In this paper, I will show why Estlund’s twist misses the point of Cohen’s argument. The fact-insensitivity claim is not a requirement to eliminate all facts from our normative theories because facts necessarily make these theories concessive. Instead, it may help us to locate the true origin of these concessions. In normative (...) theorizing, we have not explained why a fact supports a principle if we fail to articulate the higher-order principle in light of which that fact is normatively significant. (shrink)

In this article, the foundations of a new principle of international relations are discussed. They are traced back to the idea of the human being as a culturally living being (homo culturalis). The new principle of harmonic power is conceptualized in the first segment by way of contrasting it with the original meaning of the concept of ‘soft power’ by Joseph S. Nye Jr. In the next part, a portion of the intension of a new concept of culture is established. (...) It serves as a conceptual background and context for the idea of harmonic power. This foundation for a new and more comprehensive concept of culture is inspired by ancient Chinese elements of thought but also by comparable elements of Indian and Graeco-Roman philosophy. In the following step, a conceptual extension of culture in four major areas, respec-tively, mutually permeable “focus fields” is outlined. The accompanying discussion in view of ancient Chinese philosophy and elements of other traditions then leads to a completion of the intension of the concept of culture. This is achieved in view of the aspect of morality in relation to the Golden Rule. In a final step, further reflec-tions are provided regarding the interrelation of the advanced concepts of harmonic power and culture discussed in the this article. Harmonic power means the essential prerequisite for the shift away from the conflict-ridden desire for monopolar world hegemony—a yearning that has revealed itself as an impasse over and over again—towards a peace-bearing, transformative future of multipolar world participation. Harmonic power is the foundation of the cultivation of a mutually beneficial socio-cultural co-evolution on a global scale. (shrink)

This chapter defends a legal human right to tobacco control. Building on existing work, the chapter argues that the legal case for such a right is strong. Existing international human rights treaties, chiefly the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, recognize a human right to health alongside several other rights that speak for covering tobacco control under human rights law. Drawing on Allen Buchanan’s pluralistic justificatory framework for human rights, the chapter argues that the philosophical case is strong (...) too. Tobacco is among the deadliest public health threats worldwide and its health impacts so severe that humans should have a claim against their governments to protect them against the harms of tobacco. Human rights law is a promising avenue to strengthen this claim. The chapter then defends a human right to tobacco control against several philosophical worries. For example, is strong tobacco control compatible with personal freedom? Is it compatible with personal consent? Would human rights legislation facilitate power relations that unduly restrict national and individual self-determination? This chapter argues that concerns with freedom of choice, consent and power relations do not speak against tobacco control. Conversely, a concern with power relations speaks for a human right to tobacco control as it could lessen the power asymmetries between tobacco companies and vulnerable populations, such as children, smokers of lower socio-economic status and citizens in low-income countries with weaker governance structures. (shrink)

This article reconstructs and defends Theodor Adorno’s social theory by motivating the central role of abstract domination within it. Whereas critics such as Axel Honneth have charged Adorno with adhering to a reductive model of personal domination, I argue that the latter rather understands domination as a structural and de-individualized feature of capitalist society. If Adorno’s social theory is to be explanatory, however, it must account for the source of the abstractions that dominate modern individuals and, in particular, that of (...) value. While such an account remains undeveloped in Adorno, Marx provides resources for its development, in positing the constitution of value neither in production nor exchange alone, but in the social totality. This article argues that Marx’s account is compatible with Adorno’s, and that it may be used to render Adorno’s theory of domination more credible on explanatory grounds. (shrink)

What gives someone a moral right to parent? What role should the liberal state play in the creation of families? Are prospective parents allowed to create a child in a world facing a changing climate and full of parentless children? -/- In this book, Luara Ferracioli defends a new theory of the moral right to parent by focusing on the special role of parents in creating the conditions for the flourishing of their children irrespective of whether there is a biological (...) connection between them, and by explaining why the parent-child relationship remains valuable even after the child reaches the age of majority. Ferracioli also argues that although procreative and adoptive parenting enjoy equal moral standing, justice towards children requires that the liberal state make adoption more desirable and feasible for its citizens. Finally, the book provides a partial theory of childrearing which focuses on the goods of childhood that parents are primarily responsible for fostering: carefreeness, enjoyment-driven or curiosity-driven achievement, and friendship. (shrink)

Debates concerning digital automation are mostly focused on the question of the availability of jobs in the short and long term. To counteract the possible negative effects of automation, it is often suggested that those at risk of technological unemployment should have access to retraining and reskilling opportunities. What is often missing in these debates are implications that all of this may have for individual autonomy understood as the ability to make and develop long-term plans. In this paper, I argue (...) that if digital automation becomes rapid, it will significantly undermine the legitimate expectation of stability and consequently, the ability to make and pursue long-term plans in the sphere of work. I focus on what is often taken to be one of the main long-term plans, i.e. the choice of profession, and I argue that this choice may be undermined by the pressure to continuously acquire new skills while at the same time facing a diminishing range of professions that one can choose from. Given that the choice of profession is significant for not-work related spheres of life, its undermining can greatly affect individual autonomy in these other spheres too. I argue that such undermining of individual planning agency constitutes a distinctive form of harm that necessitates a proactive institutional response. (shrink)

The question of whether or not one should procreate is rarely cast as a personal choice in philosophical discourse; rather, it is presented as an ethical choice made against a backdrop of aggregate concerns. But justifications concerning procreation in popular culture regularly engage with the role that identity plays in making procreative decisions; specifically, how one’s decision will affect who they are and who they might be in the future. Women in particular cite the personally transformative aspects of becoming a (...) parent — personal circumstances, including socioeconomic status, age, health, and relationship status — as the most important considerations for the decision they make regarding possible parenthood, and not the more aggregate concerns that an ethics of procreation prioritizes. I highlight women because when women undergo a transformative experience related to parenthood, they do so in contexts where the social, economic, and emotional effects related to pregnancy and motherhood are extensive and impose greater effects on women than men. These harmful material effects threaten a woman’s economic stability, career development, social relationships, and emotional health. Because of this, I argue that an ethics of procreation must engage with the ways in which women’s identities are transformed through procreative decisions. (shrink)

The concept of ‘Ethnicity’ still enjoys some currency in the historical and social science literature. However, the cogency of the idea remains disputed. First coming to prominence in the 1980s, the word is often used to depict the character of social relations in the context of conflicts over sovereignty. The case of Northern Ireland presents a paradigmatic example. This article is a rejoinder to Ian McBride’s contention that my scepticism about the notion lacks justification. With reference to disputes over the (...) state, I show in response that ‘ethnicity’ in effect means nationality. I further claim that the nation state is a successor to the dynastic state. In clarifying the meaning of this arrangement, the article brings out how the nation is a juridical rather than empirical category. More specifically, it derives from the notion of corporate personality in law. For this reason, its retrospective integrity is a matter of fabrication, depending on the fiction of ancestral continuity. At the same time, its future-oriented cohesiveness means that it must be invested with a unifying will. I conclude that the legitimacy of a nation state rests on its democratic will, whose coherence is expressed in the action of its government. (shrink)

Ce travail examine les revendications contemporaines de droits pour les robots. Il présente les principales formes argumentatives qui ont été développées en faveur d’une considération éthique ou de droits positifs pour ces machines. Il met en relation ces argumentations avec un travail de recherche-action afin de produire un retour critique sur l’idée de droit des robots. Il montre enfin le rapport complexe entre les récits de la modernité et la revendication de droits pour les robots. This article presents contemporary vindications (...) of robot rights. The first part exposes main argumentations in favor of moral consideration or legal personhood for robots. The second part builds on cooperative action research with several French roboticists and experts in order to evaluate these arguments. These dialogues eventually show the complex relationships between the narratives of modernity and the vindication of robot rights. (shrink)

Henry Odera Oruka was one of the most influential figures in 20th-century African philosophy. During the early years of the decolonization of African countries, as universities worked to redefine themselves, Odera drove changes to curricula and research. A tireless advocate for democracy and human rights in Africa, he repeatedly intervened in the political debates of his time. -/- This is the first critical biography of both the man himself and African philosophy in the context of changing times, taking us through (...) his early life, scholarly training, and Oruka's way of transforming the field of philosophy as it was taught in Kenya. -/- The narrative unfolds from the personal to the global, from Africa to the world, and from African philosophy to the wider field of philosophy. Biographical material is woven with narratives of the social conditions and live questions as they arise in Oruka's life in Kenya, Sweden, and the United States. We are introduced to his understanding of philosophy as a critique of society. Exposing prison practices in Africa and targeting capitalists, Oruka sought to remedy social problems on a global scale, from institutional racism and ethnic division to the wealth gap between rich and poor nations. -/- Through archival material, personal interviews and primary texts, this book shines a light on Oruka's monumental contribution to African philosophy and global justice. Finally we can see how Oruka's insights are still relevant to how we think about poverty, philosophy and human rights today. (shrink)

Mobsters and others engaged in risky forms of social coordination and coercion often communicate by saying something that is overtly innocuous but transmits another message ‘off record’. In both ordinary conversation and political discourse, insinuation and other forms of indirection, like joking, offer significant protection from liability. However, they do not confer blanket immunity: speakers can be held to account for an ‘off record’ message, if the only reasonable interpreta- tions of their utterance involve a commitment to it. Legal liability (...) for speech in the service of criminal behavior displays a similar profile of significant protection from indirection along with potential liability for reasonable interpretations. Specifically, in both ordinary and legal contexts, liability depends on how a reasonable speaker would expect a reasonable hearer to interpret their utterance in the context of utter- ance, rather than on the actual speaker’s claimed communicative intentions. (shrink)

This chapter argues that several aspects of Bernard Williams’s style, methodology, and metaphilosophy can be read as evolving dialectically out of Wittgenstein’s own. After considering Wittgenstein as a stylistic influence on Williams, especially as regards ideals of clarity, precision, and depth, Williams’s methodological debt to Wittgenstein is examined, in particular his anthropological interest in thick concepts and their point. The chapter then turns to Williams’s explicit association, in the 1990s, with a certain form of Wittgensteinianism, which he called ‘Left Wittgensteinianism’. (...) It is shown how this is not a sudden conversion, but the direct product of Williams’s longstanding critical engagement with Wittgenstein’s methodology and metaphilosophy: Williams arrives at this position by envisaging a Wittgensteinianism that thinks in concrete sociohistorical terms, embraces genuine explanation, and relinquishes its insistence on the purity of philosophy. When properly understood, moreover, this critique turns out to be continuous with Williams’s advocacy of a conception of philosophy as a humanistic discipline. Finally, it is shown that Williams inherits from Wittgenstein a certain understanding of how philosophy can help us to live, in particular the therapeutic ambition to liberate us from distortions in our self-understanding by assembling reminders. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of the phrase ‘acting on behalf of another.’ To do this, acting on behalf is first distinguished from ‘acting for the sake of another,’ the latter being a matter of other-directed motivation, the former of what we call ‘normative other-directedness’—i.e., acting on the claims and duties of the other. Second, we provide a distinction between two kinds of acting on behalf of another: representation as other-directedness plus normative replacement, and normative support as other-directedness without normative (...) replacement. Third, the paper offers conditions of appropriateness for both types of acting on behalf. (shrink)

Several contemporary philosophers have argued that democracy earns its moral keep in part by rendering political authority compatible with social or relational equality. In a recent article in this journal, Alexander Motchoulski examines these relational egalitarian defenses of democracy, finds the standard approach wanting, and advances an alternative. The standard approach depends on the claim that inequality of political power constitutes status inequality (the ‘constitutive claim’). Motchoulski rejects this claim on the basis of a theory of social status: once you (...) see what social status is, Motchoulski thinks, the constitutive claim is a non-starter. In its place, Motchoulski suggests that relational egalitarians can and should content themselves with a defense of democratic institutions on the basis of a causal-instrumental link between equality of political power and equality of social relations. In this reply, I advance three main claims. First, relational egalitarians have good reason to hope for a defense of the constitutive claim, since that claim is required if relational equality is to vindicate the intrinsic value of democracy. Second, Motchoulski’s argument against the constitutive claim fails, because it depends on conflating one species of social status for the genus as a whole. Finally, I argue that the constitutive claim is trivially true for one kind of status, namely de facto authority, but, since equality of that kind of status is not intrinsically valuable, this does not amount to a defense of the intrinsic value of democracy. (shrink)

In this essay written for a general audience, the idea and concept of the metaverse is introduced and analyzed with particular emphasis on future forms of human interaction and sociality. The current state of exploitative data capitalism is criticized and used as a reference for questioning the dehumanizing view of people as mere data points in a possible "Metaverse" as envisaged by the likes of Meta, Inc., and other companies. The essay concludes by asking what could be a good life (...) in virtual environments. (shrink)

This foreword gives an overview of ethical perspectives on the question of economization and commodification. Major theories are reviewed and linked to the overarching (and seemingly inevitable) idea and leitmotif of the "market" as the driving force of societal action and organization.

If I decide to disclose information about myself, this act can undermine other people’s ability to effectively conceal information about themselves. One case in point involves genetic information: if I share ‘my’ genetic information with others, I thereby also reveal genetic information about my biological relatives. Such dependencies are well-known in the privacy literature and are often referred to as ‘privacy dependencies’. Some take the existence of privacy dependencies to generate a moral duty to sometimes avoid sharing information about oneself. (...) If true, we argue, then it is sometimes justified for others to impose harm on the person sharing the information to prevent them from doing so. This is a highly revisionary implication. Hence, one must either endorse a highly revisionary view on what one may do to protect one’s privacy, or one must reject the view that privacy dependencies can be used to justify a moral duty that constrains choices about sharing information about oneself. (shrink)

In this paper I provide a preliminary account of weakness of political will (political akrasia). My aim is to use theories from the weakness of will literature as a guide to develop a model of the same phenomenon as it occurs in collective agents. Though the account will parallel the traditional view of weakness of will in individuals, weakness of political will is a distinctly political concept that will apply to group agents such as governments, institutional actors, and other political (...) collectives. I further argue that blaming inaction by collective political agents on a “lack of political will” should be understood as blaming a kind of akratic break within the deliberative process, leading to an inability of the collective agent to capitalize on existing group attitudes in order to translate them into policy or legislation. My primary example throughout will be U.S. political inaction with respect to the climate crisis. (shrink)

El informe sobre el estado de la democracia liberal de 2022 elaborado por el Instituto de investigación V-Dem de la Universidad de Gothenburg constata la existencia de un claro declive global en el apoyo a este sistema de gobierno que baja a los niveles de 1989.

The Research Article deals with the discussion on the status and position of women in Assamese society and the role played by different traditional and cultural institutions towards the projection of women. Firstly, to examine the status and position of women in Assamese society, various religious texts, cultural myths and stories and literatures of Assam have been discussed. Next, how violence against women is justified in the patriarchal social structures of Assam has been discussed.

"Economization" is a major narrative of the present. Related processes of marketization or commodification of many central areas of life can be observed. Whether in politics, in the media, in education, science and culture: efficiency criteria are postulated and often understood as if there were no alternative. The belief in an invisible hand of the market has almost become a dogma: statistics, rankings and evaluations become mediatized lead currencies. People are supposed to behave in such a way that they function (...) better and more smoothly. How can people lead a good life under the conditions of such norms? Which maxims of individual conduct of life are beneficial to society and to sociality? What can a new ethic of values look like in the context of economization? (shrink)

From an ethical and sociological perspective this article analyzes what it means when users upload pictures of children on social media forums. The paper argues that, under the conditions of Big Data and related surveillance practices, and following up on categories introduced by Hannah Arendt in "The Human Condition" (1958), what was once private has become part of the public sphere: people would increasingly become "publicly private," and act accordingly. The categorical blurring of what can be shown publicly and what (...) should remain hidden in the private realm, and the consequences this has for digital practices such as exposing children by way of online pictures, may be a consequence of a new "relational", hive-orientated understanding of the self in online contexts which is a departure from a classically individual, autonomous understanding of the individual self. This poses an ethical problem inherent in many other practices of digitality as well. (shrink)

Digitalization has set in motion social processes that are having an impact on our democratic fabric. These include phenomena that affect the media system itself, such as a weakening of quality journalism, a strengthening of disinformation and populist media, and an increasing power of opinion of intermediaries (such as Google, Meta, et al.). As a result, processes can be observed that directly affect our understanding of democracy: these are, in particular, tendencies that lead to the destabilization of democratic opinion- and (...) will-forming and thus call democratic negotiation and decision-making processes into question. Surveillance technologies that encroach on our fundamental values of privacy and autonomy can be just as dangerous to democracy. The authors reflect from ethical, media studies, philosophical and legal perspectives on the significance of current developments for our democracy in a digital world, and what normative requirements and options for action exist. (shrink)

In this article, I examine a case involving an equity-minded parent caught in a quandary about which school to select for her child, knowing that her decision may have consequences for others. To do so, I heuristically construct a fictional portrait and explore the deliberative process a parent might have through a dialogue taking place among ‘friends’, where each friend personifies a different set of ethical considerations. I then briefly consider two competing philosophical assessments but argue that neither position helpfully (...) assists in resolving the quandary. To conclude, I ask the provocative question whether parental motives – but also their school choices – actually matter if the inequitable outcomes seem to remain unchanged. (shrink)