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  1. Consistent Collective Decisions Under Majorities Based on Difference of Votes.Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (3):473-494.
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  2. A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Couples.Ingo Althöfer & Raphael Thiele - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (1):1-15.
  3. Up and Down with Aggregation.Bradford Hooker - unknown
  4. Luck-Egalitarianism: Faults and Collective Choice: Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):151-173.
    A standard formulation of luck-egalitarianism says that ‘it is [in itself] bad – unjust and unfair – for some to be worse off than others [through no fault or choice of their own]’, where ‘fault or choice’ means substantive responsibility-generating fault or choice. This formulation is ambiguous: one ambiguity concerns the possible existence of a gap between what is true of each worse-off individual and what is true of the group of worse-off individuals, fault or choice-wise, the other concerns the (...)
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  5. Voting, Deliberation and Truth.Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2016 - Synthese:1-21.
    There are various ways to reach a group decision on a factual yes–no question. One way is to vote and decide what the majority votes for. This procedure receives some epistemological support from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Alternatively, the group members may prefer to deliberate and will eventually reach a decision that everybody endorses—a consensus. While the latter procedure has the advantage that it makes everybody happy, it has the disadvantage that it is difficult to implement, especially for larger groups. (...)
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  6. Rationality and Transitivity in Social Explanation: Logical-Mathematical Aspects.Ioan Biriș - 2015 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):65-70.
    The term “rationality” is applied to many different things, from beliefs and preferences to decisions and choices, actions and behaviors, people, collectivities, andinstitutions. Therefore this paper will limit its considerations only to social preferences and choices in order to clarify the role of rationality in social explanation. The paper will focus on degrees of rationality, calling upon the concept of transitivity for help.
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  7. Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Volume 1, Social Choice and Public Decision Making.Walter P. Heller, Ross M. Starr & David A. Starrett (eds.) - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
    Professor Kenneth J. Arrow is one of the most distinguished economic theorists. He has played a major role in shaping the subject and is honoured by the publication of three volumes of essays on economic theory. Each volume deals with a different area of economic theory. The books include contributions by some of the best economic theorists from the United States, Japan, Israel and Europe.
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  8. On the Aggregation of Wadsley Defects in Slightly Reduced Rutile.L. A. Bursill & B. G. Hyde - 1971 - Philosophical Magazine 23 (181):3-15.
  9. Aggregation Pheromone System: A Real-Parameter Optimization Algorithm Using Aggregation Pheromones as the Base Metaphor.Shigeyosi Tsutsui - 2005 - Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 20:76-83.
  10. Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory. Condorcet, Iain McLean, Fiona Hewitt.Keith Michael Baker - 1997 - Isis 88 (1):148-149.
  11. Discussion: Judgment as "the Collective Becoming Abstract.".A. H. Lloyd - 1894 - Psychological Review 1 (3):283-285.
  12. Levels of Aggregation and the Generalized Matching Law.C. Donald Heth - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (2):306-321.
  13. Taking Dictatorship Seriously: A Reply to Quesada.Greg Fried - 2014 - Public Choice 158 (1):243-251.
    Antonio Quesada (Public Choice 130:395–400, 2007) argues that a dictator has no more than two to three times the ‘average power’ of a non-dictatorial voter. If Quesada is correct, then his argument has major consequences for social choice theory; for instance, it warrants reconsidering the significance of Arrow’s Theorem. If Quesada is incorrect, however, then his position is dangerously misleading. This paper argues that Quesada is wrong. His argument depends on his own formal account of power, an account that is (...)
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  14. Aggregation of Value Judgments Differs From Aggregation of Preferences.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2016 - In .
  15. Voting Procedures.Michael Dummett - 1984 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Combines a theoretical interest in the mathematics of voting procedures with practical interest in the circumstances in which votes are cast. The most important results in the theory of voting are surveyed, and the differences between the principal types of voting procedures are explained.
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  16. The Two Tasks of Epistemology—an Impossibility Theorem.Bengt Hansson - unknown
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  17. Hopeful Losers? A Moral Case for Mixed Electoral Systems.Loren King - 2015 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 10 (2):107-121.
    Loren King | : Liberal democracies encourage citizen participation and protect our freedoms, yet these regimes elect politicians and decide important issues with electoral and legislative systems that are less inclusive than other arrangements. Some citizens inevitably have more influence than others. Is this a problem? Yes, because similarly just but more inclusive systems are possible. Political theorists and philosophers should be arguing for particular institutional forms, with particular geographies, consistent with justice. | : Les démocraties libérales encouragent la participation (...)
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  18. Aggregating Judgement in Scientifc Practice.Raphaël Künstler - unknown
    This paper argues that standard theories of judgment aggregation cannot apply to scientific practice, since science is a temporally extended process that involves both different individuals and different hypotheses during that process. Thus, for example, we seem to have no idea how to determine the judgments of dead scientists about theoretical alternatives that were proposed after their death. The paper then proposes an algorithm for judgment aggregation to try to address some of these challenges.
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  19. The Premises of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem Are Not Simultaneously Justified.Franz Dietrich - 2008 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 5 (1):56-73.
    Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they should be competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: whether a premise is justified depends on the notion of uncertainty or probability employed; no such notion renders both premises simultaneously justified. Especially the independence assumption should be weakened.
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  20. Linking as Voting : How the Condorcet Jury Theorem in Political Science is Relevant to Webometrics.George Masterton, Erik J. Olsson & Staffan Angere - unknown
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  21. An Impossibility Theorem for Verisimilitude.Sjoerd Zwart & Maarten Franssen - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):75-92.
    In this paper, we show that Arrow’s well-known impossibility theorem is instrumental in bringing the ongoing discussion about verisimilitude to a more general level of abstraction. After some preparatory technical steps, we show that Arrow’s requirements for voting procedures in social choice are also natural desiderata for a general verisimilitude definition that places content and likeness considerations on the same footing. Our main result states that no qualitative unifying procedure of a functional form can simultaneously satisfy the requirements of Unanimity, (...)
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  22. The Many as One: Integrity and Group Choice in Paradoxical Cases.Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager - 2004 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (3):249-276.
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  23. SIGRAD 2010 – Content Aggregation and Visualization.Kai-Mikael Jää-Aro & Thomas Larsson (eds.) - 2010 - Linköping University Electronic Press.
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  24. How to Condorcet a Goldman.Michele Palmira - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):413-425.
    In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, Alvin I. Goldman invokes the Condorcet Jury Theorem in order to defend the reliability of intuitions. The present note argues that the original conditions of the theorem are all unrealistic when analysed in connection to the case of intuitions. Alternative conditions are discussed.
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  25. Introducing Difference Into the Condorcet Jury Theorem.Peter Stone - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (3):399-409.
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  26. The Generalized Homogeneity Assumption and the Condorcet Jury Theorem.Ruth Ben-Yashar - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (2):237-241.
    The Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) is based on the assumption of homogeneous voters who imperfectly know the correct policy. We reassess the validity of the CJT when voters are homogeneous and each knows the correct decision with an average probability of more than a half.
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  27. Modelling Individual Expertise in Group Judgements.Dominik Klein & Jan Sprenger - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (1):3-25.
  28. Utilitarianism: Volume 26, Part 1: The Aggregation Question.Ellen Frankel Paul, Miller Jr & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    Utilitarianism and other aggregationist moral theories view the public interest or the general welfare as an aggregate of individual goods. But critics of these theories question whether there is adequate justification for employing the concept of an aggregate social good. How are we supposed to sum up individual interests? Is it even possible to compare the utilities of different people or to assign values to individual utilities that can be added or subtracted? If not, how is the general good to (...)
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  29. On Arrow’s Theorem and Scientific Rationality: Reply to Morreau and Stegenga.Samir Okasha - 2015 - Mind 124 (493):279-294.
    In a recent article I compared the problem of theory choice, in which scientists must choose between competing theories, with the problem of social choice, in which society must choose between competing social alternatives. I argued that the formal machinery of social choice theory can be used to shed light on the problem of theory choice in science, an argument that has been criticized by Michael Morreau and Jacob Stegenga. This article replies to Morreau’s and Stegenga’s criticisms.
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  30. Arrow’s Theorem by Arrow Theory. [REVIEW]Samson Abramsky - 2015 - In Andrés Villaveces, Roman Kossak, Juha Kontinen & Åsa Hirvonen (eds.), Logic Without Borders: Essays on Set Theory, Model Theory, Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics. De Gruyter. pp. 15-30.
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  31. A Refutation of Arrow's Theorem.Howard DeLong - 1991 - Upa.
    To find more information on Rowman & Littlefield titles, please visit us at www.rowmanlittlefield.com.
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  32. Correspondance Inédite de Condorcet Et Mme Suard, M. Suard Et Garat 1771-1791.Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet, Elisabeth Suard & Badinter - 1988
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  33. Democracy and Community: The Significance of Kenneth Arrow's General Possibility Theorem for Democratic Theory.Andrew Levine - 1971 - Dissertation, Columbia University
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  34. Condorcet and the Logic of Technocracy.Gorman Beauchamp - 2009 - Humanitas: Interdisciplinary journal (National Humanities Institute) 22 (1):23-32.
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  35. Democracy, Elections, and Rationality: An Examination of the Implications of Social Choice Theory for the Theory and Practice of American Government.Benjamin Franklin Radcliff - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
    Arrow's Theorem implies that the problem of cyclical majorities is endemic any non-dictatorial system of preference aggregation that meets certain minimal conditions of fairness. The present study attempts to access the significance of this result to the theory and practice of democratic government. ;The analysis begins with an empirical examination of individual and social level preferences for candidates in several recent American presidential elections. It is argued that clear Condorcet winners existed in each contest in question. Further, it was found (...)
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  36. Preference Aggregation.Paul Douglas Lyon - 1980 - Dissertation, Washington University
    In the final part, Arrow's own formal treatment of the social choice problem is examined and its relation to the preference aggregation model is analyzed. Particular attention is paid to Arrow's discussion of independence of irrelevant alternatives, and, with the aid of some additional formal work, much of what has been found problematic in this is resolved. Finally, this analysis is used as the basis of a critique of the "received view" in the literature about independence of irrelevant alternatives. ;In (...)
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  37. The Majority.Andrew Taylor - 2010 - Contemporary Political Theory 9 (4):359-392.
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  38. SÉVERAC, J. B. -Condorcet. [REVIEW]A. Robinson - 1913 - Mind 22:591.
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  39. A. F. MacKay, "Arrow's Theorem".Lanning Sowden - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (130):104.
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  40. Voting Procedures.Michael Dummett - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (7):398-401.
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  41. Condorcet.Ferdinand Buisson - 1931 - Philosophical Review 40 (3):306-307.
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  42. Alfred F. MacKay., Arrow's Theorem: The Paradox of Social Choice A Case Study in the Philosophy of Economic. [REVIEW]Debra C. Rosenthal - 1982 - International Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):91-92.
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  43. Moral Aggregation.Iwao Hirose - 2014 - Oup Usa.
    This book elucidates the theoretical structure and scope of interpersonal and intra-personal aggregation--a trade-off between benefits to a group of individuals and losses to another group of individuals--and defends a form of aggregation -- formal aggregation -- that resolves a variety of outstanding problems arising from the conventional understanding of aggregation, including the Number Problem concerning the moral relevance of the number of individuals.
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  44. An Impossibility Theorem for Allocation Aggregation.Carl Wagner & Mark Shattuck - unknown
    In axiomatic approaches to expert opinion aggregation, so-called independence conditions have been ubiquitous. Such conditions dictate that the group value assigned to each decision variable should depend only on the values assigned by individuals to that variable, taking no account of values that they assign to other variables. This radically anti-holistic stricture on the synthesis of expert opinion severely limits the set of allowable aggregation methods. As we show, the limitations are particularly acute in the case of three or more (...)
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  45. Structured Arguments and Their Aggregation: A Reply to Selinger.Chris Reed - 2014 - Argumentation 28 (3):395-399.
    Selinger provides a new take on what is being referred to in the computational literature as ‘structured argumentation’. In this commentary the differences and similarities with existing work are highlighted as a way of demonstrating how philosophical and computational approaches to argumentation are increasingly coming together and complementing one another.
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  46. Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalised -- Part Two: The Premise-Based Approach.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2017 - Social Choice and Welfare 48:787–814.
    How can different individuals' probability functions on a given sigma-algebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem often require 'event-wise independence': the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals' probabilities for that event. In practice, however, some events may be 'basic' and others 'derivative', so that it makes sense first to aggregate the probabilities for the former and then to let these constrain the probabilities for the latter. We formalize (...)
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  47. Voting in Bad Faith.Joanne C. Lau - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (3):281-294.
    What is wrong with participating in a democratic decision-making process, and then doing something other than the outcome of the decision? It is often thought that collective decision-making entails being prima facie bound to the outcome of that decision, although little analysis has been done on why that is the case. Conventional perspectives are inadequate to explain its wrongness. I offer a new and more robust analysis on the nature of voting: voting when you will accept the outcome only if (...)
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  48. Power Indices in Large Voting Bodies.Dennis Leech - unknown
    There is no consensus on the properties of voting power indices when there is a large number of voters in a weighted-voting body. On the one hand, in some real-world cases that have been studied the power indices have been found to be nearly proportional to the weights (e.g., the EUCM, US Electoral College); this is true for both the Penrose-Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices. It has been suggested that this is a manifestation of a conjecture by Penrose (known subsequently (...)
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  49. Sequential Voting by Veto: Extending the Applicability of the Mueller-Moulin Algorithm.D. S. Felsenthal & M. Machover - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33:223-240.
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  50. The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.Franz Dietrich & List & Christian - 2010 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 3. Oxford University Press.
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to …lling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...)
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