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  1. A Formal Theory of Democratic Deliberation.Hun Chung & John Duggan - 2020 - American Political Science Review 114 (1):14-35.
    Inspired by impossibility theorems of social choice theory, many democratic theorists have argued that aggregative forms of democracy cannot lend full democratic justification for the collective decisions reached. Hence, democratic theorists have turned their attention to deliberative democracy, according to which “outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals” (Cohen 1997a, 73). However, relatively little work has been done to offer a formal theory of democratic deliberation. This (...)
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  2. A Logic for Reasoning About Group Norms.Daniele Porello - 2018 - In Jan M. Broersen, Gabriella Pigozzi, Cleo Condoravdi & Shyam Nair (eds.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems - 14th International Conference, {DEON} 2018, Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 3-6, 2018. Londra, Regno Unito: pp. 301--315.
    We present a number of modal logics to reason about group norms. As a preliminary step, we discuss the ontological status of the group to which the norms are applied, by adapting the classification made by Christian List of collective attitudes into aggregated, common, and corporate attitudes. Accordingly, we shall introduce modality to capture aggregated, common, and corporate group norms. We investigate then the principles for reasoning about those types of modalities. Finally, we discuss the relationship between group norms and (...)
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  3. Reasoning About Development: Essays on Amartya Sen's Capability Approach.Thomas R. Wells - 2013 - Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam
    Over the last 30 years the Indian philosopher-economist Amartya Sen has developed an original normative approach to the evaluation of individual and social well-being. The foundational concern of this ‘capability approach’ is the real freedom of individuals to achieve the kind of lives they have reason to value. This freedom is analysed in terms of an individual’s ‘capability’ to achieve combinations of such intrinsically valuable ‘beings and doings’ (‘functionings’) as being sufficiently nourished and freely expressing one’s political views. In this (...)
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  4. Democracia, Cidadania e Direitos Humanos no Brasil.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - manuscript
    O sistema político brasileiro preenche, formalmente, os requisitos mínimos de uma poliarquia, ou seja, um sistema democrático em que o poder é atribuído com base em eleições livres e em que há ampla participação política e concorrência pelos cargos eletivos. Esse sistema implica disputa pelo poder, tolerância à diversidade de opiniões e oposição política. No entanto, o que se percebe na sociedade é que essa estrutura formal não garante a democratização dos recursos socialmente produzidos, como bens, direitos e serviços básicos (...)
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  5. The Premises of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem Are Not Simultaneously Justified.Franz Dietrich - 2008 - Episteme 5 (1):56-73.
    Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they are competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: whether a premise is justi…ed depends on the notion of probability considered; none of the notions renders both premises simultaneously justi…ed. Under the perhaps most interesting notions, the independence assumption should be weakened.
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  6. Prioritarianism: A (Pluralist) Defence.Shai Shimon Yehuda Agmon & Matt Hitchens - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (1).
    A well-known objection to prioritarianism, famously levelled by Mike Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve, is that it wrongly ignores the unity of the individual in treating intra-personal cases like inter-personal cases. In this paper we accept that there should be a moral shift between these cases, but argue that this is because autonomy is a relevant consideration in intra-personal but not inter-personal cases, and one to which pluralist prioritarians ought to attend. To avoid this response, Otsuka and Voorhoeve must assume we (...)
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  7. A Paradox for the Intrinsic Value of Freedom of Choice.Johan E. Gustafsson - forthcoming - Noûs.
    A standard liberal claim is that freedom of choice is not only instrumentally valuable but also intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable for its own sake. I argue that each one of five conditions is plausible if freedom of choice is intrinsically valuable. Yet there exists a counter-example to the conjunction of these conditions. Hence freedom of choice is not intrinsically valuable.
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  8. Condorcet’s jury theorem: General will and epistemic democracy.Miljan Vasić - 2018 - Theoria: Beograd 61 (4):147-170.
    My aim in this paper is to explain what Condorcet’s jury theorem is, and to examine its central assumptions, its significance to the epistemic theory of democracy and its connection with Rousseau’s theory of general will. In the first part of the paper I will analyze an epistemic theory of democracy and explain how its connection with Condorcet’s jury theorem is twofold: the theorem is at the same time a contributing historical source, and the model used by the authors to (...)
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  9. Independent Opinions? On the Causal Foundations of Belief Formation and Jury Theorems.Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):655-685.
    Democratic decision-making is often defended on grounds of the ‘wisdom of crowds’: decisions are more likely to be correct if they are based on many independent opinions, so a typical argument in social epistemology. But what does it mean to have independent opinions? Opinions can be probabilistically dependent even if individuals form their opinion in causal isolation from each other. We distinguish four probabilistic notions of opinion independence. Which of them holds depends on how individuals are causally affected by environmental (...)
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  10. A Theory of Bayesian Groups.Franz Dietrich - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):708-736.
    A group is often construed as one agent with its own probabilistic beliefs (credences), which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance through averaging. In their celebrated “Groupthink”, Russell et al. (2015) require group credences to undergo Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever individual credences undergo Bayesian revision based on this information. To obtain a fully Bayesian group, one should often extend this requirement to non-public or even private information (learnt by not all or (...)
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  11. Consistent Collective Decisions Under Majorities Based on Difference of Votes.Mostapha Diss & Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (3):473-494.
    The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the possibility of reaching inconsistent collective decisions from the election process. In these cases, the collective preference includes cycles and even could prevent the election of any alternative as the collective choice. The likelihood of consistent outcomes under a class of majority rules constitutes the aim of this paper. Specifically, we focus on majority rules that require certain consensus in individual preferences to declare an alternative as (...)
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  12. A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Couples.Ingo Althöfer & Raphael Thiele - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (1):1-15.
    The agents of a jury have to decide between a good and a bad option through simple majority voting. In this paper the jury consists of N independent couples. Each couple consists of two correlated agents of the same competence level. Different couples may have different competence levels. In addition, each agent is assumed to be better than completely random guessing. We prove tight lower and upper bounds for the quality of the majority decision. The lower bound is the same (...)
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  13. Up and Down with Aggregation.Bradford Hooker - unknown
  14. Review of A Primer in Social Choice Theory. [REVIEW]Juan D. Moreno-Ternero - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):397-403.
  15. Luck-Egalitarianism: Faults and Collective Choice: Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):151-173.
    A standard formulation of luck-egalitarianism says that ‘it is [in itself] bad – unjust and unfair – for some to be worse off than others [through no fault or choice of their own]’, where ‘fault or choice’ means substantive responsibility-generating fault or choice. This formulation is ambiguous: one ambiguity concerns the possible existence of a gap between what is true of each worse-off individual and what is true of the group of worse-off individuals, fault or choice-wise, the other concerns the (...)
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  16. Rights and Social Choice: Jerry S. Kelly.Jerry S. Kelly - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):316-325.
  17. Rights and Social Choice: Is There a Paretian Libertarian Paradox?: Jonathan Pressler.Jonathan Pressler - 1987 - Economics and Philosophy 3 (1):1-22.
    In 1970 Amartya Sen exposed an apparent antinomy that has come to be known as the Paradox of the Paretian Libertarian. Sen introduced his paradox by establishing a simple but startling theorem. Roughly put, what he proved was that if a mechanism for selecting social choice functions satisfies two standard adequacy conditions, there are possible situations in which it will violate either the very weak libertarian precept that every individual has at least some rights or the seemingly innocuous Paretian principle (...)
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  18. How Changes in One's Preferences Can Affect One's Freedom : A Reply to Dowding and Van Hees: Ian Carter and Matthew H. Kramer.Ian Carter - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):81-96.
    How is a person's freedom related to his or her preferences? Liberal theorists of negative freedom have generally taken the view that the desire of a person to do or not do something is irrelevant to the question of whether he is free to do it. Supporters of the “pure negative” conception of freedom have advocated this view in its starkest form: they maintain that a person is unfree to Φ if and only if he is prevented from Φ-ing by (...)
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  19. Is Individual Choice Less Problematic Than Collective Choice?: Gregory S. Kavka.Gregory S. Kavka - 1991 - Economics and Philosophy 7 (2):143-165.
    It is commonplace to suppose that the theory of individual rational choice is considerably less problematic than the theory of collective rational choice. In particular, it is often assumed by philosophers, economists, and other social scientists that an individual's choices among outcomes accurately reflect that individual's underlying preferences or values. Further, it is now well known that if an individual's choices among outcomes satisfy certain plausible axioms of rationality or consistency, that individual's choice-behavior can be interpreted as maximizing expected utility (...)
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  20. Provocation on the Politics of Government-Funded Research. Part 1.David Stoesz - 1990 - Social Epistemology 4 (1):121-123.
  21. Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem and Dictatorship.Osamu Mori - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (3):257-272.
    In this paper I investigate the possibility of a dictatorship in the context of Harsanyi's Social Aggregation Theorem. Preliminarily, some propositions about Harsanyi's Theorem are presented using an alternative principle that I name Quasi-strong Pareto, which is the latter part of Strong Pareto. Then I define dictatorship as a requirement that social preference agrees with a dictator's preference or those of members of dictatorial group even if their preferences strictly contradict those of all other people in the society. Conclusively, although (...)
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  22. Whose Rights? A Critique of Individual Agency as the Basis of Rights. E. Weyl - 2009 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (2):139-171.
    I argue that individuals may be as problematic political agents as groups are. In doing so, I draw on theory from economics, philosophy, and computer science and evidence from psychology, neuroscience, and biology. If successful, this argument undermines agency-based justifications for embracing strong notions of individual rights while rejecting the possibility of similar rights for groups. For concreteness, I critique these mistaken views by rebutting arguments given by Chandran Kukathas in his article `Are There Any Cultural Rights?' that groups lack (...)
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  23. Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality: A Theory of Social Choice.Michael Taylor - 1983 - Ethics 94 (1):150-152.
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  24. Arrow’s Theorem and the Defense of Democracy.Matt Waldschlagel - 2010 - Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (2):109-118.
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  25. Realistic Opinion Aggregation: Lehrer-Wagner with a Finite Set of Opinion Values.R. Bradley & C. Wagner - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):91-99.
    An allocation problem is a type of aggregation problem in which the values of individuals' opinions on some set of variables sum to a constant. This paper shows that for realistic allocation problems, namely ones in which the set of possible opinion values is finite, the only universal aggregation methods that satisfy two commonly invoked conditions are the dictatorial ones. The two conditions are, first, that the aggregate opinion on any variable depends only on the individuals' opinions on that variable (...)
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  26. Voting, Deliberation and Truth.Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2016 - Synthese 195:1-21.
    There are various ways to reach a group decision on a factual yes–no question. One way is to vote and decide what the majority votes for. This procedure receives some epistemological support from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Alternatively, the group members may prefer to deliberate and will eventually reach a decision that everybody endorses—a consensus. While the latter procedure has the advantage that it makes everybody happy, it has the disadvantage that it is difficult to implement, especially for larger groups. (...)
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  27. Rationality and Transitivity in Social Explanation: Logical-Mathematical Aspects.Ioan Biriș - 2015 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):65-70.
    The term “rationality” is applied to many different things, from beliefs and preferences to decisions and choices, actions and behaviors, people, collectivities, andinstitutions. Therefore this paper will limit its considerations only to social preferences and choices in order to clarify the role of rationality in social explanation. The paper will focus on degrees of rationality, calling upon the concept of transitivity for help.
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  28. Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow: Volume 1, Social Choice and Public Decision Making.Walter P. Heller, Ross M. Starr & David A. Starrett (eds.) - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
    Professor Kenneth J. Arrow is one of the most distinguished economic theorists. He has played a major role in shaping the subject and is honoured by the publication of three volumes of essays on economic theory. Each volume deals with a different area of economic theory. The books include contributions by some of the best economic theorists from the United States, Japan, Israel and Europe.
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  29. On the Aggregation of Wadsley Defects in Slightly Reduced Rutile.L. A. Bursill & B. G. Hyde - 1971 - Philosophical Magazine 23 (181):3-15.
  30. Aggregation Pheromone System: A Real-Parameter Optimization Algorithm Using Aggregation Pheromones as the Base Metaphor.Shigeyosi Tsutsui - 2005 - Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 20:76-83.
  31. Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory. Condorcet, Iain McLean, Fiona Hewitt.Keith Michael Baker - 1997 - Isis 88 (1):148-149.
  32. Discussion: Judgment as "the Collective Becoming Abstract.".A. H. Lloyd - 1894 - Psychological Review 1 (3):283-285.
  33. Levels of Aggregation and the Generalized Matching Law.C. Donald Heth - 1992 - Psychological Review 99 (2):306-321.
  34. Taking Dictatorship Seriously: A Reply to Quesada.Greg Fried - 2014 - Public Choice 158 (1):243-251.
    Antonio Quesada (Public Choice 130:395–400, 2007) argues that a dictator has no more than two to three times the ‘average power’ of a non-dictatorial voter. If Quesada is correct, then his argument has major consequences for social choice theory; for instance, it warrants reconsidering the significance of Arrow’s Theorem. If Quesada is incorrect, however, then his position is dangerously misleading. This paper argues that Quesada is wrong. His argument depends on his own formal account of power, an account that is (...)
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  35. Aggregation of Value Judgments Differs From Aggregation of Preferences.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2016 - In .
    My focus is on aggregation of individual value rankings of alternatives to a collective value ranking. This is compared with aggregation o individual prefrences to a collective preference. While in an individual preference ranking the alternatives are ordered in accordance with one’s preferences, the order in a value ranking expresses one’s comparative evaluation of the alternatives, from the best to the worst. I suggest that, despite their formal similarity as rankings, this difference in the nature of individual inputs in two (...)
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  36. Voting Procedures.Michael Dummett - 1984 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Combines a theoretical interest in the mathematics of voting procedures with practical interest in the circumstances in which votes are cast. The most important results in the theory of voting are surveyed, and the differences between the principal types of voting procedures are explained.
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  37. The Two Tasks of Epistemology—an Impossibility Theorem.Bengt Hansson - unknown
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  38. Hopeful Losers? A Moral Case for Mixed Electoral Systems.Loren King - 2015 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 10 (2):107-121.
    Liberal democracies encourage citizen participation and protect our freedoms, yet these regimes elect politicians and decide important issues with electoral and legislative systems that are less inclusive than other arrangements. Some citizens inevitably have more influence than others. Is this a problem? Yes, because similarly just but more inclusive systems are possible. Political theorists and philosophers should be arguing for particular institutional forms, with particular geographies, consistent with justice. -/- Les démocraties libérales encouragent la participation citoyenne et protègent nos libertés. (...)
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  39. Aggregating Judgement in Scientifc Practice.Raphaël Künstler - unknown
    This paper argues that standard theories of judgment aggregation cannot apply to scientific practice, since science is a temporally extended process that involves both different individuals and different hypotheses during that process. Thus, for example, we seem to have no idea how to determine the judgments of dead scientists about theoretical alternatives that were proposed after their death. The paper then proposes an algorithm for judgment aggregation to try to address some of these challenges.
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  40. Linking as Voting : How the Condorcet Jury Theorem in Political Science is Relevant to Webometrics.George Masterton, Erik J. Olsson & Staffan Angere - unknown
  41. An Impossibility Theorem for Verisimilitude.Sjoerd Zwart & Maarten Franssen - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):75-92.
    In this paper, we show that Arrow’s well-known impossibility theorem is instrumental in bringing the ongoing discussion about verisimilitude to a more general level of abstraction. After some preparatory technical steps, we show that Arrow’s requirements for voting procedures in social choice are also natural desiderata for a general verisimilitude definition that places content and likeness considerations on the same footing. Our main result states that no qualitative unifying procedure of a functional form can simultaneously satisfy the requirements of Unanimity, (...)
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  42. The Many as One: Integrity and Group Choice in Paradoxical Cases.Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager - 2004 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (3):249-276.
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  43. SIGRAD 2010 – Content Aggregation and Visualization.Kai-Mikael Jää-Aro & Thomas Larsson (eds.) - 2010 - Linköping University Electronic Press.
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  44. How to Condorcet a Goldman.Michele Palmira - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):413-425.
    In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, Alvin I. Goldman invokes the Condorcet Jury Theorem in order to defend the reliability of intuitions. The present note argues that the original conditions of the theorem are all unrealistic when analysed in connection to the case of intuitions. Alternative conditions are discussed.
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  45. Introducing Difference Into the Condorcet Jury Theorem.Peter Stone - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (3):399-409.
    This paper explores the role that difference plays in collective decision-making using the Condorcet jury theorem. Agents facing a dichotomous decision might prove biased toward one of the options facing them. That is, they may be more likely to decide correctly when one of the options is correct than when the other option is. A juror might be more likely to convict a guilty defendant than to acquit an innocent one. Agents may display opposing biases. This paper identifies the optimal (...)
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  46. The Generalized Homogeneity Assumption and the Condorcet Jury Theorem.Ruth Ben-Yashar - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (2):237-241.
    The Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) is based on the assumption of homogeneous voters who imperfectly know the correct policy. We reassess the validity of the CJT when voters are homogeneous and each knows the correct decision with an average probability of more than a half.
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  47. Modelling Individual Expertise in Group Judgements.Dominik Klein & Jan Sprenger - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (1):3-25.
  48. Utilitarianism: Volume 26, Part 1: The Aggregation Question.Ellen Frankel Paul, Miller Jr & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    Utilitarianism and other aggregationist moral theories view the public interest or the general welfare as an aggregate of individual goods. But critics of these theories question whether there is adequate justification for employing the concept of an aggregate social good. How are we supposed to sum up individual interests? Is it even possible to compare the utilities of different people or to assign values to individual utilities that can be added or subtracted? If not, how is the general good to (...)
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  49. On Arrow’s Theorem and Scientific Rationality: Reply to Morreau and Stegenga.Samir Okasha - 2015 - Mind 124 (493):279-294.
    In a recent article I compared the problem of theory choice, in which scientists must choose between competing theories, with the problem of social choice, in which society must choose between competing social alternatives. I argued that the formal machinery of social choice theory can be used to shed light on the problem of theory choice in science, an argument that has been criticized by Michael Morreau and Jacob Stegenga. This article replies to Morreau’s and Stegenga’s criticisms.
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  50. Arrow’s Theorem by Arrow Theory. [REVIEW]Samson Abramsky - 2015 - In Andrés Villaveces, Roman Kossak, Juha Kontinen & Åsa Hirvonen (eds.), Logic Without Borders: Essays on Set Theory, Model Theory, Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics. De Gruyter. pp. 15-30.
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