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  1. Arrow’s Theorem by Arrow Theory. [REVIEW]Samson Abramsky - 2015 - In Andrés Villaveces, Roman Kossak, Juha Kontinen & Åsa Hirvonen (eds.), Logic Without Borders: Essays on Set Theory, Model Theory, Philosophical Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics. De Gruyter. pp. 15-30.
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  2. Scientific Competition: Theory and Policy, Conferences on New Political Economy.M. Albert, D. Schmidtchen & S. Voigt (eds.) - forthcoming - Mohr Siebeck.
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  3. The Epistemic Edge of Majority Voting Over Lottery Voting.Yann Allard-Tremblay - 2012 - Res Publica 18 (3):207-223.
    I aim to explain why majority voting can be assumed to have an epistemic edge over lottery voting. This would provide support for majority voting as the appropriate decision mechanism for deliberative epistemic accounts of democracy. To argue my point, I first recall the usual arguments for majority voting: maximal decisiveness, fairness as anonymity, and minimal decisiveness. I then show how these arguments are over inclusive as they also support lottery voting. I then present a framework to measure accuracy so (...)
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  4. A Condorcet Jury Theorem for Couples.Ingo Althöfer & Raphael Thiele - forthcoming - Theory and Decision.
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  5. Discussions: Propositions and Judgments.John Anderson - 1926 - Mind 35 (138):237-241.
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  6. Propositions and Judgments.John Anderson - 1926 - Mind 35 (138):237-241.
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  7. On Frustration of the Majority by Fulfilment of the Majority's Will.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1976 - Analysis 36 (4):161 - 168.
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  8. Committee Decisions with Partisans and Side-Transfers.Bac Mehmet & Kanti Bag Parimal - 2002 - Theory and Decision 52 (3):267-286.
    A dichotomous decision-making context in committees is considered where potential partisan members with predetermined votes can generate inefficient decisions and buy neutral votes. The optimal voting rule minimizing the expected costs of inefficient decisions for the case of a three-member committee is analyzed. It is shown that the optimal voting rule can be non-monotonic with respect to side-transfers: in the symmetric case, majority voting is optimal under either zero, mild or full side-transfer possibilities, whereas unanimity voting may be optimal under (...)
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  9. Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules Using Voting Records. [REVIEW]Eyal Baharad, Jacob Goldberger, Moshe Koppel & Shmuel Nitzan - 2012 - Theory and Decision 72 (1):113-130.
    In certain judgmental situations where a “correct” decision is presumed to exist, optimal decision making requires evaluation of the decision-makers’ capabilities and the selection of the appropriate aggregation rule. The major and so far unresolved difficulty is the former necessity. This article presents the optimal aggregation rule that simultaneously satisfies these two interdependent necessary requirements. In our setting, some record of the voters’ past decisions is available, but the correct decisions are not known. We observe that any arbitrary evaluation of (...)
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  10. Abstract Aggregations and Proximity Preservation: An Impossibility Result. [REVIEW]Nick Baigent & Daniel Eckert - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (4):359-366.
    An impossibility result for completely abstract social aggregation rules is presented. It is shown that non-imposition and a new no-veto property (two properties in the spirit of the Pareto principle and non-dictatorship respectively) are incompatible with an inter-profile consistency condition formulated in terms of proximity preservation.
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  11. Condorcet, From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics.Keith Michael Baker - 1975 - University of Chicago Press.
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  12. Teamwork: Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives, Edited by Natalie Gold. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, XXVI+253 Pages. [REVIEW]Nicholas Bardsley - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (2):237-240.
  13. A New Approach to Rights in Social Choice Theory Which Incorporates Utilitarianism.Richard Barrett, Anne Petron-Brunel & Maurice Salles - unknown
    The paper axiomatises a generalised utilitarian aggregation rule, under which different weights are assigned to utilities depending on the different rights involved. The relationship between actions, rights and the evaluation of utilities is investigated. Application is made to a famous example, Edwin-Angelina-the Judge, which appears in the social choice literature.
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  14. Social Scientists in Times of Crisis: The Structural Transformations Within the Disciplinary Organization and Thematic Repertoire of the Social Sciences.Gennady S. Batygin - 2004 - Studies in East European Thought 56 (1):7-54.
    This is a contribution to thesociology and social epistemology of knowledgeproduction in Russian social sciences today. Inthe initial section, the epistemic status andsocial function of Soviet social scientificdiscourse are characterized in terms of textualforms and their modes of (re-)production. Theremaining sections detail the course of therestructuration of social scientific discoursesince the fall of the Soviet Union and draw onextant empirical sources, in particular studiesof bibliographical rubrics, thematicrepertoires, and current textual formsthroughout the public sphere and the academicestablishment in Russia. An underlying (...)
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  15. Simple Majority Achievable Hierarchies.Dwight Bean, Jane Friedman & Cameron Parker - 2008 - Theory and Decision 65 (4):285-302.
    We completely characterize the simple majority weighted voting game achievable hierarchies, and, in doing so, show that a problem about representative government, noted by J. Banzhaf [Rutgers Law Review 58, 317–343 (1965)] cannot be resolved using the simple majority quota. We also demonstrate that all hierarchies achievable by any quota can be achieved if the simple majority quota is simply incremented by one.
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  16. Condorcet and the Logic of Technocracy.Gorman Beauchamp - 2009 - Humanitas: Interdisciplinary journal (National Humanities Institute) 22 (1):23-32.
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  17. Reliability of Information Aggregation with Regional Biases: A Note. [REVIEW]Martina Behm & Hans Peter Grüner - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (4):355-371.
    Is there a rationale for an electoral college system or do these voting systems always waste useful information? This paper studies this question in a setup in which voting is supposed to aggregate decentralized information about individual preferences for two candidates. Individual perceptions may be affected by regional information. When such regional information plays a major role, an electoral college system may be superior to simple majority voting.
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  18. Groups Can Make a Difference: Voting Power Measures Extended. [REVIEW]Claus Beisbart - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (3):469-488.
    The voting power of a voter—the extent to which she can affect the outcome of a collective decision—is often quantified in terms of the probability that she is critical. This measure is extended to a series of power measures of different ranks. The measures quantify the extent to which a voter can be part of a group that can jointly make a difference as to whether a bill passes or not. It is argued that the series of these measures allow (...)
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  19. A Utilitarian Assessment of Alternative Decision Rules in the Council of Ministers.Claus Beisbart, Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2005 - European Union Politics 6 (4):395-419.
    We develop a utilitarian framework to assess different decision rules for the European Council of Ministers. The proposals to be decided on are conceptualized as utility vectors and a probability distribution is assumed over the utilities. We first show what decision rules yield the highest expected utilities for different means of the probability distri- bution. For proposals with high mean utility, simple bench- mark rules (such as majority voting with proportional weights) tend to outperform rules that have been proposed in (...)
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  20. Welfarism and the Assessment of Social Decision Rules.Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann - 2006 - In Jerome Lang & Ulle Endriss (eds.), Computational Social Choice 2006. University of Amsterdam.
    The choice of a social decision rule for a federal assembly affects the welfare distribution within the federation. But which decision rules can be recommended on welfarist grounds? In this paper, we focus on two welfarist desiderata, viz. (i) maximizing the expected utility of the whole federation and (ii) equalizing the expected utilities of people from different states in the federation. We consider the European Union as an example, set up a probabilistic model of decision making and explore how different (...)
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  21. The Generalized Homogeneity Assumption and the Condorcet Jury Theorem.Ruth Ben-Yashar - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (2):237-241.
    The Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) is based on the assumption of homogeneous voters who imperfectly know the correct policy. We reassess the validity of the CJT when voters are homogeneous and each knows the correct decision with an average probability of more than a half.
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  22. Choice, Internal Consistency and Rationality.Aditi Bhattacharyya, Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Yongsheng Xu - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):123-149.
    The classical theory of rational choice is built on several important internal consistency conditions. In recent years, the reasonableness of those internal consistency conditions has been questioned and criticized, and several responses to accommodate such criticisms have been proposed in the literature. This paper develops a general framework to accommodate the issues raised by the criticisms of classical rational choice theory, and examines the broad impact of these criticisms from both normative and positive points of view.
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  23. Rationality and Transitivity in Social Explanation: Logical-Mathematical Aspects.Ioan Biriș - 2015 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):65-70.
    The term “rationality” is applied to many different things, from beliefs and preferences to decisions and choices, actions and behaviors, people, collectivities, andinstitutions. Therefore this paper will limit its considerations only to social preferences and choices in order to clarify the role of rationality in social explanation. The paper will focus on degrees of rationality, calling upon the concept of transitivity for help.
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  24. Preference Aggregation and Statistical Estimation.Jean-Marie Blin - 1973 - Theory and Decision 4 (1):65-84.
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  25. Domination, Epistemic Injustice and Republican Epistemology.James Bohman - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (2):175-187.
    With her conception of epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker has opened up new normative dimensions for epistemology; that is, the injustice of denying one?s status as a knower. While her analysis of the remedies for such injustices focuses on the epistemic virtues of agents, I argue for the normative superiority of adapting a broadly republican conception of epistemic injustice. This argument for a republican epistemology has three steps. First, I focus on methodological and explanatory issues of identifying epistemic injustice and argue, (...)
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  26. Deliberative Democracy and the Epistemic Benefits of Diversity.James Bohman - 2006 - Episteme 3 (3):175-191.
    It is often assumed that democracies can make good use of the epistemic benefi ts of diversity among their citizenry, but difficult to show why this is the case. In a deliberative democracy, epistemically relevant diversity has three aspects: the diversity of opinions, values, and perspectives. Deliberative democrats generally argue for an epistemic form of Rawls' difference principle: that good deliberative practice ought to maximize deliberative inputs, whatever they are, so as to benefi t all deliberators, including the least eff (...)
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  27. Measuring Group Fitness in a Biological Hierarchy: An Axiomatic Social Choice Approach.Walter Bossert, Chloe X. Qi & John A. Weymark - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (3):301-323.
    This article illustrates how axiomatic social choice theory can be used in the evaluation of measures of group fitness for a biological hierarchy, thereby contributing to the dialogue between the philosophy of biology and social choice theory. It provides an axiomatic characterization of the ordering underlying the MichodSolariNedelcu index of group fitness for a multicellular organism. The MVSHN index has been used to analyse the germ-soma specialization and the fitness decoupling between the cell and organism levels that takes place during (...)
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  28. Realistic Opinion Aggregation: Lehrer-Wagner with a Finite Set of Opinion Values. [REVIEW]R. Bradley & Wagner - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):91-99.
    An allocation problem is a type of aggregation problem in which the values of individuals' opinions on some set of variables sum to a constant. This paper shows that for realistic allocation problems, namely ones in which the set of possible opinion values is finite, the only universal aggregation methods that satisfy two commonly invoked conditions are the dictatorial ones. The two conditions are, first, that the aggregate opinion on any variable depends only on the individuals' opinions on that variable (...)
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  29. Collective Intelligence in the Executive Branch: Ten Priority Issues for the Next U.S. President.David A. Bray, Jerry Mechling, Benn Konsynski & Holli Semetko - unknown
    Within the next few pages, we outline how the U.S. President might employ novel arrangements of human and technology elements to produce improved government efforts involving the collective insights of all government works to: (1) better serve the public, (2) protect our country, and (3) generate innovative solutions that both address present day problems and produce a better future for us all. We seek to discuss insights into collective intelligence in large organizations - which, for the most part, has not (...)
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  30. Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory, Frohlich Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992, Xiv + 258 Pages. [REVIEW]Harry Brighouse - 1994 - Economics and Philosophy 10 (1):127.
  31. Should Social Preferences Be Consistent?John Broome - 1989 - Economics and Philosophy 5 (1):7.
    Should social preferences conform to the principles of rationality we normally expect of individuals? Should they, for instance, conform to the consistency axioms of expected utility theory? This article considers one fragment of this question.
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  32. Arrow's Theorem Weglorz's Models, and the Axiom of Choice.N. Brunner & R. Mihara - 2000 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 46 (3):335-360.
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  33. Arrow's Theorem, Weglorz' Models and the Axiom of Choice.Norbert Brunner & H. Reiju Mihara - 2000 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 46 (3):335-359.
    Applying Weglorz' mode s of set theory without the axiom of choice, we investigate Arrow-type social we fare functions for infinite societies with restricted coalition algebras. We show that there is a reasonable, nondictatorial social welfare function satisfying “finite discrimination”, if and only if in Weglorz' mode there is a free ultrafilter on a set representing the individuals.
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  34. An Ambiguity in Sen's Alleged Proof of the Impossibility of a Pareto Libertarian.James M. Buchanan - 1996 - Analyse & Kritik 18 (1):118-125.
    "Minimal liberalism", in Sen's strict definition, is impossible, because any 'social state', once chosen, freezes all of its components, thereby removing any prospect of further assignment of choice-making authority.
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  35. Condorcet.Ferdinand Buisson - 1931 - Philosophical Review 40 (3):306-307.
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  36. The Seven Pillars of Popper's Social Philosophy.Mario Bunge - 1996 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26 (4):528-556.
    The author submits that Popper's social philosophy rests on seven pillars: rationality (both conceptual and practical), individualism (ontological and methodological), libertarianism, the nonexistence of historical laws, negative utilitarianism ("Do no harm"), piecemeal social engineering, and a view on social order. The first six pillars are judged to be weak, and the seventh broken. In short, it is argued that Popper did not build a comprehensive, profound, or even consistent system of social philosophy on a par with his work in epistemology. (...)
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  37. On the Aggregation of Wadsley Defects in Slightly Reduced Rutile.L. A. Bursill & B. G. Hyde - 1971 - Philosophical Magazine 23 (181):3-15.
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  38. Some Strategic Properties of Plurality and Majority Voting.Donald E. Campbell - 1981 - Theory and Decision 13 (2):93-107.
  39. Methodology and Epistemology for Social Science: Selected Papers.Donald Thomas Campbell - 1988 - University of Chicago Press.
    Since the 1950s, Donald T. Campbell has been one of the most influential contributors to the methodology of the social sciences. A distinguished psychologist, he has published scores of widely cited journal articles, and two awards, in social psychology and in public policy, have been named in his honor. This book is the first to collect his most significant papers, and it demonstrates the breadth and originality of his work.
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  40. How Changes in One's Preferences Can Affect One's Freedom (and How They Cannot): A Reply to Dowding and Van Hees.Ian Carter & Matthew H. Kramer - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):81-96.
    How is a person's freedom related to his or her preferences? Liberal theorists of negative freedom have generally taken the view that the desire of a person to do or not do something is irrelevant to the question of whether he is free to do it. Supporters of the “pure negative” conception of freedom have advocated this view in its starkest form: they maintain that a person is unfree to Φ if and only if he is prevented from Φ-ing by (...)
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  41. Acceptance, Aggregation and Scoring Rules.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):201-217.
    As the ongoing literature on the paradoxes of the Lottery and the Preface reminds us, the nature of the relation between probability and rational acceptability remains far from settled. This article provides a novel perspective on the matter by exploiting a recently noted structural parallel with the problem of judgment aggregation. After offering a number of general desiderata on the relation between finite probability models and sets of accepted sentences in a Boolean sentential language, it is noted that a number (...)
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  42. Rational Aggregation.Bruce Chapman - 2002 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 1 (3):337-354.
    In two recent papers, Christian List and Philip Pettit have argued that there is a problem in the aggregation of reasoned judgements that is akin to the aggregation of the preference problem in social choice theory. 1 Indeed, List and Pettit prove a new general impossibility theorem for the aggregation of judgements, and provide a propositional interpretation of the social choice problem that suggests it is a special case of their impossibility result. 2 Specifically, they show that no judgement aggregation (...)
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  43. Democracy and Social Epistemology.Thomas Christiano - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):67-90.
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  44. Correspondance Inédite de Condorcet Et Mme Suard, M. Suard Et Garat 1771-1791.Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet, Elisabeth Suard & Badinter - 1988
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  45. Book Review:Social Choice and Individual Values. Kenneth J. Arrow. [REVIEW]Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Ethics 62 (3):220-.
  46. A Graph-Theoretical Approach to the Aggregation of Individual Preference Orderings.L. Czayka & H. Krauch - 1972 - Theory and Decision 3 (1):12-17.
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  47. Sequential Voting by Veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin Algorithm More Versatile.S. Dan Felsenthal & Moshé Machover - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33 (3):223-240.
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  48. A Strawson–Lewis Defence of Social Preferences.Jelle de Boer - 2012 - Economics and Philosophy 28 (3):291-310.
    This paper examines a special kind of social preference, namely a preference to do one's part in a mixed-motive setting because the other party expects one to do so. I understand this expectation-based preference as a basic reactive attitude. Given this, and the fact that expectations in these circumstances are likely to be based on other people's preferences, I argue that in cooperation a special kind of equilibrium ensues, which I call a loop, with people's preferences and expectations mutually cross-referring. (...)
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  49. A Refutation of Arrow's Theorem.Howard DeLong - 1991 - Upa.
    To find more information on Rowman & Littlefield titles, please visit us at www.rowmanlittlefield.com.
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  50. Welfarism, Preferencism, Judgmentism.Franz Dietrich - manuscript
    In a single framework, I address the question of the informational basis for evaluating social states. I particularly focus on information about individual welfare, individual preferences and individual (moral) judgments, but the model is also open to any other informational input deemed relevant, e.g. sources of welfare and motivations behind preferences. In addition to proving some possibility and impossibility results, I discuss objections against using information about only one aspect (e.g. using only preference information). These objections suggest a multi-aspect informational (...)
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