Social Epistemology

This paper provides a detailed discussion of the questions relating to the role of the researcher in relation to the researched when the researcher and the researched are both of Muslim origin. Issues relating to questions of objectivity, transparency, bias and interpretation are elaborated upon as part of the analysis of impacts and outcomes in relation to methodological process. It is argued that, ultimately, the subjective positions of researcher and researched are less important than the objective nature of the research (...) process. The intention of this paper is to convey, to other Muslim and non-Muslim social researchers engaged in research on Islam and Muslims, how to avoid or identify the range of risks and pitfalls that may emerge in operationalising and evaluating social research in a highly charged political, cultural and social research arena. (shrink)

Neste artigo examinamos os aspectos epistemológicos e jurídicos dacontrovérsia que opõe darwinistas e criacionistas no contexto de decisõesacerca do currículo nas escolas públicas. Essa controvérsia, já antiga epersistente no cenário norte-americano, adquiriu recentemente relevo noBrasil por meio da Lei Estadual n. 3.459/2000, do Estado do Rio de Janeiro.A primeira seção do artigo expõe as principais teses defendidas pelosdarwinistas e pelos criacionistas. Mostramos que os criacionistasmodificaram o modo como apresentaram suas convicções centrais, emfunção das decisões judiciais que têm impedido o ensino (...) do criacionismonas escolas públicas norte-americanas. Em seguida, discutimos o papelque os filósofos podem ter num debate judicial, tomando como modelo ocaso McLean vs. Arkansas Board of Education, em que o filósofo MichaelRuse foi ouvido como testemunha. Os critérios propostos por Ruse paracaracterizar a atividade científica e seus produtos – que conduzem, emúltima instância, a descartar o criacionismo como uma doutrina nãocientífica-, são o ponto de partida de uma tentativa de explicitar as imagensde natureza e de ciência que se consolidaram desde o advento da ciênciamoderna. Nesta segunda parte do artigo, também analisamos asdivergências entre Ruse, Larry Laudan e Barry Gross a respeito darelevância e legitimidade do chamado “problema da demarcação” numcontexto filosófico, bem como num contexto jurídico. A terceira seção doartigo busca mostrar que a controvérsia norte-americana não é, contudo, opano de fundo adequado para se avaliar as implicações da Lei Estadual n.3.459/2000. Argumentamos, além disso, que a sua constitucionalidade ébastante discutível, quando examinada a partir do direito à liberdadereligiosa.In this paper we examine the epistemological and juridical aspects of thecontroversy that opposes darwinists and creationists in the context ofdecisions concerning the public school syllabus. This old and enduringcontroversy in the North-American scenario, became recently salient inBrazil through the law n. 3.459/2000 of the Rio de Janeiro State. The firstsection of the paper attempts to present the main theses sustained by thedarwinists and by the creationists. We show that the creationists changedthe way they presented their chief commitments as a response to decisionsin the courts, which rejected the teaching of creationism in the North-American public schools. In what follows, we discuss the role philosophersmight play in debates in the courts, taking as a model the McLean vs.Arkansas Board of Education case, in which the philosopher Michael Rusewas a witness. The criteria proposed by Ruse to characterize the scientificactivity and its products – which lead ultimately to discard creationism asa non-scientific doctrine –, are the starting point of an attempt to makeexplicit the images of nature and science that coalesced since the inceptionof modern science. In the second section of the paper we also analyze theclash of opinions between Ruse, Larry Laudan and Barry Gross concerningthe relevance and legitimacy of the so-called “demarcation problem” in aphilosophical context, as well as in a juridical context. The third section ofthe paper attempts to show that the North-American controversy is not anadequate background, though, for analyzing the implications of the StateLaw n. 3.459/2000. We argue, furthermore, that its constitutionality isquestionable, given the right to religious freedom. (shrink)

The present text is a special kind of an introduction to the study “Visualization and Cognition” by Bruno Latour, structurally referring to the “A prologue in form of a dialogue between a Student and his Socratic Professor” by the same author. There emerges a picture of one of Latour’s two most important works on science, the source of his most important findings in this field, a classic of the area of visual anthropology. As shown by the authors, “Visualization …” gives (...) us an opportunity to comprehend the broadly understood images of the anthropology of science and the Actor-Network Theory, and can be a starting point for the moral and political reflection on modern science, including attempts to deal with the question: how to do science in a reasonable manner. (shrink)

SummaryIn a nutshell, the present essay claims this: First, the classical problem of knowledge has recently shifted from, How do I know? to, How do we know?–from psychology to sociology. As a phenomenological matter this is a great improvement, as a solution to the problem of rationality it is erroneous and immoral. The problem, should I act, believe, etc., this or that? is answered: You should do so on the authority of your reason. But change the problem of rationality in (...) accord with the change in the problem of knowledge, and ask, should we–rather than I–act or believe as we do? and the answer is clear: We should act and believe as we do, because our society is as it is, and should be as it is. This is clearly the same as, we should because we should. Not very enlightening.Sociologism appears as the authoritarian solution to the problem of rationality in works of Polanyi and Kuhn; a variant of it appears as a liberal theory in the studies of Popper and his former students who, however, do not offer any positive theory of what to believe or do; rather, they offer a negative theory of what to reject. They view this as a better solution to the problem of rationality, if not even a better formulation of it. (shrink)

One of the most fundamental problems plaguing the state of social science research in the United Arab Emirates is the lack of methodologies that appropriately respond to the cultural context of the country. Most social science research published from the region has merely transplanted Western quantitative methods and has proved ineffective as very few social problems in UAE have been appropriately responded to by social science research. This paper suggests the use of qualitative methods to make social science research in (...) UAE more relevant and impactful. This researcher contends that qualitative methods present an epistemological framework that allows for a greater recognition of the cultural uniqueness of the country and that addresses the nuances that make UAE difficult to study under quantitative methods. (shrink)

Online bullshit consists in online claims offered by speakers misrepresenting themselves as being concerned about the truth or falsity of what they’re saying. I’ll argue that if some practice is epistemically detrimental, we have pro tanto reason to censor it; a practice of OB is epistemically detrimental; and we thereby have pro tanto reason to censor such a practice. After having considered, and rejected, the three most promising arguments to the effect that is either false, or the reasons involved tend (...) to be defeated, I defend, and finally conclude by inferring. (shrink)

To what extent can we rely on others for information without such reliance becoming epistemically problematic? In this paper, this question is addressed in terms of a specific form of reliance: cognitive outsourcing. Cognitive outsourcing involves handing over (outsourcing) one’s information collection and processing (the cognitive) to others. The specific question that will be asked about such outsourcing is if there is an epistemic problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. To ask if there is an epistemic problem with x for (...) S is to ask if x is a problem for S’s ability to acquire true belief and avoid false belief. To ask if there is a problem for S with x as such is to ask if it is impossible to solve the problem for S while leaving x as is. I argue that, if we consider the five most plausible candidate epistemic problems raised by cognitive outsourcing—i.e., unreliability, gullibility, irrationality, dependency, and lack of epistemic autonomy—we see for each candidate that it is either not an epistemic problem, or not a problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. (shrink)

It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with (...) this problem in two steps, the second of which involves educators communicating their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justice are specified and related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady’s notions of epistemic justice. Finally, a series of objections are considered and responded to. (shrink)

We know that we are fallible creatures, liable to cognitive bias. But we also have a strong and stubborn tendency to overestimate our reasoning capacities. This presents a problem for any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways: While we might see the point of others heeding intellectual advice and relying on reasoning aids, each and every one of us will tend not to see the point of doing so ourselves. The present book argues that the solution to (...) this problem lies in accepting a form of epistemic paternalism. Accepting such paternalism is to accept that we are sometimes justified in interfering with the inquiry of another without her consent but for her own epistemic good. Because when it comes to our freedom to conduct inquiry in whatever way we see fit, more is not always better. In fact, less is often more. (shrink)

The phenomenon of widespread stigmatization of victims of deadly, or previously incurable, diseases in African traditional societies would appear to pragmatically contradict the humanistic values of communalism associated with those societies. However, the implied contradiction of the phenomenon, which borders on irrationality and injustice, seems amenable to a rational explanation when one considers the thick ontological underpinnings of African traditional communalism along with their epistemic significance. The justification of the proffered explanation, the paper avers, is made clearer when it is (...) taken as a paradigm of Jurgen Habermas’ theory of rationality and action. Against this background, the paper argues that such global social problemsas terrorism and internet scams may well be justifiable if Habermas’ strategic and contextual models of rationality and action are communicatively valid. (shrink)

This essay engages with several themes from Michel Foucault’s texts in order to examine the intricate connection between the normalizing power of medical discourse and its implicit ontological and epistemological commitments. I argue that medical discourse is inherently a medico-ethical discourse and its normalizing power is sustained through its being situated within a discourse on truth that allegedly establishes medical discourse as objective and scientific. In this context, in order to account for the non-coercive normalizing power of the medical sciences, (...) I claim that medical sciences can authorize themselves as objective only on the basis of a metabody, rather than real bodies. Through an appeal to the metabody, normal and abnormal are instituted as objective evaluations, and medical scientific discourse renders ethical normativity and epistemological normativity virtually indistinguishable. (shrink)

This paper explores the significant strengths of Fricker's account, and then develops the following questions. Can volitional epistemic practice correct for non-volitional prejudices? How can we address the structural causes of credibility-deflation? Are the motivations behind identity prejudice mostly other-directed or self-directed? And does Fricker aim for neutrality vis-à-vis identity, in which case her account conflicts with standpoint theory?

Despite a large number of Knowledge Management (KM) initiatives implemented in organizations, they often fail to manage the natural heterogeneity of organizational knowledge sources. Many approaches to KM have been only based on new information systems technologies to capture all the possible knowledge of an organization into databases that would make it easily accessible to all employees. To overcome heterogeneity, documentation overload and lack of context this article proposes Onto-DOM, a question-answering ontology-based strategy within a Distributed Organizational Memory.

At the very end of the 19th century, Gabriele Tarde wrote that all society was a product of imitation and innovation. This view regarding the development of society has, to a large extent, fallen out of favour, and especially so in those areas where the rational actor model looms large. I argue that this is unfortunate, as models of imitative learning, in some cases, agree better with what people actually do than more sophisticated models of learning. In this paper, I (...) contrast the behaviour of imitative learning with two more sophisticated learning rules in the context of social deliberation problems. I show for two social deliberation problems, the Centipede game and a simple Lewis sender-receiver game, that imitative learning provides better agreement with what people actually do, thus partially vindicating Tarde. (shrink)

At the very end of the 19th century, Gabriele Tarde wrote that all society was a product of imitation and innovation. This view regarding the development of society has, to a large extent, fallen out of favour, and especially so in those areas where the rational actor model looms large. I argue that this is unfortunate, as models of imitative learning, in some cases, agree better with what people actually do than more sophisticated models of learning. In this paper, I (...) contrast the behaviour of imitative learning with two more sophisticated learning rules (one based on Bayesian updating, the other based on the Nash-Brown-von Neumann dynamics) in the context of social deliberation problems. I show for two social deliberation problems, the Centipede game and a simple Lewis sender-receiver game, that imitative learning provides better agreement with what people actually do, thus partially vindicating Tarde. (shrink)

This article examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor”, that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second question, we argue they have not shown epistemic reasons exist for the division of cognitive labor, identifying the errors that led (...) to their conclusions. Furthermore, we generalize the epistemic landscape model, showing that one should be skeptical about the benefits of social learning in epistemically complex environments. (shrink)

How should a political society be structured so as to legitimately distribute political power? One principle advanced to answer this question is the principle of subsidiarity. According to this principle, the default locus of political power is with the lowest competent political unit. This article argues that subsidiarity is a structural principle of a conception of political legitimacy informed by epistemic considerations. Broadly, the argument is that political societies organised according to the principle of subsidiarity can more effectively achieve political (...) decisions that can justifiably appear to be correct from the point of view of those subject to them. The article presents two considerations in order to establish a pro tanto case for acting separately before presenting five additional epistemic considerations that establish a prima facie case for acting separately. The article then shows that political legitimacy and the epistemic aim of decision-making can sometimes be served more effectively and efficiently by allowing higher-level political units to assist lower-level political units. (shrink)

The probabilistic account of juridical proof meets insurmountable problems. A better explanation of juridical proof is that it is a form of inference to the best explanation that involves the comparative plausibility of the parties’ stories. In addition, discrete evidentiary matters such as relevance and probative value are also best understood as involving inference to the best explanation rather than being probabilistic.

It has been argued that the transition from classical to quantum mechanics is an example of a Kuhnian scientific revolution, in which there is a shift from the simple, intuitive, straightforward classical paradigm, to the quantum, convoluted, counterintuitive, amazing new quantum paradigm. In this paper, after having clarified what these quantum paradigms are supposed to be, I analyze whether they constitute a radical departure from the classical paradigm. Contrary to what is commonly maintained, I argue that, in addition to radical (...) quantum paradigms, there are also legitimate ways of understanding the quantum world that do not require any substantial change to the classical paradigm. (shrink)

Scientific indigenous psychologies have been developed mostly in non?western countries. Indigenous psychologies, seeing mainstream psychology as too western in its cultural foundation, are based on the culture of the society being investigated. In this article I critique the concept of culture used by representative researchers of indigenous psychologies in the English?language literature and contrast it to current concepts of culture in the social sciences. Furthermore, I argue that the concept of culture used in this literature has implications for the cultural (...) contents that are identified as the culture of a specific society. I also suggest that the political dimensions of what contents of culture are associated with a specific society are not given sufficient attention in this literature. Finally, alternative approaches to culture for the indigenous psychologies are discussed. (shrink)

The culture concept used in the indigenous psychologies is important since these psychologies aim to be rooted in the local culture of the research participants. Culture is an empirical phenomenon. Thus, the extent to which meaning content is shared in a society, and by what categories of people, is an empirical issue. It should not be solved by default by the use of a culture concept that assumes that all cultural content is shared. The philosophical and pragmatic?political reasons suggested by (...) Hwang and Liu are not convincing enough to change this conclusion. Moreover, irrespective of the cultural concept used, it is imperative that the researcher has empirically informed him/herself about the cultural understanding of the participants in the study. Finally, the indigenous psychologies are not intrinsically allied with the nation state and need to be seen as a part of cross?cultural psychology. (shrink)

A fauna sul-americana evolveu durante dezenas de milhões de anos em isolamento dos outros continentes. Isso conferiu-lhe um carácter muito particular, comprovado pelo enorme número de táxones endémicos da divisão biogeográfica em que se inclue o sub-continente – Região Neotropical.Quando os descobridores e colonizadores abordaram e foram penetrando no Brasil, no século XVI e seguintes, deparou-se-lhes uma fauna – abundante na época –, diversificada e estranha ao seu conhecimento da fauna europeia, quando muito também de algumas espécies asiáticas e africanas. (...) As tendências reveladas pelos ‘colonizadores-naturalistas’ na descrição dessa fauna foram diferentes. Uns denominaram-na como se de espécies europeias ou africanas se tratasse. Outros reconheceram a sua originalidade, adoptando a nomenclatura etnobiológica dos Índios, a qual reproduziram em sons da língua portuguesa. Pêro de Magalhães Gândavo, o primeiro português a produzir obra impressa em que se descreve a fauna brasílica, seguiu ambas as vias, conforme os casos. É do seu relato, publicado em 1576, que se apresentam e comentam alguns excertos neste artigo.South American biodiversity evolved for tens of million years in isolation. A most special composition of its fauna and flora has been the result of such an isolation period, the number of endemic taxa being very large. Biogeographers soon recognized the singularity of South America, including this sub-continent in a biogeographical division of the highest rank - the Neotropical Region. When Portuguese discoverers and explorers, from the 16th century on, passed into Brazil, they found a diversified and exotic fauna quite different from the European or African ones that they eventually knew. Some of them, namely jesuits and other educated people, described the most common or conspicuous species, indicating the main edible or dangerous properties of each one. Ethnobiological nomenclature or the common names of the closer European or African species have been applied by those ‘naturalists’. The first of them recording his observations and speculations on a printed book was Pêro de Magalhães Gândavo, who lived in Brazil for a few years before 1561. Comments on his interesting book, entitled História da Província de Santa Cruz, are presented in this paper. (shrink)

The requirement by the National Science Foundation (NSF) that research proposals include plans for “broader impact” activities to foster connections between Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) research and service to society has been controversial since it was first introduced. A chief complaint is that the requirement diverts time and resources from the focus of research and toward activities for which researchers may not be well prepared. This paper describes the theoretical framework underlying a new strategy to pair NSF-funded nano (...) research centres with science museums in order to achieve greater success in the broader impact mission, and to transform the perceived burden of the requirement into an opportunity to provide enhanced value to the constituencies of the partnering organizations, as well as to the larger community. This partnership approach is presented as a model that also can be applied to NSF-funded research centres in other STEM fields, and to non-NSF-funded STEM research centres nevertheless looking to pursue broader impacts types of activities. The model also provides an opportunity to stretch the typical spectrum of broader impacts activities to include citizen engagement in science, technology and societal concerns. (shrink)

Modern societies depend on a growing production of scientific knowledge, which is based on the functional differentiation of science into still more specialised scientific disciplines and subdisciplines. This is the basis for the paradox of scientific expertise: The growth of science leads to a fragmentation of scientific expertise. To resolve this paradox, the present paper investigates three hypotheses: 1) All scientific knowledge is perspectival. 2) The perspectival structure of science leads to specific forms of knowledge asymmetries. 3) Such perspectival knowledge (...) asymmetries must be handled through second order perspectives. We substantiate these hypotheses on the basis of a perspectivist philosophy of science grounded in Peircean semiotics and autopoietic systems theory. Perspectival knowledge asymmetries are an unavoidable and necessary part of the growth of scientific knowledge, and more awareness of this fact can help avoid blind and futile struggles between scientific perspectives, and direct efforts toward more appropriate ways of handling these fundamental knowledge asymmetries. Concretely, we show how different kinds of scientific knowledge, expertise, disagreement and learning can be correlated to the perspectival structure of science, and propose how polyocular communication based on observations of the observations made by specialised perspectives can be used to handle such perspectival knowledge asymmetries. This can help overcome the observed problems in carrying out cross-disciplinary research and in the collective use of different kinds of scientific expertise, and thereby make society better able to solve complex, real-world problems. (shrink)