About this topic
Summary Social externalism claims that the meaning of a representational item is constitutively (rather than merely causally) determined partly by social factors. For example, social externalism claims that the meaning of a word in my mouth is determined partly by how others use that word, rather than solely by how I use that word or conceive of its meaning. Social externalism raises many questions about the nature and generation of meaning. To what degree is meaning determined socially? What types of representations have their meaning determined socially? What is the social and what is its role in determining meaning? Is social externalism really distinct from more general types of semantic externalism? Can we divide the determinants of meaning into social and non-social factors? Can we incompletely understand, or even misunderstand, the meanings of our own representations?
Key works Putnam 1975 introduces the idea of a division of linguistic labor. Burge 1979 uses a series of thought experiments, including the now-famous 'arthritis' case, to argue for his own form of externalism about mental content, which he calls 'anti-individualism', and to introduce the idea of incomplete understanding.
Introductions Kallestrup 2011, Lau 2008
Related categories

91 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 91
  1. added 2020-06-03
    Content and Community.Harry A. Lewis & Andrew Woodfield - 1985 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 59:177-214.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-03-10
    Metasemantic Ethics.Derek Ball - forthcoming - Ratio.
  3. added 2019-06-06
    Communication and Rational Responsiveness to the World.Robert Briscoe - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):135-159.
    Donald Davidson has long maintained that in order to be credited with the concept of objectivity – and, so, with language and thought – it is necessary to communicate with at least one other speaker. I here examine Davidson’s central argument for this thesis and argue that it is unsuccessful. Subsequently, I turn to Robert Brandom’s defense of the thesis in Making It Explicit. I argue that, contrary to Brandom, in order to possess the concept of objectivity it is not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-06-05
    Social Externalism and Conceptual Errors.Asa Maria Wikforss - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):217-231.
    Ever since Putnam and Burge launched their respective attacks on individualist accounts of meaning the individualist has felt squeezed for space.1 Very little maneuvering room, it seems, is left for the philosopher who wants to deny that meaning and mental content depend on the speaker's social environment. One option, popular amongst individualists, is to grant that reference is socially determined but argue that there is nevertheless a notion of meaning or content that can be understood individualistically. That is, the individualist (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  5. added 2018-05-20
    Externalist Thought Experiments and Direction of Fit.Casey Woodling - 2017 - Argumenta 3 (1):139-156.
    The classic thought experiments for Content Externalism have been motivated by consideration of intentional states with a mind-to-world direction of fit. In this paper, I argue that when these experiments are run on intentional states with a world-to-mind direction of fit, the thought experiments actually support Content Internalism. Because of this, I argue that the classic thought experiments alone cannot properly motivate Content Externalism. I do not show that Content Externalism is false in this paper, just that it cannot be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2018-02-16
    Chomsky and His Critics.Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.) - 2003 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  7. added 2016-12-12
    Thought and Language.John Preston - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    The relationship between thought and language has been of central importance to philosophy ever since Plato characterised thinking as 'a dialogue the soul has with itself'. In this volume, several major twentieth-century philosophers of mind and language make further contributions to the debate. Among the questions addressed are: is language conceptually prior to thought, or vice versa? Must thought take place 'in' a medium? To what extent can creatures without language be credited with thoughts? Do we have to suppose that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. added 2016-12-08
    Against Temporal Externalism.J. Brown - 2000 - Analysis 60 (2):178-188.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  9. added 2016-11-13
    Where After All Are the Meanings? A Defense of Internalism. Searle Versus Putnam.Christian Helmut Wenzel - 2004 - Experience and Analysis. Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium 12:408-409.
    There has been recent dispute between Putnam and Searle over whether meanings are “in the head”. Putnam makes use of Twin-Earth thought experiments to show that our mental states alone cannot determine what we refer to (and thus “mean”) and that we rely also on external factors, which are not “in the head”. This suggests to me that we in some way mean more than we actually know. Searle on the other hand makes use of what he calls “Intentional contents”, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2016-05-11
    Modes of Presentation: Perceptual Vs Deferential.Francois Recanati - 2001 - In Albert Newen, Ulrich Nortmann & Rainer Stuehlmann-Laeisz (eds.), Building on Frege: New Essays on Sense, Content, and Concept. CSLI Stanford. pp. 197-208.
    Through perception we gain information about the world. We also gain information about the world through communication with others. There are concepts — indexical concepts, such as the concept of the present time ('now') or of the present place ('here') or the concept of oneself — which have a special link to perception. Are there concepts which are tied to communication in the same way in which indexical concepts are tied to perception? After discussing, and criticizing, a deflationary approach to (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11. added 2016-05-11
    Deference and Indexicality.Francois Recanati - 2001 - In Stephen Kosslyn, Albert Galaburda & Yves Christen (eds.), Languages of the Brain. Harvard University Press. pp. 102-109.
  12. added 2016-05-11
    Deferential Concepts: A Response to Woodfield.François Recanati - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (4):452–464.
  13. added 2016-05-11
    Can We Believe What We Do Not Understand?François Recanati - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):84-100.
    In a series of papers, Sperber provides the following analysis of the phenomenon of ill-understood belief (or 'quasi-belief', as I call it): (i) the quasi-believer has a validating meta-belief, to the effect that a certain representation is true; yet (ii) that representation does not give rise to a plain belief, because it is 'semi-propositional'. In this paper I discuss several aspects of this treatment. In particular, I deny that the representation accepted by the quasi-believer is semantically indeterminate, and I reject (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  14. added 2016-03-10
    Outsourcing Concepts: Deference, the Extended Mind, and Expanding Our Epistemic Capacity.Cathal O'Madagain - forthcoming - In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Semantic deference is the apparent phenomenon whereby some of -/- our concepts have their content fixed by the minds of others. The -/- phenomenon is puzzling both in terms of how such concepts are -/- supposed to work, but also in terms of why we should have -/- concepts whose content is fixed by others. Here I argue that if we -/- rethink semantic deference in terms of extended mind reasoning -/- we find answers to both of these questions: the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2016-02-29
    Two-Dimensionalism and the Social Character of Meaning.Derek Ball - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):567-595.
    This paper develops and critiques the two-dimensionalist account of mental content developed by David Chalmers. I first explain Chalmers's account and show that it resists some popular criticisms. I then argue that the main interest of two-dimensionalism lies in its accounts of cognitive significance and of the connection between conceivability and possibility. These accounts hinge on the claim that some thoughts have a primary intension that is necessarily true. In this respect, they are Carnapian, and subject to broadly Quinean attack. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2015-09-12
    The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism.Bryan Frances - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):123-138.
    Many philosophers have used premises about concepts and rationality to argue that the protagonists in the various Twin Earth thought experiments do not have the concepts that content externalists say they have. This essay argues that this popular internalist argument is flawed in many different ways, and more importantly it cannot be repaired in order to cast doubt on externalism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2015-08-31
    What We Talk About When We Talk About Content Externalism.Jeff Engelhardt - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):125-143.
    Some content externalists claim that if C is a theoretical concept and “C” expresses C, then the content of C in a community at a time is determined by how some members of the community at the time—call them “experts”—understand C or use “C”. Thus, when non-expert Chauncey utters “C”, the content of the concept he expresses does not depend entirely on his intrinsic physical properties, contra the claims of content internalism. This paper proposes that “concept” expresses a theoretical concept, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2015-08-31
    Consciousness and Conceptual Mastery.Derek Ball - 2013 - Mind 122 (486):fzt075.
    Torin Alter (2013) attempts to rescue phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument from the critique of Ball 2009 by appealing to conceptual mastery. I show that Alter’s appeal fails, and describe general features of conceptual mastery that suggest that no such appeal could succeed.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  19. added 2015-07-06
    Historical Kinds and the "Special Sciences".Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.
    There are no "special sciences" in Fodor's sense. There is a large group of sciences, "historical sciences," that differ fundamentally from the physical sciences because they quantify over a different kind of natural or real kind, nor are the generalizations supported by these kinds exceptionless. Heterogeneity, however, is not characteristic of these kinds. That there could be an univocal empirical science that ranged over multiple realizations of a functional property is quite problematic. If psychological predicates name multiply realized functionalist properties, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   101 citations  
  20. added 2015-04-13
    A Philosophically Inexpensive Introduction to Twin-Earth.Bryan Frances - manuscript
    I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2015-04-13
    The Twin Earth Thought Experiments.Bryan Frances - 1998
  22. added 2015-03-14
    Active Content Externalism.Holger Lyre - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):17-33.
    The aim of this paper is to scrutinize active externalism and its repercussions for externalism about mental content. I start from the claim that active externalism is a version of content externalism that follows from the extended cognition thesis as a thesis about cognitive vehicles. Various features of active content externalism are explored by comparison with the known forms of passive externalism – in particular with respect to the multiple realizability of the relevant external content-determining components and with respect to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  23. added 2014-03-31
    Mental Content and the Division of Epistemic Labour.Christopher Gauker - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (3):302-18.
    Tyler Burge's critique of individualistic conceptions of mental content is well known.This paper employs a novel strategy to defend a strong form of Burge's conclusion. The division of epistemic labor rests on the possibility of language-mediated transactions, such as asking for something in a store and getting it. The paper shows that any individualistic conception of content will render such transactions unintelligible.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2014-03-30
    Curing Folk Psychology of Arthritis.Michael McKinsey - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (3):323-36.
    Tyler Burge's (1979) famous thought experiment concerning 'arthritis' is commonly assumed to show that all ascriptions of content to beliefs and other attitudes are dependent for their truth upon facts about the agent's social and linguistic environment. It is also commonly claimed that Burge's argument shows that Putnam's (1975) result regarding natural kind terms applies to all general terms whatever, and hence shows that all such terms have wide meanings.1 But I wish to show here, first, that neither Burge's initial (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  25. added 2014-03-28
    We Live Forwards but Understand Backwards: Linguistic Practices and Future Behavior.Henry Jackman - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):157-177.
    Ascriptions of content are sensitive not only to our physical and social environment, but also to unforeseeable developments in the subsequent usage of our terms. This paper argues that the problems that may seem to come from endorsing such 'temporally sensitive' ascriptions either already follow from accepting the socially and historically sensitive ascriptions Burge and Kripke appeal to, or disappear when the view is developed in detail. If one accepts that one's society's past and current usage contributes to what one's (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  26. added 2014-03-28
    Davidson's Social Externalism.Steven Yalowitz - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (1-2):99-136.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  27. added 2014-03-27
    Social Externalism and Conceptual Diversity.Andrew Woodfield - 1998 - In John M. Preston (ed.), Thought and Language. Cambridge University Press. pp. 77-.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. added 2014-03-27
    Personal Identity and Mental Content.James Baillie - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33.
    In this paper, I attempt to map out the 'logical geography' of the territory in which issues of mental content and of personal identity meet. In particular, I investigate the possibility of combining a psychological criterion of personal identity with an externalist theory of content. I argue that this can be done, but only by accepting an assumption that has been widely accepted but barely argued for, namely that when someone switches linguistic communities, the contents of their thoughts do not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. added 2014-03-24
    Physical Externalism and Social Externalism: Are They Really Compatible?Jeeloo Liu - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:381-404.
    Putnam and Burge have been viewed as launching a joint attack on individualism, the view that the content of one's psychological state is determined by what is in the head . Putnam argues that meanings are not in the head while Burge argues that beliefs are not in the head either, and both have come up with convincing arguments against individualism. It is generally conceived that Putnam's view is a version of physical externalism, which argues that factors in the physical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. added 2014-03-22
    Incorrect Understanding and Concept Possession.Halvor Nordby - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):55-70.
    Tyler Burge has argued that an incorrect understanding of a word can be sufficient for possessing the concept the word literally expresses. His well-known 'arthritis' case involves a patient who understands 'arthritis' incorrectly, but who nevertheless, according to Burge, possesses the concept arthritis. Critics of Burge have objected that there is an alternative concept that best matches the patient's understanding and that this, therefore, is the patient's concept. The paper first argues that Burge's response to this objection is unconvincing. A (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  31. added 2014-03-22
    Defending Burge's Thought Experiment.Anthony Brueckner - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (3):387-391.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2014-03-22
    On the Explanatory Deficiencies of Linguistic Content.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.
    The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. added 2014-03-21
    The Status of Supposition.Mitchell S. Green - 2000 - Noûs 34 (3):376–399.
    According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34. added 2014-03-20
    Social Externalism and the Ontology of Competence.Andrew Davis - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):297-308.
    Social externalism implies that many competences are not personal assets separable from social and cultural environments but complex states of affairs involving individuals and persisting features of social reality. The paper explores the consequences for competence identity over time and across contexts, and hence for the predictive role usually accorded to competences.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  35. added 2014-03-20
    Davidson on Social Externalism.Halvor Nordby - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):88-94.
    A central premise in Tyler Burge's argument for social externalism says that an incomplete understanding can be sufficient for concept possession. Burge claims that this premise is grounded in ordinary practices of giving psychological explanations. On the basis of an extended version of Burge's 'arthritis' case Donald Davidson has argued that this claim is false. The paper argues that Davidson's argument is unconvincing. A closer analysis of Davidson's extended 'arthritis' case shows that the belief ascriptions Davidson focuses on actually support (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2014-03-19
    How Social Must Language Be?Claudine Verheggen - 2006 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36 (2):203-219.
    According to the communitarian view, often attributed to the later Wittgenstein, language is social in the sense that having a (first) language essentially depends on meaning by one's words what members of some community mean by them. According to the interpersonal view, defended by Davidson, language is social only in the sense that having a (first) language essentially depends on having used (at least some of) one's words, whatever one means by them, to communicate with others. Even though these views (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  37. added 2014-03-19
    Burge's Thought Experiment: Still in Need of Defense. [REVIEW]Nicholas Georgalis - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (2):267-273.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2014-03-17
    Intersubjective Externalism.Peter Pagin - 2006 - In T. Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholar Press.
    in T. Marvan (ed) What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute, Cambridge Scholar Press, Newcastle upon Tyne, 39-54, 2006.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  39. added 2014-03-17
    Temporal Externalism, Constitutive Norms, and Theories of Vagueness.Henry Jackman - 2006 - In Tomas Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Another paper exploring the relation between Temporal externalism and Epistemicism about Vagueness, but with slightly more emphasis on the role of constitutive norms relating to our concept of truth.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. added 2014-03-13
    Can Groups Have Concepts? Semantics for Collective Intentions.Cathal O'Madagain - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):347-363.
    A substantial literature supports the attribution of intentional states such as beliefs and desires to groups. But within this literature, there is no substantial account of group concepts. Since on many views, one cannot have an intentional state without having concepts, such a gap undermines the cogency of accounts of group intentionality. In this paper I aim to provide an account of group concepts. First I argue that to fix the semantics of the sentences groups use to make their decisions (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. added 2014-03-12
    Individualism, Externalism and Idiolectical Meaning.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2006 - Synthese 152 (1):95-128.
    Semantic externalism in contemporary philosophy of language typically – and often tacitly – combines two supervenience claims about idiolectical meaning (i.e., meaning in the language system of an individual speaker). The first claim is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her intrinsic, physical properties. The second is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her understanding of its use. I here show (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. added 2014-03-09
    Social Externalism and First-Person Authority.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):287 - 300.
    Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with first-person authority—provides a check on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  43. added 2014-03-09
    Anti-Individualism and Knowledge.Jessica Brown - 2004 - MIT Press.
    A persuasive monograph that answers the keyepistemological arguments against anti-individualism in thephilosophy of mind.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  44. added 2014-03-09
    Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge.Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.) - 2003 - MIT Press.
    Essays by various philosphers on the work of Tyler Burge and Burge's extensive responses.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  45. added 2014-03-09
    Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content.Akeel Bilgrami - 1992 - Blackwell.
    Belief and Meaning is a philosophical treatment of intentionality. It offers an original, logical and convincing account of intentional content which is local and contextual and which takes issues with standard theories of meaning.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  46. added 2014-03-06
    Temporal Externalism, Natural Kind Terms, and Scientifically Ignorant Communities.John M. Collins - 2006 - Philosophical Papers 35 (1):55-68.
    Temporal externalism (TE) is the thesis (defended by Jackman (1999)) that the contents of some of an individual’s thoughts and utterances at time t may be determined by linguistic developments subsequent to t. TE has received little discussion so far, Brown 2000 and Stoneham 2002 being exceptions. I defend TE by arguing that it solves several related problems concerning the extension of natural kind terms in scientifically ignorant communities. Gary Ebbs (2000) argues that no theory can reconcile our ordinary, practical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. added 2014-02-10
    Social Anti-Individualism, Objective Reference.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):682–690.
  48. added 2014-02-10
    Burge on Content.Reinaldo Elugardo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):367-84.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  49. added 2013-06-27
    Internalism and Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind and Language.Basil Smith - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    How are the contents of our beliefs, our intentions, and other attitudes individuated? Just what makes our contents what they are? Content externalism, as Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, and others have argued, is the position that our contents depend in a constitutive manner on items in the external world, that they can be individuated by our causal interaction with the items they are about. Content internalism, by contrast, is the position that our contents depend primarily on the properties of our (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. added 2011-12-08
    Incomplete Understanding, Deference, and the Content of Thought.Mark Greenberg - unknown
    Tyler Burge’s influential arguments have convinced most philosophers that a thinker can have a thought involving a particular concept without fully grasping or having mastery of that concept. In Burge’s (1979) famous example, a thinker who lacks mastery of the concept of arthritis nonetheless has thoughts involving that concept. It is generally supposed, however, that this phenomenon – incomplete understanding, for short – does not require us to reconsider in a fundamental way what it is for a thought to involve (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
1 — 50 / 91