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  1. The Structure of the Life-World.G. A. - 1974 - Review of Metaphysics 28 (1):138-139.
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  2. Marx's Social Ontology.W. S. A. - 1979 - Review of Metaphysics 32 (4):755-756.
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  3. Marx's Social Ontology" by Carol Gould. [REVIEW]Walter L. Adamson - 1981 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (1):108.
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  4. Back to the Drawing Board.Joseph Agassi - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (4):509-518.
    Within ontology new theories are extremely rare. Hacking bravely claims to have one: "historical ontology" or "dynamic nominalism." Regrettably, he uses "nominalism" idiosyncratically, without explaining it or its qualifier. He does say what historical ontology is: it is "the presentation of the history of ontology in context." This idea is laudable, as it invites presenting idealism as once attractive but no longer so (due to changes in perception theory, for example). But this idea is a proposal, not a theory, muchless (...)
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  5. Social Theory and Human Reality.Pertti Alasuutari - 2004 - Sage Publications.
    'This is a smart and compelling book. Difficult ideas are presented in an accessible manner, with plenty of supporting illustrations…Students will enjoy the research material and other supporting material. A definite winner!'- Professor Jay Gubrium, University of Missouri This book gets to the heart of what the social sciences really know about the elusive and contradictory object of research: human reality. Drawing on a wide range of international examples and scenarios, Social Theory and Human Reality examines key sociological concepts that (...)
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  6. Groupware and Social Reality.Jonathan Allen - 1992 - Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 22 (1-4):24-28.
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  7. The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators: Identity, Pluralism, and Ontology in Charles Taylor's Value Theory.Joel Anderson - 1996 - Constellations 3 (1):17-38.
  8. Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (Eds), Recognition and Social Ontology.Sybol Anderson - 2012 - Critical Horizons 13 (1):134 - 137.
    Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (eds), Recognition and Social Ontology Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 134-137 Authors Sybol Cook Anderson, St. Mary's College of Maryland, USA Journal Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy & Social Theory Online ISSN 1568-5160 Print ISSN 1440-9917 Journal Volume Volume 13 Journal Issue Volume 13, Number 1 / 2012.
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  9. Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (Eds), Recognition and Social Ontology (Leiden, EJ Brill, 2011), ISBN 978-90-04-20290-0 (Hbk), 398 Pp. US $182.00. [REVIEW]Sybol Cook Anderson - 2012 - Critical Horizons 13 (1):134-137.
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  10. Power and Social Ontology.Åsa Andersson - unknown
    This work presents an account of social power based on recent advances in social ontology. It is argued that a conceptual analysis of social power can be informed by developments in social ontology, but also that this field can be enriched, and in fact requires, an analysis of this central social concept. Social power is dependent on the existence of various kinds of social phenomena, such as institutions and social structures, in order to exist. Consequently, a precise analysis of these (...)
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  11. Animal Groups and Social Ontology: An Argument From the Phenomenology of Behavior.Alejandro Arango - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):403-422.
    Through a critical engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the concepts of nature, life, and behavior, and with contemporary accounts of animal groups, this article argues that animal groups exhibit sociality and that sociality is a fundamental ontological condition. I situate my account in relation to the superorganism and selfish individual accounts of animal groups in recent biology and zoology. I argue that both accounts are inadequate. I propose an alternative account of animal groups and animal sociality through a Merleau-Pontian inspired (...)
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  12. After Mandelbaum : From Societal Facts to Emergent Properties.Margaret S. Archer - 2010 - In Ian Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism. Routledge.
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  13. Freedom’s Right. The Social Foundations of Democratic Life. [REVIEW]Hans Arentshorst - 2014 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):167–170.
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  14. Nationalism in Theory and Reality.H. Aronovitch - 2000 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (3):457-479.
  15. Review Essay: Chant, Sara Rachel, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer, Editors. From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 240. [REVIEW]Caroline T. Arruda - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (3):318–331.
    I summarize and evaluate the aims of the collection From Individual to Collective Intentionality: New Essays edited by Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks and Gerhard Preyer in the context of the on-going debate about collective intentionality and group agency. I then consider the individual essays contained therein, both from the perspective of how they advance the collection’s goals and the coherence of their individual arguments.
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  16. Mind, Matter and the Separate Reality of Information.David Bakan - 1974 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 4 (1):1-15.
  17. Human Persons as Social Entities.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):77-87.
    The aim of this article is to show that human persons belong, ontologically, in social ontology. After setting out my views on ontology, I turn to persons and argue that they have first-person perspectives in two stages (rudimentary and robust) essentially. Then I argue that the robust stage of the first-person persective is social, in that it requires a language, and languages require linguistic communities. Then I extend the argument to cover the rudimentary stage of the first-person perspective as well. (...)
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  18. Searle on Social Institutions: A Critique.Wolfgang Balzer - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (3):195–211.
    The dominant “harmonious” notion of a social institution used by Searle in the discussion of social facts is critically reconsidered. It is argued that an essential ingredient is missing from this notion, namely the harming feature of power. The harmonious view treats power as an important part of social institutions, but takes into account only its beneficial side. This led to a thoroughly positive notion of social institutions which makes us blind to the harm they inflict, the duality of those (...)
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  19. From Sedentary Foragers to Village Hierarchies: The Emergence of Social Institutions.Ofer Bar-Yosef - 2001 - In The Origin of Human Social Institutions. pp. 1-38.
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  20. Mental Life.Xabier Barandiaran - unknown
    Conceptual models and synthetic methodologies for a post-cognitivist psychology.
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  21. Collective Reasoning: A Critique of Martin Hollis's Position.Nicholas Bardsley - 2001 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 4 (4):171-192.
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  22. Objectivity and Social Anthropology: J. H. M. Beattie.J. H. M. Beattie - 1984 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 17:1-20.
    This lecture is divided, roughly, into three parts. First, there is a general and perhaps rather simple-minded discussion of what are the ‘facts’ that social anthropologists study; is there anything special about these ‘facts’ which makes them different from other kinds of facts? It will be useful to start with the common-sense distinction between two kinds or, better, aspects of social facts; first—though neither is analytically prior to the other—and putting it very crudely, ‘what people do’, the aspect of social (...)
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  23. Wittgenstein Running: Neural Mechanisms of Collective Intentionality and We-Mode.Cristina Becchio & Cesare Bertone - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):123-133.
    In this paper we discuss the problem of the neural conditions of shared attitudes and intentions: which neural mechanisms underlie “we-mode” processes or serve as precursors to such processes? Neurophysiological and neuropsychological evidence suggests that in different areas of the brain neural representations are shared by several individuals. This situation, on the one hand, creates a potential problem for correct attribution. On the other hand, it may provide the conditions for shared attitudes and intentions.
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  24. The Construction of Social Reality de John Searle.T. Bejarano-Fernández - 2008 - Thémata: Revista de Filosofía 39:331-334.
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  25. Wittgenstein and the Ontology of the Social : Some Kripkean Reflections on Bourdieu's "Theory of Practice".Lorenzo Bernasconi-Kohn - 2007 - In Clive Lawson, John Latsis & Nuno Martins (eds.), Contributions to Social Ontology. Routledge.
  26. Plural Action.Bernhard Schmid Hans - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1):25-54.
    In this paper, I distinguish three claims, which I label individual intentional autonomy, individual intentional autarky, and intentional individualism. The autonomy claim is that under normal circumstances, each individual's behavior has to be interpreted as his or her own action. The autarky claim is that the intentional interpretation of an individual's behavior has to bottom out in that individual's own volitions, or pro-attitudes. The individualism claim is weaker, arguing that any interpretation of an individual's behavior has to be given in (...)
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  27. Theorising Ontology.Roy Bhaskar - 2007 - In Clive Lawson, John Latsis & Nuno Martins (eds.), Contributions to Social Ontology. Routledge.
  28. 12 Theorising Ontology.Roy Bhaskar - 2007 - In Clive Lawson, John Latsis & Nuno Martins (eds.), Contributions to Social Ontology. Routledge. pp. 15--192.
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  29. From Joint Attention to Communicative Action Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 41 (6):593-608.
    In this article I consider the relevance of Tomasello’s work on social cognition to the theory of communicative action. I argue that some revisions are needed to cope with Tomasello’s results, but they do not affect the core of the theory. Moreover, they arguably reinforce both its explanatory power and the plausibility of its normative claims. I proceed in three steps. First, I compare and contrast Tomasello’s views on the ontogeny of human social cognition with the main tenets of Habermas’ (...)
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  30. Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.
    In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint (...)
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  31. Review of Kirk Ludwig, From Individual to Plural Agency, Collective Action: Volume 1. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
  32. Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality: Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with His Responses, Edited by Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2017.08.10).
  33. An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour.Olle Blomberg - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag.
    Philosophical accounts of joint action are often prefaced by the observation that there are two different senses in which several agents can intentionally perform an action Φ, such as go for a walk or capture the prey. The agents might intentionally Φ together, as a collective, or they might intentionally Φ in parallel, where Φ is distributively assigned to the agents, considered as a set of individuals. The accounts are supposed to characterise what is distinctive about activities in which several (...)
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  34. Individual Beliefs and Collective Beliefs in Sciences and Philosophy: The Plural Subject and the Polyphonic Subject Accounts: Case Studies.Alban Bouvier - 2004 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (3):382-407.
    The issue of knowing what it means for a group to have collective beliefs is being discussed more and more in contemporary philosophy of the social sciences and philosophy of mind. Margaret Gilbert’s reconsideration of Durkheim’s viewpoint in the framework of the plural subject’s account is one of the most famous. This has implications in the history and the sociology of science—as well asin the history and sociology of philosophy—although Gilbert only outlined them in the former fields and said nothing (...)
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  35. Acts and Other Events.M. Brand - 1981 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 11 (4):485-494.
  36. Shared Agency.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press. pp. 41--59.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways. Forms of shared activity matter to us a great deal, both intrinsically – think of friendship and love, singing duets, and the joys of conversation -- and instrumentally – think of how we frequently manage to work together to achieve complex goals. My focus will be on activities of small, adult groups in the absence of asymmetric authority relations within those groups. My approach begins with an underlying model of individual planning agency, and (...)
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  37. Précis of Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together.Michael E. Bratman - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):1-5.
    A précis of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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  38. Shared Agency: Replies to Ludwig, Pacherie, Petersson, Roth, and Smith.Michael E. Bratman - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):59-76.
    These are replies to the discussions by Kirk Ludwig, Elizabeth Pacherie, Björn Petersson, Abraham Roth, and Thomas Smith of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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  39. A Reply to John Searle and Other Traditionalists.Robert Greenleaf Brice - 2008 - Multicultural Education 16 (2):37-40.
    One of the more recent pedagogical debates confronting university instructors is whether liberal education should be replaced with multiculturalism. John Searle has labeled these positions as “traditionalists” and “challengers,” respectively. While not finding “much that is objectionable in the [traditionalists’] assumptions,” Searle argues that the challengers’ assumptions are “weak” and “fallacious.” This negative outcome for the challengers however, is due in large part to Searle’s misrepresentation of their position. Searle presents a flawed, straw-man argument; he unfairly and inaccurately presents the (...)
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  40. Collective Intentional Activities and the Law.Rodrigo Sanchez Brigido - 2009 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2):305-324.
    We ascribe the performance of intentional actions to groups. We claim, for instance, that the orchestra is playing a symphony, that a gang has robbed a bank, and so on. But what is a collective intentional action? Most accounts suggest that, for there to be a collective intentional action, at least two necessary conditions should be met. First, participants must act in accordance with, and because of, the intentions that the group perform a certain action. Second, there must be common (...)
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  41. Lo Social Desde El Concepto de Ilusión En Platón, Aristóteles, Machiavelo y Bacon.Ricardo Camargo Brito - 2007 - Cinta de Moebio 28:29-38.
    The epistemological tradition set up by Plato has been permanently reading as a ‘way of doing philosophy’ in which the dualisms: reality versus illusion, on the one hand, and individual versus the social, on the other, would present not only in an explicit and incommensurable opposition to modern co..
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  42. Methodological Peculiarities of History in Light of Idealizational Theory of Science.Krzysztof Brzechczyn - 2009 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 97 (1):137-157.
    The aim of the paper is an extension of the idealizational theory of science in order to explicate intuitions of historians and philosophers of history about unpredictability and contingency of history. The author identifies two types of essential structures: the first kind dominated by the main factor and the second kind which is dominated by a class of secondary factors. In an essential structure dominated by the main factor, the power of influence it exerts is greater than the sum of (...)
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  43. Psychoanalytic Facts as Unintended Institutional Facts.F. Buekens & M. Boudry - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (2):239-269.
    We present an inference to the best explanation of the immense cultural success of Freudian psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic method. We argue that an account of psychoanalytic facts as products of unintended declarative speech acts explains this phenomenon. Our argument connects diverse, seemingly independent characteristics of psychoanalysis that have been independently confirmed, and applies key features of John Searle’s and Eerik Lagerspetz’s theory of institutional facts to the psychoanalytic edifice. We conclude with a brief defence of the institutional approach against (...)
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  44. "Counting As" a Bridge Principle: Against Searle Against Social-Scientific Laws.William Butchard & Robert D'Amico - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (4):455-469.
    John Searle’s argument that social-scientific laws are impossible depends on a special open-ended feature of social kinds. We demonstrate that under a noncontentious understanding of bridging principles the so-called "counts-as" relation, found in the expression "X counts as Y in (context) C," provides a bridging principle for social kinds. If we are correct, not only are social-scientific laws possible, but the "counts as" relation might provide a more perspicuous formulation for candidate bridge principles.
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  45. Ethics and Social Ontology.Gideon Calder - 2008 - Analyse & Kritik 30 (2):427-443.
    Normative theory, in various idioms, has grown wary of questions of ontology—social and otherwise. Thus modern debates in ethics have tended to take place at some distance from debates in social theory. One arguable casualty of this has been due consideration of relational factors in the interrogation of ethical values. Part 1 of this paper addresses some examples of this tendency, and some of the philosophical assumptions which might underlie it. Parts 2 and 3 discuss two issues of growing prominence—disability, (...)
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  46. "Social Action" Edited by Gottfried Seebass and Raimo Tuomela.José A. López Cerezo - 1988 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18 (2):276.
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  47. Book Review: Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. [REVIEW]Marc Champagne - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (2):252-258.
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  48. Ontology, Epistemology, and Multimethod Research in Political Science.A. Chatterjee - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (1):73-99.
    Epistemologies and research methods are not free of metaphysics. This is to say that they are both, supported by (or presumed by), and support (or presume) fundamental ontologies. A discussion of the epistemological foundations of "multimethod" research in the social sciences—in as much as such research claims to unearth "causal" relations—therefore cannot avoid the ontological presuppositions or implications of such a discussion. But though there isn’t necessarily a perfect correspondence between ontology, epistemology, and methodology, they do constrain each other. As (...)
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  49. In What Sense Is Scientific Knowledge Collective Knowledge?Hyundeuk Cheon - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (4):407-423.
    By taking the collective character of scientific research seriously, some philosophers have claimed that scientific knowledge is indeed collective knowledge. However, there is little clarity on what exactly is meant by collective knowledge. In this article, I argue that there are two notions of collective knowledge that have not been well distinguished: irreducibly collective knowledge (ICK) and jointly committed knowledge (JCK). The two notions provide different conditions under which it is justified to ascribe knowledge to a group. It is argued (...)
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  50. Review of Francesco Guala "Understanding Institutions". [REVIEW]Christopher Clarke - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
1 — 50 / 425