Social Phenomena

This paper examines the complexity of the interconnection of varna and caste systems in Indian society. It reflects the complexities of the traditions of different caste groups and the system that regulates their relationship with each other. It will also reflect on the modes where they turn slightly flexible and become harshly rigid. The concept of community no longer exists. However, it is a stronger claim but is made while stressing the importance of the social Purushārtha Sādhana. Both terms (caste (...) and varna) are used interchangeably. However, a question regarding their meaning would need an entire book to be written. Both words are too ambiguous, especially for non-Indians or non-Hindus, though everyone, including Hindus and Indians, may find it challenging to distinguish between them. (shrink)

We argue against the view that human behavior is the benchmark of robotic performance for every kind of social interaction. To the contrary, it is rather human agents who, in what we call ‘functional social interactions,’ aim at simulating social automatons. An important aspect of this simulation is the agent’s attempt to suppress every indication of the existence of a difference between what she experiences from the “‘I’-perspective” and what is perceived by other agents, the “‘me’-perspective”. Although experiencing this difference (...) is not needed for realizing functional interaction it is, however, needed for what we call “close interhuman relationships”. (shrink)

The question of whether or not one should procreate is rarely cast as a personal choice in philosophical discourse; rather, it is presented as an ethical choice made against a backdrop of aggregate concerns. But justifications concerning procreation in popular culture regularly engage with the role that identity plays in making procreative decisions; specifically, how one’s decision will affect who they are and who they might be in the future. Women in particular cite the personally transformative aspects of becoming a (...) parent — personal circumstances, including socioeconomic status, age, health, and relationship status — as the most important considerations for the decision they make regarding possible parenthood, and not the more aggregate concerns that an ethics of procreation prioritizes. I highlight women because when women undergo a transformative experience related to parenthood, they do so in contexts where the social, economic, and emotional effects related to pregnancy and motherhood are extensive and impose greater effects on women than men. These harmful material effects threaten a woman’s economic stability, career development, social relationships, and emotional health. Because of this, I argue that an ethics of procreation must engage with the ways in which women’s identities are transformed through procreative decisions. (shrink)

New Mutualisms. Politics, Needs and Emancipation. According to the research hypothesis that forms the backdrop of this contribution, the most diverse forms of mutualism represent variants of political action born of, among, and for subjects in need. In contrast to the hypothesis of an uncritical valorization of these experiences, however, it is not necessarily the case that these collective actions of solidarity reciprocity also express the same need for renewal of institutional politics. The reconstruction of the different stages of the (...) modern history of mutualism will allow to question the alleged mutually exclusive relationship between politics and needs theorized by a long and authoritative philosophical tradition and, paradoxically, reaffirmed precisely by its fiercest critics such as Hannah Arendt. Following this operation of historical and conceptual contextualization it will become possible to identify the main differences between mutualism and other forms of civic engagement of the charitable or assistentialist kind, and then to draw an idealtypical classification of the different degrees of politicalness openly claimed or, in fact, expressed, by its contemporary manifestations. (shrink)

A good education provides useful ‘knowledge, skills, attitudes, and dispositions’ (Brighouse, Ladd, Loeb, & Swift, 2016, p. 6).1 Educational justice cares about the distribution of these goods beca...

Noise and silence as social phenomena with certain depths in terms of their cultural value, when viewed through the lens of the mindsponge theory, become very interesting and often contain many underlying educational implications.

In contemporary political discussions, it is depressingly common to see people criticized for expressing impure beliefs. Moreover, those who sometimes defect from their tribe are criticized for failing to be firmly enough on the side of the angels. We consider explanations for this behavior, including its relationship to moral grandstanding. We will also argue, on both moral and epistemic grounds, in favor of a norm against “blocking the exits.” We should not use social pressure to discourage people from publicly changing (...) their minds. (shrink)

According to public reason liberalism, the laws and institutions of society must be in some sense justifiable to all reasonable citizens. But why care about justifiability to reasonable citizens? R...

We are witnessing increasing use of the Internet, particular social media, to criticize (perceived or actual) moral failings and misdemeanors. This phenomenon of so-called ‘online public shaming’ could provide a powerful tool for reinforcing valuable social norms. But it also threatens unwarranted and severe punishments meted out by online mobs. This paper analyses the dangers associated with the informal enforcement of norms, drawing on Locke, but also highlights its promise, drawing on recent discussions of social norms. We then consider two (...) crucial conditions that online public shaming must meet in order to be justifiable: proportionality and accountability. We argue that these requirements are in fact frequently violated, rendering most cases of online public shaming unjustified. While the use of online public shaming against others’ vices has some apparent virtues, it is currently rarely justified, given its own vices. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Solar radiation management (SRM) has been proposed as a means of mitigating climate change. Although SRM poses new risks, it is sometimes proposed as the ‘lesser evil’. I consider how research and implementation of SRM could be regulated, drawing on what I call a ‘precautionary checklist’, which includes consideration of the longer term political implications of technical change. Particular attention is given to the moral hazard of ‘regulatory drift’, in which strong initial regulation softens through complacency, deliberate deregulation (‘regulatory gift’) (...) and the limited constituency of people with the skills to regulate (‘thin markets’). I propose the strengthening of civil society groups to keep regulators in check. (shrink)

Must a society aim indefinitely for continued economic growth? Proponents of economic growth advance three central challenges to the idea that a society, having attained high levels of income and wealth, may justly cease to pursue further economic growth: if environmentally sustainable and the gains fairly distributed, first, continued economic growth could make everyone within a society and globally, and especially the worst off, progressively better off; second, the pursuit of economic growth spurs ongoing innovation, which enhances people’s opportunities and (...) protects a society against future risks; and third, continued economic growth fosters attitudes of openness, tolerance, and generosity, which are essential to the functioning of a liberal democratic society. This article grants these challenges’ normative foundations, to show that, even if one accepts their underlying premises as requirements of justice, a society may still justly cease to aim for economic growth, so long as it continues to aim for and realize gains on other dimensions. I argue that, while continued economic growth might instrumentally serve valuable ends, it is not necessary for their realization, as a society can achieve these ends through other means. (shrink)

Starting with the observation that transparency has become a concept so familiar that one hardly ever stops to consider the presuppositions and consequences of its usage, the chapter analyses transparency demands as a specific way of exercising power. By doing so, the author shows that the intrinsic logic of transparency leads to paradoxical effects. Any attempts to realize complete transparency undermine its own preconditions. As Vogelmann argues, instead of providing more visibility and clarity, transparency makes its objects “invisible” and the (...) intensification of transparency demands produces self-censorship. The chapter concludes that transparency claims undermine the distinction between the private and the public and threaten the individual autonomy. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Responding to the Dutch Labour Party's campaign centred around the theme of security ("zekerheid"), I explore the political philosophy of security. How is security good for us, why would we carry responsibility for one another's security, and what does politics have to do with it? [Dutch].

This is a comprehensive, critical review of social theory that places leading contributions in their larger context. Written predominantly for students, the scope and range of the subjects and authors dealt with results in one of the most comprehensive introductions to social theory published to date. Ranging from the philosophical foundations of sociology and the discovery of `the social' to distinctive sociological approaches, to the significance of issues pertaining to gender and patriarchy, to questions of modernity and post-modernity, the book (...) is comprehensive in subject matter. (shrink)

An epistemic account of the circumstances of justice allows one to make three important claims about the Humean and Rawlsian ‘standard account’ of those circumstances. First, and contrary to Hume, the possibility and necessity of justice are rooted not in limited beneficence or confined generosity, but in the epistemic insight that the knowledge relevant to deciding what to do with the fruits of social cooperation is for a variety of reasons uncentralisable. Second, and regardless of whether Rawlsian ethical disagreement is (...) more persuasive as a circumstance of justice than Humean confined generosity, it does not explain the possibility and necessity of justice, for the uncentralisability of social knowledge would be decisive even under conditions of unanimity. Finally, the epistemic account not only shows what the circumstances of justice are but, contra Cohen’s critique of the standard account, also provides at least some guidance as to what justice itself may be. (shrink)

This paper responds to a recent challenge posed to Claudia Card’s atrocity paradigm by “transmuted goods,” or, goods which positively transmute victims of atrocity in ways which are difficult for the paradigm to explain. Whereas the legacy of Card’s atrocity paradigm will surely be its demand that we hold others culpable for allowing and perpetuating systems of harm which threaten our ability to flourish, this paper suggests a way for the paradigm to incorporate transmuted goods in a manner that strengthens (...) the paradigm’s overall goal of holding people responsible for perpetuating atrocious harms. To that end, I will articulate the systematicity and transmutativity conditions of an “atrocity,” will demonstrate how “transmuted goods” can threaten the transmutativity condition of an atrocity, and will conclude by suggesting a potential integration of transmuted goods into the atrocity paradigm to salvage the transmutativity condition for the paradigm. (shrink)

The childhood platitude, “sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me,” has become nothing more than wishful thinking as we prepare each new generation for the slew of hurtful words they will inevitably encounter throughout their life. The truth of the matter is, words can hurt. To discuss how this is possible, a recent surge in philosophy of language literature has had the sole focus of analyzing pejorative language, particularly slurs. From semantic content theories to (...) deflationary accounts, there have been numerous attempts to answer the questions “How can words hurt?” and “Why do some words hurt?” Unfortunately, in the current discourse, the focus has been so heavily on accounting for the features of derogatory words that the accounts skip over providing for even the most basic insult, as an indirect speech act. Using an analysis of insults, I argue that there is a layer of analysis prior to any semantic content that theories regarding speech acts should include and and I present a framework for an ethicist to do such an analysis. (shrink)

This philosophical dialogue explores some of the barriers to an adequate definition of general health, encompassing physical, social, and mental/emotional well-being. Many of the putative obstacles to such a definition—concerns about subjectivity, cultural difference, marginal cases, etc.—prove to be chimerical once the characters take seriously the Peircean insight that truth-claims methodologically grounded in people’s lives, experiences, and conversations need not be apodictic to be useful. Drawing on Canguilhem and others, the characters critically discuss a proposed definition of health: a dynamic (...) equilibrium by which a human being thrives in relation to its situation. Although they do not manage to resolve all of this definition’s difficulties, or all of their differences, their interaction in some ways models the ongoing task of inquiry. (shrink)

Most psychological literature on gaslighting focuses on it as a dyadic phenomenon occurring primarily in marriage and family relationships. In my analysis, I will extend recent fruitful philosophical engagement with gaslighting by arguing that gaslighting, particularly gaslighting that occurs in more public spaces like the workplace, relies upon external reinforcement for its success. I will ground this study in an analysis of the film Gaslight, for which the phenomenon is named, and in the course of the analysis will focus on (...) a paradox of this kind of gaslighting: it wreaks significant epistemic and moral damages largely through small, often invisible actions that have power through their accumulation and reinforcement. (shrink)

Does expertise have a place in ethics? As this question has been raised in moral philosophy and bioethics literatures over the past twenty years, skepticism has been a common theme, whether metaphysical, epistemological or social-political. Here I identify three common, contestable assumptions about ethics expertise which underwrite skepticism of one form or another: a singular conception of ethics expertise constituted by a core property or unity among multiple properties, equivocation of ethics expertise and ethicists’ expertise, and priority of moral deference (...) as an unavoidable implication of ethics expertise. Taken separately, each assumption can have unpalatable implications for ethics expertise that make skepticism seem more attractive; taken together, the resulting picture of ethics expertise is that much worse. Each of these assumptions is vulnerable to criticism, however, and jettisoning them enables a pluralist approach to ethics expertise less prone to skepticism and better suited for the ranging functions of ethics expertise in healthcare and other contexts. (shrink)

When it comes to explaining someone’s puzzling, objectionable, or otherwise problematic behavior, one type of explanation occasionally employed in the service of doing so is as follows: “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so.” But what, exactly, do explanations of the type “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so” mean? More specifically, in what way, if any, is it meaningful or informative to say such things? And what is the precise function of such explanations of someone’s behavior? Is it merely to present what one (...) takes to be the underlying causes of the behavior, or something beyond that? In what follows, I lay out a few possibilities—basic possibilities, to be precise, given philosophy’s keen interest in fundamentals—with respect to the various meanings, functions, and moral implications of explanations of the type “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so.” While doing so, I apply these basic possibilities to three tokens of this kind of explanation: “That’s just Manny being Manny” (in reference to Manny Ramirez, the former professional baseball player), “That’s just Charlie being Charlie” (in reference to Charlie Rose, the former television host), and “That’s just Trump being Trump” (in reference to Donald Trump, the current President of the United States). (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of confidentiality and the quality of the relationship between young people experiencing mental health problems and social workers supporting them. The nature of a therapeutic intervention brings into focus the rigidities and complexities in adhering to agency and professional guidelines on confidentiality. The paper highlights the tensions and ethical dilemmas in making decisions about risk and whether, when, and how to breach confidentiality.

According to common-sense morality, agents can become morally connected to the wrongdoing of others, such that they incur special obligations to prevent or rectify the wrongs committed by the primary wrongdoer. We argue that, under certain conditions, voluntary and unjustified observation of another agent’s degrading wrongdoing, or of the ‘product’ of their wrongdoing, can render an agent morally liable to bear costs for the sake of the victim of the primary wrong. We develop our account with particular reference to widespread (...) modern phenomena such as so-called ‘revenge porn’, ‘up-skirting’, and the online observation of sexual assault and murder. On our account, observation is not a sui generis basis of liability. Instead, observation grounds liability in virtue of manifesting three, more general, grounds of liability. First, observation can compound a primary wrong, making that wrong more harmful for the victim. Second, observation can constitute degrading treatment of the victim. Third, in certain cases observation can enable primary wrongdoing. We conclude by discussing the conditions under which observing degrading wrongs might be morally justified. (shrink)

The article analyzes the philosophical and cultural view of 'doctor’s professional culture' as a result of centuries-old practice of human relations, which is characterized by constancy and passed from generation to generation. Medicine is a complex system in which an important role is played by: philosophical outlook of a doctor, philosophical culture, ecological culture, moral culture, aesthetic culture, artistic culture. We have found that within the system “doctor-patient” the degree of cultural proximity becomes a factor that influences the health or (...) life of a patient. Thus, the following factors are important here: 1) communication that suppresses a sick person; 2) the balance of cultural and intellectual levels; 3) the cultural environment of a patient which has much more powerful impact on a patient than the medical one. At the present stage, the interdependence of professional and humanitarian training of future specialists is predominant, as a highly skilled specialist can not but become a subject of philosophizing. We outlined the sphere where the doctors present a genre variety of philosophizing. This tradition represents the original variations in the formation of future doctor’s communicative competences, which are formed in the process of medical students’ professional training. A survey conducted among medical students made it possible to establish their professional values, which are indicators of the formation of philosophical and culturological competence. It was found out that 92% of respondents believed that a doctor should demonstrate a high level of health culture 99% of respondents favoured a high level of personal qualities of a doctor which would allow methods and forms of medical practice to assert higher human ideals of truth, goodness and beauty that are the subject area of cultural studies and philosophy. (shrink)

By considering various case studies drawn from contemporary culture, I propose the idea of victim-blaming shaming, which, like victim blaming, involves replicating injustice by focusing attention on the particular situation rather than the general problem. In cases of victim-blaming shaming, a person is criticized for in any way addressing a problem by addressing the victim. Victim-blaming not only involves an inconsistent ethic, but because of this inconsistency promotes that which it opposes. It responds to a social problem by directing attention (...) to an individual within that problematic social situation. (shrink)

Marxist Philosophy as an explanation of social reality has, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, been largely neglected. However, some philosophers have contended that it may still be relevant to explain today’s social reality. In this article, I wish to demonstrate precisely that Marxist philosophy can be relevant to understand social reality. To carry out this task, I show that Marxist philosophy of law can offer a sound explanation of Animal law in South Africa. My argument is that South (...) African law is a superstructure that reinforces the power of the animal farming industry in South Africa. That is, the hidden purpose of the law is to benefit the industry. In order to argue for this, I present two sets of arguments. The first set argues that the law facilitates the functioning of the animal farming industry. In the second set of arguments I contend that the law socialises individuals into approving the methods of slaughtering by the animal farming industry. (shrink)

Client-provider relationships have significant effects on how individuals comprehend their life situation during chronic disease and illness. Yet, little is known about how frontline health care providers (HCPs) influence client’s identity formation through meaning-making with clients such as HIV-positive women living in poverty. This requires ethical consideration of the meanings made between clients and providers about client’s health and well-being, both individually and in the larger society. Health care providers (N = 15) and married women living with HIV (N = (...) 33) in north-central India engaged in separate intensive interviews providing narrative data which were analysed using a conceptual framework crossing Lipsky’s street-level bureaucracy theory (Lipsky 2010) with meaning-making processes. HCPs and women construct meanings of women’s role as caregivers that impact women’s sense of identity, health, and well-being. Findings indicate that despite being well-intentioned, HCPs inadvertently reinforce rigid gender norms and convey that women’s worth is tied to their familial caregiving role. HCPs’ discretionary advocacy may also reinforce societal images of women as incapable and needy, thereby harming them more generally. Attention to the gender-sensitive training of HIV health care providers may assure that discretion is ethically interrogated to promote gender equity and enhance women’s access to social welfare services. (shrink)

If free markets consist in nothing more than “capitalist acts between consenting adults,” and if in the old legal maxim “volenti non fit injuria,” then it seems to follow that free markets do no wrongs. But that defense of free markets wrenches the “volenti” maxim out of context. In common law adjudication of disputes between two parties, it is perfectly appropriate to cast standards of “volenti” narrowly, and largely ignore “duress via third parties” (wrongs done to or by others who (...) are not themselves party to the action). In economic markets, of course, those third-party effects are rife. But we want them to be rectified systematically, not piecemeal through particular cases between particular parties that happen to come to court. That is the proper province of political philosophers and system-designers, in critiquing and constraining the operation of the market. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, Page 384-418, Fall 2018.

The primary thesis of Terrorism and the Ethics of War is that terrorist acts are always wrong. I begin this paper by describing two views that I criticize in the book The first condemns all terrorism but applies the term in a biased way; the second defends some terrorist acts. I then respond to issues raised by the commentators. I discuss Joan McGregor’s concerns about the definition of terrorism and about how terrorism differs from other forms of violence againstinnocent people. (...) I respond to Sally Scholz’s challenges to my interpretation of innocence. She argues that soldiers can be innocent victims of terrorism and that both relationships and vulnerability are important to understanding innocence. Matthew Silliman questions my defense of utilitarianism and challenges two views that I defend: that all terrorist acts are wrong and that war can sometimes be right. I sketch brief responses to these important points. (shrink)

This article examines how childhood has become a strategy that answers to questions concerning the governability of life. The analysis is organized around the concept of “biosocial power,” which is shown to be a particular zone of intensity within the wider field of biopolitics. To grasp this intensity it is necessary to attend to the place of imagination in staging biosocial strategies, that is the specific ways in which childhood is both an imaginary projection and a technical project, and to (...) this end Agamben’s concept of the “anthropological machine” is used to examine how biosocial power has been assembled and deployed. The paper begins with the question of childhood as it was posed towards the end of the nineteenth century, focusing on how this positioned the figure of the child at the intersection of zoē and bios, animal and human, past and future. It ends with a discussion on how the current global obesity “epidemic” has transformed this one-time vision of mastery into a strategy of survival. (shrink)

This article re-conceptualises the ‘constitutive outside’ through Roberto Esposito’s theory of immunity to detach it from Laclau and Mouffe’s political antagonism. It identifies Esposito’s thought as an innovative epistemological perspective to dissolve post-ontological political theories of community from the intertwinement with a foundational self/other dialectic. Esposito shows how a community can sustain its relations through introversive immunisation against a primarily undefined outside. But it is argued that his theory of immunity slips back to a vitalist depth ontology which ultimately de-politicises (...) the construction of the communal outside. This article draws on Niklas Luhmann’s immunity theory to resituate immunisation in the political production of social connectivity. Following Luhmann, politics relies on immunisation through contradictions to reproduce its functional role as a decision-making institution, but is at the same time constantly exposed to potential rupture through the political op... (shrink)

After examining different liberal narratives and suggesting that liberalism is open to a range of legitimate methodologies, the fluidity of liberalism is offered as a basis for a study in comparative political thought. Ten propositions on liberalism's structural and semantic features are listed and brought to bear on its adaptations, appropriations and misappropriations in Europe. They are tested in relation to various combinations of liberal components within and outside the family of liberalisms. Different views about the role of the state (...) in Eastern and Western Europe are considered, as is the distinction between constitutional and welfare liberalism in Western Europe. Individual development versions are contrasted with market versions, and the problematic role of civil society is discussed. Finally, some misappropriations are explored with a view to assessing their claims to represent liberal positions. European liberalism emerges as a loosely assembled yet durable ideology around a strong core of value-commitments. (shrink)

ABSTRACTJason Stanley’s How Propaganda Works intends to offer a novel account of what propaganda is, how it works, and what damage it does inside a democratic culture. The book succeeds in showing that, contrary to the stereotype, propaganda need not be false or misleading. However, Stanley offers contradictory definitions of propaganda, and his theory, which is both over- and under-inclusive, is applied in a dismissive, highly ideological way. In the end, it remains unclear how much damage propaganda does. Voters in (...) modern democracies would be ignorant and irrational even without propaganda. (shrink)