Sophists

Hacia el final del Protágoras, Sócrates y Protágoras disputan sobre si la valentía y el conocimiento (o sabiduría) son lo mismo. El primer argumento que Sócrates emplea para mostrarlo, y la respuesta de Protágoras, han sido objeto de mucha discusión y desacuerdo entre los especialistas (349e1-351b2). Me parece que ninguna de las interpretaciones disponibles de este debate es completamente satisfactoria, pues éstas tienden a favorecer exclusivamente a Sócrates o a Protágoras. En este trabajo presento una interpretación nueva, más equilibrada y (...) completa, según la cual, tanto el argumento de Sócrates como la respuesta de Protágoras son razonables y válidos en el contexto del diálogo, y ambos consiguen, hasta cierto punto, su objetivo. (shrink)

Evenus of Parus plays a surprisingly important role in Plato’s account of the life and death of Socrates: in both the Apology and the Phaedo he works as a negative foil for the philosopher at two key moments, namely when he converts, respectively, to the practice of elenchus and to the composition of poetry. Evenus’ importance in Socrates’ life, I argue, reflects Plato’s appropriation of a number of his poems, which Plato reshapes so as to adapt the sophist’s relativism and (...) values, arguably modelled on Protagoras’, to his own truth-oriented agenda. Plato’s Phaedrus echoes Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen along similar lines, that is by replacing doxa with aletheia. A pattern emerges: Plato appropriates the writings of the sophists by placing them in a markedly truth-oriented context. This helps explain a discussed piece of information, according to which Protagoras’ Antilogiai was a major influence on Plato’s Republic. (shrink)

The article aims to reconstruct (on the basis of some rarely studied passages of the Protagoras and Theaetetus, as well as some doxographical evidence) the theory of the Protagorean dialeghesthai, and shows its connections with other areas (linguistic, theory of law and hermeneutics) of Protagoras’ thought. This theory is related to the distinction between the competitive and the dialectical use of the discourse. The latter is constructive and involves an application of the principles of the orthoepeia to dialectical argumentation, in (...) order to strengthen its logical and linguistic rigor, and elaborate exemplary speeches on topics of law, politics, ethics. Divenuto partecipe di una sorte divina, l’uomo, a causa della sua parentela con la divinità, fu, in primo luogo, il solo tra gli esseri viventi a credere negli dèi, e a imprendere a elevare altari e statue delle divinità; in seguito, egli articolò ben presto la voce e le parole per mezzo dell’arte, inventò abitazioni, vesti, calzature, coperte e gli alimenti che provengono dalla terra. (shrink)

In modern studies it has been largely denied that the so-called “secret doctrine” (which would be more correct to call “private teaching”) of the Theaetetus can be traced back to Protagoras. However, reasons why this doctrine can not be his own, have never been explained. At the same time, an appropriate justification of the hypothesis that it would be considered a pure Platonic creation has never been offered, nor was explained why it would be attributed to followers of Protagoras, but (...) not to Protagoras himself. This article examines the Platonic text in an analytical way, shows how Plato repeatedly attributes to the sophist of Abdera the content of this doctrine, and, based on fragments of Protagoras and other doctrines related to him by ancient sources, it is evident that nothing in Protagorean concepts comes into conflict with Theaetetus so-called “secret doctrine”, and how actually is completely coherent with it. (shrink)

Protagoras est un sophiste, les sophistes sont les ennemis de Platon... De ce syllogisme, la conclusion semble evidente. Elle appelle cependant quelques nuances. Plus qu'un ennemi, Protagoras apparait en effet chez Platon comme une figure exemplaire, un interlocuteur valable qui, a travers son affirmation selon laquelle l'homme est la mesure de toutes choses, incarne la democratie, ses conditions et ses consequences.Ce livre traite le theme general, et classique, de l'opposition entre sophistique et philosophie, mais en le limitant a une seule (...) question dont il deploie les differentes facettes : l'idee de mesure. Il reconstitue une pensee protagoreenne qui replace Platon dans son contexte intellectuel et montre comment, a travers la figure de Protagoras, c'est le debat avec la democratie qui se joue, non seulement en tant que regime politique, mais aussi en tant que modele theorique aux implications multiples (epistemologiques, morales, pedagogiques, techniques).Sur quel critere fonder la mesure? Comment concevoir l'expertise et le savoir? Quel role attribuer au langage dans l'education? Que faire de l'identite du sujet dans le processus de memoire? Comment penser l'unite de la Cite? Autant de questions soulevees dans le dialogue avec le modele protagoreen. Comprendre ce que Platon doit a Protagoras, c'est ainsi chercher par quels elements cette pensee l'a mis au defi et par reaction a quoi il a elabore sa propre theorie de la mesure, de l'expertise, de l'education et de l'unite politique. (shrink)

Das Buch des emeritierten Salzburger Gräzisten enthält eine Auswahl seiner in den Jahren seit 1971 entstandenen Aufsätze sowie einen umfangreichen, noch nicht publizierten Beitrag zum sokratisch-platonischen ethischen Intellektualismus. Ausgehend vom Zusammenhang zwischen der areté, dem Wissen vom Guten und dem richtigen Handeln, gelangt Platon zur Konzeption der anámnesis und zur Ideenlehre - ein bisher in der Forschung wenig beachteter Komplex. Weitere Themen der ueber zwanzig Aufsätze sind u.a. die Ontologie des Parmenides, der homo-mensura-Satz des Protagoras und Platons Auseinandersetzung mit ihm, (...) Platons literarische Techniken, die Sozialphilosophie und Sozialpolitik Marc Aurels. Unter dem Aspekt "Lohnt es sich, fuer die Menschen zu leiden?" wird der Prometheusmythos interpretiert. Ausserdem behandelt Dalfen den Wissenschaftsbegriff der griechischen Medizin, die Präsens der Griechen im Denken der modernen Naturwissenschaft, die Wurzeln des europäischen Kulturbegriffs, Politik und Utopie in einer Komödie des Aristophanes, und aus dem Bereich der Religion das Gebet des Kleanthes an Zeus und das Schicksal sowie Deutungen menschlicher Existenz in der fruehen griechischen Dichtung. (shrink)

This article will contrast two portrayals of Protagoras: one in the "Theaetetus," where Socrates discusses Protagorean theory and even comes to his defense by imitating the deceased sophist; and another in the "Protagoras," where Socrates recounts his encounter with the sophist. I suggest that Plato wants listeners and readers of the dialogues to hear the dissonance between the two portraits and to wonder why Socrates so distorts Protagoras in the "Theaetetus." Protagoras in the "Protagoras" behaves and speaks in ways that (...) are incompatible with the Protagorean position presented in the "Theaetetus.". (shrink)

This paper argues, first, that one can render Protagoras’s view on the teach ability of political virtue coherent by distinguishing between the affect required for achieving it and the capacity for developing these affect into fully fledged virtues. Second, the paper argues that by focusing on Books II - III of the Republic one might see an affinity between between Protagoras’s suggestion that virtuous citizens might give advice, without ruling it, in the affairs of the city and Plato’s conservative practical (...) political theory. (shrink)

According to a fragment of Porphyry (410 F Smith = 80 B 2 DK), containing a dialogue on the theme of plagiarism, Plato made use of the same arguments as Protagoras’ Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος against monistic thinkers, most likely the Eleatics. My paper aims to analyse Porphyry’s testimony to assess some aspects of Protagoras’ reflection on being through a comparison with parallel sources, in particular Plato’s dialogues (Theaetetus, Euthydemus, Sophist, Parmenides). I conclude that it is plausible to suppose that, within (...) the framework of a more general reflection on ὀρθοέπεια, Protagoras viewed the notion of being in Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος from a linguistic perspective. (shrink)

This paper investigates a reference to the voice of the legendary musician Orpheus in Plato’s Protagoras. I propose that the Orpheus image does serious philosophical work in the text. Understanding the mythic and religious elements of the Orpheus tradition can help us conceptualize the harms of sophistry from a Platonic viewpoint. In the light of the image, the sophist emerges as a quasi-magical manipulator of rhetorical beauty who charms his students into subrational creatures. Furthermore, the image provides insight into Plato’s (...) conception of the difference between sophistic and Socratic education. Playing on the tradition of Orpheus as (failed) psychopomp, I suggest that the sophist employs a descent-style education which holds students captive in an underworld of glamorous but empty sensibles. In sharp contrast, Socratic ascent-style education pulls students upwards to active contemplation of ultimate reality. (shrink)

Aujourd’hui, de la sentence de « l’homme est la mesure de toutes choses, pour celles qui sont, de leur existence ; pour celles qui ne sont pas, de leur non-existence » du sophiste Protagoras, on ne retient, souvent, que le jugement incendiaire de Platon qui la tient pour un relativisme selon lequel « à chacun sa vérité » de sorte qu’il serait impossible de mentir. C’est ainsi que cette phrase, qui est à inscrire dans le contexte des débats qui opposèrent (...) Protagoras aux éléates concernant les rapports entre le logos et la vérité, est brandie comme argument pour disqualifier, philosophiquement et moralement, Protagoras et l’ensemble des sophistes. Jugement à la hâte qui n’a rien de fécond pour qui veut étudier et comprendre la pensée du sophiste, principalement sa rhétorique politique. Le logos, dans la perspective de Protagoras, ne saurait être un discours sur l’être ou la vérité comme l’enseignait Parménide. Il est une sorte de démiurge qui fait advenir les choses : « Le choix intellectuel formulé par Protagoras est délibérément celui de la doxa, celui du non-être, celui du logos également qui ne dit pas ce qui est, mais qui fait être ce qu’il dit ». C’est à partir d’une étude du statut du logos que Protagoras va repenser les fondements de l’absolu et de la connaissance. Dans cette approche du statut du logos dans laquelle l’homme est considéré comme le critère des choses, l’originalité de Protagoras sera d’accorder à la parole un pouvoir absolu tout. (shrink)

This essay explores a curious point of intersection in the historical pairing of becoming and negation, between two thinkers and two traditions: the Sophist Protagoras of fifth-century BCE Greece and the second-century CE South Asian Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna. I offer a speculative account of how becoming and negation are linked in Protagoras—speculative because only so much can be deduced from the extant fragments and testimony. I compare that account to the more coherent picture offered by Nāgārjuna—more coherent because a complete (...) account of the logic that links becoming and negation is carefully preserved in the works attributed to Nāgārjuna. While no specific conclusions regarding the bridge that linked India and Greece may be reached, the similarities between these thinkers and the greater coherence of the Buddhist tradition nevertheless offer hypothetical possibilities for reconstructing the larger architecture of the world of sophistic thought that is now lost to us. (shrink)

We combine linear temporal logic (with both past and future modalities) with a deontic version of justification logic to provide a framework for reasoning about time and epistemic and normative reasons. In addition to temporal modalities, the resulting logic contains two kinds of justification assertions: epistemic justification assertions and deontic justification assertions. The former presents justification for the agent’s knowledge and the latter gives reasons for why a proposition is obligatory. We present two kinds of semantics for the logic: one (...) based on Fitting models and the other based on neighborhood models. The use of neighborhood semantics enables us to define the dual of deontic justification assertions properly, which corresponds to a notion of permission in deontic logic. We then establish the soundness and completeness of an axiom system of the logic with respect to these semantics. Further, we formalize the Protagoras versus Euathlus paradox in this logic and present a precise analysis of the paradox, and also briefly discuss Leibniz’s solution. (shrink)

This paper discusses two broadly logical issues related to Protagoras’ measure doctrine (M) and the self-refutation argument (SRA). First, I argue that the relevant interpretation of (M) has it that every individual human being determines all her own truths, including the truth of (M) itself. I then turn to what I take to be the most important move in the SRA: that Protagoras recognises not only that his opponents disagree with him about the truth of (M), but also that they (...) hold that (M) is false simpliciter. By recognising that his opponents do not make the relativising concession he makes for them, he is forced to accept that (M) is false. I go on to argue that several other defenders of the SRA end up with a regress which is difficult to end and might not favour anti-Protagoreans. On my reading, by recognising what his opponents believe, Protagoras is barred from adding qualifiers, and the possible regress doesn’t get off the ground. I conclude with brief discussions of how Protagoras might try to avoid the result of the SRA and the argument’s role in this part of the Theaetetus. (shrink)

The epistemic justification and nature of Protagoras of Abdera’s agnosticism continues to be subject to varying interpretations, and there remain several reconstructions for the theological and anthropological argumentation that apparently followed on from his declaration of agnosticism that apparently opened his book On the Gods. In this article, the grounds for these hypothetical reconstructions will be challenged and a “strong agnostic” interpretation of Protagoras’ theology interpreted critically in light of his epistemology will be proposed. The article will conclude with discussion (...) on a more recent argument for Protagorean atheism. (shrink)

»Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν [Pántôn khrēmátôn métron éstin ánthrôpos, tôn mèn όntôn hôs éstin, tôn dè ouk όntôn hôs ouk éstin]« – »Čovjek je mjerilo svih stvari, onih koje jesu da jesu, onih koje nisu da nisu«, kaže Protagora. Onaj tko hoće razmotriti Protagorin iskaz (ili raspravljati o njemu), trebao bi najprije potražiti odgovor ne prethodno pitanje: što je čovjek? Utoliko će se u ovome prilogu našem razgovoru (...) najprije (uz pomoć Aristotela) potražiti neki odgovori na to prethodno pitanje, da bi se Protagorin iskaz pokušalo razmotriti s vidika tih odgovora te da bi ga se iskušalo u dva različita vida čovjekova života – u vidu što ga Aristotel naziva θεωρετικός βίος (theōretikόs bíos) i u vidu što ga naziva πολιτικός βίος (politikόs bíos). Napokon, ako se prihvati interpretacija Protagorina iskaza kao afirmacija relativističkog načela (kako to u svojoj kritici u Theaitētu drži Platon), pokušat će se mjesto i smisao relativizma odrediti s obzirom na ta dva vida čovjekova života te s obzirom na razliku između sofizma i filozofije (sofista i filozofa). Na kraju će biti sugerirano da je Protagorin iskaz moguće i drugačije interpretirati te da svaka od različitih interpretacija može imati valjanu težinu. (shrink)

Les penseurs qu’aujourd’hui nous appelons les sophistes ont été rassemblés en tant que groupe ou école de pensée par Platon. Platon, comme on l’a souvent dit, nous a donné (à dessein ou non) une impres­sion fausse de l’unité de ce groupe et de ses idées au ve siècle. À cette époque – et même au ive siècle – le mot « sophiste » fut une appellation souple, et les membres de ce groupe ont soutenu des idées et des posi­tions intellectuelles (...) diverses. Platon lui-même nous montre clairement, surtout dans le Protagoras, que les sophistes étaient plutôt rivaux que col­lègues dans un mouvement intellectuel cohérent. (shrink)

Le célèbre incipit du Peri theon (80 B 4 DK = 31 D 10 Laks-Most), dans lequel Protagoras affirmait être dans l’incapacité de savoir si les dieux existent ou non, joue sans aucun doute un rôle important dans l’histoire de l’athéisme ancien dans la mesure où il permet, comme le souligne David Sedley, de reconstruire un contexte culturel dans lequel la négation de l’existence des dieux était considérée comme une thèse philosophique digne d’être discutée. La présente contribution portera sur les (...) principaux problèmes exégétiques relatifs au fragment protagoréen. Dans un premier moment, nous nous occuperons de la question de la constitution du texte. Nous considérerons ensuite l’historicité de la tradition biographique concernant la persécution judiciaire du sophiste, qui est évoquée par la plupart des sources citant le fragment. Finalement, nous essayerons d’étudier le fragment de Protagoras dans le cadre de la tradition philosophique et littéraire qui le précède et de l’analyser à la lumière de la réflexion philosophique du sophiste lui-même, afin de mieux comprendre le point de vue sur les dieux et la religion que Protagoras exprimait dans son écrit. (shrink)

The paper argues for an analytic interpretation of Protagoras’ myth in Plato’s dialogue by showing that its goal is not so much to reconstruct the origins of civilization as to identify some essential features of humankind. Against the widespread opinion that human progress depends on the development of technai, Protagoras claims that political art is the most important one, insofar as it is the condition for the existence of society. More concretely, the emphasis on the political art also serves to (...) bring light to what is distinctive of Protagoras as opposed to the other sophists and poets. As clearly shown in the dialogue, Protagoras can thus present himself as the only teacher who is capable of imparting the teachings suited to the needs of the new world of the polis. (shrink)

La cultura occidental, con la que vivimos y entendemos, nació bajo los auspicios de un triple ente: la conjugación de lacultura arábigo-musulmana, la civilización germano-eslava y el mundo clásico-bíblico; todos éstos vendrían a encajar, en principio, los miembros articulados del hombre moderno occidental. En concreto, las lenguas modernas han resultado un vehículo habitual y pertinente de la cultura clásica, en mayor o menor proporción y la someten a su propio arbitrio, creando una nueva dinámica literaria, determinada por razones estilísticas o (...) de prestigio. Por ello, no dejan de ser preocupantes los constantes vaivenes de una sociedad ávida de informaciones y conocimientos, sin ningún rumbo a seguir ni alguna meta humanamente satisfactoria. (shrink)

Com base no Teeteto de Platão, busca-se compreender a dimensão do termo ánthropos na famosa sentença de Protágoras. Segundo a crítica platônica, Protágoras parece entender corpo e alma como diferentes tipos de percipientes: os órgãos sensoriais corporais percebem a aparência imediata de algo que provoca a sensibilidade; a alma, por sua vez, ‘percebe’ por ter julgamentos admitidos pela aprendizagem e experiência. O homem-medida protagórico, do tema da realidade sensível, conduz-nos à formulação do problema em termos de julgamento e opinião, e (...) a medida, que inicialmente é atribuída a cada indivíduo, para além de cada ser humano, é reputada a cada cidade. (shrink)

This paper argues that Protagoras’ concept of education, unlike the Platonic ideal of complete transmission of cognitive knowledge, is not oriented towards the paradigm of axiomatic geometry, but seeks to develop virtue and judgment through processes of consideration, insight, imitation, and practice. Accordingly, his epistemology combines consciousness of moderate relativity with a preference for proliferation of theories, without giving up the claim to gradually better logoi. Protagoras’ position can thus be understood and defended against the reservations of Plato to Boghossian (...) as a systematically attractive and virtuous epistemic attitude. (shrink)

Protagoras’ Grand Speech is traditionally considered to articulate a contractualist approach to political existence and morality. There is, however, a newly emerging line of interpretation among scholars, which explores a naturalist layer in Protagoras’ ethical and political thought. This article aims to make a contribution to this new way of reading Protagoras’ speech, by discussing one of its most elaborate versions.

In the Theaetetus Socrates provides an elaboration and discussion of Protagoras’ measure doctrine, grounding it in a “secret doctrine” of flux. This paper argues that the anthropology of the myth in the Protagoras provides an earlier, very different way to explain the measure doctrine, focusing on its application to civic values, such as “just,” “fine,” and “pious.” The paper shows that Protagoras’ explanation of the dual etiology of virtue – that it is acquired both by nature and by nurture – (...) tracks the two meanings of “anthropos” in his formulation of the measure doctrine, as “humankind” and “individual human.” On Protagoras’ account, humankind’s survival can be explained by the fact that humans share shame and justice, which enables them to live together in cities. (shrink)

Protagoras and Aristotle’s conceptions of virtue are without doubt different. The former conceives it as the exercise of certain moral qualities that are indispensable to the attainment or maintenance of what is useful to oneself and to those who dedicate themselves to the affairs of the city. The latter conceives it as a strong and immutable state of character, which is the condition for the realization of the individual’s and of the city’s Eudaimonia. It would seem, however, that Protagoras and (...) Aristotle converge on this point: the subsistence of a city does not depend upon a ruler who holds the science of ruling well with which he rules, but rather on well educated and excellent rulers and citizens, which is the condition for good political exercise. My aim here is to indicate the affinity between the political conceptions of Protagoras and Aristotle concerning the end of civic education as a guarantee of justice in the city. (shrink)

En el Gran Discurso de Protágoras, en el diálogo platónico que lleva su nombre, Platón pone en boca de Protágoras un mito acerca del origen, desarrollo y naturaleza del ser humano, que es de gran relevancia filosófica. Se expresa que los dioses crearon a los seres mortales desde dos elementos: la tierra y el fuego. A su vez, también asignaron dos titanes, Epimeteo y Prometeo, para que proveyeran a los mortales de sus facultades. ¿Acaso esto implica que la creación no (...) fue terminada por los dioses? ¿Hasta qué punto los dioses crearon enteramente al ser humano? ¿Podría afirmarse que este es un mito creacionista? El desarrollo de los seres vivientes puede dividirse en cuatro instancias. A lo largo de este artículo, se proponen distintos modelos hermenéuticos para responder los interrogantes mencionados anteriormente. (shrink)

The following article provides an interpretation of the structure of courage in Plato’s Laches, Meno and Protagoras. I argue that these dialogues present courage (ἀνδρεία) in the soul according to the same scheme: that there is a normatively neutral psychic state which is informed by the knowledge of good and evil. The knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) which informs this normatively neutral psychic state is called practical wisdom (which Plato refers to as φρόνησις or sometimes σοφία). This interpretation seems to negate the claim (...) that virtue is knowledge. I will show, however, that this is not a contradiction and that virtue is in fact knowledge, despite the complex moral psychology of courage. Finally, I will argue that the conception of courage in the Republic addresses some of the problems posed by the discussion of courage in the above-mentioned dialogues. (shrink)

The goal of this research was to analyze the philosophical meaning of the sentence of the fifth century sophist a.C. Protagoras de Abdera: “Man is the measure of all things: of the things that are, that they are, of the things that are not, that they are not”. That phrasing wording was criticized by philosophers of the time, especially Plato. Drawing from various sources, I intend to retrace Protagoras' ideas and its philosophical force. I intend to investigate how, in a (...) way, Protagoras contributes to Plato's philosophical reflection and to investigate, on the other hand, whether there are relevant arguments to show that the interpretation of Protagoras's sentence is different from that of Plato. (shrink)

The Great Speech of Protagoras in Plato’s dialogue is now widely seen as an expression of democratic theory, one of the earliest substantial expressions of democratic theory on record. At the same time, there have long been arguments to the contrary, the most formidable presentation of which is an article by Peter Nicholson that appeared in these pages in 1981. In this short piece, I address Nicholson’s skeptical arguments head-on and in full, in a way that has not yet been (...) done. By doing so, I hope to put skeptical arguments of this sort to rest, and to confirm Protagoras’ Great Speech once and for all as an early, and very interesting, fragment of democratic theory. (shrink)

Protagoras beansprucht, die Jugend erziehen zu können. Warum nicht? Wenn «Mensch Maß aller Dinge» ist, kann jeder jeden ‘besser’ machen… Für Plato geht das nicht auf. Was fehlt? Was ist das Maß des Menschen, wenn der Mensch Maß sein soll? Protagoras claims to be able to educate the young. Why not? If «Man is Measure of Everything», anybody can make everybody ‘better’… To Plato, this doesn't add up. What's lacking? What is the measure of Man, if Man be measure?

En el presente trabajo intentaremos poner en evidencia un singular enfoque sobre la pólis ateniense ofrecido por Protágoras en el diálogo platónico que lleva su nombre. Dicho enfoque, soslayado por los intérpretes, hace hincapié en la dimensión visual de la praxis política de los ciudadanos y es coherente con los posicionamientos ontológicos que emergen de los fragmentos del sofista.

Plato's Theaetetus discusses and ultimately rejects Protagoras's famous claim that "man is the measure of all things." The most famous of Plato's arguments is the Self-Refutation Argument. But he offers a number of other arguments as well, including one that I call the 'Future Argument.' This argument, which appears at Theaetetus 178a−179b, is quite different from the earlier Self-Refutation Argument. I argue that it is directed mainly at a part of the Protagorean view not addressed before , namely, that all (...) beliefs concerning one's own future sensible qualities are true. This part of the view is found to be inconsistent with Protagoras's own conception of wisdom as expertise and with his own pretenses at expertise in teaching. (shrink)

Taking a cue from the interpretive difficulties faced by Socrates and his interlocutors in Plato’s Theaetetus as they struggle to determine the meaning of Protagoras’ homo-mensura doctrine (HM), I argue that Protagoras, or early Protagoreans, used HM to speak on the relativity of literary criticism. For evidence I adduce an overlooked passage of the anonymous Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi, which contains an ethical formulation of HM. This formulation of HM, compatible with the portrait of Protagoras from Theaetetus, explains the concern (...) for literary interpretation latent in two sections of the Certamen. From the evidence in the Certamen, we may infer that HM was directly related to Protagorean education in civic virtue, part of which included a study of how to read and listen to texts. (shrink)

This paper is written on the supposition that the main theme in the Protagoras is the nature of Protagoras’ teaching. This teaching, as it must have been displayed in his lessons, is, however, neither accounted for nor discussed directly in the dialogue. Instead of asking Protagoras for a trial lecture, Socrates from the start is set to challenge the underlying assumptions of his teaching; the structure of its moral underpinnings. This structure, I assume, is less formed by theoretical thinking on (...) Protagoras’ part than by social and institutional factors, factors that to a large extent determine the professional role of Protagoras as a teacher. I will discuss this structure under four headings: (1) The expectations of a potential student. (2) The ambiguities of Protagoras’ position as a teacher. (3) Protagoras’ attitude to the virtues. (4) What is it to live well? (shrink)

Cet article examine le fragment de l’homme-mesure de Protagoras, tout d’abord en exposant les grands courants de son interprétation, ensuite et surtout en présentant les positions respectives et antagonistes de Nietzsche et Heidegger. Heidegger, contre Nietzsche, fait reposer l’homo-mensura sur un arrière-fond ontologique et platonicien, où la mesure n’est possible que depuis l’ouverture ontologique qui la précède. Cette interprétation a sa légitimité historique et philologique. Mais Nietzsche comprend le fragment comme entièrement irréductible au platonisme : Protagoras aurait pensé la connaissance (...) comme l’étude de types psychologiques, non pas selon une norme épistémique stable, mais selon les variations d’intensité qui touchent toute psychè mais aussi toute communauté sociale. Je prends appui sur cette dernière intuition pour dégager ce qui me semble l’interprétation la plus riche du fragment de l’homme-mesure, à partir des remarques d’Eugène Dupréel – une interprétation sociale et normative où Protagoras est le penseur d’une praxis qui, dans une situation et dans une communauté données, est capable d’améliorer les impressions subjectives du plus grand nombre. (shrink)