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  1. added 2018-01-29
    Reason and Intuitive Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics: Two Ways of Knowing, Two Ways of Living.Sanem Soyarslan - 2011 - Dissertation, Duke University
    In this dissertation, I explore the distinction between reason (ratio) and intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva) in Spinoza’s Ethics in order to explain the superior affective power of the latter over the former. In addressing this fundamental but relatively unexplored issue in Spinoza scholarship, I suggest that these two kinds of adequate knowledge differ not only in terms of their method, but also with respect to their content. I hold that unlike reason, which is a universal knowledge, intuitive knowledge descends to (...)
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  2. added 2016-11-28
    The Distinction Between Reason and Intuitive Knowledge in Spinoza's Ethics.Sanem Soyarslan - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):27-54.
    While both intuitive knowledge and reason are adequate ways of knowing for Spinoza, they are not equal. Intuitive knowledge, which Spinoza describes as the ‘greatest virtue of mind’, is superior to reason. The nature of this superiority has been the subject of some controversy due to Spinoza's notoriously parsimonious treatment of the distinction between reason and intuitive knowledge in the Ethics. In this paper, I argue that intuitive knowledge differs from reason not only in terms of its method of cognition—but (...)
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  3. added 2015-01-24
    "By Eternity I Understand": Eternity According to Spinoza.Julie R. Klein - 2002 - Iyyun, The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (July):295-324.
  4. added 2015-01-07
    "Spinoza on Knowing, Being and Freedom," Ed. J. G. Van der Bend. [REVIEW]Stephen H. Daniel - 1976 - Modern Schoolman 53 (3):329-330.