Se expone la relación entre el signo en tanto gnoseológica y semánticamente subordinado a la imaginación y el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar las verdades filosóficas por parte de Spinoza. Al respecto, se revisan tres posturas: (i) la de David Savan, quien sostiene la inadecuación del lenguaje para expresar verdades filosóficas debido a la vinculación spinoziana entre las palabras y la imaginación; (ii) la de G.H.R. Parkinson, quien afirma que el uso del lenguaje no es inconsistente con la (...) expresión de las proposiciones filosóficas por parte de Spinoza, sino que, la mayor parte de lo propuesto en la Ética pertenece al conocimiento de razón y las nociones comunes y; (iii) la de Mogens Laerke, quien defiende la posibilidad de atribuir coherencia al uso del lenguaje, por un lado, y a la filosofía spinoziana, por el otro, a partir del recurso matemático de la demostración geométrica. Finalmente, se argumenta una interpretación propia con base en el análisis semiótico del signo en Spinoza, a partir de la cual (i) es posible atribuirle al signo una función dentro del entendimiento, sin detrimento de su capacidad gnoseológica y semántica para alcanzar verdades filosóficas y, por consiguiente, (ii) validar el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar su filosofía. (shrink)
This book reconstructs Spinoza's theory of the human mind against the backdrop of the twofold notion that subjective experience is explainable and that its successful explanation is of ethical relevance, because it makes us wiser, freer, and happier.
Spinoza's causal axiom is at the foundation of the Ethics. I motivate, develop and defend a new interpretation that I call the ‘causally restricted interpretation’. This interpretation solves several longstanding puzzles and helps us better understand Spinoza's arguments for some of his most famous doctrines, including his parallelism doctrine and his theory of sense perception. It also undermines a widespread view about the relationship between the three fundamental, undefined notions in Spinoza's metaphysics: causation, conception and inherence.
Spinoza’s mind-body thesis states that the mind is the idea of the body. At the same time, Spinoza is clear in affirming that we have ideas of external bodies. There is a question, therefore, of how to reconcile two contending objects of perception: the human body qua object of the mind, on the one hand, and the myriad bodies external to ours, on the other. After evaluating various commentators’ attempts to address the issue, I make two primary claims: the object (...) of sense perception in Spinoza is the human body only ; and the tension in Spinoza’s account of representation stems from its relationship to his doctrine of the attributes. (shrink)
The idea of an original contract is, ironically, inherently narrative in form; although tautological in essence, it nevertheless portrays events occurring in sequence. In response to Filmer's provocations that the idea of an original contract lacks historical veracity. Locke tries and repeatedly fails to establish a direct historical substantiation of his position in the early chapters of the Second Treatise. The most important of these various miscalculations concern the role of consent in his account of the origins of government, the (...) tension between logical and historical evidence in describing the development of prerogative in the English monarchy, and the inescapable conclusion that conquest and not consent was the likely origin of most states. In these places, the Locke's deductive argument is forced to slow, hesitate, and change direction. The general concept of individual transgression, as it emerges from Locke's depiction of the state of nature, war, and slavery, later transforms itself into the basis of governmental injustice and tyranny. These, in turn, work to generate a sort of secondary and “political” state of nature in which a now “historical” people, by means of concrete acts of resistance and revolution, enact the hypothesis of the consensual theory in their own actual time and place. (shrink)
This dissertation investigates the nature of imaginatio in the works of Spinoza. The first three chapters are devoted to explicating the ways imaginatio figures in Spinoza's accounts of the attributes, extensio and cogitatio. I show how both attributes are aspects of the same force in which substance perseveres through its essence, and how imaginatio is the key to understanding the movement from corpus to mente. In chapters 4 and 5, my work explores the place of imaginatio in the nature of (...) each of these attributes, examining first the dynamics of extensio before turning to the distinctions essential to cogitatio. These two chapters also trace in great detail the ways in which Spinoza's account of imaginatio derives, on the one hand, from his critique of the principles of Descartes' physics and, on the other, from his critique of Maimonides' account of prophecy. Concluding chapters focus on the 'intensive-extensive' aspects of imaginatio insofar as Spinoza shows these to possess ethical/political implications for the constitution of the state and for human relations as the expression of historical, and a-historical, force. (shrink)