Søren Kierkegaard

The Book of Job is often read as the Bible's response to theodicy's 'problem of evil.' As a resolution to the logical difficulties of this problem, however, it is singularly unsatisfying. Job's ethical protest against God is never addressed at the level of the ethical. But suggested in Job's final encounter with God is the possibility of a spiritual resolution beyond the ethical. In this paper I examine the Book of Job as a response to the spiritual problem of despair; (...) despair engendered by the ethical problem of evil. My reading is informed by Kierkegaard's analysis of despair in The Sickness unto Death, and Stephen Mitchell's extraordinary translation of the Book of Job, as well as his insightful commentary. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard’s influence on the thought of Mikhail Bakhtin has received relatively little attention from Bakhtin scholars (and hardly any attention from Bakhtin scholars in the English-speaking world). Yet, as I argue in this paper, Kierkegaard was among the most important formative influences on Bakhtin's work. This influence is most evident in Bakhtin's early ethical philosophy, but remains highly relevant in later periods. Reading Bakhtin as a follower and developer of Kierkegaard's fundamental philosophical insights provides us with a key to (...) the unity of Bakhtin's thought. (shrink)

If there is no God everything is permitted. The phenomenology of decision tells us that permissibility and utility are intimately coordinated (Reason Internalism is effectively a thesis that erases the line between the two). Because of the difference in utility one does not find every choice equally permitted. That the instant of decision is madness means one finds facing every real decision frightening. it is not the case that there is no God. One's God is that which matters most crucially (...) for one's decision. (shrink)

The courage to use one's own reason is an invitation to take more actions---implicating excessive use of agency, even under rampant false consciousness manufactured by mass media and technological priorities. If one does nothing and gains nothing by doing nothing, one is not subject to any evaluation or interpretation. Modernity is an ongoing incessant festival of cruel hermeneutic sacrificial.

The character of Charlie Chaplin in his movies is the personification of forgetfulness but not forgiveness ------ Someone who is not susceptible to bad conscience: (Nietzsche: the sting of conscience teaches one to sting). He carries no guilt, no regret, and is a mechanism of historical forgetfulness (like a happy beast which grazes free from past and future) ------ He undergoes misfortunes and occasional fortunes and comes out the same mechanism of historical forgetfulness he used to be ------ He is (...) virtuoso in terms of accepting the external reality and its misfortunes and is delighted alright as long as a minimally descent condition of life obtains but is vigilant and agile otherwise in the face of danger and unjust irregularities. Agility means he is always on the verge of trusting and mistrusting the external environmental factors. He is suffering from borderline personality disorder. (shrink)

The Prosecutor in Camus’ novel claims to have peered into Meursault’s soul but found nothing human in there. But the nothingness attests to Meursault embodying something like a musical instrument through which the world plays its music. Meursault does not initiate anything that in the presence of standing conditions causes a change in environment—aside from physical needs which are also immensely flexible and dependent on existing circumstances. He himself constitute the standing conditions awaiting external factors to cause any change. Meursault’s (...) radical indifference and acceptance towards the world and authenticity (his speech and his deed are perfectly coordinated) (his thought and his speech are the same except situation where out of consideration for others he keeps silent) indicates that he has no sickness unto death undergoing life or in anticipation of his death. What the prosecutor announces amounts to Meursault’s existence preceding his essence (given his openness to the world despite his acute rationality and understanding of his environment). But if existence precedes essence, the method precedes existence. He roams the world already equipped with a method. ------------ Abstract II: ---------- What is something that it is not a being? The question implicates there be something that it is not a being but that into which beings as a whole in one's existence slipped into in sickness unto death. Meursault brings to consciousness (of the chaplain) the sickness unto death separated from absurdity by a transparent sheet. Something to which he himself was not susceptible out of his own life-affirmative reasoning. (shrink)

The question that "how one should live?" constitutes the ultimate question of philosophy according to Aristotle. According to Camus "there is only one really serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide." The riddle and our predicament is that these two questions are exactly one and the same question. [Why?] ------ [Because for example] Nietzsche, in claiming that "the beggars should be entirely abolished ... truly it is annoying to give to them and it is annoying one not to give to (...) them", has spectacularly failed to notice that there is another logical option: simply to abolish the observer. (Especially that nowadays we witness live-stream misery of other human beings comfortably numb.) The option also resolves the problematic that "if I must love my fellow man, he had better hide himself, for no sooner do I see his face than there is an end to my love for him". (shrink)

Kierkegaard's Either-Or is a book about the choice between aesthetic, ethical, and religious approaches to life. I show that Either-Or also contains a proposal for philosophy of science, and in particular, about the ideal epistemic state for human beings. Whereas the Cartesian-Hegelian tradition conceived of the ideal state as one of detached deliberation -- i.e. "seeing the world as it is in itself" -- Kierkegaard envisions the ideal state as the achievement of equilibrium between the "spectator" and "actor" aspects of (...) the human being. Kierkegaard's proposal thus sets the stage for Niels Bohr's "epistemological lesson of quantum mechanics". (shrink)

I argue that Kierkegaard has an account of thought experiment. While his contemporary Ørsted’s contributions to the early history of the concept of ‘thought experiment’ have been recently acknowledged, Kierkegaard’s contributions remain largely unrecognized. I argue that Kierkegaard’s method of ‘imaginary construction’ [Tanke-Experiment] aims at identifying underlying invariants in objects of experience. I outline similarities between Ørsted’s pursuit of invariants in the sciences and Kierkegaard’s fictional variations in Repetition. One implication is that Kierkegaard’s view is more scientific and methodological than (...) is standardly thought by Kierkegaard scholars, who more commonly treat imaginary construction as a literary device. A further implication is that Kierkegaard, like Ørsted, is interested in the success or failure of mental acts, rather than (or in addition to) practical action, as is more standardly associated with Kierkegaard. One original development, beyond what Kierkegaard inherits from Ørsted, is the role of thought experiments as exceptions. An exception is a case that falls outside a rule without breaking it. Exceptions can neither establish a rule nor refute its necessity; however, they turn attention to relevant principles and further determine their content. I highlight similarities between Ørsted’s account of thought experiments and Kierkegaard’s as a method of variation. (shrink)

Although doubt (Tvivl) and despair (Fortvivlelse) are widely recognized as two central and closely associated concepts in Kierkegaard’s authorship, their precise relationship remains opaque in the extant interpretive literature. To shed light on their relationship, this paper develops a novel interpretation of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the connection between despair and our agency over our beliefs, and its significance for Kierkegaard’s ethics of belief. First, I show that an important yet largely overlooked form of Kierkegaardian despair involves either failing to take (...) ethico-religious responsibility for one’s practical agency over one’s beliefs, or misusing one’s practical agency over one’s beliefs by refusing to recognize or comply with externally given ethico-religious norms governing belief. Second, I argue that Kierkegaard takes properly exercising one’s agency over one’s beliefs to matter because beliefs are partly constitutive of the theological virtues (faith, hope, and love) that Kierkegaard regards as the cure for despair. (shrink)

I argue that in Sheridan Hough's book Kierkegaard's Dancing Tax Collector, the distinctive and novelistic literary form is not a playful, whimsical, or otherwise contingent feature, but a structure that's needed to convey the account of Kierkegaardian faith as practical in nature.

In this article, evidence is briefly presented for three facts that together point to something puzzling. (1) That major continental philosophers of the nineteenth century tended to engage in some detail, as part of a broader preoccupation with ancient Greek thought, with Pyrrhonian scepticism. (2) That major continental philosophers of the twentieth century tended to engage in some depth with their nineteenth-century forebears and maintained their tendency to engage significantly with ancient Greek thought. (3) That twentieth-century continental philosophers demonstrate little (...) to no interest in Pyrrhonian scepticism. This raises the question: why does engagement with Pyrrhonism disappear from continental philosophy? The article discusses two hypotheses that might explain this disappearance. (shrink)

Explores boredom's intellectual history from its early origins to the modern day. Essential reading for students and researchers in the history of philosophy, emotion studies, phenomenology, and moral psychology. It will also interest scholars in religion, classics, sociology, and the history of psychology.

In “Story of Your Life” and “Anxiety Is the Dizziness of Freedom,” Ted Chiang explores questions that would be at home in contemporary scholarship on free will, agency, and moral responsibility. In “Story of Your Life,” Chiang asks whether knowledge of the future is compatible with free will. And the prism technology in “Anxiety Is the Dizziness of Freedom” prompts questions of whether we are responsible for out-of-character actions. If such actions were genuine anomalies, would we be less responsible for (...) them? In these stories, however, these questions are entangled with questions more at home in the existentialist tradition. Put in conversation with Friedrich Nietzsche and Soren Kierkegaard, Chiang’s stories present a compelling picture of existential responsibility and what it means to live a rich human existence, in particular, what it means to affirm our lives (Nietzsche) and to become selves (Kierkegaard). (shrink)

This paper aims to develop the notion of ‘therapy of desire’ as a hermeneutic key for understanding Kierkegaard’s view of desire. First, I develop the notion of ‘therapy of desire’ as it has appeared in the secondary literature on Kierkegaard and Augustine, particularly in Lee C. Barrett. In my reading, I underscore how a ‘therapy of desire’ implies that the desire can be ‘healed’ and that the desirer has ‘agency’ over his/her desires. Second, I conduct a textual analysis of Kierkegaard’s (...) discourse on Lk 22:15, which deals with the desire for the Eucharist. In employing the notion of ‘therapy of desire’ as a hermeneutic key to interpret it, I characterize Kierkegaard’s view of desire as a lack of satisfaction and verify how the ideas of ‘agency’ and ‘healing’ appear in Kierkegaard’s text. Finally, I show how the characterization of desire as a constant lack of satisfaction that consists in a gift from God, that implies the possibility of undertaking a healing process and that underscores the agency of the desirer, differs from some Lutheran ideas, namely the relationship between grace and deeds and the understanding of original sin. (shrink)

In 1848, the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard wrote a short yet highly significant theater review, titled “Mr. Phister as Captain Scipio.” This review deals with a seemingly prosaic problem: how can an actor convincingly play the role of a drunk police captain while simultaneously disclosing that this captain is deliberately concealing his intoxicated condition? This article argues that this ‘disclosure of concealment’ underlies Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. It elucidates this argument by illustrating that the three levels of theatrical performance highlighted in “Mr. (...) Phister as Captain Scipio” correspond to three parallel levels of authorial performance. Drawing inspiration from the actor, Kierkegaard adopts the persona of a pseudonym who conceals his true identity behind an incognito while simultaneously disclosing that this pseudonym is hiding something. Emulating the dramatic performativity of the actor, Kierkegaard developed a method of indirect communication that constantly works against itself and thus relies on a form of linguistic performativity. (shrink)

Si bien existen algunos intentos de repensar el tema de la tecnología desde la filosofía de Søren Kierkegaard, no existe todavía un diálogo directo con la postura transhumanista. En este artículo proponemos un acercamiento inédito, entendido como una crítica, desde el pensamiento de Kierkegaard al transhumanismo y su concepto de singularity. Primero, analizamos el modo en el que los transhumanistas entienden el concepto de singularity y sus limitaciones; después, apoyándonos en la filosofía de Kierkegaard, defendemos que la única singularidad posible (...) y real es la persona humana como relación primigenia, fuente de angustia y libertad, pecado y amor, espíritu. Defendemos también que esta relación no puede ser replicada por una creación artificial. (shrink)

John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308) and Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) have much to say regarding the relationship between the commandments to love God and to love one’s neighbor. Their positions are so similar in places that some interpreters have suggested that Kierkegaard and Scotus agree that the command to love one’s neighbor follows necessarily from the command to love God. That is, Scotus and Kierkegaard allegedly hold that the indicative, “One’s neighbor is to be loved” is necessarily true in the same way (...) as the indicative, “God is to be loved.” For Scotus, determining the modal status of these commands involves framing imperatives as indicatives. According to Scotus, there is a distinction between natural law in the strict sense (where the truths of propositions are epistemically immediate and necessary) and the loose sense (where the truths of propositions are mediate and contingent), and the command to love God is natural law in the strict sense. However, Scotus does not posit an entailment relationship between love of God and love of neighbor, where loving one’s neighbor is necessary and epistemically immediate, and the suggestion that Scotus holds this belief seems unwarranted given textual evidence in Ordinatio III. 28 and, especially, III. 37, nn. 32-39. This paper argues that while Kierkegaard and Scotus share remarkably similar accounts of neighbor-love, Kierkegaard departs from the Scotus in some crucial respects, particularly concerning the modal status of the indicative “one’s neighbor is to be loved,” and the qualifications for a neighbor. Identifying where Kierkegaard departs from Scotus highlights the subtleties of their respective accounts of neighbor-love, and it might also supply clues regarding the trajectory of Kierkegaard’s mediated reception of the Subtle Doctor. (shrink)

The Concept of the Interesting portrays the artistic theories and life-view of Søren Kierkegaard's pseudonymous aesthete, known as A-one of the most intelligent and reflective yet deeply misguided characters in the modern literary tradition-ultimately revealing the flaws in his theory of existence and the new directions his aporia makes possible.

Soren Kierkegaard’s Lutheran existentialism represents a distinctively postmetaphysical philosophy of religion, focused in particular on a Christian vision of ethical authenticity. His philosophy continues to pose challenging questions for postmetaphysical philosophers in contemporary pluralistic settings. Focusing on specific works of Kierkegaard, this essay develops three such questions: (1) Can philosophy in a postmetaphysical vein still give advice for the pursuit of the good life, today’s diversity of life styles and values notwithstanding? (2) How can a postmetaphysical philosophy relate to the (...) ethical teachings and truth claims of religious doctrines? (3) Is postmetaphysical philosophy still capable of an “upbuilding and awakening” discourse that can induce and stabilize an ethical self-consciousness? (shrink)

This book reconstructs Heidegger’s philosophy of time by reading his work with and against a series of key interlocutors that he nominates as being central to his own critical history of time. In doing so, it explains what makes time of such significance for Heidegger and argues that Heidegger can contribute to contemporary debates in the philosophy of time. Time is a central concern for Heidegger, yet his thinking on the subject is fragmented, making it difficult to grasp its depth, (...) complexity, and promise. Heidegger traces out a history that focuses on the conceptualisations of time put forward by Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, and Husserl—an “alternative history of time” that challenges how time has been defined and studied within both philosophy and the sciences. This book explores what happens when we take seriously Heidegger’s claim that these seven figures are essential to any understanding of time, setting out what this can tell us about existence, possibility, and philosophy as a historical discipline. Heidegger’s Alternative History of Time will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on Heidegger, phenomenology, the philosophy of time, and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

This article engages the considerations of imagination in Kierkegaard and Ricoeur to argue for a moral dimension of the imagination and its objects. Imaginary objects are taken to be mental representations in images and narratives of people or courses of action that are not real in the sense that they are not actual, or have not yet happened. Three claims are made in the article. First, by drawing on the category of possibility, a conceptual distinction is established between imagination and (...) fantasy, (1) I claim that imagination has a moral dimension because it is engaged in considering real-life possibilities. Second, (2) drawing on Kierkegaard and Ricoeur, it is argued that mental representations of selfhood in imagination have a moral dimension because they essentially allow people to understand the development of agency in human selfhood by means of representations of would-be selves and narrative figurations of the self. Third, (3) mental representations of human selves have a moral dimension because they form important points of reference for moral orientations in the field of human praxis (moral pointers). (shrink)

"Faithful to the original Danish text and eminently readable, Jech's translation of Fear and Trembling admirably communicates the literary qualities of Kierkegaard's text, as well as his occasional fits of inspiration. Jech displays an unusual sensitivity not only to the literary/linguistic qualities of Kierkegaard’s prose, but also to his (often realized) aspirations to philosophical precision. As presented by Jech, Kierkegaard is not simply a gifted writer and speculative theologian dabbling in philosophy, but a philosopher concerned to limn the optimal role (...) of philosophical reflection, and to do so experimentally, especially with respect to matters of morality and faith. The translation is furthermore supplemented by very helpful explanatory notes that convey Kierkegaard’s own erudition and the multiple influences upon his thinking. The Historical Glossary will become a valuable reference tool for students and scholars of Kierkegaard’s writings. It is likely to play a welcome role in encouraging an improved understanding of what Kierkegaard means when he employs his idiosyncratic categories, allusions, and vocabulary." —Daniel Conway, Professor of Philosophy and Humanities, Texas A&M University. (shrink)

This essay describes and analyzes the four versions of the biblical story of Abraham proposed by Johannes de Silentio (a pseudonym used by Kierkegaard) in Fear and Tremblingto understand, from the movement of faith, how in none of these versions is the absurdity that claims the leap of the religious realized. Next, we explain Kierkegaard’s views on ethics and selfhood to then delve into the inextricable paradox that faith signifies and the radical movement that it demands for the existent.

Detendo-se na angústia enquanto existência como possibilidade, o Prof. Luiz Carlos Mariano Da Rosa mostra que, tal qual em seu emergir caracteriza-se como aquilo que guarda condição de estranheza, Kierkegaard assinala que a sua emergência consiste em um sentimento de risco que em condição de imanência se impõe a toda possibilidade como tal enquanto sentimento puro da possibilidade em face da liberdade como determinação fundamental do devir e o caráter contingente do possível, o que implica a realidade da liberdade enquanto (...) possibilidade para a possibilidade, que encerra dois caminhos, a saber, o suicídio ou a fé. Dessa forma, baseado no princípio fenomenológico-ontológico-existencial, o artigo sublinha que Heidegger assinala que não é senão a angústia que instaura e antes inaugura o abrir o mundo como mundo, a qual, longe de se deter em angústia-com, implica também angústia-por que, remetendo a pre-sença para aquilo pelo que a angústia se angustia, a saber, o seu próprio poder-ser-no-mundo. E, finalizando, o artigo destaca que, tendo como princípio teórico-conceitual a perspectiva de que a liberdade é o ser da consciência, Sartre se detém na questão se há consciência enquanto consciência de liberdade, como pressuposto, e qual é a forma desta consciência, assinalando que, constituindo-se angústia o locus que possibilita ao existente humano a consciência de sua liberdade, não é senão o que perfaz o modus essendi da liberdade como consciência de ser. (shrink)

Existentialist philosophy has, at times, been exceptionally popular. This is because of its promise of possibility, both in doctrine and in style: Its doctrine promises that we can break free from the shackles of cognitive or social structures we are thrown into, and we can overcome our marred personal or collective history. Its style promises that philosophy can be exciting, moving, exhilarating, and funny. Analytic Existentialism brings together ten essays in which analytic philosophers engage with existentialism. The essays take up (...) central existentialist themes, such as freedom, consciousness, and bad faith. Some bring existentialist ideas to bear on issues in contemporary analytic philosophy; some engage analytically with existentialist concerns; some employ the methods of analytic philosophy to interpret existentialist texts; and some articulate how existentialist insights speak to ongoing matters of concern outside of philosophy. All essays, taken together, make good on the existentialist promise for analytic philosophy: Even as analytic philosophers, we can embrace the thought that freedom is at the heart of our being. And even as analytic philosophers, we can write philosophical texts that capture the imagination. We trust that these essays can rekindle the excitement of philosophical thought. (shrink)

With a focus on Works of Love, this book argues that for Kierkegaard the living of the life of faith and love is a kind of art, involving skillful attention to the specificity of the episodes in an individual's life, and the creative imagining of new ways of enacting these virtues.

Cinematographic art can regenerate the experience of time as a spiritual memory because cinema can simultaneously present the modes of time, separating them from chronology and immediacy, seeing and thinking about the reality of the future of the world and, therefore, the crossroads where the spirit is called to create itself in relation to the way things become, which implies choosing to believe that is possible. The aim of this work is to show how the film concept and style of (...) Tarkovsky in the film Nostalghia, through the sequence shot, expresses a spiritual memory that can be understood as Kierkegaard’s existential becoming of the human spirit in the world. (shrink)