Søren Kierkegaard

The Book of Job is often read as the Bible's response to theodicy's 'problem of evil.' As a resolution to the logical difficulties of this problem, however, it is singularly unsatisfying. Job's ethical protest against God is never addressed at the level of the ethical. But suggested in Job's final encounter with God is the possibility of a spiritual resolution beyond the ethical. In this paper I examine the Book of Job as a response to the spiritual problem of despair; (...) despair engendered by the ethical problem of evil. My reading is informed by Kierkegaard's analysis of despair in The Sickness unto Death, and Stephen Mitchell's extraordinary translation of the Book of Job, as well as his insightful commentary. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard’s influence on the thought of Mikhail Bakhtin has received relatively little attention from Bakhtin scholars (and hardly any attention from Bakhtin scholars in the English-speaking world). Yet, as I argue in this paper, Kierkegaard was among the most important formative influences on Bakhtin's work. This influence is most evident in Bakhtin's early ethical philosophy, but remains highly relevant in later periods. Reading Bakhtin as a follower and developer of Kierkegaard's fundamental philosophical insights provides us with a key to (...) the unity of Bakhtin's thought. (shrink)

By contextualising the striking similarities in Feuerbach and Kierkegaard’s conceptions of sin as infinite qualitative difference, and the related question of the individual and the species as a shared response to the Hegelian Entzweiung, this article seeks to offer a new framework for understanding Feuerbach’s critique of Christian theology and of Kierkegaard’s famous articulation of the infinite qualitative difference as simultaneously ontological, hamartiological, and soteriological. It argues that Kierkegaard offers a modification of the Feuerbachian account to argue against Feuerbach’s conclusion (...) that the Christian doctrine of sin negates qualitative differences between individual humans, and to conversely affirm that sin differentiates not just God and humans, but each single individual too. Kierkegaard might be said to at once uphold Feuerbach’s critique of Hegelian theology, while inverting Feuerbach’s anti-theological programme by harnessing the ambiguities that appear in Feuerbach’s account of sin. It is thereby shown how both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard make use of Hegelian logic, both through their formal application of the concepts of quality and quantity, as well as their creative appropriation of the notion of Entzweiung. (shrink)

There is a tension for those who want to simultaneously hold that Abraham’s disposition to sacrifice Isaac is epistemically justified and yet hold that a contemporary father would not be justified in believing that God is commanding him to sacrifice his son. This paper attempts to resolve that tension. While some commentators have correctly pointed out that one must take Abraham’s long relationship with God into account when considering Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice his son, they do not entertain the possibility (...) that his hearing this commandment is evidence against the hypothesis that Abraham is speaking to God. I grant this possibility. But I argue that when God commands Abraham to do the unthinkable, Abraham’s previously acquired evidence could still be sufficient to justify his belief that he is speaking with God. And in making this argument, I attempt to show what differentiates Abraham from the contemporary father who thinks that God is commanding him to sacrifice his son. (shrink)

Kierkegaard's Either-Or is a book about the choice between aesthetic, ethical, and religious approaches to life. I show that Either-Or also contains a proposal for philosophy of science, and in particular, about the ideal epistemic state for human beings. Whereas the Cartesian-Hegelian tradition conceived of the ideal state as one of detached deliberation -- i.e. "seeing the world as it is in itself" -- Kierkegaard envisions the ideal state as the achievement of equilibrium between the "spectator" and "actor" aspects of (...) the human being. Kierkegaard's proposal thus sets the stage for Niels Bohr's "epistemological lesson of quantum mechanics". (shrink)

I argue that Kierkegaard has an account of thought experiment. While his contemporary Ørsted’s contributions to the early history of the concept of ‘thought experiment’ have been recently acknowledged, Kierkegaard’s contributions remain largely unrecognized. I argue that Kierkegaard’s method of ‘imaginary construction’ [Tanke-Experiment] aims at identifying underlying invariants in objects of experience. I outline similarities between Ørsted’s pursuit of invariants in the sciences and Kierkegaard’s fictional variations in Repetition. One implication is that Kierkegaard’s view is more scientific and methodological than (...) is standardly thought by Kierkegaard scholars, who more commonly treat imaginary construction as a literary device. A further implication is that Kierkegaard, like Ørsted, is interested in the success or failure of mental acts, rather than (or in addition to) practical action, as is more standardly associated with Kierkegaard. One original development, beyond what Kierkegaard inherits from Ørsted, is the role of thought experiments as exceptions. An exception is a case that falls outside a rule without breaking it. Exceptions can neither establish a rule nor refute its necessity; however, they turn attention to relevant principles and further determine their content. I highlight similarities between Ørsted’s account of thought experiments and Kierkegaard’s as a method of variation. (shrink)

This article engages the considerations of imagination in Kierkegaard and Ricoeur to argue for a moral dimension of the imagination and its objects. Imaginary objects are taken to be mental representations in images and narratives of people or courses of action that are not real in the sense that they are not actual, or have not yet happened. Three claims are made in the article. First, by drawing on the category of possibility, a conceptual distinction is established between imagination and (...) fantasy, I claim that imagination has a moral dimension because it is engaged in considering real-life possibilities. Second, drawing on Kierkegaard and Ricoeur, it is argued that mental representations of selfhood in imagination have a moral dimension because they essentially allow people to understand the development of agency in human selfhood by means of representations of would-be selves and narrative figurations of the self. Third, mental representations of human selves have a moral dimension because they form important points of reference for moral orientations in the field of human praxis. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus famously defines faith as a risky “venture” that requires “holding fast” to “objective uncertainty.” Yet puzzlingly, he emphasizes that faith requires resolute conviction and certainty. Moreover, Climacus claims that all beliefs about contingent propositions about the external world “exclude doubt” and “nullify uncertainty,” but also that uncertainty is “continually present” in these very same beliefs. This paper argues that these apparent contradictions can be resolved by interpreting Climacus as a belief-credence dualist. That is, Climacus holds that (...) beliefs and credences (i.e., degrees of belief) are two irreducibly distinct types of mental states. Beliefs are resolutions that close inquiry, thereby excluding doubt and reflecting subjective certainty by disregarding the possibility of error. Credences, by contrast, reflect assessments of evidential probabilities, thereby encoding a recognition of “objective uncertainty” by acknowledging the possibility of error. In addition to solving a vexing interpretive puzzle and showing how Kierkegaard anticipates contemporary views about the nature of belief and credence, this paper demonstrates that Kierkegaard developed a sophisticated account of the nature of belief, doubt, and certainty that merits serious philosophical consideration. (shrink)

I argue that in Sheridan Hough's book Kierkegaard's Dancing Tax Collector, the distinctive and novelistic literary form is not a playful, whimsical, or otherwise contingent feature, but a structure that's needed to convey the account of Kierkegaardian faith as practical in nature.

Se trata de una reseña del libro: Otto Böhmer, Reif für die Ewigkeit. Kierkegaard und das Lachen der Götter. Karl Alber: München / Freiburg, 2021.

In this chapter, I argue that the loss of loved ones requires a revised vision of our relationship to past persons. In particular, I argue that relating to deceased loved ones as points on an ordered, forward-moving timeline—on which they grow more distant from us by the moment—has a distorting and damaging effect on our own identity. If we detach ourselves completely from those who sustain important aspects of our identity, this will cause a jagged break in our narrative where (...) a new self must be constructed (whether by us or our circumstances) ex nihilo. On the other hand, if we allow ourselves to drift into the past with the dead—resigning ourselves to existence as an historical object—we will find that we begin to fade away ourselves. Either way, both the self and the beloved are ultimately lost, since both depend on the lost union. To reject both options is a tremendously difficult task that will require rethinking time and our relationship to the past. I argue that we can look to Kierkegaard’s work on maintaining contemporaneity with the historical past, particularly his warnings about how we must not respond to the loss of a beloved. In the last section of the paper, I offer some suggestions for how we might, in a Kierkegaardian spirit, strive to maintain real union with deceased loved ones, thereby rising above the destructive current of time. (shrink)

In this paper I put forward a new interpretation of the “Exordium” and “Eulogy for Abraham” sections in Fear and Trembling. It reads them in tension, as mutually incompatible approaches to the biblical narrative of Abraham. I argue this tension is productive insofar as it reveals and critiques the failure of each section to respond to Abraham as a religious exemplar of faith. Drawing on the work of Paul Ricœur, I argue that this failure consists in the absence of the (...) hermeneutical moment of refiguration, which takes up what is understood in the narrative in the lived experience of the reader. By enacting this irreconcilable contrast within his text, Silentio poses a hermeneutical critique of faith by highlighting the importance of narrative refiguration in the life of faith, that is, the lived experience of those who understand Abraham to be a religious exemplar. (shrink)

In light of Jacques Derrida’s writings on death and mourning, it may seem that the Christian teaching that the dead will be raised is a betrayal of others, a failure to take up one’s responsibility to testify to those who have died. In conversation with Emmanuel Falque’s work on finitude, Martin Heidegger’s reading of 1 Thessalonians, and Søren Kierkegaard’s reading of Abraham, I respond in two movements to this objection to faith that God will raise the dead. First, I propose (...) that even for the Christian, the death of the other remains a loss, since the Christian must surrender the other to God. It is, however, this very surrender of the other to God that seems to be an abdication of responsibility. Second, therefore, I argue that faith in the resurrection decenters the self and challenges our understanding of responsibility even more than does Derrida’s own analysis. Faith, I conclude, means giving up the desire to cling to one’s own responsibility. (shrink)

The article aims at reconstructing Kierkegaard’s reception of Schopenhauer’s philosophy with the purpose of discussing the pessimism of Kierkegaard’s late writings. The thesis of the article is that the theology of the late Kierkegaard that lies behind his attack on the so-called ‘Christendom’ and, in a wider perspective, on Protestantism in general, must be characterized as ‘pessimistic,’ insofar as it considers the mundane world as fundamentally ‘wicked’ or ‘wretched.’ Accordingly, a certain tendency toward asceticism and denial of the world becomes (...) a distinctive feature of Kierkegaard’s late works and of his interpretation of Christianity. Kierkegaard’s pessimism is, however, limited to his view of the mundane world, and he does not, like Schopenhauer, consider human existence fundamentally meaningless and purposeless. On the contrary, it is the aim of life for the true Christian, according to Kierkegaard, to obtain eternal salvation through self-chosen suffering and negation of his or her own desires for temporal gratification. (shrink)

Adorno und Kierkegaard trennen Welten. Dennoch hat sich der kritische Theoretiker der Gesellschaft zeitlebens intensiv mit dem religiösen Schriftsteller und Vater der Existenzphilosophie aus dem 19. Jahrhundert beschäftigt. Das vorliegende Buch untersucht die vielfältigen Motive dieses spannungsvollen Verhältnisses, von der Soziologie der Innerlichkeit bis zur Ästhetik. Grundlage ist die eingehende Analyse von Adornos Erstlingswerk und anderer Texte über den Dänen. Gleichwohl gilt es, dessen Denken auch in seiner Eigenständigkeit zu berücksichtigen. Denn nur wo beide auf Augenhöhe behandelt werden, lässt sich (...) die Frage nach dem Einfluss Kierkegaards auf Adorno stellen. Eine Antwort ist die Forschung bisher weitgehend schuldig geblieben, entweder weil sie sich die Deutung des Frankfurters zu eigen gemacht, oder diese umgekehrt als verfehlt abgetan hat. Was ihn mit Kierkegaard zugleich verbindet und entzweit, ist die Kritik des Deutschen Idealismus und die Radikalität, mit der das moderne autonome Subjekt als entfremdetes bestimmt wird. Überraschen mag die Erkenntnis, dass sie vor diesem Hintergrund und im Rückgriff auf Kant den Möglichkeitsspielraum individueller Praxis und der Ethik im engeren Sinne durchaus ähnlich bewerten. (shrink)

This paper explores Socratic irony as reflected in the famous passages of Alcibiades’ speech in Plato’s Symposium, focusing on the relationship between ironic utterance and the philosophic guidance process. Reviewing the diverse meanings of the term eirôneia in Greek comedy and philosophy, it examines the way in which Plato employs irony in fashioning Socrates’ figure and depicting the ideal of philosophic guidance as the “art of midwifery.” It then analyzes Kierkegaard’s most positive perception of Socratic irony as a necessary methodical (...) element in the Socratic maieutic process of “deceiving into the truth.” Contrasting Kierkegaard with Alcibiades’ scathing critique, it reads the latter in a combined dramatic-philosophical perspective, as presenting irony as an anti-philosophic phenomenon, leading to cognitive puzzlement and Dionysian irrationality. Alcibiades’ negative stance will be manifested via analyzing his use of four literary rhetorical devices: comparing Socrates with the Silenoi, drawing an analogy between ironic speech and Marysas’ satyric flute playing, symbolizing philosophy as snake venom, and presenting the scene of Socrates’ seduction as dramatic irony. The discussion shows, then, that there are two distinct manifestations of Socratic irony drawn from Plato’s writings, destructive and constructive, derived from the character of his philosophical pupils. (shrink)

This is the first English edition of a major work by the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup (1905-81). It is the culmination of his critical engagement with Kierkegaardianism, which had begun almost 20 years earlier. In this text, Løgstrup focuses on four main themes in Kierkegaard: his understanding of Christ and thus of Christianity; his understanding of suffering in human existence; Christian vs. secular ethics; and Platonistic influences on Kierkegaard's position, which Løgstrup characterises as nihilistic. Løgstrup presents his (...) own alternative conception in response: that Christ revealed universal ontological ethical structures that put Christians and non-Christians on a par; that suffering is a basic human experience and so there is no such thing as a particular Christian suffering; that sovereign expressions of life such as trust, sincerity, and compassion are the fundamental phenomena of ethics that enable our lives to function, and are thus given as a gift of creation, not of faith; and finally that human existence as created is meaningful and holds value and so is not a Kierkegaardian 'nothingness' of mere relativity. As well as offering a classic and yet controversial critique of Kierkegaard, this text also develops Løgstrup's conception of the sovereign expressions of life, which was to become central to his later ethics, further deepening his distinctive understanding of the human condition. Here translated in full for the first time, it will now be possible for English-speaking readers to explore the issues that drew Løgstrup into his controversion with Kierkegaard. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag wird Richard Rortys „liberale Ironikerin“ mit der Ironie bei Sokrates und Søren Kierkegaard in Verbindung gebracht. Die drei Vergleichspunkte sind hierbei: erstens Ironie und Wahrheit, zweitens Ironie und Gespräch und drittens Ironie als Lebensform. Während bei Sokrates die Ironie noch zur universalen Wahrheit führen will, betont Kierkegaard mit seinem Ironiebegriff bereits die Bedeutung einer individuellen Wahrheit. Rortys „liberale Ironie“ wendet sich gegen jegliche ontologische Wahrheit. Bei allen drei Vertretern hat die Ironie einen dialogischen Charakter. Unter dem Punkt (...) Ironie und Gespräch werden auch literarische und performative Aspekte der Ironie untersucht. Schließlich ist die Ironie für alle drei Autoren eine Haltung und Lebensform. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Table of ContentsIntroduction -- 1. Kierkegaard's Audience and Approach -- 2. Against Hegelianism: Kierkegaard on Creation and Christology -- 3. Karl Barth and the Legacy of the Enlightenment: Cultural Religion, Nationalism, and Idealism -- 4. God's Relationship with Us in Time: The Kierkegaard-Barth Trajectory -- 5. Barth's Appropriation of Kierkegaard -- 6. The Kierkegaard-Barth Trajectory and the Challenge of the "Socratic": What Should Christian Engagement with Secular Society Presuppose? -- 7. Beyond Immanence -- Conclusion -- Bibliography (...) . (shrink)

이 논문은 지금까지 규정되어온 절망에 관한 통속적이고 피상적인 고찰과 불충분한 이해에서 벗어나 인간이 왜 절망하는지 그 본질적 문제에 주목하고, 나아가 절망 끝에 숨어있는 새로운 삶의 시작이 어떻게 가능한지에 대해 논의한다. 현대를 ‘절망의 시대’로 선언한 키에르케고어가 그의 저서 『죽음에 이르는 병』에서 절망을 죽음의 병으로 규정하는 근거가 무엇인지, 절망이 현실적인 문제로 인한 일시적인 혼란의 감정이 아니라면 도대체 왜 인간은 절망하는지, 그에 대한 이론적 고찰을 수행한 뒤, 절망에 빠진 인간이 삶을 지탱해나갈 수 있는 근원을 오히려 절망에서 찾는 키에르케고어의 역설적 시도를 철학상담의 관점에서 재해석한다. (...) 키에르케고어에게 자기와의 참된 관계란 절망을 통하지 않고서는 자기기만에서 벗어날 수 없으며, 또한 자기의 한계를 인정하고 수용하는 진정한 ‘나’로 거듭날 수 없다. 이 점에 주목하는 이 논문은 ‘자기 자신’에 관한 논고라 할 수 있는 『죽음에 이르는 병』이 절망하는 사람을 도울 수 있는 매우 중요한 철학적 단초를 제공하고 있다고 보고, 이를 토대로 철학상담이 어떻게 그들을 도울 수 있는지에 대해 그 가능성을 모색하고 있다. (shrink)

Soren Kirkegaard and Maurice Blondel are positioned together in a dialogue regarding the vision of the supernatural. Maurice Ashley Agbaw-Ebai draws from this a sharper image of the preeminent place religious experience possesses in human life and thought. Kirkegaard's lament of Christian lack of fervor and Blondel's concern that religion and philosophy no longer interact are both examined and Agbaw-Ebai concludes that they both indicate the same outcome: a "dominant leveling of society" that robs religion of its particularity. This devastates (...) the individual because he is no longer challenged to seek a relationship with God and expose himself to the supernatural. The boundlessness of man must be acknowledged or else his actions will never be understood, and religious experience and philosophy must coexist with mutual reference or self-knowledge will never amount to the discovery of supernatural destiny. And this, asserts Agbaw-Ebai, is the shared urgency of both Kirkegaard and Blondel. Like these philosophers who have preceded him, Agbaw-Ebai exhorts us to never allow the sense of our relation to the supernatural as a settled matter. The philosophy of religion we have inherited does not protect us from having to confront our own subjectivity with autonomy: to be God without God and against God, or to be God with and through God. (shrink)

Kierkegaard, like Plato, though using different methods and conclusions, sought to ground knowledge in the ineffability of subjectivity. For Plato, knowledge comes subjectively (internally); for Kierkegaard, it comes by God's grace through faith. Socrates becomes the facilitator for the slave in the /Meno/, as does God for the man of faith. Again, Kierkegaard is also concerned with passion. "...the paradox is the passion of thought, and the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without passion; a mediocre fellow" (p. (...) 37). The paradox is necessitated by the metaphysical nature of the inquiry. Only knowledge through faith can approach the paradox since it is by definition beyond our knowledge. Passion must accompany the leap of faith, since knowledge acquisition for the man of faith is guided by God. (shrink)

The right to revolt is a central concept in political philosophy, denoting when it is justified to replace a corrupt government with a new one. As such, it is a normative concept that would-be revolutionaries should consult in order to determine the justness of a possible revolution. However, this article argues that within Kierkegaard’s thought lies a wholly new conception of revolution that does not look to describe when it might be just to revolt but that instead sees revolution as (...) an act we are sometimes obligated to enact. Consequently, revolt transforms from a right to a responsibility, with important ethical and political consequences. (shrink)

Recent debates over the role of recognition by the community for one’s development and flourishing generally discuss community in a univocal sense: the way that recognition functions in particular communities is not fundamentally different from the way it functions in the larger community. They also tend to logically prioritize a fundamental human identity over particular religious, ethnic, or societal identities, which are understood to be secondary to, and derivative of, this basic identity. In his depiction of how communal recognition contributes (...) to individual selfhood, Søren Kierkegaard challenges these accounts by (1) differentiating between how communal recognition occurs in society in general and in one particular community, the Christian church and (2) questioning the idea that the self created in the former is more fundamental than that created in the latter. For Kierkegaard, one’s identities as both a Christian and a fully-developed self depend essentially on recognition by the Other: initially and fundamentally on recognition by God alone, and secondarily and derivatively on recognition by the human Other. (shrink)