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  1. added 2020-02-11
    Critical Scientific Realism.Stathis Psillos - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):454-458.
  2. added 2019-09-22
    To Be a Realist About Quantum Theory.Hans Halvorson - 2019 - In Olimpia Lombardi (ed.), Quantum Worlds: Perspectives on the Ontology of Quantum Mechanics.
    I look at the distinction between between realist and antirealist views of the quantum state. I argue that this binary classification should be reconceived as a continuum of different views about which properties of the quantum state are representationally significant. What's more, the extreme cases -- all or none --- are simply absurd, and should be rejected by all parties. In other words, no sane person should advocate extreme realism or antirealism about the quantum state. And if we focus on (...)
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  3. added 2019-09-19
    Karl Popper's Critique of Idealism.İsmail Kurun - 2018 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):273-301.
    Karl Popper’s critique of philosophical idealism manifests itself with the application of his method, falsification, to metaphysics, epistemology, social and political philosophy. According to Popper, who identifies himself as a philosophical realist, idealism has emerged as a result of the idea that reality cannot be known by reason and of the search for certainty which is erroneous,and it has begotten two mistaken and detrimental views. These views are historicism, the notion that history has an irresistible course, and holism, the notion (...)
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  4. added 2019-06-10
    A Methodological Argument Against Scientific Realism.Darrell P. Rowbottom - forthcoming - Synthese:1-15.
    First, I identify a methodological thesis associated with scientific realism. This has different variants, but each concerns the reliability of scientific methods in connection with acquiring, or approaching, truth or approximate truth. Second, I show how this thesis bears on what scientists should do when considering new theories that significantly contradict older theories. Third, I explore how vulnerable scientific realism is to a reductio ad absurdum as a result. Finally, I consider which variants of the methodological thesis are the most (...)
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  5. added 2019-06-10
    Scientific Realism: What It is, the Contemporary Debate, and New Directions.Darrell Rowbottom - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):451-484.
    First, I answer the controversial question ’What is scientific realism?’ with extensive reference to the varied accounts of the position in the literature. Second, I provide an overview of the key developments in the debate concerning scientific realism over the past decade. Third, I provide a summary of the other contributions to this special issue.
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    Models, Scientific Realism, the Intelligibility of Nature, and Their Cultural Significance.Mohd Hazim Shah bin Abdul Murad - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):253-261.
    In this article, I will view realist and non-realist accounts of scientific models within the larger context of the cultural significance of scientific knowledge. I begin by looking at the historical context and origins of the problem of scientific realism, and claim that it is originally of cultural and not only philosophical, significance. The cultural significance of debates on the epistemological status of scientific models is then related to the question of ‘intelligibility’ and how science, through models, can give us (...)
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  7. added 2019-06-06
    Detecting Extrasolar Planets.Peter Kosso - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):224-236.
    The detection of extrasolar planets presents a good case in which to clarify the distinction between observation and inference from evidence. By asking whether these planets have been observed or inferred from evidence, and by using the scientific details to answer the question, we will get a clearer understanding of the epistemic difference between these two forms of information. The issue of scientific realism pivots on this distinction, and the results of this case will help to articulate the epistemically important (...)
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  8. added 2019-06-06
    La distinción teórico/observacional: ¿favorece o perjudica al realismo científico? (Is the Observational/Theoretical Distinction Negative or Favorable for Scientific Realism?).Christián C. Carman - 2005 - Critica 37 (111):83-96.
    Laudan denuncia una paradoja que recae sobre el realista científico. Por un lado, necesita la distinción teórico/observacional para definir su posición pero, por otro, la disolución de la distinción favorece su argumentación. En este artículo me propongo mostrar que si dentro de la distinción teórico/observacional se identifican dos dicotomías diferentes --una entre entidades observables y no observables y otra entre términos teóricos y no teóricos--, la paradoja se disuelve, pues para la caracterización del realismo hace falta la distinción entre términos (...)
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  9. added 2019-06-06
    Ronald N. Giere, Review of The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science by Nancy Cartwright. [REVIEW]Ronald N. Giere - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):527-530.
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    Studies in Scientific Realism.Jarrett Leplin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):109-112.
    Why be a scientific realist? The predominant motivation is explanationist: we need realism to understand the successfulness of science. Why be an antirealist? The predominant motivation is skeptical: theory systematically exceeds the reach of empirical warrant. Antirealists deny that explanatory power is evidential; realists deny that the reach of empirical warrant summarily terminates at the boundary of the observable. But these counterarguments are mere protection of philosophical stances to which the adversaries independently incline.
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Scientific Realism and Components: The Case of Classical Astronomy.Marc Lange - 1994 - The Monist 77 (1):111-127.
    Scientific realism is the view that one can be justified in believing, of some theory about unobservable entities, that the entities it posits are real and accurately described by the theory, in the same sense as one can be justified in believing that the theory’s empirical predictions are accurate, and that so to believe is what it means for a scientist to “accept” that theory, because the goal of science is to describe reality, even its unobservable features. The first part (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Theoretical Entities and Metatheories.Edward Mackinnon - 1972 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 3 (2):105.
    This paper argues that existence claims for theoretical entities must be based on more than their role in one theory. The supplementary evidence should be either observation, whether direct or indirect, or the possibility of detaching the existence claim from one particular theory. A logical schematism for the latter type of support is developed.
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  13. added 2019-06-06
    The Foundations of Scientific Realism: A Critical Review of Wilfrid Sellars’ Science and Metaphysics. [REVIEW]Bernard Gendron - 1970 - International Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1):129-151.
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  14. added 2019-06-06
    J. J. C. Smart's "Philosophy and Scientific Realism". [REVIEW]George Dickie - 1965 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1):138.
    During the past few years, Smart has published a series of provocative articles in which he has argued for a "tough-Minded" scientific materialism. In this book, Which makes use of the articles and combines them with new material, He boldly defends the possibility of a synthetic philosophy which attempts to think clearly and comprehensively about the nature of the universe and the principles of conduct. Starting with a critique of phenomenalism, He argues that the physicist's picture of the world is (...)
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  15. added 2019-05-31
    Muhammad Ali Khalidi: Natural Categories and Human Kinds. Classification in the Natural and Social Sciences.Georg Theiner - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):247-255.
    The notion of 'natural kinds' has been central to contemporary discussions of metaphysics and philosophy of science. In recent years, essentialism has been the dominant account of natural kinds among philosophers, but the essentialist view has encountered resistance. Informed by detailed examination of classification in the natural and social sciences, Prof. Muhammad Ali Khalidi argues against essentialism and for a naturalist account of natural kinds. By looking at case studies drawn from diverse scientific disciplines, from fluid mechanics to virology and (...)
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  16. added 2018-09-11
    Qu'est-ce que le realisme scientifique?Howard Sankey - 2002 - Reseaux 94:69-82.
    Les tables, les chaises, les gens assis sur des chaises, à des tables sont des objets composés de matière. Selon la science, la matière se compose principalement d'atomes. Les atomes sont faits d'électrons, de neutrons et de protons. Les neutrons et les protons forment un noyau autour duquel orbitent les électrons. Outre ces particules, les physiciens en ont découvert un grand nombre d'autres, comme les photons, les quarks et les neutrinos.
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  17. added 2018-08-29
    From the End of Unitary Science Projection to the Causally Complete Complexity Science: Extended Mathematics, Solved Problems, New Organisation and Superior Purposes.Andrei P. Kirilyuk - 2017 - In A. P. Kirilyuk, Theory of Everything, Ultimate Reality and the End of Humanity: Extended Sustainability by the Universal Science of Complexity. Beau Bassin: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing. pp. 199-209.
    The deep crisis in modern fundamental science development is ever more evident and openly recognised now even by mainstream, official science professionals and leaders. By no coincidence, it occurs in parallel to the world civilisation crisis and related global change processes, where the true power of unreduced scientific knowledge is just badly missing as the indispensable and unique tool for the emerging greater problem solution and further progress at a superior level of complex world dynamics. Here we reveal the mathematically (...)
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  18. added 2018-02-17
    Truth May Not Explain Predictive Success, but Truthlikeness Does.Gustavo Cevolani & Luca Tambolo - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):590-593.
    In a recent paper entitled “Truth does not explain predictive success” , Carsten Held argues that the so-called “No-Miracles Argument” for scientific realism is easily refuted when the consequences of the underdetermination of theories by the evidence are taken into account. We contend that the No-Miracles Argument, when it is deployed within the context of sophisticated versions of realism, based on the notion of truthlikeness , survives Held’s criticism unscathed.
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  19. added 2018-02-17
    Realism and Anti-Realism.Stuart Brock & Edwin Mares - 2006 - Routledge.
    There are a bewildering variety of ways the terms "realism" and "anti-realism" have been used in philosophy and furthermore the different uses of these terms are only loosely connected with one another. Rather than give a piecemeal map of this very diverse landscape, the authors focus on what they see as the core concept: realism about a particular domain is the view that there are facts or entities distinctive of that domain, and their existence and nature is in some important (...)
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  20. added 2018-02-16
    Scientific Realism And The Inevitability Of Science.Howard Sankey - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):259-264.
    This paper examines the question of whether scientific realism is committed to the inevitability of science or is consistent with claims of the contingency of science. In order to address this question, a general characterization of the position of scientific realism is presented. It is then argued that scientific realism has no evident implications with regard to the inevitability of science. A historical case study is presented in which contingency plays a significant role, and the appropriate realist response to this (...)
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  21. added 2018-01-28
    Common Sense, Science and Scepticism: A Historical Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge.Alan Musgrave - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
    Can we know anything for certain? There are those who think we can (traditionally labeled the "dogmatists") and those who think we cannot (traditionally labeled the "skeptics"). The theory of knowledge, or epistemology, is the great debate between the two. This book is an introductory and historically-based survey of the debate. It sides for the most part with the skeptics. It also develops out of skepticism a third view, fallibilism or critical rationalism, which incorporates an uncompromising realism about perception, science, (...)
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  22. added 2017-10-18
    Subject and Object in Scientific Realism.Howard Sankey - 2017 - In Paula Angelova, Jassen Andreev & Emil Lensky (eds.), Das Interpretative Universum. Wurzburg, Germany: Konigshausen & Neumann. pp. 293-306.
    In this paper, I explore the relationship between the subject and the object from the perspective of scientific realism.
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  23. added 2017-06-29
    Scientific Representation and Realism.Michel Ghins - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (3):461-474.
    After a brief presentation of what I take to be the representational démarche in science, I stress the fundamental role of true judgements in model construction. The success and correctness of a representation rests on the truth of judgements which attribute properties to real targeted entities, called “ontic judgements”. I then present what van Fraassen calls “the Loss of Reality objection”. After criticizing his dissolution of the objection, I offer an alternative way of answering the Loss of Reality objection by (...)
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  24. added 2017-06-29
    The Two Faces of Realism.Mario De Caro - 2012 - Quaestio 12:503-513.
    According to some philosophers, philosophical realism is an obsolete, specious and irrelevant conceptio. In this essay I argue that this thesis is deeply flawed because the issue of realism is philosophically inescapable. Then I discuss two versions of philosophical realism that are particularly widespread today: common sense realism and scientific realism. These conceptions tend to be hegemonic, and consequently often in conflict with each other. The biggest challenge for philosophical realism over the next few years will be to try and (...)
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  25. added 2017-06-29
    The Pragmatic Realism of Hilary Putnam.Fernando González García - 2008 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 95 (1):223-242.
    This paper will concentrate mainly on the analysis of some features present in Putnam's internal realism and in his "natural realism" that he shares with the pragmatist thinkers Peirce and James. Following the middle way which Putnam tries to reach between "reactionary metaphysics" and "irresponsible relativism," the first part of the paper deals with what is the positive insight of traditional realism, i. e., the reality of external things as independent from our mind, as it is emphasized by Putnam. It (...)
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  26. added 2017-06-29
    Idealization, Confirmation, and Scientific Realism.Chuang Liu - unknown
    The paper first raises the problem concerning the confirmation of idealized theories in science and its relationship to scientific realism. Then a solution by Laymon is discussed. It is then argued that two different types of idealization need to be distinguished and that only one of them produces false theories. But then, such “theories” are really theory-maps, which point to theories at the end of improvements. Finally, Laymon’s account is modified in accordance with the above insight.
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  27. added 2017-06-29
    Realism, Positivism and Reference.Jane Duran - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):401-407.
    Depending on the realist or instrumentalist twist that is given to positivism, interesting arguments can be made for both causal and classical theories of reference with regard to the use of scientific terms in the language of theory. But my claim is that the rigid foundationalism that supports the theoretical terms via the correspondence rules of the Received View undercuts the notion that it is possible to argue coherently for a causal theory of reference as allied to a positivistic view.
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  28. added 2017-06-29
    A Different Conception of Scientific Realism: The Case for the Missing Explananda.James Deri - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):243-267.
  29. added 2017-06-29
    The Realism/Antirealism Debate in the Philosophy of Science.Radu Dudau - unknown
    This is a defense of the doctrine of scientific realism. SR is defined through the following two claims: Most essential unobservables posited by the well-established current scientific theories exist independently of our minds. We know our well-established scientific theories to be approximately true. I first offer positive argumentation for SR. I begin with the so-called 'success arguments' for SR: 1) scientific theories most of the times entail successful predictions; 2) science is methodologically successful in generating empirically successful theories. SR explains (...)
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  30. added 2017-06-29
    Theoretical Entities.Grover Maxwell - 1999 - In Robert Klee (ed.), Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 30.
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  31. added 2017-06-29
    The Scientific Realism of Rom Harre.Anthony A. Derksen & C. A. Hooker - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):647-653.
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  32. added 2017-06-29
    Realism Versus Anti-Realism: What Is the Issue? In Science in Reflection. The Israel Colloquium: Studies in History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science (Vol. 3). [REVIEW]Lj Cohen & em ZEmach - 1988 - Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 110:81-101.
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  33. added 2017-06-29
    Conceptions of Ether. Studies in the History of Ether Theories.G. N. Cantor & M. J. S. Hodge - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):81-85.
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  34. added 2017-06-29
    The Changing Role of Young's Ether.Geoffrey Cantor - 1970 - British Journal for the History of Science 5 (1):44-62.
    This paper sets out to examine the changes which took place in Thomas Young's concepts of the ether between 1799 and 1807. During the earlier part of this period he supposed the ether to consist of mutually repelling subtle particles which are attracted to particles of matter. Hence, he considered that the ether is denser within dense bodies than in rare ones. Furthermore, Young proposed that the ether density does not change abruptly at an interface; instead the denser ether extends (...)
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  35. added 2017-06-29
    Realism in Physics.Thomas Michael Mcnulty - 1970 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
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  36. added 2017-06-29
    "Philosophy and Scientific Realism," by J. J. C. Smart.Maurice R. Holloway - 1964 - Modern Schoolman 42 (1):122-122.
  37. added 2017-06-27
    Putnam’s Progress.Julian Baggini - 2001 - The Philosophers' Magazine 15:43-45.
  38. added 2017-06-27
    Can a Historian of Science Be a Scientific Realist?Theodore Arabatzis - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (S3):S531-S541.
    In this paper I address some of the problems that the historical development of science poses for a realist and discuss whether a realist construal of scientific activity is conducive to historiographical practice. First, I discuss, by means of historical examples, Ian Hacking's defense of entity realism. Second, I try to show, drawing on Kuhn's recent work on incommensurability, that the realism problem is relevant to historiography and that a realist position entails a particular historiographical strategy, which faces problems. Finally, (...)
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  39. added 2017-06-27
    Five Theses on Instrumental Realism.Davis Baird - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:165 - 173.
    I present five theses to characterize and argue for "Instrumental Realism," a realism wedded to what we do with instruments, and not what our theories say: The Independence Thesis: Questions about realism are independent of questions about meaning. The Intervening Thesis: Our ability to produce consistent effects with our instruments provides one guarantee that we are engaged with the real world. The Historical Thesis: If the descriptions of what we know and do are of something real, then it will be (...)
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  40. added 2017-06-27
    Realism and the Aim of Science.Nicholas Capaldi - 1985 - Review of Metaphysics 38 (4):900-901.
    Along with The Open Universe and Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, this book forms part of the trilogy Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery. Although written twenty-five years ago and circulated among Popper's students, we owe it to W. W. Bartley III's editorial assistance that the work now appears in print.
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  41. added 2017-04-24
    Scientific Realism and Antirealism.Liston Michael - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Scientific Realism and Antirealism Debates about scientific realism concern the extent to which we are entitled to hope or believe that science will tell us what the world is really like. Realists tend to be optimistic; antirealists do not. To a first approximation, scientific realism is the view that well-confirmed scientific theories are approximately true; … Continue reading Scientific Realism and Antirealism →.
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  42. added 2017-04-24
    Is Evolutionary Epistemology of Science Compatible with Scientific Realism.Ivan Kuzin - 2015 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 46 (4):163-179.
    Classical, selectionist evolutionary epistemology of science draws an analogy between development of science and natural selection. But natural selection immediately increases only the relative fitness of organisms with regard to specific and changing environment. Therefore evolutionary epistemology of science is exploited against scientific realism which presumes existence of absolute scientific progress as an approach to truth. In modern biology in order to explain absolute evolutionary progress nonadaptationist, nonselectionist models based on a passive trend mechanism were worked out, the ratchet model (...)
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  43. added 2017-04-24
    Is Logical Empiricism Compatible With Scientific Realism?Matthias Neuber - 2014 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 17:249-262.
    Scientific realism is the view that the theoretical entities of science exist. Atoms, forces, electromagnetic fields, and so on, are not merely instruments for organizing observational data but are real and causally effective. This view seems to be hardly compatible with the logical empiricist agenda: As common wisdom has it, logical empiricism is mainly characterized by a strong verification criterion of meaning, i.e., by the project of defining the meaning of theoretical terms by virtue of the meaning of purely observational (...)
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  44. added 2017-04-24
    Two Arguments for Scientific Realism Unified.Harker David - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):192-202.
    Inferences from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories remain central to the most influential arguments for scientific realism. Challenges to such inferences, however, based on radical discontinuities within the history of science, have motivated a distinctive style of revision to the original argument. Conceding the historical claim, selective realists argue that accompanying even the most revolutionary change is the retention of significant parts of replaced theories, and that a realist attitude towards the systematically retained constituents of our (...)
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  45. added 2017-04-24
    Scientific Realism and the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis.Howard Sankey - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (2):196-202.
    This paper reconsiders the challenge presented to scientific realism by the semantic incommensurability thesis. A twofold distinction is drawn between methodological and semantic incommensurability, and between semantic incommensurability due to variation of sense and due to discontinuity of reference. Only the latter presents a challenge to scientific realism. The realist may dispose of this challenge on the basis of a modified causal theory of reference, as argued in the author’s 1994 book, The incommensurability thesis. This referential response has been the (...)
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  46. added 2017-04-24
    Scientific Realism and The Ironic Science.Nikita Golovko - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:73-76.
    The development of string theory shows an unusual situation within the development of knowledge theory. Science achieves progress in understanding nature without direct empirical confirmation. Definitely, “an altered conception of scientific progress emerges”. In our opinion, the only possibility to understand the new situation is to adopt some kind of naturalized epistemology. Naturalization viewed as declining of the a-prioriticity of philosophical knowledge, first, and reintroducing of psychology, second, gives many naturalized approaches in the realism debate field. Is it possible to (...)
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  47. added 2017-04-24
    Abduction and Scientific Realism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 12:137-142.
    Many scientific realists think that the best reasons for scientific theories are abductive, i.e., must appeal to what is also called inference to the best explanation, while some anti-realists have argued that the use of abduction in defending realism is question-begging, circular, or incoherent. This paper studies the idea that abductive inference can be reformulated by taking its conclusion to concern the truthlikeness of a hypothetical theory on the basis of its success in explanation and prediction. The strength of such (...)
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  48. added 2017-04-24
    What's the Point in Scientific Realism If We Don't Know What's Really There?: Sophie R. Allen.Sophie R. Allen - 2007 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 61:97-123.
    The aim of this paper will be to show that certain strongly realist forms of scientific realism are either misguided or misnamed. I will argue that, in the case of a range of robustly realist formulations of scientific realism, the ‘scientific’ and the ‘realism’ are in significant philosophical and methodological conflict with each other; in particular, that there is a tension between the actual subject matter and methods of science on the one hand, and the realists' metaphysical claims about which (...)
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  49. added 2017-04-24
    Scientific Realism Bit by Bit: Part I. Kitcher on Reference.Christina McLeish - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):668-686.
    In this paper, I consider Kitcher’s account of reference for the expressions of past science. Kitcher’s case study is of Joseph Priestley and his expression ‘dephlogisticated air’. There is a strong intuitive case that ‘dephlogisticated air’ referred to oxygen, but it was underpinned by very mistaken phlogiston theory, so concluding either that dephlogisticated air referred straightforwardly or that it failed to refer both have unpalatable consequences. Kitcher argues that the reference of such terms is best considered relative to each token—some (...)
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  50. added 2017-04-24
    Scientific Realism and the 'Pessimistic Induction'.Stathis Psillos - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (5):S306-S314.
    Over the last two decades, the debate over scientific realism has been dominated by two arguments that pull in contrary directions: the 'no miracle' argument and the 'pessimistic induction'. The latter suggests that the historical record destroys the realist's belief in an explanatory connection between truthlikeness and genuine empirical success. This paper analyzes the structure of the 'pessimistic induction', presents a move--the divide et impera move--that neutralizes it, and motivates a substantive yet realistic version of scientific realism. This move is (...)
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