States and Nations, Misc

At the heart of the tension between state autonomy and international law is the question of whether states should willingly restrict their freedom of action for the sake of international security, human rights, trade, communication, and the environment. David Hume offers surprising insights to answer this question. He argues that the same interests in cooperation arise among individuals as well as states and that their interactions should be regulated by the same principles. Drawing on his model of dynamic coordination, I (...) will reconstruct the Humean case for developing international law into a more robust legal system and also highlight the limitation of Hume’s account of justice for such a reconstructive project. Hume’s lessons are enduring; we must strengthen the essential features of international law that allow states and individuals to reap the benefits of its protections, such as nonoptional rules that articulate a moral minimum, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and stronger mechanisms of enforcement. (shrink)

The debate about justice in immigration seems somehow stagnated given that it seems justice requires both further exclusion and more porous borders. In the face of this, I propose to take a step back and to realize that the general problem of borders—to determine what kind of borders liberal democracies ought to have—gives rise to two particular problems: first, to justify exclusive control over the administration of borders (the problem of legitimacy of borders) and, second, to specify how this control (...) ought to be exercised (the problem of justice of borders). The literature has explored the second but ignored the first. Therefore, I propose a different approach to the ethics of immigration by focusing on concerns of legitimacy in a three-step framework: first, identifying the kind of authority or power that immigration controls exercise; second, redefining borders as international and domestic institutions that issue that kind of power; and finally, considering supranational institutions that redistribute the right to exclude among legitimate borders. (shrink)

Many conservatives endorse a defence of closed borders grounded in basic liberal rights such as the basic right of association. Some conservatives also endorse libertarian principles of legitimacy. It is not clear though that this sort of defence of closed borders is somehow coherent with these libertarian ideals. I argue that conservative libertarians of this kind must reject this defence of closed borders because either it collapses into a form of statism incoherent with libertarian principles of legitimacy, or into an (...) ideal precept without appeal regarding reality in the here and now that could only be applied to changing the very nature of the societies we know. As a result, at least conservative libertarians need to find a different source of justification for closed borders. (shrink)

My intention in this essay will be to explore the role that consent-based arguments perform in Kant's political and legal philosophy. I want to uncover the extent to which Kant considered that the legitimacy of the State and of its laws depends upon the outcome of intersubjective deliberation. Commentators have divided over the following question: Is Kant best viewed as a member of the social contract tradition, according to which the legitimacy of the state and of the laws it promulgates (...) derives from the consent of those people over whom it claims authority, or should he be read as having put forward a secularized version of natural law theory, according to which the state and its laws are legitimate to the extent that they are attained by standards of sound reason and supported by an objective account of the human good? (shrink)

David Brady argues that low European poverty rates are a result of the welfare state. His finding relies on a relative measure of poverty, according to which the threshold for being poor differs across countries. Using the American poverty threshold as a fixed measure, though, Western Europe has a poverty rate of 18 percent, higher than that of the United States. Moreover, Brady's thesis that welfare-state spending explains cross-country differences in inequality does not take account of the problem of reverse (...) causality. Historically, welfare states developed in homogeneous nations that started out with higher levels of social capital and lower inequality. Scandinavia, for example, had unusually low poverty rates a century ago, and even today Americans with Scandinavian ancestry exhibit a poverty rate no higher than that in Scandinavia. Since poverty, social capital, population homogeneity, and the size of the welfare state relate in multiple ways to each other, we cannot rely on cross-country correlations to isolate the causal effect of the welfare state on poverty rates. (shrink)

Marcel Gauchet's theory of democracy focuses on the secularization of Western societies and the emergence of “autonomy” in them—Weber's “disenchantment of the world.” The nineteenth-century liberalism that resulted failed to generate a sense of collective purpose that could fill the gap left by the retreat of religion. Totalitarian ideologies achieved this by harnessing the passions unleashed by World War I, but at the cost of radicalization. Conversely, the post-1945 “social state” set the groundwork for modern individualism and established new legitimacy (...) for the regulatory and protective nation-state, conceptually bonded directly with its voter-citizens. Democracy is thus impossible to disentangle from social democracy—regardless of its actual effectiveness. If Gauchet is right, the left's embrace of “voice” over “exit” mixes a deep insight with flawed prescriptions, as it overlooks the national nature of the experience of citizenship, whereas classical liberals favoring the “exit” option risk undermining the core of the democratic compact. (shrink)

Should the EU be a federal union or an intergovernmental forum? Recently, demoicrats have been arguing that there exists a third alternative. The EU should be conceived as a demoicracy, namely a ‘Union of peoples who govern together, but not as one’. The demoi of Europe recognise that they affect one another’s democratic health, and hence establish a union to guarantee their freedom qua demoi – which most demoicrats cash out as non-domination. This is more than intergovernmentalism, because the demoi (...) govern together on these matters. However, if the union aims at protecting the freedom of the different European demoi, it cannot do so by replacing them with a ‘superdemos’, as federalists want. This paper argues that demoicracy does possess distinctive normative features; it claims, however, that an institutional choice between intergovernmentalism and federalism is necessary. Depending on how we interpret what the non-domination of demoi requires, demoicracy will either ground a specific way of practicing intergovernmentalism or a specific form of federalism. It cannot, however, ground an institutional model which is genuinely alternative to both. (shrink)

This article examines changing modalities of citizenship in a fast-moving, informationalized and connected world. The argument here is that, in an increasingly globalized economic, social and cultural environment, forms and practices of citizenship inevitably – and increasingly – fragment across space and time. While this tendency for citizenship to ‘shape-shift’ politically and socially is not new – and indeed while the spatial fragmentation of belonging has been frequently commented upon, particularly in relation to the claimed decline of the bordered nation-state (...) – the dimension of time in relationship to citizenship has been rather less well explored. By examining the interplay of space and time in contemporary citizenship, understood here in terms of civic and political engagement, identity and belonging, it becomes possible to understand how citizenship practices operate differentially according to degrees of spatial embeddedness, on the one hand, and degrees of temporal ‘thickness’, on the other. (shrink)

This article offers an alternative reading of the Abbé Sieyès and the modern ‘nation-state’ problématique. I argue that the subject/object that is constituted in the early days of modernity is the incomplete society: an impossible-possibility ideal of congruency of population, authority and space. I suggest reading this ideal of congruency as a fantasy in that it offers a certain ‘fullness to come’, the promise of jouissance that can never be attained and is thus constantly re-envisioned and reinvoked. Drawing on discourse-analytical (...) and psychoanalytical tools I explain the logic of fantasy before analysing Sieyès’ What is the Third Estate?, as I show how he critiques and fragments the old model of the state and how his reading of the nation is fantasmatic, a continuous project towards impossible congruency. (shrink)

This essay contends that postcolonial migrants have a right to enter their former colonizing nations, and that these should accept them. Our novel argument challenges well-established justifications for restrictions in immigration-policies advanced in liberal nationalism, which links immigration controls to the nation’s self-determination and the legitimate preservation of national identity. To do so, we draw on postcolonial analyses of colonialism, in particular on Edward Said’s notion of “intertwined histories,” and we offer a more sophisticated account of national identity than that (...) of liberal nationalists. In our view, the national identity of former colonizing nations cannot be understood in isolation from their ex-colonies. This entails that liberal nationalists cannot justify the restriction on the entrance of members of the nation’s former colonies by resorting to an argument about the preservation of national identity: the former colonized constitute an inseparable element of that national identity, because they are already historically part of it. (shrink)

Although many libertarians share similar moral foundations, they disagree about whether the state can be justified. The most famous libertarian attempt to justify the state is that of Robert Nozick. This attempt has been criticized by, among others, the libertarian anarchist Murray Rothbard. In this article, Nozick’s theory and Rothbard’s critique are discussed, as well as some other attempts to justify the state from libertarian premises. Keeping the criticisms of those theories in mind, an alternative theory, which attempts to bypass (...) the criticisms, is put forward. This alternative theory explains how a state—most probably a nonminimal democratic state—can legitimately be formed in a condition of anarchy without violating anyone’s libertarian rights. One result of this is that the rights-based case for minarchism is severely weakened. (shrink)

Książka ta jest zbiorem dwudziestu studiów przygotowanych przez badaczy polskich, którzy reprezentują różne dziedziny nauki: ekonomię, geografię, historię, politologię i stosunki międzynarodowe, prawo, socjologię. Badacze ci podjęli się analizy i opisu problemów, zjawisk oraz procesów, które nie zawsze są sobie bliskie. Autorów studiów łączy jednak wspólne zainteresowanie tym, czym jest i jak w dzisiejszym świecie funkcjonuje maszyna zwana państwem. Odmienność płaszczyzn i podejść badawczych jest o tyle cenna, iż pozwala na postrzeganie współczesnych problemów państwa z różnych perspektyw. Do kluczowych zagadnień (...) poruszanych w tym zbiorze należą: idea państwa; fenomen państwa narodowego; istota władzy i jej prawomocność; państwo we współczesnej myśli politycznej; wpływ charakteru władzy państwowej na rozwój społeczny; wolność jednostki w państwie; suwerenność państwa; wielopłaszczyznowa transformacja państwa; różne aspekty funkcjonowania instytucji państwa; fenomen państwa w stanie upadku. Autorzy studiów korzystają z dorobku filozofów różnych epok, teoretyków państwa, badaczy dziejów najnowszych, uznanych autorytetów naukowych. Część tekstów powstała w oparciu o analizę dokumentów krajowych porządków prawnych oraz prawa międzynarodowego. W zbiorze tym poruszane są problemy Europy, obu Ameryk, Afryki, różnych regionów Azji i Pacyfiku. Takie podejście pozwala zapomnieć o istniejących odmiennościach kulturowych i dostrzec podobieństwa między społeczeństwami i państwami często – wydawałoby się – bardzo od siebie odległymi. Pomocna jest w tym również bogata literatura, do której kierują swych Czytelników autorzy. Zbiór ten nie pretenduje do roli całościowego opracowania traktującego o głównych problemach współczesnego państwa. Często autorzy nie odpowiadają nawet do końca na zadawane przez siebie pytania, a raczej inspirują Czytelników do szukania odpowiedzi. Odważne wnioski prezentowane w niektórych tekstach zachęcają nie tylko do rewidowania czy przewartościowywania wielu utartych poglądów, ale także obalają utrwalone niekiedy mity oraz zmuszają do dalszych intelektualnych poszukiwań. (shrink)

Aux Etats-Unis les gouvernements des Etats tout autant que le gouvernement fédéral jouent un rôle important dans le traitement des effets des sinistres naturels. Le gouvernement fédéral subventionne l’assurance-inondations pour les individus, les entreprises privées et les gouvernements d’Etats et locaux, et il affecte des fonds sur une base ad hoc pour reconstruire après de très importants sinistres naturels tels que de fortes inondations ou des tremblements de terre. Les gouvernements des Etats réglementent l’assurance-seïsme et l’assurance-ouragan en imposant à l’ensemble (...) des assurances et à certains de leurs utilisateurs de subventionner d’autres assurés. Cet article analyse les diverses formes d’implications gouvernementales dans l’assistance des sinistres et évalue de manière critique les arguments normatifs pour ces formes de participations et de réglementations. Il propose que le gouvernement fédéral se retire du marché de l’assurance-inondation et que les gouvernements des états arrêtent de réglementer les marchés d’assurance privés qui obligent des gens à subventionner l’assurance pour d’autres.Government at both the state and federal level in the United States has an extensive role in dealing with the effects of natural disasters. The federal government provides subsidized flood insurance to private individuals, businesses, and state and local government, and it appropriates f unds on an ad hoc basis for rebuilding after highly visible natural disasters such as large floods and earthquakes. State governments regulate earthquake insurance and hurricane insurance in ways that force the insurance industry and some of its customers to subsidize other policyholders. This essay details the various forms of government involvement in disaster assistance and critically evaluates the normative arguments for these forms of government involvement and regulation. It proposes that the federal government should withdraw from the flood insurance market and that state governments should stop regulating private insurance markets in such a way that some people are forced to subsidize insurance for others. (shrink)

Le rôle de l’Etat face aux catastrophes naturelles est examiné en fonction des critères d’ efficacité et de liberté. Les bureaucraties d’assistance face aux désastres ont des points communs, mais aussi d’importantes différences, avec celles de la santé publique. Certains programmes gouvernementaux faits pour assister les victimes de catastrophes naturelles ont des effets pervers en créant plus de souffrance, et d’autres entretiennent activement les comportements irresponsables. Le rôle de l’Etat en tant que coordinateur des efforts d’assistance est justifié, mais il (...) se trouve qu’il n’est pas logiquement nécessaire.The role of the state in responding to natural disasters is examined with an eye to questions of both efficacy and liberty. Disaster relief bureaucracies have some similarities to, but important differences from, welfare relief bureaucracies. Some government programs designed to assist the victims of natural disasters have perverse effects of creating more suffering, and others actively foster irresponsible behavior. The role of the state in coordinating relief efforts is justified, but turns out not to be logically necessary. (shrink)

Does the kind of socialist ideal articulated by G. A. Cohen in Why Not Socialism? add anything substantial to the Rawlsian conception of justice? Is it an ideal that Rawlsians should want to take on board, or is it ultimately foreign to their outlook? I defend a mixed answer to these questions. On the one hand, we shouldn’t underestimate the extent to which Rawls's theory already addresses the concerns that motivate Cohen’s appeal to the socialist ideal. Within the bounds of (...) a society living up to Rawls’s two principles of justice, I maintain, there would be little room left for an ideal of social relations to do any independent work. On the other hand, Cohen’s ideal may still have an important role to play within Rawlsian theory – not within the confines of a given society but on the international stage, beyond the liberal state as we know it. This asymmetry between the domestic and the international case stems from the fact that Rawls's principles of justice apply in full strength only at the domestic l... (shrink)

The objective of this article is to show that Hannah Arendt’s understanding of totalitarianism is indebted to the analysis of National Socialism elaborated by Franz Neumann in Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism . It is argued that Arendt adopted the central thesis of Neumann according to which Nazi Germany is a ‘non-state’ and that this thesis as well as its presuppositions are discernible in her overall approach, developed in The Origins of Totalitarianism.

Drawing on archival evidence, this article explores the salience of ‘patriotic’ themes and motifs in the emergence of the Napoleonic legend in France after 1815. Symbolizing France’s defeated and humiliated status, the captive of Saint-Helena became an emblem of French patriotism, a rallying point for all the men and women who refused to accept their nation’s containment by the 1815 treaties. And, contrary to the traditional view that Bonapartist nationalism was merely a celebration of violence, military glory and conquest, it (...) will also become apparent that the image of the Emperor was used in French popular political culture to promote a coherent cluster of ideas and values of ‘nationhood’, which in many respects connected back to the defensive patriotism of the Revolutionary era. Ultimately, through their celebration of the memory of Napoleon, his supporters and allies demonstrated the convergence of republican and Bonapartist values around core notions of the Revolutionary tradition, most notably a resolute defence of French national sovereignty. (shrink)

This article is a study of the trajectory of the contemporary French liberal philosopher Marcel Gauchet from his early, ‘anarchist’ commitments through the 1970s to his discovery and defense of liberalism, notably as expressed in his 1980 revival and interpretation of his 19th-century countryman Benjamin Constant’s post-revolutionary liberalism. Discussed in the article are Gauchet’s devotion to and revision of the portrait of primitive society he inherited from the French anthropologist Pierre Clastres, how his early political and theoretical concerns are transmuted (...) in Gauchet’s reading of Constant, and the relevance of this trajectory for comprehending even Gauchet’s most recent pronouncements about the nature and future of liberal society. (shrink)

This article aims to examine the problem of political representation through the work of Lefort, Gauchet and Rosanvallon. It first looks at Lefort, who argues that a democratic society is characterized by a tension between its abstract guiding principles and its concrete reality. Political representation, then, mediates between these principles and society. This theory of representation allows Lefort, Gauchet and Rosanvallon not only to examine critically both past and present discourses of their contemporaries, but also to offer an alternative history (...) of their own. Yet, since the 1980s, increasing individualization has exacerbated the tension between abstract principles and society, thus making political mediation more difficult. This article discusses the diagnosis and remedy to this predicament, as developed by Gauchet and Rosanvallon. While Gauchet offers an interesting diagnosis, but remains sceptical about possible solutions, Rosanvallon is more voluntarist and offers concrete solutions for today’s crisis of political representation. (shrink)

"In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: -/- This excellent collection, edited by Julian Young, features ten essays on the topic of Nietzsche’s valuation of the individual and the implications this has for notions of community. The book features contributions from some of the most respected contemporary Nietzsche scholars, and each essay displays rigorous analysis while being written in an engaging style. -/- Many of these contributions are evidently written in response to Young’s own (...) provocative reading of Nietzsche as a communitarian thinker in Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), and Young presents aspects of this reading in the opening essay. He argues that Nietzsche’s “liberal communitarianism” (8) stems from his intellectual inheritance from Wagner of a distinctly Hegelian project, that of synthesizing the need for common meaning with the desire for liberal individual rights. Young provides a close reading of Wagner, identifying the liberal aspect of Wagner’s communitarianism in a form of “soft power” (9)—namely, the capacity to inspire, rather than coerce, the collective toward a shared ideal. This soft power opens the space for reconciliation between the desires of the individual and the goals of the community at large. Young contends that Wagner’s early Hegelianism “appears virtually word for word” in Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy (16). More controversially and less convincingly, he extends this liberal communitarianism across Nietzsche’s entire corpus. In particular, for Young, we should understand Nietzsche’s free spirits as “agents of change” (25), exemplary individuals who both establish and question the evaluative boundaries of the collective ethical imperative. -/- Hans Sluga’s chapter investigates Nietzsche’s call for a new “great politics” (32). Drawing comparisons with Plato, Sluga argues that Nietzsche views the lack of a socially recognized order of rank, a corollary of modern democratic pluralism, as the inception of political nihilism. Sluga locates this diagnosis in Human, All Too Human, where Nietzsche’s critique of modern democracy inaugurates his concern with the tensions between political processes and the prospect of cultural flourishing. For Sluga, however, it is in Beyond Good and Evil that Nietzsche floats the possibility of reconciliation between the two, with the prospect of exceptional individuals instigating a new political relationship. Sluga argues that Nietzsche sees the European notion of the nation-state as something that should and will be abolished. While taking Nietzsche’s recommendation to be problematic, Sluga concludes that his diagnosis is profound. [End Page 469] -/- How convincing one takes Sluga’s argument to be depends on the literalness one thinks should be placed on the phrase “great politics.” By Beyond Good and Evil, is it not employed purely as a metaphor? This would accord with Ken Gemes and Chris Sykes’s approach in the following essay. Like Young, Gemes and Sykes emphasize Nietzsche’s kinship with Wagner, identifying the problem of meaning as central to both. Nietzsche is identified as conducting an anthropology of communities’ answers to the problem of meaning, or, rather, their creations of illusions to act as semblances of meaning. In his early works they take Nietzsche to hold that the foundations for the kind of cultural consecration necessary for the provision of collective meaning can be provided through myth, in the place of metaphysics. But, contra Young, Gemes and Sykes argue that Nietzsche develops away from his early communitarianism: first, toward an (ultimately pessimistic) investigation into the possibility of a scientific culture that provides meaning, and then by advocating a narrower individualism. For Gemes and Sykes, then, Nietzsche’s aspiration for communitarian cultural flourishing died at Bayreuth, and with Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche makes a final attempt to provide a life-affirming “mythology” (72) for the flourishing of his intended recipients, now of a far more limited scope—namely, only truly exemplary individuals. -/- Here one might wonder whether Nietzsche’s thought of the eternal recurrence might better fit this need for the provision of a mythology. Although Nietzsche marks out Zarathustra as the jewel of his oeuvre (EH P:4), he also declares the eternal recurrence, which receives...". (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 47, Issue 2, Page 144-178, Spring 2019.