Stem Cell Research

When in doubt, for the embryo. New arguments on the moral status of human embryos. - In the first part of our essay we distinguish the philosophical from the legal and political level of the embryo debate and describe our indirect justification strategy. It consists in renouncing a determination of the dignity-giving φ-properties and instead starting from premises that are undoubted by all discussion partners. In the second part we reconstruct and criticize the species, continuum, identity and potentiality arguments. The (...) species argument only has a certain plausibility, if at all, as a critical argument. From the continuum argument and identity argument we take over the idea of numerical identity (NI) and link it with the core idea of the potentiality argument (P). So we come to the NIP argument: -/- (NIP) -/- (1) Every living human body that is the bearer of (or has) potential φ-properties has dignity. (2) Every viable human embryo is a living human body that is the bearer of (or has) potential φ properties. Therefore, (3) Every viable human embryo has dignity. -/- Reversibly comatose people and newborns are protected because they have the potential to have actual personal characteristics in the future; our thesis is that embryos that are capable of development also have the same potential in moral terms. The basic idea of numerical identity, with which we support the second premise, is that every human being, from embryonic existence to adulthood, forms a physical unity. In a detailed part, we deal with the crown princess, gametes, parthenogenesis, somatic cell, pronuclear stage, biological heteronome early embryo, multiple, fusion, Siamese twin, hydatidiform mole and finally trophoblast problems. In a third part, the indirect argument is supplemented by a metatheoretical cautionary argument. It states that in situations where there is doubt as to whether a being falls within the scope of a moral norm, but there are sufficiently strong reasons for this subsumption, it must be assumed that this is the case if the contrary assumption and the positive effects it may have are in no acceptable proportion to the moral harm that would result if that subsumption were not made. The main result of our considerations is therefore: When in doubt, for the embryo. (shrink)

In future φ. On a subjectivist thought experiment in the embryo debate. -.

The dignity of human embryos. On the moral relevance of potentiality and numerical identity. -.

In the debate about the moral status of human embryos, it is not always clear which arguments are actually disputed. This book offers students and researchers, but also laypersons interested in the current debate, the opportunity to inform themselves about the current state of discussion and to learn about the most important arguments in a clear and concise form. These arguments are as follows: Since embryos as members of the species homo sapiens sapiens are human beings, they possess dignity (species (...) argument); embryos develop continuously, i.e. without morally relevant incisions, into adult human beings possessing dignity (continuum argument); embryos are identical with adult human beings possessing dignity (identity argument); embryos have the potential to become human beings, and this potential is without restriction worth protecting (potentiality argument). These arguments are each represented by a pro position and a contra position and defended or criticized. In an accompanying contribution by the editors, the four arguments in context are reconstructed, evaluated, and supported by new arguments. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophical discussion on human embryonic stem cell research has focused primarily on the metaphysical and meta-ethical issues suchresearch raises. Though these discussions are interesting, largely ignored are arguments rooted in the secular research ethics tradition already informing humansubject research. This tradition countenances the notion of vulnerability and that vulnerable human subjects ought to be protected from research-related harms. This is the basic idea behind the argument from vulnerability, and it enjoys prima facie plausibility. This articlepresents the vulnerability argument and (...) then focuses critically on several lines of attack including: twinning and totipotency arguments, embryo-rescuearguments, and natural loss arguments. The article concludes that there is no good defeater for the vulnerability argument, and, therefore, we have undefeated reasons for protecting human embryos from research related harms. (shrink)

The clonal evolution model and the cancer stem cell model are two independent models of cancers, yet recent data shows intersections between the two models. This article explores the impacts of the CSC model on the CE model. I show that CSC restriction, which depends on CSC frequency in cancer cell populations and on the probability of dedifferentiation of cancer non-stem cells into CSCs, can favor or impede some patterns of evolution and some processes of evolution. Taking CSC restriction into (...) account for the CE model thus has implications for the way in which we understand the patterns and processes of evolution, and can also provide new leads for therapeutic interventions. (shrink)

This chapter brings a philosophical perspective to the concept of stem cell. Three general questions both clarify the concept of stem cell and emphasize its ambiguities: (1) How should we define stem cells? (2) What makes them different from non-stem cells? (3) What is their ontology? (i.e. what kind of property is “stemness”?) Following this last question, the Chapter distinguishes four conceptions of stem cells and highlights their respective consequences for the cancer stem cell theory. Determining what kind of property (...) stemness is, in what context, is an urgent question, at least for therapeutic strategies against cancers. I hope that this chapter also illustrates how philosophy can be useful to biology. -/- The Chapter starts by clarifying the notions of self-renewal and differentiation. This leads to the question “can we (and if so, how) distinguish stem cells from non-stem cells through these two properties?”. From that will follow an interrogation on whether stem cells belong to a natural kind. On this issue, biologists and philosophers have framed the following alternative: either the concept of stem cell refers to entities (the cells that belong to the stem cell natural kind) or it refers to a transient and reversible cell state. I will argue that four conceptions of stemness should be distinguished rather than two. Finally, I will develop the case of the cancer stem cell (CSC) theory in order to show why it is crucial to answer the ontological question: some therapies might or might not be efficient depending on what stemness is. (shrink)

Reprogramming technologies show that cellular identity can be reprogrammed, challenging the classical conception of cell differentiation as an irreversible process. If non-stem cells can be reprogrammed into stem cells, then what is it to be a stem cell, and what kind of property is stemness? This article addresses this question both philosophically and biologically, states the different possibilities, and illustrates their potential consequences for science with the example of anti-cancer therapies.

In recent decades, debates about exploitation have tended to be subsumed by debates about choice and autonomy. This phenomenon has affected international feminism adversely, creating polarized debates over such issues as prostitution. Equally grave is the more recent tendency, even among some feminists, to assume that a woman's free choice to accept payment for egg "donation" in somatic cell nuclear transfer stem cell research absolves researchers of any charge of exploitation or abuse of research subjects. This paper suggests that much (...) of this dissension among feminists is due to conflicting understandings of the crucial but neglected concept of exploitation. Analyzing two possible senses of exploitation—a disparity between value "in" and value "out" versus an affront to dignity—this paper argues that both are underpinned by what Carole Pateman identifies as gender subordination. In conclusion it is suggested that transnational feminism return to a more traditionally feminist stance, which explicitly focuses on opposing the subordination and exploitation of women. (shrink)

Abstract I argue that embryonic stem cell research is fair to the embryo, even on the assumption that the embryo has attained full personhood and an attendant right to life at conception. This is because the only feasible alternatives open to the embryo are to exist briefly in an unconscious state and be killed or to not exist at all. Hence, one is neither depriving the embryo of an enduring life it would otherwise have had nor is one causing the (...) embryo pain. I also argue that a rational agent in a situation relevantly similar to that of the embryo would consent to such research, and I use this insight to ground two justice-based arguments in favor of this research. Content Type Journal Article Category Original Research Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11673-012-9364-0 Authors Aaron Rizzieri, The Humanities Department (E-202), LaGuardia Community College, 31-10 Thompson Ave, Long Island City, NY 11101, USA Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529. (shrink)

The closely related debates concerning abortion, the protection of the embryo and stem cell science have captured the legislative agenda in Mexico in recent years. This paper examines some contemporary debates related to stem cell science and the legal and political action that has followed in the wake of the latest Supreme Court judgment on abortion, which debates are directly linked to the degrees of protection of the embryo stipulated in the Mexican Constitution. While some Mexican states have opted to (...) take no further action, others, where conservative political forces are in the majority, have been very active in seeking to ensure that their constitutions are amended to protect human life from conception onwards. This intense legislative activity has not, however, been repeated at the federal level, where there is currently no overarching national regulatory framework governing stem cell research. Although major efforts have been made by the conservative block within the Senate to bring forward legislative proposals for the prohibition of human embryonic stem cell research, and despite the public expression by the federal government of its commitment to encourage inward investment and innovation in the area of biotechnology, stem cell science has, so far, remained unregulated. The legislative challenge is to resist the pressure that has been injected by religious leaders and to act in accordance with the values and principles adopted by the community in the Mexican Constitution. In the final analysis, Mexico faces particular difficulties in accommodating conservative political forces on one hand, while recognising on the other its need, as an emerging economy, to promote a progressive approach to innovation in biotechnology. (shrink)

The debate concerning the moral permissibility of using human embryos in human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research has long centred on the question of the embryo's supposed right to life. However, in focussing only on this question, many opponents to hESC research have escaped rigorous scrutiny by making vague and unfounded appeals to the concept of moral respect in order to justify their opposition to certain hESC practices. In this paper, I offer a critical analysis of the concept of moral (...) respect, and its use to support the intuitively appealing principle of proportionality in hESC research. I argue that if proponents of this principle are to justify its adoption by appealing to the concept of moral respect, they must explain two things concerning the nature of the moral respect owed to embryos. First, they must explain which particular aspect of the embryo is morally relevant, and why. Second, they must explain why some uses of embryos in research fail to acknowledge what is morally relevant about the embryo, and thereby involve a violation of the moral respect that they are due. I shall show that providing such explanations may be more difficult than it first appears. (shrink)

In his discussion of in vitrogametogenesis, Rob Sparrow claims that an ethical barrier to development of this technology is that many jurisdictions currently prohibit the practice of creating embryos solely for the purpose of research. However, he suggests that this ethical barrier will soon be eroded, in view of the fact that in vitro gametogenesis could serve as a powerful new technology to overcome infertility. In this commentary, I argue that Sparrow is being overly optimistic in his analysis here. I (...) claim that the debate over so-called compromise positions in the human embryonic stem cell debate suggests that the purpose of the research for which a research embryo is created is unlikely to be considered as having any significant bearing on the moral permissibility of the practice for those who oppose it. Even though in vitro gametogenesis could serve as a powerful new technology to overcome infertility, I argue that opponents of the practice of creating embryos solely for research purposes would still view the creation of research embryos that the development of in vitro gametogenesis would require, as being incompatible with affording the embryo proper moral respect. I conclude by suggesting that Sparrow's analysis of the potential benefits of in vitro gametogenesis provides us with further reasons to scrutinise the unconvincing arguments that are often cited in favour of prohibiting the practice of creating embryos solely for research purposes. (shrink)

Ontologies of living things are increasingly grounded on the concepts and practices of current life science. Biological development is a process, undergone by living things, which begins with a single cell and (in an important class of cases) ends with formation of a multicellular organism. The process of development is thus prima facie central for ideas about biological individuality and organismality. However, recent accounts of these concepts do not engage developmental biology. This paper aims to fill the gap, proposing the (...) lineage view of stem cells as an ontological framework for conceptualizing organismal development. This account is grounded on experimental practices of stem cell research, with emphasis on new techniques for generating biological organization in vitro. On the lineage view, a stem cell is the starting point of a cell lineage with a specific organismal source, time-interval of existence, and ‘tree topology’ of branch-points linking the stem to developmental termini. The concept of ‘enkapsis’ accommodates the cell-organism relation within the lineage view; this hierarchical notion is further explicated by considering the methods and results of stem cell experiments. Results of this examination include a (partial) characterization of stem cells’ developmental versatility, and the context-dependence of developmental processes involving stem cells. (shrink)

The controversy about research on human embryonic stem cells raises many fundamental ethical and religious questions, especially about the sanctity of lifeand the Divine mandate of human dominion over nature. This paper reviews the different perspectives of three monotheistic religions on the use of embryo for stem cell research. Looking at the religious perspectives, it shows us that Islam and Judaism support most forms of stem cell research. Both of them express their beliefs on when life begins or what the (...) role of scientists in stem cell research is by interpreting specific religious texts. Although Christianity has put the issue of stem cell research on the forefront of its agenda, they do not point to any specific biblical text that supports their concept of when life begins. While science cannot answer the question of when life begins, Christianity, Judaism and Islam have answered the question in some ways. (shrink)

Few advances in the history of science and technology have generated as much ethical controversy and captured as much public attention as research on human stem cells. This paper distinguishes two parallel research programs involving stems cells: embryonic and adult stem cell research programs, then surveys the ethical arguments advanced for and against human embryonic stem cell research. The popular media has tended to exaggerate the therapeutic potential of embryonic stem cells. Adult stem cell therapies are already available for different (...) kinds of cancer and a host of autoimmune diseases such us lupus, multiple sclerosis, Crohn’s disease and rheumatoid arthritis. Furthermore, recent research has shown that human adult stem cells have more plasticity than previously thought. Taking this into consideration, and using the principle of subsidiarity which states that if the same results can be obtained by two types of research, one should undertake the research that is least offensive or problematic, I argue that a moratorium on human embryonic stem cell research should be considered. In the meantime, I suggest that research on human adult stem cells and both animal embryonic and animal adult stem cells should continue. (shrink)

Ever since August 2001, when President Bush announced his shaky compromise policy on federal funding for research on stem cells, American scientists have been charging that the policy severely impedes progress in this promising new area. Bush's policy allowed federal funding only for research using stem cell lines that were in existence on the date of his speech. Thus, he maintained, such funding would not encourage anyone to destroy human embryos to obtain stem cells, because if they did so, the (...) newly created stem cell lines could not be developed or studied with federal funding. (shrink)

It is common in bioethical discussion to present thought experiments or cases in order to construct an argument. Some thought experiments are quite illuminating, and ethical theorizing will often appeal at some point to one’s intuitions. But there are cases in which thought experiments are useless or do not contribute to the argument. This article considers cases presented in the context of stem cell research that are destructive of human embryos. I argue that certain popular cases that are meant to (...) motivate the view that such research is permissible either are dialectically useless or do not contribute to the argument. By dialectically useless, I mean that the cases analyzed here yield intuitions in people who are already committed to the permissibility of such research. I end with some reflections that challenge the reliability of our intuitions on applied ethics issues by suggesting that thought experiments in this field are dubious from the start. My argument should not be read to support moral skepticism but to urge that our inquiries on applied issues requires certain intellectual virtues. (shrink)

This paper will address the translation of basic stem cell research into clinical research. While “stem cell” trials are sometimes used to describe established practices of bone marrow transplantation or transplantation of primary cells derived from bone marrow, for the purposes of this paper, I am primarily focusing on stem cell trials which are far less established, including use of hESC derived stem cells. The central ethical challenges in stem cell clinical trials arise in frontier research, not in standard, well-established (...) areas of research. (shrink)

Embryonic stem cell research holds great promise for biomedical research, but involves the destruction of human embryos. Katrien Devolder explores the tension between the view that embryos should never be deliberately harmed, and the view that such research must go forward. She provides an in-depth analysis of major attempts to resolve the problem.

The United Kingdom's Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, introduced into Parliament on the 8th of November 2007 contains a number of controversial proposals inter alia expressly permitting the creation of inter-species embryos for research and destruction and increasing the scope for human cloning also for destructive research. It is supposed that there ought not to be a blanket ban on the creation of human clones, hybrids, cybrids and chimeras because these embryos are valuable for research purposes. The prohibition on the (...) gestation of non-permitted embryos and interspecies embryos is used to generate confidence that embryos with compromised origins would not be gestated and reared. The argument outlined here demonstrates how uncertain are any legal prohibitions on gestation. Accordingly, the practical import of the distinction between compromised embryos for research and the same for live birth is equally dubious. The legislation would not, on this analysis, supply effective controls over this reproductive technology. (shrink)

Human–nonhuman chimeras have been the focus of ethical controversies for more than a decade, yet some related issues remain unaddressed. For example, little has been said about the relationship between the origin of transferred cells and the morally relevant capacities to which they may give rise. Consider, for example, a developing mouse fetus that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a human and another that receives a brain stem cell transplant from a dolphin. If both chimeras acquire morally relevant (...) capacities as a result of transplantation, and if those capacities are indistinguishable, should the difference in cell origin matter to how we classify these creatures? I argue that if morally relevant capacities are easy to detect, cell origin is irrelevant to how the chimera ought to be treated. However, if such capacities are hard to detect, cell origin should play a role in considerations about how to treat the chimera. (shrink)

I am grateful to the authors who commented on my article (Piotrowska 2014) for their careful examination of my argument. They have presented a variety of stimulating ideas and suggestions, with which I largely agree and which I would like to discuss further, but in the interest of brevity, I shall try to concentrate only on points of contention.

Each of the 13 articles in this collection wrestles with intricate metaphysical and moral aspects of the widespread belief that a thing’s potential—what it could, would, might, or will be, but isn’t yet—matters for how we should treat that thing. As John Lizza explains in his lucid introduction, the articles are grouped into three parts according to their aims and theoretical constraints. In this review, I briefly summarize and offer some critical discussion of each part.

When does a developing human being acquire moral status? I outline three different positions based on substance ontology that attempt to solve the question by locating some morally salient event in the process of human development question. In the second section, I consider some specific empirical objections to one of these positions, refute them, and then show how similar objections and responses would generalize to the other substance-based positions on the question. The crucial finding is that all the attempts to (...) answer the question that involve substance ontology need to appeal to dispositions. (shrink)

Patient-funded trials are gaining traction as a means of accelerating clinical translation. However, such trials sidestep mechanisms that promote rigor, relevance, efficiency, and fairness. We recommend that funding bodies or research institutions establish mechanisms for merit review of patient-funded trials, and we offer some basic criteria for evaluating PFT protocols.

Are embryos deserving of moral consideration in our actions? A standard view suggests that embryos are considerable only if they have interests. One argument for embryonic interests contends that embryos are harmed by death because they are deprived of valuable future lives as adult persons. Some have challenged this argument on the grounds that embryos aren’t identical to adults: either due to the potential for embryos to twin or because we do not exist until the fetus develops consciousness. These arguments (...) fail to show that embryos do not have future adult lives. There is a better reason to think that embryos cannot have interests; namely, because they are not capable of having desires. Others have held this view but have not sufficiently justified it. The justification lies in the fact that the capacity for desires is necessary to make sense of the normativity of interests. (shrink)

Proliferation of stem cell self-replication capabilities, can be used as medical treatment of disease control, tissue transplantation, or drug development and testing. Obtained from research using embryonic pluripotent stem cells, have captured a large embryo life too. Tendency to deny the embryo the scientific community is equal to the entire whole of the "person." General recommendations: embryo research in fourteen days after egg fertilization, because embryonic development at this time, no perception nor sense, does not have "people" the moral sense. (...) Buddhism can be straight down according to the "egalitarianism" of arguments, emphasizing: whether the embryo is not a "person" as long as it is "life" to use it there is "killing" of moral evil. Furthermore, the starting point of life, indeed from the moment the sperm-egg binding began. Beings in the embryonic state, because the emotions and sensory awareness has not been bred, so the only "no pain no fun subject." But this does not mean that the use of these embryos will not be the situation right, "killing" element. Compliance with "do not kill ring," the disciples of the Buddha, of course, can not agree to seize the behavior of embryonic life. If the disciples of the Buddha is in the public domain, involved in the legal side of this issue and the policy side, the face of the wider community and the interests of all parties, very limited space for individual autonomy, but it should not give up the gradual and slow to mercy killing of non- concept, less and affect the quality of laws and regulations. Obviously in a practical level, Buddhism is to have a "middle origin," the philosophy of action. Stem cells have the ability to self-replicate. They can be used in medical therapy, organ transplant, and pharmacological development or testing. However, obtaining pluripotent stem cells from embryos, for research purposes, implies snatching away the lives of the embryos or foetuses . Scientists tend to deny that an embryo is a human being. The general suggestion is that research on the embryo can be carried out within fourteen days after the egg has been fertilised because the embryo at that stage does not have any senses or feelings and hence does not possess the significance of a human being ethically. Based directly on the belief that 'all sentient beings are equal', Buddhism emphasises that regardless of whether an embryo is a human being or not, as long as it is already a life form, using it constitutes the immoral act of killing. Furthermore, life actually begins at the time when the sperm and egg fuses. Although the embryo does not have the feeling of pain or pleasure, as its sensory organs have not fully developed, this does not mean that using such embryos does not constitute the act of killing. Buddhists who uphold the precept of no killing certainly cannot agree to the act of seizing the lives of the embryos or foetuses. When a Buddhist encounters the legal and the policy-making aspects of this issue in public, he / she has limited personal autonomy because he / she has to face all of society and the interests of various people. However, one should not give up in slowly and gradually putting the idea of ​​mercy and no killing, little by little, into the quality of the laws and rules. Thus, it is obvious that, from a practical point of view, Buddhism still requires a guiding framework on how to practically apply the teaching of the Middle Path of Dependent Origination. (shrink)

In this timely collection, some of the world's leading ethicists grapple with the variety of issues posed by human embryonic stem cell research. Investigates the moral status of the embryo including the creation of chimeras and paying for gametes and embryos for research purposes Provides a thorough evaluation of the ethics and politics of regulating hESC research, and the privacy, confidentiality, and informed consent in the conduct of research and clinical investigations Essential reading for scientists, philosophers, policy makers, and all (...) who are interested in the ethical conduct of science Contributors include David DeGrazia, Lori Gruen, Elizabeth Harman, John Harris, Jeff McMahan, Don Marquis and Peter Singer. (shrink)