Stoics: Metaphysics and Physics

Sources for Stoicism present conflicting accounts of the Stoic principles. Some suggest that the principles are inseparable from each other. Others suggest that they are separable. To resolve this apparent interpretive dilemma, I distinguish between the functions of the principles and the bodies that realize those functions. Although the principles cannot separate when realizing their roles, the Stoic theory of blending entails that the bodies that realize those roles are physically separable. I present a strategy for further work on the (...) principles in light of this interpretation. (shrink)

Reconstructs the original Greek version of the confatalia-argument that Cicero attributes to Chrysippus in De fato and misrepresent in crucial ways. Compares this argument with Seneca's discussion of determinism in the Naturales quaestiones. Clarifies that Seneca makes a different distinction from that attested in Cicero's De fato. Argues that problems with interpreting both accounts derive from disregarding terminological distinctions harder to spot in the Latin versions and, related to this, insufficient attention to the ontological distinction between bodies (such as Fate) (...) and predicates (e.g. "what is fated"), which unfortunately does not square well with the modern ontological category "event." Contains some corrections to the author's earlier discussion of the topic in Seneca und die Stoa: Der Platz des Menschen in der Welt, De Gruyter 2006, ch. 3.3.4. (shrink)

Relates Stoic changing conceptions of time to these philosophers’ theology. Roughly speaking, we can distinguish a first phase in which the original definition by Zeno was developed and refined, and a second phase, beginning with Posidonius at the latest, in which new concepts of both objective and subjective time were introduced that turned out to be incompatible with the strictly "corporealist" ontology into which the original definitions had been embedded. The early Stoics defined time in dependence of moving bodies in (...) such a way that the subsistence of times, their structural coherence and unity within the whole time of the cosmos's movement as well as the division of time into past, present and future were a consequence of god's activities. It was god who determined time and what it was like. Maybe under the influence of Aristotle, some middle Stoics and in particular Posidonius seem to have become dissatisfied with the idea that there are only times of single movements but no time as a universal temporal dimension. They introduced a distinction between objective time and - both perceptually and conceptually - subjective time as well as the concept of a now that implies both a point-like division between past and future and a defined location for the present within objective time. As a consequence, God's activities are now structured by a temporal dimension that does no longer depend of God in all its aspects. Now, God too has a past and a future, and his activities can be analyzed in terms of necessity and possibility. This raises questions about divine agency similar to those discussed in order to define human responsibility and freedom of action. Reflexes of such a debate about the determinedness of god's activities can be observed in the imperial Stoic Seneca. (shrink)

Argues that the demarcation between humans and animals in Stoicism is made in functional terms, by their different capacities, but also quantitative terms, as smaller or larger shares of pneuma and thus the active principle Gods. Discusses how they Stoics may have related these two categories and makes a case for the possibility to formulate a non-exploitative animal ethic in Stoic terms.

Demonstrates the sophistication of Seneca’s Stoicism by setting his contributions within the context of his school. Seneca’s contributions to physics, metaphysics, logic, determinism, theodicy and eschatology are set within a systematic reconstructions of Stoic positions. Ample documentation of sources and scholarship as well as the thematic, handbook-like structure allow for this book to be used as a look-up tool and introduction to the Stoic cosmos and the place of humans within it. -/- There are a number of new readings and (...) interpretations, e.g. concerning the corporeality of the principles; mixture (krasis di’ holôn); the elements and pneuma; identity; the relation of God and humans; Seneca’s attitude to logic; Seneca’s philosophy of time; the role of lekta in defining reality and action; Stoic and Senecan theodicy; Seneca’s contribution to the determinism debate. (shrink)

Chrysippus often talks as if there is a third option when we might expect that two options in response to a question are exhaustive. Things are true, false or neither; equal, unequal, or neither; the same, different, or neither.. and so on. There seems to be a general pattern here that calls for a general explanation. This paper offers a general explanation of this pattern, preserving Stoic commitments to excluded middle and bivalence, arguing that Chrysippus employs this trichotomy move when (...) he wishes to argue that apparent contradictories are only contraries, and wishes to endorse a third option. This general explanation of the pattern of trichotomies sheds light on a number of interpretive puzzles, including on Chrysippus's response to the paradox of the cone. The purpose of these trichotomies is also discussed, and it is suggested that they originate from the dialectical context in which philosophical problems were posed. (shrink)

This paper rehabilitates the Stoic conception of blending from the ground up, by freeing the Stoic conception of body from three interpretive presuppositions. First, the twin hylomorphic presuppositions that where there is body there is matter, and that where there is reason or quality there is an incorporeal. Then, the atomistic presupposition that body is absolutely full and rigid, and the attendant notion that resistance (antitupia) must be ricochet. I argue that once we clear away these presuppositions about body, the (...) foundations of Stoic corporealism fall into place. Body is fundamental (not hylomorphic). The two fundamental principles (archai) are bodies: divine active reason (logos) and passive matter (hulē); and these two bodies are two, not matter and form all over again, nor actual and potential, but agent and patient. The independence of the two archai is no threat to the unity of the cosmos, however, because the Stoic theory of body allows for the complete coextension of the archai. The hylomorphic thinker rightly asks, what relation could be tighter than that of the wax and its shape? The Stoic replies: a causal relation, the interaction of agent and patient completely coextended in a through and through blend. (shrink)

In this paper, I clarify some central aspects of Stoic thought concerning identity, identification, and so-called peculiar qualities (qualities which were seemingly meant to ground an individual’s identity and enable identification). I offer a precise account of Stoic theses concerning the identity and discernibility of individuals and carefully examine the evidence concerning the function and nature of peculiar qualities. I argue that the leading proposal concerning the nature of peculiar qualities, put forward by Eric Lewis, faces a number of objections, (...) and offer two constructive suggestions which turn upon reconsidering the nature and function(s) of peculiar qualities. Finally, I examine a simple but potent Academic argument against the view that identification requires detecting some attribute(s) unique to the relevant individual. Such an argument is, I argue, largely successful and may have encouraged later Stoics not to think that peculiar qualities enable identification. (shrink)

How does God think? How, ideally, does a human mind function? Must a gap remain between these two paradigms of rationality? Such questions exercised the greatest ancient philosophers, including those featured in this book: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Plotinus. This volume encompasses a series of studies by leading scholars, revisiting key moments of ancient philosophy and highlighting the theme of human and divine rationality in both moral and cognitive psychology. It is a tribute to Professor A. A. Long, (...) and reflects multiple themes of his own work. (shrink)

"Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind" is an elegant survey of Stoic and Epicurean ideas about the soul an introduction to two ancient schools whose belief in the soul's physicality offer compelling parallels to modern approaches in the ...

One of Leibniz’s more unusual philosophical projects is his presentation (in a series of unpublished drafts) of an argument for the conclusion that a time will necessarily come when “nothing would happen that had not happened before." Leibniz’s presentations of the argument for such a cyclical cosmology are all too brief, and his discussion of its implications is obscure. Moreover, the conclusion itself seems to be at odds with the main thrust of Leibniz’s own metaphysics. Despite this, we can discern (...) a serious and important point to Leibniz’s consideration of the doctrine, namely in what it suggests about the proper boundary between metaphysics and theology, on the one hand, and ordinary history (whether human or natural), on the other. And we can get a better sense of Leibniz purpose in the essays by considering them in the context of Leibniz's response to Thomas Burnet's "Telluris theoria sacra" (1681-89). Leibniz praises Burnet's history of earth for presenting a harmony between the principles of nature and grace, a harmony absent in the cosmogonies of Descartes and the Newtonians. But Leibniz also complains that Burnet misconceives the boundary between natural explanation and reflections on divine wisdom. And Leibniz's essays on cyclical cosmology suggest the alternative to Burnet's account: a natural history of the earth and its inhabitants should be radically autonomous from, even if ultimately harmonious with, theological principles. (shrink)

My ultimate purpose here is to examine, discuss, and interpret a difficult excerpt in Stobaeus’ 5th c. AD anthology, alleging to report—uniquely, it appears—a distinction Chrysippus drew between three different applications of the term stoixe›on or element (i.e., physical element).1 Stobaeus lists this passage as giving opinions specifically of Chrysippus “about the elements out of substance” (per‹ t«n §k t∞w oÈs€aw stoixe€vn), though in holding them he says Chrysippus was following Zeno, the leader of his sect. Hermann Diels (1879) identified (...) this selection as an excerpt (his fr. 21) from Arius Didymus’ late first century BC Epitome of Physical Doctrines.2 I print a translation below, with the text in an Appendix, as it is given in von Arnim (1903). The text is not without its problems, and I indicate in footnotes to the text which of the principal editors’ textual interventions I accept and follow in my translation. Whether this text presents a single, continuous excerpt from Arius Didymus, or instead some compilation of Stobaeus (or an earlier anthologist whose work Stobaeus employed) from dispersed passages of.. (shrink)

Void is at the heart of Stoic metaphysics. As the incorporeal par excellence, being defined purely in terms of lacking body, it brings into sharp focus the Stoic commitment to non-existent Somethings. This article argues that Stoic void, far from rendering the Stoic system incoherent or merely ad hoc, in fact reflects a principled and coherent physicalism that sets the Stoics apart from their materialist predecessors and atomist neighbors.

L’article analyse les témoignages stoïciens qui définissent la divinité comme «intellect» et comme «âme du monde», et qui permettent de déterminer les contenus de la pensée divine comme logoi, c’est-à-dire certains «discours» ou «raisonnements». En premier lieu, on examine les mots νοερόν, et νοητόν pour établir à quelles réalités les Stoïciens confèrent les caractères d’intelligence et d’intelligibilité et comment ils décrivent la pensée scientifique à laquelle ils comparent la pensée divine. En second lieu, on examine la théorie des raisons séminales (...) et ses relations historiques avec le problème des objets de la pensée divine. Enfin, on tente de montrer que les Stoïciens, tout en suivant la théologie démiurgique du Timée, unifient ce que Platon a tenu bien séparé : le Démiurge lui-même, l’âme du monde, le «vivant intelligible». (shrink)

The purpose of the present article is to show that there is a clear line of continuity between the early Stoics’ and Cornutus’ works, as all of them assumed that the ancient mythmakers had transformed their original cosmological conceptions into anthropomorphic deities. Hence, the Stoics from Zeno to Cornutus believed that the names of the gods reflected the mode of perceiving the world that was characteristic of the people who named the gods in this way. Accordingly, the major thesis advanced (...) in the paper proposes that the Stoics conducted their etymological analyses so as to gather ethnographical information about the origin and development of the existing religion. When doing so, they treated the conventional mythological narratives as sources of information about the early conceptions of the cosmos. Th us, the Stoics from Zeno to Cornutus employed etymology as a certain research strategy: they analyzed the names of traditional deities so as to extract the physical and moral beliefs that constituted the ancients’ world picture. Treated as ethnologists, the Stoics seem to equate piety with retrieving philosophical truths obscured under the guise of primitive mythical formulations. Furthermore, when unravelling the original worldview inadvertently transmitted by the poets in their poems, the Stoics reconstruct the history of religion and contribute to the development of ancient anthropology. (shrink)

Book synopsis: Plato is perhaps the most readable of all philosophers. Recent scholarship on Plato has focused attention on the dramatic and literary form through which Plato presents his philosophy, an integral part of that philosophy. The papers in this volume for the first time consider Aristotle and the Stoics as readers of Plato. That these successors were influenced by the thought of Plato is a commonplace: the ‘whole of western philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato’. Arising from (...) Institute of Classical Studies Research Seminars in 2004-5 and 2005-6, the papers in this volume rather consider whether and how the philosophical concerns of these later thinkers were served were served by close reading of Plato, through inter-textual engagement with specific passages of Plato’s works. (shrink)

This is a study of the psychological ideas of Galen (AD 129-c.210, the most important medical writer in antiquity) and Stoicism (a major philosophical theory in ...

In this paper, it is argued the Stoics develop an account of corporeals that allows their theory of bodies to be, at the same time, a theory of causation, agency, and reason. The paper aims to shed new light on the Stoics' engagement with Plato's Sophist . It is argued that the Stoics are Sons of the Earth insofar as, for them, the study of corporeals - rather than the study of being - is the most fundamental study of reality. (...) However, they are sophisticated Sons of the Earth by developing a complex notion of corporeals. A crucial component of this account is that ordinary bodies are individuated by the way in which the corporeal god pervades them. The corporeal god is the one cause of all movements and actions in the universe. (shrink)

A survey of Stoic views on religion, with an emphasis on their proofs of the existence and nature of Zeus.

This is a collective study, in nine new essays, of the close connection between theology and cosmology in Stoic philosophy.

Meijer's book, a comprehensive study of Stoic theological arguments, defends the thesis that the Stoics were not narrowly interested in proving the existence of a god. The theology of the Stoa began with its founder, Zeno of Citium, presenting arguments that the cosmos is an intelligent being, though Zeno himself seems not to have explicitly identified that intelligent being as god. A clear statement equating the cosmos with god had to wait until the rise of the third head of the (...) school, Chrysippus, though Meijer acknowledges that there is no reason to think that Zeno or Cleanthes, the second head, would have opposed the proposition that the cosmos, or at least the rational fire that pervades it, is god. Confusion about the true intent of Zeno's arguments is due to their distortion in the sources, for example, by Sextus Empiricus, who, Meijer contends, presents several of Zeno's arguments for the rationality of the cosmos as if they were intended as arguments to establish the existence of god. As a result, Sextus is an unreliable witness for determining the point of these arguments. Further confusing matters is the existence of a set of arguments attributed to Zeno that aim to establish the existence of the traditional gods. Meijer. (shrink)

Scholars have long recognised the interest of the Stoics' thought on geometrical limits, both as a specific topic in their physics and within the context of the school's ontological taxonomy. Unfortunately, insufficient textual evidence remains for us to reconstruct their discussion fully. The sources we do have on Stoic geometrical themes are highly polemical, tending to reveal a disagreement as to whether limit is to be understood as a mere concept, as a body or as an incorporeal. In my view, (...) this disagreement held among the historical Stoics, rather than simply reflecting a doxographical divergence in transmission. This apparently Stoic disagreement has generated extensive debate, in which there is still no consensus as to a standard Stoic doctrine of limit. The evidence is thin, and little of it refers in detail to specific texts, especially from the school's founders. But in its overall features the evidence suggests that Posidonius and Cleomedes differed from their Stoic precursors on this topic. There are also grounds for believing that some degree of disagreement obtained between the early Stoics over the metaphysical status of shape. Assuming the Stoics did so disagree, the principal question in the scholarship on Stoic ontology is whether there were actually positions that might be called "standard" within Stoicism on the topic of limit. In attempting to answer this question, my discussion initially sets out to illuminate certain features of early Stoic thinking about limit, and then takes stock of the views offered by late Stoics, notably Posidonius and Cleomedes. Attention to Stoic arguments suggests that the school's founders developed two accounts of shape: on the one hand, as a thought-construct, and, on the other, as a body. In an attempt to resolve the crux bequeathed to them, the school's successors suggested that limits are incorporeal. While the authorship of this last notion cannot be securely identified on account of the absence of direct evidence, it may be traced back to Posidonius, and it went on to have subsequent influence on Stoic thinking, namely in Cleomedes' astronomy. (shrink)

Ésta es la respuesta a la crítica hecha por Ricardo Salles a mi interpretación del compatibilismo estoico. Aunque en parte admito sus objeciones, intento mostrar que algunos textos nos permiten pensar que, aunque lo que depende de nosotros no implique necesariamente acciones alternativas, eso no significa que no pueda implicarlas. También trato de mostrar que un reexamen de la noción crisipea de posibilidad que tenga en cuenta el deseo y la creencia permite explicar por qué no es posible (en el (...) sentido de "posibilidad específica") llevar a cabo las acciones X e Y (o Y en vez de X) en un tiempo dado, lo cual indicaría que la posibilidad específica también excluye acciones alternativas. /// This is the reply to Ricardo Salles' criticism of my interpretation of the Stoic compatibilism. Although I partially admit his objections, I intend to show that some texts allow us to think that, even though what depends on us does not necessarily imply alternative actions, this does not mean that it can not imply them. I also endeavour to show that a re-examination of the Chrysippean notion of possibility taking into account desire and belief permits to explain why it is not possible (in the sense of "specific possibility") to perform the actions X and Y (or Y instead of X) in a given time, which would indicate that the specific possibility rules out alternative actions as well. (shrink)

Zeno's so-called proofs of divine existence -- Zeno and the traditional gods: a serious problem -- Cleanthes' proofs -- Cleanthes and the traditional gods -- Chrysippus' contribution -- Chrysippus and the traditional gods -- Other Stoic proofs -- Other (Stoic?) arguments in Sextus -- Polemics against the arguments pro the existence of God(s) -- Abolishing the gods leads to odd consequence: the atopical arguments pro the existence of the gods -- The counter-arguments -- Carneades and the data of Sextus and (...) Cicero -- The sorites arguments as a weapon against the traditional gods -- Epilogue -- Appendix I. Cleanthes' humn on Zeus: a running commentary -- Appendix II. Where is God? -- Appendix III. Alexinus' Parabolai. (shrink)

Maykʻl Papazian - The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.3 488-490 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Michael Papazian Berry College Ricardo Salles. The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism. Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Philosophy. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2005. Pp. xxii +132. Cloth, $79.95. Stoic determinism has been the object of important work recently, most notably Susanne Bobzien's monumental work, Determinism and Freedom in (...) Stoic Philosophy. Ricardo Salles provides a fresh and distinct perspective. He challenges several points in Bobzien's work, so his book serves as a good complement to Bobzien's arguments. The first part of the book is an analysis of the Stoic arguments for determinism. The rest of the book.. (shrink)

Este trabajo discute la interpretación de Marcelo Boeri sobre el compatibilismo estoico; esto es, la tesis de que es compatible con el determinismo que rige al mundo natural el que podamos ser genuinamente responsables de nuestras acciones. Según Boeri, los estoicos intentaron conciliar las dos cosas abriendo un margen de indeterminación gracias al cual nuestras acciones no están sujetas a la necesidad que domina los demás fenómenos naturales. La discusión que se ofrece aquí se basa en un análisis del concepto (...) antiguo de lo que depende de nosotros y de los conceptos estoicos de determinismo y modalidad. /// This paper discusses Marcelo Boeri's interpretation of Stoic compatibilism, the thesis that natural determinism does not rule out that we can genuinely be responsible for our actions. According to Boeri, the Stoic hold that this is so because our actions are to a great extent free from determination. The discussion of this interpretation is based on an analysis of the ancient concept of what depends on us and of Stoic concepts of determinism and modality. (shrink)

An argument for the existence of gods given by the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and reported by Sextus Empiricus appears to be an ancient version of the ontological argument. In this paper I present a new reconstruction of Diogenes' argument that differs in certain important respects from the reconstruction presented by Jacques Brunschwig. I argue that my reconstruction makes better sense of how Diogenes' argument emerged as a response to an attack on an earlier Stoic argument presented by Zeno of (...) Citium. Diogenes' argument as reconstructed here is an example of a modal ontological argument that makes use of the concept of being of such a nature as to exist. I argue that this concept is a modal concept that is based on the Philonian definition of possibility, and thus that Diogenes' argument is a source of important evidence about the use of non-Stoic modalities in the post-Chrysippean Stoa. I conclude by arguing that the objections made against considering Diogenes' argument as ontological are unfounded and that Diogenes' argument clearly resembles modern versions of modal ontological arguments. (shrink)

Christopher Gill offers a new analysis of what is innovative in Hellenistic--especially Stoic and Epicurean--philosophical thinking about selfhood and personality. His wide-ranging discussion of Stoic and Epicurean ideas is illustrated by a more detailed examination of the Stoic theory of the passions and a new account of the history of this theory. His study also tackles issues about the historical study of selfhood and the relationship between philosophy and literature, especially the presentation of the collapse of character in Plutrarch's Lives, (...) Senecan tragedy, and Virgil's Aeneid. As all Greek and Latin is translated, this book presents original ideas about ancient concepts of personality to a wide range of readers. (shrink)

In this paper I offer an interpretation of the Stoic argumentum ex gradibus entium as it appears in Book II of Cicero's De Natura Deorum. In addition to displaying certain similarities to later formulations of the so-called "ontological argument," particularly Anselm's, I argue that the argument ex gradibus entium was a versatile feature of Stoic philosophical theology, capable of employment in relation to two distinct topics: the existence of god and the identification of god's essential nature with the world. I (...) claim that the instance of the argument ex gradibus entium at ND II 18-21 is a token of this latter type, and show that there are no textual reasons precluding this interpretation. In light of the fact that the argument can be analyzed more effectively in this role, I suggest that this particular instance of the argument is best thought of as an attempt on the part of the Stoics to identify the world with god rather than as a strict proof for god's bare existence. I end with some reflections on the general type of the Stoic argument qua precursor to two of Anselm's ontological proofs. Although I think it is a mistake to call the Stoic argument "ontological" in a strict sense, it may, I suggest, have shared a similar conceptual underpinning with at least one of Anselm's famous formulations. (shrink)

The surviving sources on the Stoic theory of division reveal that the Stoics, particularly Chrysippus, believed that bodies, places and times were such that all of their parts themselves had proper parts. That is, bodies, places and times were composed of gunk. This realisation helps solve some long-standing puzzles about the Stoic theory of mixture and the Stoic attitude to the present.