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  1. added 2018-11-13
    Pictures, Plants, and Propositions.Alex Morgan - forthcoming - Minds and Machines:1-21.
    Philosophers have traditionally held that propositions mark the domain of rational thought and inference. Many philosophers have held that only conceptually sophisticated creatures like us could have propositional attitudes. But in recent decades, philosophers have adopted increasingly liberal views of propositional attitudes that encompass the mental states of various non-human animals. These views now sit alongside more traditional views within the philosophical mainstream. In this paper I argue that liberalized views of propositional attitudes are so liberal that they encompass states (...)
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  2. added 2018-10-12
    Concept Designation.Arvid Båve - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4).
    The paper proposes a way for adherents of Fregean, structured propositions to designate propositions (and other complex senses/concepts), using a special kind of functor. Investigating some formulations by Peacocke, I highlight certain problems that arise when we try to quantify over propositional constituents while referring to propositions using “that”-clauses (I also consider some other kinds of proposition designator). With the functor notation, by contrast, we can quantify over senses/concepts with ordinary quantifiers and speak without further ado about how they can (...)
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  3. added 2018-10-07
    Russellians Can Solve the Problem of Empty Names with Nonsingular Propositions.Thomas Hodgson - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    Views that treat the contents of sentences as structured, Russellian propositions face a problem with empty names. It seems that those sorts of things cannot be the contents of sentences containing such names. I motivate and defend a solution to the problem according to which a sentence may have a singular proposition as its content at one time, and a nonsingular one at another. When the name is empty the content is a nonsingular Russellian structured proposition; when the name is (...)
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  4. added 2018-08-19
    Russellians Can Have a No Proposition View of Empty Names.Thomas Hodgson - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):670-691.
    Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names. I will defend this theory against the problem of meaningfulness, and show that the theory is in general well motivated. My solution to the problem of meaningfulness is that speakers’ judgements about meaningfulness are tracking grammaticality, and not propositional content.
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  5. added 2018-07-12
    Thisness Presentism: An Essay on Time, Truth, and Ontology.David Ingram - forthcoming - Oxford, UK: Routledge.
    Thisness Presentism outlines and defends a novel version of presentism, the view that only present entities exist and what is present really changes. Presentism is a view of time that captures a real and objective difference between what is past, present, and future, and which offers a model of reality that is dynamic and mutable, rather than static and immutable. The book advances a new defence of presentism by developing a novel ontology of thisness, combining insights about the nature of (...)
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  6. added 2018-06-12
    Modal Difficulties with Singular Propositions.Filip Kawczyński - 2015 - Filozofia Nauki 23 (1):39-58.
    Singular propositions are structured entities which sometimes include macroscopic concrete things as their elements. That leads to numerous difficulties, also those concerning modalities, good example of which is the famous argument developed by Plantinga, who concludes that accepting a theory of singular propositions leads to necessary existence of (apparently contingent) objects — elements of such propos¬itions. In the paper I present a possible way to avoid such harmful consequences and to undermine Plantinga’s reasoning. My approach involves the idea of two (...)
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  7. added 2018-06-12
    Frege’s Puzzle and the Direct Reference Theory.Filip Kawczyński - 2014 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Semantics and Beyond: Philosophical and Linguistic Inquiries. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 109-126.
    In the paper, I discuss a possibility of defending the Direct Reference theory from its most dangerous threaten which is the notorious Frege's puzzle. I discuss two possible ways of doing that. First is based on King's theory of propositions as facts. I show that tools provided by King's theory are not enough to solve the puzzle. More promising is a method supported by new Soames's theory of propositions as cognitive event-types. I try to show that this framework allows us (...)
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  8. added 2018-03-20
    Propositions as Interpreted Abstracta.Thomas Hodgson - forthcoming - In Chris Tillman (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge.
    Neo-Russellians claim that propositions can be modelled by tuples. A common view is that propositions cannot be tuples. I argue that the interpretivist account of propositions developed by Jeffrey C. King can be adapted for the tuple view.
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  9. added 2018-03-01
    Instrumentalism About Structured Propositions.Ori Simchen - forthcoming - In Chris Tillman (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge.
    Explanations deploy theoretical representations of their explananda. One question to ask about such representations is whether to regard them under a realist attitude, i.e. as revealing the nature of what they represent, or under an instrumentalist attitude, i.e. as serving particular explanatory ends without such further revelatory pretension. This question can be raised for representations wielded within metaphysical explanation to fruitful effect. I consider structured propositions as theoretical representations within a particular explanatory enterprise – the metaphysics of what is said (...)
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  10. added 2018-02-21
    Why 0-Adic Relations Have Truth Conditions: Essence, Ground, and Non-Hylomorphic Russellian Propositions.Cody Gilmore - forthcoming - In Chris Tillman (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. London: Routledge.
    I formulate an account, in terms of essence and ground, that explains why atomic Russellian propositions have the truth conditions they do. The key ideas are that (i) atomic propositions are just 0-adic relations, (ii) truth is just the 1-adic version of the instantiation (or, as I will say, holding) relation (Menzel 1993: 86, note 27), and (iii) atomic propositions have the truth conditions they do for basically the same reasons that partially plugged relations, like being an x and a (...)
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  11. added 2018-02-02
    Storrs McCall's Tree of The Universe and Counterfactuals شجرة الكون وقضايا مناقضة الواقع عند ستورس مكال.Salah Osman - 1999 - Journal of the Faculty of Arts, Menoufia University 2956-2090 39:83 – 128.
    لم يكن العلم يومًا غريبًا عن الفلسفة، بل لقد أدت العلاقة الجدلية المستمرة بينهما إلى مزيد من المصداقية والقبول لبعض النماذج التفسيرية، سواء منها ما كان في الأصل نموذجًا فلسفيًا ثم وجد دعمًا علميًا – كنموذج الذرات والفـراغ عند «ديمرقــريطس» وتبنى النظرية الذرية الحديثة لإطاره العام – أو ما كان منها نموذجًا علميًا تم تداوله فلسفيًا – كنموذج النقاط المادية المتجاذبة عند »نيوتن« وتبنى معظم فلاسفة الحقبة الحديثة له. وفي هذا المقال يهتم الدكتور صلاح عثمان بمناقشة نموذج شجرة الكون لفيلسوف (...)
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  12. added 2018-01-16
    On Indirect Sense and Reference.Lukas Skiba - 2015 - Theoria 81 (1):48-81.
    According to Frege, expressions shift their reference when they occur in indirect contexts: in “Anna believes that Plato is wise” the expression “Plato” no longer refers to Plato but to what is ordinarily its sense. Many philosophers, including Carnap, Davidson, Burge, Parsons, Kripke and Künne, believe that on Frege's view the iteration of indirect context creating operators gives rise to an infinite hierarchy of senses. While the former two take this to be problematic, the latter four welcome the hierarchy with (...)
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  13. added 2018-01-13
    Propositionalism Without Propositions, Objectualism Without Objects.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oxford, UK. pp. 214-233.
    Propositionalism is the view that all intentional states are propositional states, which are states with a propositional content, while objectualism is the view that at least some intentional states are objectual states, which are states with objectual contents, such as objects, properties, and kinds. This paper argues that there are two distinct ways of understanding propositionalism and objectualism: (1) as views about the deep nature of the contents of intentional states, and (2) as views about the superficial character of the (...)
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  14. added 2017-11-16
    The Structure of Content is Not Transparent.Thomas Hodgson - 2017 - Topoi:1-13.
    Sentences in context have semantic contents determined by a range of factors both internal and external to speakers. I argue against the thesis that semantic content is transparent to speakers in the sense of being immediately accessible to speakers in virtue of their linguistic competence.
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  15. added 2017-11-06
    Predication and the Frege–Geach Problem.Indrek Reiland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):141-159.
    Several philosophers have recently appealed to predication in developing their theories of cognitive representation and propositions. One central point of difference between them is whether they take predication to be forceful or neutral and whether they take the most basic cognitive representational act to be judging or entertaining. Both views are supported by powerful reasons and both face problems. Many think that predication must be forceful if it is to explain representation. However, the standard ways of implementing the idea give (...)
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  16. added 2017-10-24
    Frege's Unthinkable Thoughts.Lukas Skiba - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):333–343.
    There are two common reactions to Frege’s claim that some senses and thoughts are private. Privatists accept both private senses and thoughts, while intersubjectivists don’t accept either. Both sides agree on a pair of tacit assumptions: first, that private senses automatically give rise to private thoughts; and second, that private senses and thoughts are the most problematic entities to which Frege’s remarks on privacy give rise. The aim of this paper is to show that both assumptions are mistaken. This will (...)
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  17. added 2017-09-24
    Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: A History and Defence of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement.Samuel Lebens - 2017 - New York: Routledge.
    Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions offers the first book-length defence of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement (MRTJ). Although the theory was much maligned by Wittgenstein and ultimately rejected by Russell himself, Lebens shows that it provides a rich and insightful way to understand the nature of propositional content. In Part I, Lebens charts the trajectory of Russell’s thought before he adopted the MRTJ. Part II reviews the historical story of the theory: What led Russell to deny the (...)
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  18. added 2017-06-28
    The Subject-Predicate Class II.Joseph Almog - 1991 - Noûs 25 (5):621-638.
  19. added 2017-06-28
    The Subject-Predicate Class I.Joseph Almog - 1991 - Noûs 25 (5):591-619.
  20. added 2017-05-06
    Descriptions and Non-Doxastic Attitude Ascriptions.Wojciech Rostworowski - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1311-1331.
    This paper addresses a certain objection to the quantificational theory of definite descriptions. According to this objection, the quantificational account cannot provide correct interpretations of definite descriptions embedded in the non-doxastic attitude ascriptions and therefore ought to be rejected. In brief, the objection says that the quantificational theory is committed to the view that a sentence of the form “The F is G” is equivalent to the claim that there is a unique F and it is G, while the ascription (...)
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  21. added 2017-02-13
    Propositional Content. [REVIEW]Indrek Reiland - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):132-136.
  22. added 2017-02-10
    The Nature and Structure of Content. By Jeffrey C. King. (Oxford UP, 2007. Pp. X + 230. Price £37.50 Hardback. £17.99 Paperback). [REVIEW]Nicholas Unwin - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):876-878.
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  23. added 2017-02-09
    Are There Analytic Propositions?Reginald Jackson - 1938 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 39:185 - 206.
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  24. added 2017-02-08
    Fact-, Proposition-, and Event-Individuation.Philip L. Peterson - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:29-36.
    The distinctions among facts, propositions, and events are supported by linguistic analyses segregating factive, propositional, and eventive predicates. The concepts of fact, proposition, and event may be basic categories of human understanding, as well as being ontologically significant. FPE theory was developed in part to reject the identification of facts with true propositions. The degree of ‘fineness’ of individuations within each category results from how closely event-, fact-, or proposition-individuation mirrors linguistic semantic structure. Event structure is not reflected in many (...)
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  25. added 2017-02-07
    Can Propositions Be Naturalistically Acceptable?Jeffrey C. King - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):53-75.
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  26. added 2017-01-23
    A Hyperintensional Account of Metaphysical Equivalence.Kristie Miller - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):772-793.
    This paper argues for a particular view about in what metaphysical equivalence consists: namely, that any two metaphysical theories are metaphysically equivalent if and only if those theories are strongly hyperintensionally equivalent. It is consistent with this characterisation that said theories are weakly hyperintensionally distinct, thus affording us the resources to model the content of propositional attitudes directed towards metaphysically equivalent theories in such a way that non-ideal agents can bear different propositional attitudes towards metaphysically equivalent theories.
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  27. added 2017-01-22
    Gappy Propositions?Seyed N. Mousavian - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):125-157.
    After introducing Millianism and touching on two problems raised by genuinely empty names for Millianism (section I), I provide a brief exposition of the Gappy Proposition View (GPV) and of how different versions of this view can reply to the problems in question (section II). In the following sections I develop my reasons against the GPV. First, I will try to argue that apparently promising arguments for the claim that gappy propositions are propositions are not successful (section III). Then, I (...)
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  28. added 2017-01-21
    The Nature and Structure of Content, by Jeffrey C. King. [REVIEW]Genoveva Martí & Dan Zeman - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):814-819.
  29. added 2017-01-19
    Review of Jeffrey C. King, The Nature and Structure of Content[REVIEW]Harry Deutsch - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).
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  30. added 2017-01-14
    The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
    InThe Nature and Structure of Content Jeffrey C. King formulates a detailed account of the metaphysical nature of propositions, and explains what it is that binds together the constituents of structured propositions and imposes structure on them. Scholars and students of philosophy, metaphysics, and linguistics will find this book rewarding reading.
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  31. added 2017-01-03
    On Propositions and Fineness of Grain (Again!).Jeffrey C. King - forthcoming - Synthese.
  32. added 2016-12-12
    Unbound Anaphoric Pronouns: E-Type, Dynamic, and Structured-Propositions Approaches.Friederike Moltmann - 2006 - Synthese 153 (2):199-260.
    Unbound anaphoric pronouns or ‘E-type pronouns’ have presented notorious problems for semantic theory, leading to the development of dynamic semantics, where the primary function of a sentence is not considered that of expressing a proposition that may act as the object of propositional attitudes, but rather that of changing the current information state. The older, ‘E-type’ account of unbound anaphora leaves the traditional notion of proposition intact and takes the unbound anaphor to be replaced by a full NP whose semantics (...)
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  33. added 2016-12-08
    Numbers, Reference and Russellian Propositions.Pierdaniele Giaretta - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):95-110.
    Stewart Shapiro and John Myhill tried to reproduce some features of the intuitionistic mathematics within certain formal intensional theories of classical mathematics. Basically they introduced a knowledge operator and restricted the ways of referring to numbers and to finite hereditary sets. The restrictions are very interesting, both because they allow us to keep substitutivity of identicals notwithstanding the presence of an epistemic operator and, especially, because such restrictions allow us to see, by contrast, which ways of reference are not compatible (...)
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  34. added 2016-12-08
    Propositions.Sean Crawford - 2005 - In Keith Brown (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd ed. Elsevier.
    A number of traditional roles that propositions are supposed to play are outlined. Philosophical theories of the nature of propositions are then surveyed, together with considerations for and against, with an eye on the question whether any single notion of a proposition is suited to play all or any of these roles. Approaches discussed include: (1) the structureless possible-worlds theory; (2) the structured Russellian theory; and (3) the structured Fregean theory. It is noted that it is often unclear whether these (...)
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  35. added 2016-10-27
    Are Propositions Essentially Representational?Bryan Pickel - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
    Jeffrey King argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true or false by rational agents. But – for good reason – King claims that propositions possess truth conditions essentially and intrinsically. I will argue that King cannot have both: if the truth conditions of a proposition depend on the reactions of rational agents, then the possession of truth conditions can't follow from the intrinsic nature or existence of the proposition. This leaves two options. Either, nothing (...)
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  36. added 2016-10-14
    Introduction.David Hunter & Gurpreet Rattan - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):515-517.
    (2013). Introduction. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 515-517.
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  37. added 2016-10-14
    Unnecessary Existents.Joshua Spencer - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5-6):766-775.
    (2013). Unnecessary existents. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 766-775.
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  38. added 2016-10-13
    All Things Must Pass Away.Joshua Spencer - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 7:67.
    Are there any things that are such that any things whatsoever are among them. I argue that there are not. My thesis follows from these three premises: (1) There are two or more things; (2) for any things, there is a unique thing that corresponds to those things; (3) for any two or more things, there are fewer of them than there are pluralities of them.
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  39. added 2016-10-09
    Self-Referential Propositions.Bruno Whittle - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):5023-5037.
    Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions? That is, propositions that say of themselves that they have a certain property, such as that of being false. There can seem reason to doubt that there are. At the same time, there are a number of reasons why it matters. For suppose that there are indeed no such propositions. One might then hope that while paradoxes such as the Liar show that many plausible principles about sentences must be given up, no such fate will befall (...)
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  40. added 2016-10-03
    Structured Propositions in a Generative Grammar.Bryan Pickel - forthcoming - Mind:fzw074.
    Semantics in the Montagovian tradition combines two basic tenets. One tenet is that the semantic value of a sentence is an intension, a function from points of evaluations into truth-values. The other tenet is that the semantic value of a composite expression is the result of applying the function denoted by one component to arguments denoted by the other components. Many philosophers object to intensional semantics on the grounds that intensionally equivalent sentences do not substitute salva veritate into attitude ascriptions. (...)
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  41. added 2016-08-29
    Thought Without Representation.John Perry - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60 (1):137-151.
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  42. added 2016-08-18
    Propositions. [REVIEW]Thomas Hodgson - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):585-587.
  43. added 2016-07-14
    La Structure Logique du Langage Ordinaire chez les Stoiciens.Ada Bronowski - 2014 - In Jean-Michel Counet (ed.), Philosophie et Langage Ordinaire de l'Antiquité a' la Renaissance. Edition Peeters. pp. 83-96.
    Rather than considering ordinary language as deficient and incapable of grasping the structure of reality, the Stoics set out a theory, based on their notion of a lekton, by which ordinary language is a reflection of the structure of lekta which themselves are constitutive of reality.
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  44. added 2016-06-03
    Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content.Scott Soames - 2009 - In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 33-71.
  45. added 2016-06-03
    Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content.Scott Soames - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):47-87.
  46. added 2016-05-19
    The Problem of Empty Names and Russellian Plenitude.Joshua Spencer - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):1-18.
    ‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express different propositions, even though neither ‘Ahab’ nor ‘Holmes’ has a referent. This seems to constitute a theoretical puzzle for the Russellian view of propositions. In this paper, I develop a variant of the Russellian view, Plenitudinous Russellianism. I claim that ‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express distinct gappy propositions. I discuss key metaphysical and semantic differences between Plenitudinous Russellianism and Traditional Russellianism and respond to objections that (...)
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  47. added 2016-05-11
    The Iconicity of Metarepresentations.François Recanati - 2000 - In Dan Sperber (ed.), Meta-Representations: a Multidisciplinary Perspective. Oxford University Press. pp. 311-360.
  48. added 2016-05-11
    Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief Reports.François Recanati & Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1):175 - 209.
  49. added 2016-03-29
    Solving Frege's Puzzle.Richard G. Heck Jr - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):132-174.
    So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional features of their mental states, and doing that seems to undermine the intentionality of psychological explanation. In the present paper, I develop this sort of objection in what seems to me to be its strongest form, but then offer a response to it. (...)
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  50. added 2016-01-26
    Two Notions of Logical Form.Andrea Iacona - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (12):617-643.
    This paper claims that there is no such thing as the correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfil two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and semantics. The first part of the paper outlines the thesis that a unique notion of logical form fulfils both roles, and argues that the alleged best candidate for making it true is unsuited for one of the two roles. (...)
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