Stuff

Edited by Henry Laycock (Queen's University)
About this topic
Summary The category of stuff is notoriously vague, due in part to the unclear and ill-defined contrast between 'stuff' and 'things' . In particular, while there appears to be a loose and informal consensus within philosophy that 'stuff' is to be treated as an extremely general concrete noun - to be applied to substances like sugar, flour, dough and plutonium (but not to the extension of such nouns as 'furniture') - and to be juxtaposed to 'things', as in some of Quine's writings, there is little consensus as to the extension of 'things'. For some, 'things' should here be understood to cover, roughly, Aristotle's substances - substances in that very different sense of being discrete, concrete, organised individuals consisting of both form and matter, stuff and structure. For others, 'things' is understood more generally as 'objects' in the traditional purely logical sense - roughly, whatever counts as the value of a variable - and the question then arises of whether the initial dichotomy can be preserved, or not. It is here that the nature of the metaphysical dichotomy, if such it be, meets the semantical dichotomy of so-called mass and count nouns. Some concrete nouns that are semantically mass are, in virtue of their particular semantic character, nouns for things described collectively. Thus 'furniture' denotes not stuff but things, while other mass nouns such as 'soup' are naturally words for stuff. However, if 'things' is construed purely logically, as with Quine or Witttgenstein, then it is often argued that mass nouns too are words for things - 'quantities', 'parcels', 'portions', etc. of stuff. Stuff on such accounts is often theorised in terms of a mereology, and here again, the fields of metaphysics and semantics virtually coincide. More recently, and consequent on studies of non-singular reference and predication, the question of whether our standard 'singularist' logic is suited to the analysis of mass nouns in general, and words for stuff in particular, has been pressed. Here, the logico-semantic writings of George Boolos and Tom McKay on plurals have acquired a certain relevance, and figure in the more recent logico-metaphysical writings of Laycock on the topics of things or objects, stuff, and mass nouns. The overlap between this topic and related issues in the philosophy of language is represented in the entry on mass nouns and count nouns.
Key works Both Quine 1957, and Strawson 1959, describe an obscure category of 'stuff' or 'features' as pre-individuative or pre-particular, and as 'prior' to speaking of objects. Against this, the influential Cartwright 1965 and Cartwright 1970 attempt to show that talk of stuff is really talk of discrete objects of a special type, or quantities. Laycock 1972 maintains that stuff is better understood as a plurality of elements, and Laycock 1975 attacks Cartwright-style accounts of references to stuff as singular. Hacker 1979 provides a synoptic but probing review of work to that date, and Laycock 2006 suggest an account entirely beyond ontologies of objects, while Laycock 2010 recontructs divergent formal conceptions of the object category itself. Steen 2012 offers a synoptic treatment of the entire debate to date.
Introductions Chappell 1970
Related categories

142 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 142
  1. added 2019-11-14
    Constitution and Dependence.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (3):150-177.
    Constitution is the relation that holds between an object and what it is made of: statues are constituted by the lumps of matter they coincide with; flags, one may think, are constituted by colored pieces of cloth; and perhaps human persons are constituted by biological organisms. Constitution is often thought to be a.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2019-08-06
    How Many There Are Isn’T.Jonah P. B. Goldwater - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-21.
    A world where there exists n concrete things is a count-determinate world. The orthodox view is count-determinacy is necessary; if to be is to be the value of a variable and the domain of quantification is enumerable, count-determinacy follows. Yet I argue how many there are can be indeterminate; count-indeterminacy is metaphysically possible and even likely actual. Notably, my argument includes rebuttals of Evans’ reductio of indeterminate identity and the Lewis/Sider ‘argument from vagueness’. Count-indeterminacy should therefore be recognized as another (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2019-07-24
    Anaxagoras, the Thoroughgoing Infinitist: The Relation Between His Teachings on Multitude and on Heterogeneity.Miloš Arsenijević, Saša Popović & Miloš Vuletić - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (1):35-70.
    In the analysis of Anaxagoras’ physics in view of the relation between his teachings on multitude and heterogeneity, two central questions emerge: 1) How can the structure of the universe considered purely mereo-topologically help us explain that at the first cosmic stage no qualitative difference is manifest in spite of the fact that the entire qualitative heterogeneity is supposedly already present there? 2) How can heterogeneity become manifest at the second stage, resulting from the noûs intervention, if according to fragment (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-06-27
    An Alternative Model for Understanding Anaxagoras’ Mixture.David Torrijos-Castrillejo - 2019 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 126:7-26.
    For Anaxagoras, both before the beginning of the world and in the present, “all is together” and “everything is in everything.” Various modern interpretations abound regarding the identity of this “mixture.” It has been explained as an aggregation of particles or as a continuous “fusion” of different sorts of ingredients. However—even though they are not usually recognized as a distinct group—there are a number of other scholars who, without seemingly knowing each other, have offered a different interpreta- tion: Anaxagoras’ mixture (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2019-06-06
    Substance: Things and Stuffs.Peter Hacker - 2004 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (1):41-63.
    We conceive of the natural world as populated by relatively persistent material things standing in spatio-temporal relations to each other. They come into existence, exist for a time, and then pass away. We locate them relative to landmarks and to other material things in the landscape which they, and we, inhabit. We characterize them as things of a certain kind, and identify and re-identify them accordingly. The expressions we typically use to do so are, in the technical terminology derived from (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. added 2019-06-06
    John Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter: Aspects of its Background in Neoplatonism and the Ancient Commentary Tradition.Frans A. J. De Haas (ed.) - 1996 - Brill.
    This is the first full discussion of Philoponus' account of matter. It is shown here that philosophical problems in Neoplatonism motivated the definition of prime matter as three-dimensional extension, and that Plotinus, Syrianus, and Proclus prepared the way for Philoponus.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2019-06-06
    Prime Matter in Aquinas.Mark McGovern - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 61:221.
  8. added 2019-06-05
    Any Sum of Parts Which Are Water is Water.Henry Laycock - 2011 - Humana Mente 4 (19):41-55.
    Mereological entities often seem to violate ‘ordinary’ ideas of what a concrete object can be like, behaving more like sets than like Aristotelian substances. However, the mereological notions of ‘part’, ‘composition’, and ‘sum’ or ‘fusion’ appear to find concrete realisation in the actual semantics of mass nouns. Quine notes that ‘any sum of parts which are water is water’; and the wine from a single barrel can be distributed around the globe without affecting its identity. Is there here, as some (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2018-10-15
    Homogeneity and Invariance.Paul G. Morrison - 1956 - Tulane Studies in Philosophy 5:71-77.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2018-07-04
    Form, Matter, Substance.Kathrin Koslicki - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    In _Form, Matter, Substance_, Kathrin Koslicki defends a hylomorphic analysis of concrete particular objects (e.g., living organisms). The Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism holds that those entities that fall under it are compounds of matter (hulē) and form (morphē or eidos). Koslicki argues that a hylomorphic analysis of concrete particular objects is well-equipped to compete with alternative approaches when measured against a wide range of criteria of success. A successful application of the doctrine of hylomorphism to the special case of concrete (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. added 2018-05-25
    How to Solve the Puzzle of Dion and Theon Without Losing Your Head.Chad Carmichael - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):205-224.
    The ancient puzzle of Dion and Theon has given rise to a surprising array of apparently implausible views. For example, in order to solve the puzzle, several philosophers have been led to deny the existence of their own feet, others have denied that objects can gain and lose parts, and large numbers of philosophers have embraced the thesis that distinct objects can occupy the same space, having all their material parts in common. In this paper, I argue for an alternative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2017-02-12
    Mass Terms: Some Philosophical Problems.Rita Nolan - 1981 - Philosophical Books 22 (1):37-40.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2017-02-09
    The Concept of Matter.P. F. L. - 1964 - Review of Metaphysics 18 (2):388-389.
    This book contains twenty-seven essays prepared for a 1961 conference at Notre Dame, and also includes comments on several of the papers by participants of the conference. The essays trace the concept of matter from its origin in Greek and Medieval philosophy through its function in seventeenth-century science to its current scientific and philosophical status. The essays can stand by themselves, in some cases as useful historical surveys, in other cases as presentations of new ideas or defenses of current viewpoints. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2017-02-08
    The Stuff of Thought.Joško Žanić - 2009 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):135-140.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. added 2017-02-01
    Afterthoughts on Mass Terms.Terence Parsons - 1975 - Synthese 31 (3-4):517 - 521.
    This is a short note indicating how I would revise an earlier paper ("an analysis of mass terms and amount terms," "foundations of language", Volume 6, Number 3, 1970) in the light of criticisms that have been made of it.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2017-01-26
    Review: Frank Arntzenius: Space, Time, and Stuff. [REVIEW]David John Baker - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2017-01-26
    Mass Terms in English.Julius Moravcsik - 1973 - In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), Approaches to Natural Language. D. Reidel Publishing. pp. 263--285.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  18. added 2017-01-25
    Aristotle on Pure and Simple Stuff.Tiberiu Popa - 2010 - Rhizai. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science:29-61.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. added 2017-01-25
    Don't Count on It.Rex Downie - 1994 - The Chesterton Review 20 (4):552-554.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2017-01-24
    Space, Time, and Stuff, by Arntzenius Frank: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, Pp. Viii + 288, £30.Andrew Turner - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):827-827.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2017-01-23
    Review of "Space, Time, and Stuff", Frank Arntzenius, OUP 2012. [REVIEW]Steven Weinstein - unknown
    Review of "Space, Time, and Stuff" by Frank Arntzenius.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. added 2017-01-23
    The Write Stuff.Al Martinich - 2005 - The Philosophers' Magazine 31 (31):51-53.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2017-01-23
    The Logic of Common Nouns: An Investigation in Quantified Modal Logic.Charles F. Kielkopf - 1982 - Review of Metaphysics 36 (2):451-453.
    Anil Gupta's slightly revised 1977 Pittsburgh doctoral dissertation is not a linguistic investigation of common nouns. There is no thorough attempt to organize and explain data about common nouns in natural languages. Gupta's goal is to develop and to defend formal modal languages and logics useful for the representation and defense of metaphysical theses on topics such as the structure of individuals, sorts or kinds, substances, and essences. He does, however, develop the special features of his formal syntax and semantics (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2017-01-22
    The Stuff of Life.Rick Lewis - 2006 - Philosophy Now 55:4-4.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2017-01-22
    Logic and Common Nouns.Peter M. Simons - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):161 - 167.
    Common nouns enter into modern predicate logic only as parts of predicates, While in lesniewski's 'ontology' they are classified together with proper nouns as 'names'. A system of natural deduction rules is presented which sharply separates proper from common nouns, Within which lesniewski's calculus is contained as a logic solely of common nouns, Together with copula, Identity predicate, Definite article, And quantifiers 'any', 'every', 'some' and 'no'. The fragment developed is closer to the natural syntax of english than either frege's (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. added 2017-01-22
    Count Nouns and Mass Nouns.H. W. Noonan - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):167 - 172.
    The paper argues that one distinction between concrete count nouns and concrete mass nouns is that geach's derelativization thesis is valid for the former but not valid for the latter. That is, Where 'f' is a concrete count noun 'x is (an) f' means 'for some y, X is the same f as y', But where 'f' is a concrete mass noun this is not so; rather, In this case, 'x is f' is tantamount to 'for some y, X is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2017-01-22
    Stuff and Things.V. C. Chappell - 1970 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71:61 - 76.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  28. added 2017-01-19
    Mass Terms as Subjects.D. S. Clarke - 1970 - Philosophical Studies 21 (1-2):25 - 28.
    This is a criticism of quine's treatment of mass terms such as "water", "gold", Etc. In word and object. Instead of becoming singular terms referring to a "scattered object", It is argued that they either become general terms as subjects of sentences or retain their unique status as ascribed to an indicated place.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. added 2017-01-19
    "Mind-Stuff" From the Historical Point of View.T. Whittaker - 1881 - Mind 6 (24):498-513.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2017-01-18
    Summation Relations and Portions of Stuff.Maureen Donnelly & Thomas Bittner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):167 - 185.
    According to the prevalent 'sum view' of stuffs, each portion of stuff is a mereological sum of its subportions. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the sum view in the light of a modal temporal mereology which distinguishes between different varieties of summation relations. While admitting David Barnett's recent counter-example to the sum view, we show that there is nonetheless an important sense in which all portions of stuff are sums of their subportions. We use our summation relations (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  31. added 2017-01-18
    Towards a Common Semantics for English Count and Mass Nouns.Brendan S. Gillon - 1992 - Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (6):597 - 639.
    English mass noun phrases & count noun phrases differ only minimally grammatically. The basis for the difference is ascribed to a difference in the features +/-CT. These features serve the morphosyntactic function of determining the available options for the assigment of grammatical number, itself determined by the features +/-PL: +CT places no restriction on the available options, while -CT, in the unmarked case, restricts the available options to -PL. They also serve the semantic function of determining the sort of denotation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  32. added 2017-01-17
    Prime Matter and Barrington Jones.William H. Brenner - 1975 - Philosophy Research Archives 1:46-53.
    In Philosophical Review, October 1974, Professor Jones argues that Aristotle's concept of matter is that of any individual item, such as a piece of bronze or a seed, with which a process of coming into existence begins, and which is prior to the product which comes to exist. Aristotle does not try to prove the existence of some sort of "super-stuff" called "prime matter."I argue that Jones' account does not do full justice to Aristotle's analysis of change, or to the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2017-01-16
    Clouds and Blood. More on Vagueness and the Mass/Count Distinction.Gennaro Chierchia - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2523-2538.
    A vagueness-based approach to the mass/count distinction was developed in Chierchia. Liebesman argues against Chierchia’s proposal developing four arguments against it. He furthermore tries to make a case that regardless of the details of C’s proposal no vagueness-based account of the distinction is viable. In this paper I show that Liebesman’s arguments against C don’t go through and that a line of investigation on the mass count contrast in terms of vagueness is not only viable but also perhaps a source (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2017-01-16
    Who Thinks That a Piece of Furniture Refers to a Broken Couch? Count-Mass Constructions and Individuation in English and Spanish.Maria D. Sera & Whitney Goodrich - 2010 - Cognitive Linguistics 21 (3).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2017-01-15
    Count Nouns - Mass Nouns, Neat Nouns - Mess Nouns.Fred Landman - 2010 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 6 (1).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. added 2017-01-15
    Coincident Objects: Could a 'Stuff Ontology' Help?D. W. Zimmerman - 1997 - Analysis 57 (1):19-27.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  37. added 2017-01-14
    Kinds, Things, and Stuff: Mass Terms and Generics.Francis Jeffry Pelletier (ed.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press USA.
    A generic statement is a type of generalization that is made by asserting that a "kind" has a certain property. For example we might hear that marshmallows are sweet. Here, we are talking about the "kind" marshmallow and assert that individual instances of this kind have the property of being sweet. Almost all of our common sense knowledge about the everyday world is put in terms of generic statements. What can make these generic sentences be true even when there are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2017-01-06
    L'étoffe du sensible [Sensible Stuffs].Olivier Massin - 2014 - In J.-M. Chevalier & B. Gaultier (eds.), Connaître, Questions d'épistémologie contemporaine. Paris, France: Ithaque. pp. 201-230.
    The proper sensible criterion of sensory individuation holds that senses are individuated by the special kind of sensibles on which they exclusively bear about (colors for sight, sounds for hearing, etc.). H. P. Grice objected to the proper sensibles criterion that it cannot account for the phenomenal difference between feeling and seeing shapes or other common sensibles. That paper advances a novel answer to Grice's objection. Admittedly, the upholder of the proper sensible criterion must bind the proper sensibles –i.e. colors– (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2016-12-24
    Existence and Strong Uncountability.Jonah Goldwater - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (3):321-331.
    On the standard view for something to exist is for one thing to exist: in slogan form, to be is to be countable. E.J. Lowe argues something can exist without being countable as one, however. His primary example is homogenous “stuff,” i.e., qualitatively uniform and infinitely divisible matter. Lacking nonarbitrary boundaries and being everywhere the same, homogenous stuff lacks a principle of individuation that would yield countably distinct constituents. So, for Lowe, homogenous stuff is strongly uncountable. Olson rejects Lowe’s view (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. added 2016-12-08
    Familiar Objects and Their Shadows.Crawford L. Elder - 2011 - Cambridge University Press.
    Most contemporary metaphysicians are sceptical about the reality of familiar objects such as dogs and trees, people and desks, cells and stars. They prefer an ontology of the spatially tiny or temporally tiny. Tiny microparticles 'dog-wise arranged' explain the appearance, they say, that there are dogs; microparticles obeying microphysics collectively cause anything that a baseball appears to cause; temporal stages collectively sustain the illusion of enduring objects that persist across changes. Crawford L. Elder argues that all such attempts to 'explain (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  41. added 2016-12-08
    Mereological Essentialism, Composition, and Stuff: A Reply to Kristie Miller.David Nicolas - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (3):425-429.
    In ‘Essential stuff' (2008) and ‘Stuff' (2009), Kristie Miller argues that two generally accepted theses, often formulated as follows, are incompatible: - (Temporal) mereological essentialism for stuff (or matter), the thesis that any portion of stuff has the same parts at every time it exists. - Stuff composition, the thesis that for any two portions of stuff, there exists a portion of stuff that is their mereological sum (or fusion). She does this by considering competing hypotheses about stuff, trying to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. added 2016-12-08
    Stuff.Paul Needham - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (3):270-290.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  43. added 2016-12-08
    Prime Matter: A Rejoinder.William Charlton - 1983 - Phronesis 28 (2):197-211.
  44. added 2016-12-08
    Prime Matter in Aristotle.H. M. Robinson - 1974 - Phronesis 19 (1):168-188.
  45. added 2016-03-01
    Thing and Object.Kristie Miller - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):69-89.
    There is a fundamental ontological difference between two kinds of entity: things and objects. Unlike things, objects are not identical to any fusion of particulars. Unlike things, objects do not have mereological parts. While things are ontologically innocent, objects are not. Objects are meaty. I defend the distinction between things and objects, and provide an account of the nature of objects.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2015-10-31
    Review of Henry Laycock, Words Without Objects: Semantics, Ontology, and Logic for Non-Singularity. [REVIEW]Kathrin Koslicki - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):160-163.
  47. added 2015-06-08
    Aquinas's Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material Objects.Jeffrey E. Brower - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Jeffrey E. Brower presents and explains the hylomorphic conception of the material world developed by Thomas Aquinas, according to which material objects are composed of both matter and form. In addition to presenting and explaining Aquinas's views, Brower seeks wherever possible to bring them into dialogue with the best recent literature on related topics. Along the way, he highlights the contribution that Aquinas's views make to a host of contemporary metaphysical debates, including the nature of change, composition, material constitution, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  48. added 2015-06-03
    La distinction massif / comptable.David Nicolas - 2006 - Sémanticlopédie : Dictionnaire de Sémantique.
    In D. Godard, L. Roussarie & F. Corblin (eds.), Sémanticlopédie : dictionnaire de sémantique, GDR Sémantique & Modélisation, CNRS, http://www.semantique-gdr.net/dico/.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49. added 2015-06-03
    La Catégorisation des Noms Communs: Massifs Et Comptables.David Nicolas - 2002 - In Catégorisation et langage. Hermès.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. added 2015-05-31
    Count Nouns, Mass Nouns and Their Acquisition.David Nicolas - manuscript
    'Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is.' 'We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.'.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 142