Related categories

217 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 217
  1. added 2020-04-30
    A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles About Reasons.Stephen Finlay - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
    This paper champions the view (REG) that the concept of a normative reason for an agent S to perform an action A is that of an explanation why it would be good (in some way, to some degree) for S to do A. REG has numerous virtues, but faces some significant challenges which prompt many philosophers to be skeptical that it can correctly account for all our reasons. I demonstrate how five different puzzles about normative reasons can be solved by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-03-11
    Gründe, Rationalität und Parenthetikalismus. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie.
    This is a review of Tim Henning's 'From a Rational Point of View' (Oxford 2019).
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2020-03-03
    Rationality as Reasons-Responsiveness.Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Australasian Philosophical Review.
    John Broome argues that rationality cannot consist in reasons-responsiveness since rationality supervenes on the mind, while reasons-responsiveness does not supervene on the mind. I here defend this conception of rationality by way of defending the assumption that reasons-responsiveness supervenes on the mind. Given the many advantages of an analysis of rationality in terms of reasons-responsiveness, and in light of independent considerations in favour of the view that reasons-responsiveness supervenes on the mind, we should take seriously the backup view, a hypothesis (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2020-02-07
    Was Sally's Reason for Running From the Bear That She Thought It Was Chasing Her?Rowland Stout - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Arguing against the claim that beliefs are reasons for action.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. added 2019-12-02
    Three Cheers for Dispositions: A Dispositional Approach to Acting for a Normative Reason.Susanne Mantel - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):561-582.
    Agents sometimes act for normative reasons—for reasons that objectively favor their actions. Jill, for instance, calls a doctor for the normative reason that Kate is injured. In this article I explore a dispositional approach to acting for a normative reason. I argue for the need of epistemic, motivational, and executional dispositional elements of a theory of acting for a normative reason. Dispositions play a mediating role between, on the one hand, the normative reason and its normative force, and the action (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  6. added 2019-11-21
    The Case for Stance Dependent Reasons.David Sobel - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (2).
    Many philosophers maintain that neither one’s reasons for action nor well-being are ever grounded in facts about what we desire or favor. Yet our reasons to eat a flavor of ice cream we like rather than one we do not seem an obvious counter-example. I argue that there is no getting around such examples and that therefore a fully stance independent account of the grounding of our reasons is implausible. At least in matters of mere taste our “stance” plays a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2019-11-14
    The Good, the Bad, and the Uncertain: Intentional Action Under Normative Uncertainty.Fabienne Peter - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):57-70.
    My focus in this paper is on a type of bad actions, namely actions that appear to be done for reasons that are not good reasons. I take such bad actions to be ubiquitous. But their ubiquity gives rise to a puzzle, especially if we assume that intentional actions are performed for what one believes or takes to be good reasons. The puzzle I aim to solve in this paper is: why do we seem to be getting it wrong so (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2019-10-15
    Perspectives and Good Dispositions.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I begin with various cases that have been used to motivate the need for a more “subjective” kind of ought, and accompanying norms, in both the practical and theoretical domains. I outline a broad paradigm for thinking about such oughts, which I call perspectivist. According to this paradigm, what one ought to do and believe is fixed by one’s perspective, which is a kind of representation of the world (e.g. the propositions constituting one’s evidence). My purpose is to sketch and (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. added 2019-10-05
    Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, we propose a new theory of rationality defeat. We propose that defeaters are indicators of ignorance, evidence that we’re not in a position to know some target proposition. When the evidence that we’re not in a position to know is sufficiently strong and the probability that we can know is too low, it is not rational to believe. We think that this account retains all the virtues of the more familiar approaches that characterise defeat in terms of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2019-09-25
    Суб’єкт у пасивних конструкціях сучасного адміністративно-канцелярського мовлення.Olena Lavrinets - 2018 - Language: Classic – Modern – Postmodern 4:48-67.
    У статті з’ясовано специфіку морфологічного вираження суб’єктної синтаксеми в пасивних конструкціях сучасного адміністративно-канцелярського мовлення. Проаналізовано асинкретизм (суб’єкт дії) та синкретизм (суб’єкт-інструмент, суб’єкт-інструмент-час, суб’єктінструмент-об’єкт, суб’єкт-простір) семантики орудного відмінка субстантива та прийменниково-іменникового словосполучення. Матеріалом для дослідження слугували навчальні посібники та довідники з офіційно-ділового мовлення, датовані першими десятиліттями ХХІ ст.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2019-09-19
    Consequentialism and the "Ought Implies Can" Principle.Elinor Mason - 2003 - American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (4):319-331.
    It seems that the debate between objective and subjective consequentialists might be resolved by appealing to the ought implies can principle. Howard-Snyder has suggested that if one does not know how to do something, cannot do it, and thus one cannot have an obligation to do it. I argue that this depends on an overly rich conception of ability, and that we need to look beyond the ought implies can principle to answer the question. Once we do so, it appears (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  12. added 2019-09-13
    Tim Henning, From a Rational Point of View: How We Represent Subjective Perspectives in Practical Discourse. [REVIEW]Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):113-118.
    Reasons internalists claim that facts about normative reasons for action are facts about which actions would promote an agent’s goals and values. Reasons internalism is popular, even though paradigmatic versions have moral consequences many find unwelcome. This article reconstructs an influential but understudied argument for reasons internalism, the “if I were you” argument, which is due to Bernard Williams and Kate Manne. I raise an objection to the argument and argue that replying to it requires reasons internalists to accept controversial (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2019-09-13
    Internal Reasons and the Boy Who Cried Wolf.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):32-58.
    Reasons internalists claim that facts about normative reasons for action are facts about which actions would promote an agent’s goals and values. Reasons internalism is popular, even though paradigmatic versions have moral consequences many find unwelcome. This article reconstructs an influential but understudied argument for reasons internalism, the “if I were you” argument, which is due to Bernard Williams and Kate Manne. I raise an objection to the argument and argue that replying to it requires reasons internalists to accept controversial (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2019-09-13
    The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.
    According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. added 2019-09-13
    Rational Internalism.Samuel Asarnow - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):147-178.
    I describe and motivate Rational Internalism, a principle concerning the relationship between motivating reasons (which explain actions) and normative reasons (which justify actions). I use this principle to construct a novel argument against Objectivist theories of normative reasons, which hold that facts about normative reasons can be analyzed in terms of an independently specified class of normative or evaluative facts. I then argue for an alternative theory of normative reasons, the Reasoning View, which is consistent with both Rational Internalism and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16. added 2019-09-09
    Two Accounts of Objective Reasons.Christian Piller - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):444-451.
    GE Moore vehemently defended the view that what actually happens and not what we, even reasonably, expect to happen, determines what we ought to do. ‘The only possible reason that can justify any action’, Moore writes, ‘is that by it the greatest possible amount of what is good absolutely should be realized’. Moore is an objectivist about reasons and duties: The world and not our view of it gives us reasons to act; the way the world is, and not the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2019-07-18
    How to Be a Subjectivist.David Sobel - forthcoming - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. Routledge.
    Subjectivism, desires, reasons, well-being, ethics.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2019-06-06
    XV—The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
    Belief does aim at the truth. When our beliefs do not fit the facts, they cannot do what they are supposed to do, because they cannot provide us with reasons. We cannot plausibly deny that a truth norm is among the norms that govern belief. What we should not say is that the truth norm is the fundamental epistemic norm. In this paper, I shall argue that knowledge is the norm of belief and that the truth norm has a derivative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  19. added 2019-06-06
    XV—Agents and Patients, Or: What We Learn About Reasons for Action by Reflecting on Our Choices in Process‐of‐Thought Cases.Michael Smith - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3):309-331.
    Can we draw substantive conclusions about the reasons for action agents have from premisses about the desires of their idealized counterparts? The answer is that we can. The argument for this conclusion is Rawlsian in spirit, focusing on the choices that our idealized counterparts must make simply in virtue of being ideal, and inferring from these choices the contents of the desires that they must have. It turns out that our idealized counterparts must have desires in which we ourselves figure (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  20. added 2019-06-06
    In Defence of State‐Based Reasons to Intend.James Morauta - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.
    A state‐based reason for one to intend to perform an action F is a reason for one to intend to F which is not a reason for one to F. Are there any state‐based reasons to intend? According to the Explanatory Argument, the answer is no, because state‐based reasons do not satisfy a certain explanatory constraint. I argue that whether or not the constraint is correct, the Explanatory Argument is unsound, because state‐based reasons do satisfy the constraint. The considerations that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  21. added 2019-06-06
    Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):509-510.
    Reasons without Rationalism has two related parts, devoted to action theory and ethics, respectively. In the second part, I argue for a close connection between reasons for action and virtues of character. This connection is mediated by the idea of good practical thought and the disposition to engage in it. The argument relies on the following principle, which is intended as common ground: " Reasons: The fact that p is a reason for A to ϕ just in case A has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   122 citations  
  22. added 2019-06-06
    Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reasons for Belief: A Reply to Tom Kelly’s “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique”.Adam Leite - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):456-464.
    Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist aeeounts of epistemie rationality fail beeause what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the eontent of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe. Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist ean avoid Kelly’s objeetions. The paperconcludes by sketehing what I take to be the most defensible version of the instrumentalist view.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  23. added 2019-06-05
    The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity.Daniel Star (ed.) - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    This Handbook maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides the definitive guide to it. An illustrious team of philosophers explore the concept of a reason to do or believe something, in order to determine what these reasons are and how they work. And they investigate the nature of 'normative' claims about what we ought to do or believe.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. added 2019-06-05
    Review Essay: Impartial ReasonImpartial Reason.Marcus G. Singer & Stephen L. Darwall - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (3):507.
  25. added 2019-05-24
    Objectivity and Evaluation.Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics.
    I this article, I introduce the notion of pluralism about an area, and use it to argue that the questions at the center of our normative lives are not settled by the facts -- even the normative facts. One upshot of the discussion is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. Another is that the concept of objectivity, not realism, should take center stage.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2019-04-17
    An Objectivist’s Guide to Subjective Reasons.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):229-244.
    The distinction between objective and subjective reasons plays an important role in both folk normative thought and many research programs in metaethics. But the relation between objective and subjective reasons is unclear. This paper explores problems related to the unity of objective and subjective reasons for actions and attitudes and then offers a novel objectivist account of subjective reasons.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2019-04-09
    Racje wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne.Bernard Williams & Tomasz Żuradzki - 2019 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 67 (1):231-246.
    Artykuł, opublikowany po raz pierwszy w 1979 r., jest jednym z najczęściej cytowanych tekstów filozoficznych z drugiej połowy XX wieku. Tekst Bernarda Williamsa zainicjował kilka ważnych debat, toczących się do dziś w etyce i filozofii działania. Zaproponowana przez niego interpretacja pojęcia racji działania jest, z jednej strony, niezwykle wpływowa, ale z drugiej bardzo niejednoznaczna i często krytykowana. Williams broni stanowiska, które z czasem zaczęto określać jako internalizm racji: pewne względy są racjami działania dla danego podmiotu tylko wtedy, gdy mają ścisły (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. added 2018-12-03
    An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons.Caj Strandberg - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (2):160-188.
    According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism about normative reasons, these theories confront us with a dilemma. Internalism is taken to involve a view about rationality which is considered less philosophically problematic than its competitors, whereas externalism is taken to suggest a more contentious view concerning this notion. However, the assumption that externalism involves a more demanding notion of rationality implies that it is able to account for categorical moral reasons, whereas internalism is unable (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2018-11-27
    Subjective Unpossessed Reasons.Arturs Logins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):262-270.
    A common assumption in contemporary debates about normative reasons is that ‘subjective’ and ‘possessed’ are two names for the same sort of reason. This paper challenges that assumption. Given our cognitive limitations, it is unsurprising that normative reasons that derive from what we know and reasons that we are in a position to use in our deliberation are not always one and the same.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2018-11-06
    Should Reasons Be Our Guide?Clayton Littlejohn - manuscript
    This paper examines the idea that normative reasons are things that should provide us with guidance. This idea deserves careful scrutiny because it plays a prominent role in recent discussions of reasons, rationality, and obligation. On some ways of understanding this idea, it is harmless enough. On some ways of understanding this idea, it is a mistake that might beget further mistakes. After arguing that we should reject the idea that normative reasons can only help to determine obligation if they (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2018-11-04
    On the Normativity of Rationality and of Normative Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - manuscript
    Abstract: Scepticism about the normativity of rationality is often partially based on the assumption that normative reasons are normative. Starting from the assumption that normative reasons are normative, someone will argue that reasons and rationality can require different things from us and conclude that rationality must not be normative. We think that the assumption that normative reasons are normative is one that deserves more scrutiny, particularly if it turns out, as we shall argue, that no one has yet shown that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2018-10-24
    The Value of Rationality. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Ethics 129 (3):501-508.
  33. added 2018-09-19
    Decision-Making Under Moral Uncertainty.Andrew Sepielli - forthcoming - In Karen Jones, Mark C. Timmons & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology.
  34. added 2018-09-19
    How Moral Uncertaintism Can Be Both True and Interesting.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 7.
  35. added 2018-08-18
    Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons.Caj Sixten Strandberg - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):69-100.
    A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire‐independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2018-05-15
    “Yes, the Theory is Abstemious, But...”: A Critique of Yehezkel.Regan Lance Reitsma - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (1):59-79.
    This article is a critique of Gal Yehezkel’s attempt to refute subjectivism about normative practical reasons, a school of thought inspired by Hume. Yehezkel believes reason, far from being, as Hume puts it, “the slave of the passions,” has the normative authority to be a critic of basic desires and argues that subjectivism lacks the theoretical resources both to acknowledge this alleged truth and to analyze the distinction between wanting an outcome and intending to pursue it. I contend his refutation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. added 2018-05-15
    A Defence of a Rationalist Conception of Practical Reason.Gal Yehezkel - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (1):39-57.
    In this paper I attempt to refute the instrumental conception of practical reason, and thus defend a rationalist conception of practical reason. I argue that, far from merely playing an instrumental role, reason can be used by an agent to evaluate, that is, to approve or reject, final ends, which might be suggested by desires, and further to determine final ends independently of any desires, whether actual or potential, that the agent might have. My argument relies on an analysis of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. added 2018-04-11
    Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.
    This paper looks at whether it is possible to unify the requirements of rationality with the demands of normative reasons. It might seem impossible to do because one depends upon the agent’s perspective and the other upon features of the situation. Enter Reasons Perspectivism. Reasons perspectivists think they can show that rationality does consist in responding correctly to reasons by placing epistemic constraints on these reasons. They think that if normative reasons are subject to the right epistemic constraints, rational requirements (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  39. added 2018-04-08
    Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.
    In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be rational to believe a proposition if you have sufficient evidential support for it. It seems plausible that it rationality requires you to conform to the categorical requirements of rationality. It also seems plausible that our first-order attitudes ought to mesh with our higher-order attitudes. It seems unfortunate that we cannot accept all three claims about rationality. I will present three ways of trying to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  40. added 2018-04-03
    Rationality as the Rule of Reason.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - Noûs.
    The demands of rationality are linked both to our subjective normative perspective (given that rationality is a person-level concept) and to objective reasons or favoring relations (given that rationality is non-contingently authoritative for us). In this paper, I propose a new way of reconciling the tension between these two aspects: roughly, what rationality requires of us is having the attitudes that correspond to our take on reasons in the light of our evidence, but only if it is competent. I show (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. added 2018-03-08
    Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons?Daniel Wodak - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3):259-279.
    I argue that existing objectivist accounts of subjective reasons face systematic problems with cases involving probability and possibility. I then offer a diagnosis of why objectivists face these problems, and recommend that objectivists seek to provide indirect analyses of subjective reasons.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  42. added 2018-02-17
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2.Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.
  43. added 2018-02-17
    How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?Paul Boghossian - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (1):1-40.
    Epistemic relativism has the contemporary academy in its grip. Not merely in the United States, but seemingly everywhere, most scholars working in the humanities and the social sciences seem to subscribe to some form of it. Even where the label is repudiated, the view is embraced. Sometimes the relativism in question concerns truth, sometimes justification. The core impulse appears to be a relativism about knowledge. The suspicion is widespread that what counts as knowledge in one cultural, or broadly ideological, setting (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  44. added 2018-02-16
    If You Justifiably Believe That You Ought to Φ, You Ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  45. added 2018-02-11
    Argumentative Virtues as Conduits for Reason’s Causal Efficacy: Why the Practice of Giving Reasons Requires That We Practice Hearing Reasons.Daniel Cohen - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):711-718.
    Psychological and neuroscientific data suggest that a great deal, perhaps even most, of our reasoning turns out to be rationalizing. The reasons we give for our positions are seldom either the real reasons or the effective causes of why we have those positions. We are not as rational as we like to think. A second, no less disheartening observation is that while we may be very effective when it comes to giving reasons, we are not that good at getting reasons. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2018-01-24
    Self-Validation and Internalism in Velleman’s Constitutivism.Michael Bukoski - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2667-2686.
    Metaethical constitutivists explain reasons or normativity in terms of what is constitutive of agency. In Velleman’s paradigmatic constitutivist theory, that is the aim of self-understanding. The best-known objection to constitutivism is Enoch’s shmagency objection: constitutivism cannot explain normativity because a constitutive aim of agency lacks normative significance unless one has reason to be an agent rather than a “shmagent”. In response, Velleman argues that the constitutive aim is self-validating. I argue that this claim is false. If the constitutive aim of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2018-01-12
    Having False Reasons.Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  48. added 2017-12-28
    Review: John Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning. [REVIEW]Review by: Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1194-1199,.
  49. added 2017-12-27
    Broome, John. Rationality Through Reasoning.Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. Pp. 322. $99.95.Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1194-1199.
  50. added 2017-12-27
    Review: John Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning. [REVIEW]Aaron Bronfman - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1194-1199.
1 — 50 / 217