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  1. Outcome Effects, Moral Luck and the Hindsight Bias.Markus Kneer & Iza Skoczeń - manuscript
    In a series of ten preregistered experiments (N=2043), we investigate the effect of outcome valence on judgments of probability, negligence, and culpability – a phenomenon sometimes labelled moral (and legal) luck. We found that harmful outcomes, when contrasted with neutral outcomes, lead to increased perceived probability of harm ex post, and consequently to increased attribution of negligence and culpability. Rather than simply postulating a hindsight bias (as is common), we employ a variety of empirical means to demonstrate that the outcome-driven (...)
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  2. Probabilistic Inferences From Conjoined to Iterated Conditionals.Giuseppe Sanfilippo - 2018 - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 93:103-118.
    There is wide support in logic, philosophy, and psychology for the hypothesis that the probability of the indicative conditional of natural language, $P(\textit{if } A \textit{ then } B)$, is the conditional probability of $B$ given $A$, $P(B|A)$. We identify a conditional which is such that $P(\textit{if } A \textit{ then } B)= P(B|A)$ with de Finetti's conditional event, $B|A$. An objection to making this identification in the past was that it appeared unclear how to form compounds and iterations of (...)
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  3. Permissivism and the Truth-Connection.Michele Palmira - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Permissivism is the view that, sometimes, there is more than one doxastic attitude that is perfectly rationalised by the evidence. Impermissivism is the denial of Permissivism. Several philosophers, with the aim to defend either Impermissivism or Permissivism, have recently discussed the value of (im)permissive rationality. This paper focuses on one kind of value-conferring considerations, stemming from the so-called “truth-connection” enjoyed by rational doxastic attitudes. The paper vindicates the truth-connected value of permissive rationality by pursuing a novel strategy which rests on (...)
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  4. Fully Bayesian Aggregation.Franz Dietrich - forthcoming - Journal of Economic Theory.
    Can a group be an orthodox rational agent? This requires the group's aggregate preferences to follow expected utility (static rationality) and to evolve by Bayesian updating (dynamic rationality). Group rationality is possible, but the only preference aggregation rules which achieve it (and are minimally Paretian and continuous) are the linear-geometric rules, which combine individual values linearly and combine individual beliefs geometrically. Linear-geometric preference aggregation contrasts with classic linear-linear preference aggregation, which combines both values and beliefs linearly, but achieves only static (...)
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  5. Counterfactuals and Probability. [REVIEW]Justin Khoo - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):489-495.
  6. Making Conditional Speech Acts in the Material Way.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The conventional wisdom about conditionals claims that (1) conditionals that have non-assertive acts in their consequents, such as commands and promises, are not plausibly interpreted as material implications; (2) the most promising hypothesis about these sentences is conditional-assertion theory, which explains a conditional as a conditional speech act, i.e., a performance of a speech act given the assumption of the antecedent. This hypothesis has far-reaching and revisionist consequences, because conditional speech acts are not synonymous with a proposition with truth conditions. (...)
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  7. Incomplete Preference and Indeterminate Comparative Probability.Yang Liu - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axaa009.
    The notion of comparative probability defined in Bayesian subjectivist theory stems from an intuitive idea that, for a given pair of events, one event may be considered “more probable” than the other. Yet it is conceivable that there are cases where it is indeterminate as to which event is more probable, due to, e.g., lack of robust statistical information. We take that these cases involve indeterminate comparative probabilities. This paper provides a Savage-style decision-theoretic foundation for indeterminate comparative probabilities.
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  8. Epistemic Decision Theory's Reckoning.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - manuscript
    Epistemic decision theory (EDT) employs the mathematical tools of rational choice theory to justify epistemic norms, including probabilism, conditionalization, and the Principal Principle, among others. Practitioners of EDT endorse two theses: (1) epistemic value is distinct from subjective preference, and (2) belief and epistemic value can be numerically quantified. We argue the first thesis, which we call epistemic puritanism, undermines the second.
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  9. Obligation, Permission, and Bayesian Orgulity.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    This essay has two aims. The first is to correct an increasingly popular way of misunderstanding Belot's Orgulity Argument. The Orgulity Argument charges Bayesianism with defect as a normative epistemology. For concreteness, our argument focuses on Cisewski et al.'s recent rejoinder to Belot. The conditions that underwrite their version of the argument are too strong and Belot does not endorse them on our reading. A more compelling version of the Orgulity Argument than Cisewski et al. present is available, however---a point (...)
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  10. Independent Opinions? On the Causal Foundations of Belief Formation and Jury Theorems.Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):655-685.
    Democratic decision-making is often defended on grounds of the ‘wisdom of crowds’: decisions are more likely to be correct if they are based on many independent opinions, so a typical argument in social epistemology. But what does it mean to have independent opinions? Opinions can be probabilistically dependent even if individuals form their opinion in causal isolation from each other. We distinguish four probabilistic notions of opinion independence. Which of them holds depends on how individuals are causally affected by environmental (...)
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  11. Bayesian Decision Theory and Stochastic Independence.Philippe Mongin - 2017 - TARK 2017.
    Stochastic independence has a complex status in probability theory. It is not part of the definition of a probability measure, but it is nonetheless an essential property for the mathematical development of this theory. Bayesian decision theorists such as Savage can be criticized for being silent about stochastic independence. From their current preference axioms, they can derive no more than the definitional properties of a probability measure. In a new framework of twofold uncertainty, we introduce preference axioms that entail not (...)
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  12. An Observation on Carnapʼs Continuum and Stochastic Independencies.J. B. Paris - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):421-429.
    We characterize those identities and independencies which hold for all probability functions on a unary language satisfying the Principle of Atom Exchangeability. We then show that if this is strengthen to the requirement that Johnson's Sufficientness Principle holds, thus giving Carnap's Continuum of inductive methods for languages with at least two predicates, then new and somewhat inexplicable identities and independencies emerge, the latter even in the case of Carnap's Continuum for the language with just a single predicate.
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  13. Experts in Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in Science.Kristin Shrader-Frechette - 1993 - Ethics 103 (3):599-601.
  14. Subjective Probability: The Real Thing.Richard Jeffrey - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book offers a concise survey of basic probability theory from a thoroughly subjective point of view whereby probability is a mode of judgment. Written by one of the greatest figures in the field of probability theory, the book is both a summation and synthesis of a lifetime of wrestling with these problems and issues. After an introduction to basic probability theory, there are chapters on scientific hypothesis-testing, on changing your mind in response to generally uncertain observations, on expectations of (...)
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  15. On the Logical Structure of de Finetti's Notion of Event.Tommaso Flaminio, Lluis Godo & Hykel Hosni - 2014 - Journal of Applied Logic 12 (3):279-301.
    This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno de Finetti's conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective nature of de Finetti's interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer form against such a logical background. By making explicit the epistemic structure which underlies what we call Choice-based probability we show that whilst all rational degrees of belief must be probabilities, the converse doesn't hold: some probability values (...)
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  16. Non-Conglomerability for Countably Additive Measures That Are Not Κ-Additive.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (2):284-300.
    Let κ be an uncountable cardinal. Using the theory of conditional probability associated with de Finetti and Dubins, subject to several structural assumptions for creating sufficiently many measurable sets, and assuming that κ is not a weakly inaccessible cardinal, we show that each probability that is not κ-­additive has conditional probabilities that fail to be conglomerable in a partition of cardinality no greater than κ. This generalizes our result, where we established that each finite but not countably additive probability has (...)
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  17. Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings.Antony Eagle (ed.) - 2010 - Routledge.
    _Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings_ is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...)
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  18. The Numbers Don't Fit: A Problem for Reliabilism.Jan-Hendrik Heinrichs - 2014 - Epistemologia 37 (1):96-105.
    Reliabilism suffers from a problem with long sequences of justifications. The theory of justification provided in process reliabilism allows for an implausibly large extension of ‘justified belief’. According to process reliabilist theory, it is possible that a justifying cognitive process has an arbitrarily low probability of being successful and a justified belief an arbitrarily low probability of being true. This result violates reliabilism’s aims as well as our ordinary standards of justification.
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  19. Quantificational Credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    In addition to full beliefs, agents have attitudes of varying confidence, or credences. For instance, I do not believe that the Boston Red Sox will win the American League East this year, but I am at least a little bit confident that they will – i.e. I have a positive credence that they will. It is also common to think that agents have conditional credences. For instance, I am very confident – i.e. have a conditional credence of very-likely strength – (...)
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  20. Coherence in the Aggregate: A Betting Method for Belief Functions on Many-Valued Events.Tommaso Flaminio, Lluis Godo & Hykel Hosni - unknown
    Betting methods, of which de Finetti's Dutch Book is by far the most well-known, are uncertainty modelling devices which accomplish a twofold aim. Whilst providing an interpretation of the relevant measure of uncertainty, they also provide a formal definition of coherence. The main purpose of this paper is to put forward a betting method for belief functions on MV-algebras of many-valued events which allows us to isolate the corresponding coherence criterion, which we term coherence in the aggregate. Our framework generalises (...)
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  21. Betting on Famine: Why the World Still Goes Hungry [Book Review].Howard Hodgens - 2014 - Australian Humanist, The 115:22.
    Hodgens, Howard Review of: Betting on famine: Why the world still goes hungry, by Jean Ziegler, The New Press $34.99.
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  22. Why Are Betting and Gambling Wrong?Arthur Thomas Barnett - 1897
  23. The Odds Against Betting. Odds - 1870
  24. Gambling and Betting, an Address. [2 Issues].Samuel Reynolds Hole - 1888
  25. Betting and Gambling.Moore Richard Neligan - 1909
  26. Cournot's Probabilism.Janevive Nadler Mechanic - 1959 - Dissertation, Columbia University
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  27. Theaetetus Invents Dutch Books.Arthur Falk - 1984 - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 9.
  28. Bayesian Decision Theory and the Justification of the Admissibility Requirement on Degrees of Belief.Jinsun Park - 1988 - Dissertation, The Ohio State University
    Bayesians hold a subjective interpretation of probability. To show that rational degrees of belief satisfy the probability axioms, Bayesians often refer to the Dutch Book Argument. Similarly, Bayesians argue that rational preference is transitive. They offer the Money-pump Argument. I show that both arguments fail for the same reason. These arguments employ a consequentialist conception of rationality. However, the basic tenet of Bayesian decision theory employs a decision-theoretic conception. The Bayesian decision-theoretic conception of rationality blocks any move to make irrationality (...)
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  29. VICKERS, J. M. "Belief and Probability". [REVIEW]B. Carr - 1980 - Mind 89:452.
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  30. The Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability.Alan Roy Hajek - 1993 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    Very roughly, the conditional construal of conditional probability is the hypothesis that the conditional probability P equals the probability of the conditional 'if A, then B'. My main purposes are to hone this rough statement down to various precise versions of the Hypothesis, as I call it, and to argue that virtually none of them is tenable. ;In S 1, I distinguish four versions of the Hypothesis. The subsequent four sections are largely an opinionated historical survey, tracing the motivations for (...)
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  31. Never Judge a Dutch Book by its Cover.Peter G. Found - 2001 - Dissertation, Bowling Green State University
    The purpose of this dissertation was to expose the Dutch Book Argument as a thoroughly flawed justification for applying the probability calculus to subjective degrees of belief. ;Through close and careful scrutiny of the internal logical and conceptual structure of the argument, it was concluded that the DBA relies on a number of questionable assumptions and misguided interpretations, to the point of virtually begging the question. In particular, it was shown that the key concept of fairness was distorted and misapplied. (...)
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  32. Owntree's Betting and Gambling. [REVIEW]H. G. Lord - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy 2 (18):499.
  33. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. [REVIEW]R. W. J. - 1961 - Review of Metaphysics 15 (2):344-344.
    After describing the three main kinds of probability theories, the author presents a new logical theory of probability. Probability, for him, is a logical relation between bodies of evidence and statements. The theory is an advance over Carnap's logical theory of probability in that it is not based on a formal language with strong completeness properties. The theory is formalized in Quine's protosyntax, which has two disadvantages: first, long formulas couched in terms of a large number of defined symbols disfigure (...)
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  34. You Can’T Always Get What You Want: Some Considerations Regarding Conditional Probabilities.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):573-603.
    The standard treatment of conditional probability leaves conditional probability undefined when the conditioning proposition has zero probability. Nonetheless, some find the option of extending the scope of conditional probability to include zero-probability conditions attractive or even compelling. This article reviews some of the pitfalls associated with this move, and concludes that, for the most part, probabilities conditional on zero-probability propositions are more trouble than they are worth.
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  35. A Normatively Adequate Credal Reductivism.Justin M. Dallmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.
    It is a prevalent, if not popular, thesis in the metaphysics of belief that facts about an agent’s beliefs depend entirely upon facts about that agent’s underlying credal state. Call this thesis ‘credal reductivism’ and any view that endorses this thesis a ‘credal reductivist view’. An adequate credal reductivist view will accurately predict both when belief occurs and which beliefs are held appropriately, on the basis of credal facts alone. Several well-known—and some lesser known—objections to credal reductivism turn on the (...)
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  36. Conditional Fallacies in Probability Judgment.J. M. Miyamoto, J. W. Lundell & Sf Tu - 1988 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 26 (6):516-516.
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  37. The Conditional in Mental Probability Logic.Niki Pfeifer & Kleiter & Gernot - 2010 - In Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (eds.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thinking. Oxford University Press.
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  38. How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James M. Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.
  39. Williamson's Casual Approach to Probabilism.Mark Kaplan - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  40. Two Dogmas of Probabilism.Carl G. Wagner - 2003 - In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 143--152.
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  41. Dutch Philosophy.Ferdinand Sassen - 1967 - In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. pp. 8--440.
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  42. De Finetti's Generalizations of Exchangeability.Persi Diaconis & David Freedman - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 2--233.
  43. The Hypothesis of the Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability.Alan Hájek & N. Hall - 1994 - In Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.), Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press. pp. 75.
  44. The Day of the Dolphins: Puzzling Over Epistemic Partnership.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 2005 - In John Woods, Kent A. Peacock & A. D. Irvine (eds.), Mistakes of Reason: Essays in Honour of John Woods. University of Toronto Press. pp. 111-133.
  45. The Paradox of the Bayesian Experts.Philippe Mongin - 2001 - In David Corfield & Jon Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 309-338.
    This paper (first published under the same title in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 29, 1998, p. 331-361) is a sequel to "Consistent Bayesian Aggregation", Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 1995, p. 313-351, by the same author. Both papers examine mathematically whether the the following assumptions are compatible: the individuals and the group both form their preferences according to Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory, and the preferences of the group satisfy the Pareto principle with respect to those of the individuals. While (...)
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  46. The Limits of Probabilism.Wolfgang Pietsch - 2013 - In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 55--65.
  47. Epistemic Probability and Coherent Degrees of Belief.Colin Howson - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. pp. 97--119.
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  48. Who Will Catch the Nagami Fever? Causal Inferences and Probability Judgment in Mental Models of Diseases.Manfred Thiiring & Helmut Jungermann - 1992 - In D. A. Evans & V. L. Patel (eds.), Advanced Models of Cognition for Medical Training and Practice. Springer. pp. 97--307.
    Explanation and prediction play an important role in medical decision making, particularly for diagnostic and treatment decisions. For the most part, explanations as well as predictions are derived from causal knowledge and have to be made under uncertainty. In cognitive psychology, these phenomena have been approached from two directions. On the one hand, there is research on knowledge representation and inferential reasoning (Holland et al. 1986; Anderson 1990). On the other hand, there is research on heuristics and biases in judgments (...)
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  49. Choice and the Conditional Probability of Alternation: Some New Data.J. Gregor Fetterman & Stanley S. Pliskoff - 1981 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 18 (2):95-98.
  50. Bibliopolis: A Platform for the Dutch History of the Book.Marieke van Delft & Marco de Niet - 2004 - Logos 15 (1):25-29.
1 — 50 / 947