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  1. Obligation, Permission, and Bayesian Orgulity.Michael Nielsen & Rush Stewart - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    This essay has two aims. The first is to correct an increasingly popular way of misunderstanding Belot's Orgulity Argument. The Orgulity Argument charges Bayesianism with defect as a normative epistemology. For concreteness, our argument focuses on Cisewski et al.'s recent rejoinder to Belot. The conditions that underwrite their version of the argument are too strong and Belot does not endorse them on our reading. A more compelling version of the Orgulity Argument than Cisewski et al. present is available, however---a point (...)
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  2. Bayesian Decision Theory and Stochastic Independence.Philippe Mongin - 2017 - TARK 2017.
    Stochastic independence has a complex status in probability theory. It is not part of the definition of a probability measure, but it is nonetheless an essential property for the mathematical development of this theory. Bayesian decision theorists such as Savage can be criticized for being silent about stochastic independence. From their current preference axioms, they can derive no more than the definitional properties of a probability measure. In a new framework of twofold uncertainty, we introduce preference axioms that entail not (...)
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  3. An Observation on Carnapʼs Continuum and Stochastic Independencies.J. B. Paris - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):421-429.
    We characterize those identities and independencies which hold for all probability functions on a unary language satisfying the Principle of Atom Exchangeability. We then show that if this is strengthen to the requirement that Johnson's Sufficientness Principle holds, thus giving Carnap's Continuum of inductive methods for languages with at least two predicates, then new and somewhat inexplicable identities and independencies emerge, the latter even in the case of Carnap's Continuum for the language with just a single predicate.
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  4. Subjective Probability: The Real Thing.Richard Jeffrey - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book offers a concise survey of basic probability theory from a thoroughly subjective point of view whereby probability is a mode of judgment. Written by one of the greatest figures in the field of probability theory, the book is both a summation and synthesis of a lifetime of wrestling with these problems and issues. After an introduction to basic probability theory, there are chapters on scientific hypothesis-testing, on changing your mind in response to generally uncertain observations, on expectations of (...)
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  5. On the Logical Structure of de Finetti's Notion of Event.Tommaso Flaminio, Lluis Godo & Hykel Hosni - 2014 - Journal of Applied Logic 12 (3):279-301.
    This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno de Finetti's conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective nature of de Finetti's interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer form against such a logical background. By making explicit the epistemic structure which underlies what we call Choice-based probability we show that whilst all rational degrees of belief must be probabilities, the converse doesn't hold: some probability values (...)
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  6. Nonconglomerability for Countably Additive Measures That Are Not Κ-Additive.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (2):284-300.
    Let κ be an uncountable cardinal. Using the theory of conditional probability associated with de Finetti and Dubins, subject to several structural assumptions for creating sufficiently many measurable sets, and assuming that κ is not a weakly inaccessible cardinal, we show that each probability that is not κ-­additive has conditional probabilities that fail to be conglomerable in a partition of cardinality no greater than κ. This generalizes our result, where we established that each finite but not countably additive probability has (...)
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  7. Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings.Antony Eagle (ed.) - 2010 - Routledge.
    _Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings_ is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...)
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  8. The Numbers Don't Fit: A Problem for Reliabilism.Jan-Hendrik Heinrichs - 2014 - Epistemologia 37 (1):96-105.
    Reliabilism suffers from a problem with long sequences of justifications. The theory of justification provided in process reliabilism allows for an implausibly large extension of ‘justified belief’. According to process reliabilist theory, it is possible that a justifying cognitive process has an arbitrarily low probability of being successful and a justified belief an arbitrarily low probability of being true. This result violates reliabilism’s aims as well as our ordinary standards of justification.
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  9. Quantificational Credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    In addition to full beliefs, agents have attitudes of varying confidence, or credences. For instance, I do not believe that the Boston Red Sox will win the American League East this year, but I am at least a little bit confident that they will – i.e. I have a positive credence that they will. It is also common to think that agents have conditional credences. For instance, I am very confident – i.e. have a conditional credence of very-likely strength – (...)
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  10. Coherence in the Aggregate: A Betting Method for Belief Functions on Many-Valued Events.Tommaso Flaminio, Lluis Godo & Hykel Hosni - unknown
    Betting methods, of which de Finetti's Dutch Book is by far the most well-known, are uncertainty modelling devices which accomplish a twofold aim. Whilst providing an interpretation of the relevant measure of uncertainty, they also provide a formal definition of coherence. The main purpose of this paper is to put forward a betting method for belief functions on MV-algebras of many-valued events which allows us to isolate the corresponding coherence criterion, which we term coherence in the aggregate. Our framework generalises (...)
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  11. Betting on Famine: Why the World Still Goes Hungry [Book Review].Howard Hodgens - 2014 - Australian Humanist, The 115:22.
    Hodgens, Howard Review of: Betting on famine: Why the world still goes hungry, by Jean Ziegler, The New Press $34.99.
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  12. Why Are Betting and Gambling Wrong?Arthur Thomas Barnett - 1897
  13. The Odds Against Betting. Odds - 1870
  14. Gambling and Betting, an Address. [2 Issues].Samuel Reynolds Hole - 1888
  15. Betting and Gambling.Moore Richard Neligan - 1909
  16. Cournot's Probabilism.Janevive Nadler Mechanic - 1959 - Dissertation, Columbia University
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  17. Theaetetus Invents Dutch Books.Arthur Falk - 1984 - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 9.
  18. Bayesian Decision Theory and the Justification of the Admissibility Requirement on Degrees of Belief.Jinsun Park - 1988 - Dissertation, The Ohio State University
    Bayesians hold a subjective interpretation of probability. To show that rational degrees of belief satisfy the probability axioms, Bayesians often refer to the Dutch Book Argument. Similarly, Bayesians argue that rational preference is transitive. They offer the Money-pump Argument. I show that both arguments fail for the same reason. These arguments employ a consequentialist conception of rationality. However, the basic tenet of Bayesian decision theory employs a decision-theoretic conception. The Bayesian decision-theoretic conception of rationality blocks any move to make irrationality (...)
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  19. VICKERS, J. M. "Belief and Probability". [REVIEW]B. Carr - 1980 - Mind 89:452.
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  20. The Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability.Alan Roy Hajek - 1993 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    Very roughly, the conditional construal of conditional probability is the hypothesis that the conditional probability P equals the probability of the conditional 'if A, then B'. My main purposes are to hone this rough statement down to various precise versions of the Hypothesis, as I call it, and to argue that virtually none of them is tenable. ;In S 1, I distinguish four versions of the Hypothesis. The subsequent four sections are largely an opinionated historical survey, tracing the motivations for (...)
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  21. Never Judge a Dutch Book by its Cover.Peter G. Found - 2001 - Dissertation, Bowling Green State University
    The purpose of this dissertation was to expose the Dutch Book Argument as a thoroughly flawed justification for applying the probability calculus to subjective degrees of belief. ;Through close and careful scrutiny of the internal logical and conceptual structure of the argument, it was concluded that the DBA relies on a number of questionable assumptions and misguided interpretations, to the point of virtually begging the question. In particular, it was shown that the key concept of fairness was distorted and misapplied. (...)
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  22. Owntree's Betting and Gambling. [REVIEW]H. G. Lord - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy 2 (18):499.
  23. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. [REVIEW]R. W. J. - 1961 - Review of Metaphysics 15 (2):344-344.
  24. A Unified Characterization of Belief-Revision Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - manuscript
    This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upon learning some event, Jeffrey revision upon learning new probabilities of some events, Adams revision upon learning some new conditional probabilities, and 'dual-Jeffrey' revision upon learning a new conditional probability function. Despite their differences, these revision rules can be characterized in terms of the same two axioms: responsiveness, which requires that revised beliefs incorporate what has been learnt, and conservativeness, which requires that beliefs on which the learnt input (...)
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  25. You Can't Always Get What You Want: Some Considerations Regarding Conditional Probabilities.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):573-603.
    The standard treatment of conditional probability leaves conditional probability undefined when the conditioning proposition has zero probability. Nonetheless, some find the option of extending the scope of conditional probability to include zero-probability conditions attractive or even compelling. This article reviews some of the pitfalls associated with this move, and concludes that, for the most part, probabilities conditional on zero-probability propositions are more trouble than they are worth.
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  26. A Normatively Adequate Credal Reductivism.Justin M. Dallmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.
    It is a prevalent, if not popular, thesis in the metaphysics of belief that facts about an agent’s beliefs depend entirely upon facts about that agent’s underlying credal state. Call this thesis ‘credal reductivism’ and any view that endorses this thesis a ‘credal reductivist view’. An adequate credal reductivist view will accurately predict both when belief occurs and which beliefs are held appropriately, on the basis of credal facts alone. Several well-known—and some lesser known—objections to credal reductivism turn on the (...)
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  27. Conditional Fallacies in Probability Judgment.J. M. Miyamoto, J. W. Lundell & Sf Tu - 1988 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 26 (6):516-516.
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  28. The Conditional in Mental Probability Logic.Niki Pfeifer & Kleiter & Gernot - 2010 - In Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (eds.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thinking. Oxford University Press.
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  29. How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19:153-179.
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  30. Williamson's Casual Approach to Probabilism.Mark Kaplan - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  31. Two Dogmas of Probabilism.Carl G. Wagner - 2003 - In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 143--152.
  32. Dutch Philosophy.Ferdinand Sassen - 1967 - In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. pp. 8--440.
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  33. The Hypothesis of the Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability.Alan Hájek & N. Hall - 1994 - In Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.), Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press. pp. 75.
  34. The Day of the Dolphins: Puzzling Over Epistemic Partnership.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2005 - In John Woods, Kent A. Peacock & A. D. Irvine (eds.), Mistakes of Reason: Essays in Honour of John Woods. University of Toronto Press. pp. 111-133.
  35. The Paradox of the Bayesian Experts.Philippe Mongin - 2001 - In David Corfield & Jon Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 309-338.
    This paper (first published under the same title in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 29, 1998, p. 331-361) is a sequel to "Consistent Bayesian Aggregation", Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 1995, p. 313-351, by the same author. Both papers examine mathematically whether the the following assumptions are compatible: the individuals and the group both form their preferences according to Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory, and the preferences of the group satisfy the Pareto principle with respect to those of the individuals. While (...)
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  36. The Limits of Probabilism.Wolfgang Pietsch - 2013 - In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 55--65.
  37. Epistemic Probability and Coherent Degrees of Belief.Colin Howson - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. pp. 97--119.
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  38. Choice and the Conditional Probability of Alternation: Some New Data.J. Gregor Fetterman & Stanley S. Pliskoff - 1981 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 18 (2):95-98.
  39. Bibliopolis: A Platform for the Dutch History of the Book.Marieke van Delft & Marco de Niet - 2004 - Logos 15 (1):25-29.
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  40. Betting on Belief.Will Barrett - 2001 - Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 3 (1):40.
  41. A Forward Looking Decision Rule for Imprecise Credences.Rohan Sud - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):119-139.
    Adam Elga (Philosophers’ Imprint, 10(5), 1–11, 2010) presents a diachronic puzzle to supporters of imprecise credences and argues that no acceptable decision rule for imprecise credences can deliver the intuitively correct result. Elga concludes that agents should not hold imprecise credences. In this paper, I argue for a two-part thesis. First, I show that Elga’s argument is incomplete: there is an acceptable decision rule that delivers the intuitive result. Next, I repair the argument by offering a more elaborate diachronic puzzle (...)
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  42. Belief and Probability.J. P. Day & John M. Vickers - 1978 - Philosophical Quarterly 28 (111):171.
  43. A Betting Market: Description and a Theoretical Explanation of Bets in Pelota Matches. [REVIEW]Loreto Llorente & Josemari Aizpurua - 2008 - Theory and Decision 64 (2-3):421-446.
    In Pelota matches, bets are made between viewers through a middleman who receives 16% of the finally paid amount. In this paper, a description of the way bets are made and an explanation of the existence of those markets are presented. Taking betting markets as a simplified analogy for financial markets we have searched for the explanation in a world where both sides of the market are not different in believes and preferences. We find that for a bet to exist (...)
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  44. Rational Probabilistic Incoherence.Michael Caie - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):527-575.
    Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately as possible. The key claim in this argument is that the goal of representing the world as accurately as possible is best served by having credences that are probabilistically coherent. This essay shows that this claim is false. In certain (...)
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  45. Probabilism and Scotism at the Stuart Court.Anne A. Davenport - 2008 - Quaestio 8:303-321.
  46. Dynamic Inference and Everyday Conditional Reasoning in the New Paradigm.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):346-379.
  47. NP-Containment for the Coherence Test of Assessments of Conditional Probability: A Fuzzy Logical Approach. [REVIEW]Tommaso Flaminio - 2007 - Archive for Mathematical Logic 46 (3-4):301-319.
    In this paper we investigate the problem of testing the coherence of an assessment of conditional probability following a purely logical setting. In particular we will prove that the coherence of an assessment of conditional probability χ can be characterized by means of the logical consistency of a suitable theory T χ defined on the modal-fuzzy logic FP k (RŁΔ) built up over the many-valued logic RŁΔ. Such modal-fuzzy logic was previously introduced in Flaminio (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. (...)
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  48. Bibliopolis: A Platform for the Dutch History of the Book.Marieke van Delft & Marco de Niet - 2004 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 15 (1):25-29.
  49. Conditional Response Distributions in a Multiple-Choice Probability-Learning Situtation.James R. Erickson & Karen K. Block - 1970 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 86 (2):328.
  50. Run Structure and Probability Learning: Disproof of Restle's Model.Frank Restle - 1966 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 72 (3):382.
1 — 50 / 796